SITE_HOST takes a comma-separated list now, the first name canonical. It serves
the site; every other name in the list redirects there permanently, path and
query intact. An apex domain and its www are two names for one thing, and
answering on both without picking one splits search rankings and cookies
between them.
The redirect is a host-bound catch-all rather than middleware. Middleware that
only some routes carry is the same half-measure this file already made once,
and a catch-all registered without a host would swallow every path in the
application — which is what the third test is there to stop.
The test harness needed fixing too, and the fix is the finding. Router::dispatch
on a standalone router does not rebind the container's request, so a route
reading one — through the helper OR through an injected parameter, both of which
resolve from the container — gets the test's request rather than the one being
answered. The redirect silently lost its query string in the test while working
in production. dispatchOn() binds it where the framework would.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The previous release bound the landing page and stopped there. The website duly
vanished from the portal — and the portal stayed reachable from the website:
www.clupilot.com/dashboard, /login, /settings all kept working. Half a
separation is no separation, and it was reported back within the hour.
APP_HOST binds every portal route, Fortify's own POST actions included through
fortify.domain — a sign-in form on the website's hostname would otherwise post
to a route that answers there. SITE_HOST now takes the legal pages and
robots.txt with the landing page rather than leaving them everywhere; binding
them is also what makes route('legal.impressum') produce a www URL from inside
a queued mail, where there is no request to take a hostname from.
There is no clever middleware here and there should not be. Route::domain() is
the mechanism: a route registered for one host does not exist on another, and a
request for it gets the 404 it deserves. The only deliberate exception is "/" on
the portal host, which redirects to the dashboard or the sign-in page — that is
what people type from memory, and turning it into an error page to make a point
about hostnames helps nobody. The Stripe webhook and /up stay host-agnostic:
Stripe posts to whichever URL it was given, and a mismatch there loses payments.
Both are opt-in and empty by default, which every development machine reached
by a bare IP depends on.
The tests now check BOTH directions for every path rather than only the one
that was reported. That is the mistake this commit exists to correct.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The landing page was registered host-agnostically, so app.clupilot.com served
it: marketing copy, a pricing table and a "sign up" call to action, at the
address where a customer's servers live. Reported exactly that way.
SITE_HOST binds the website to its own hostname. Every other host — the portal,
a bare IP — answers "/" with the product: the dashboard for somebody signed in,
the sign-in page for everybody else. Never a 404 there: "/" is what people type
from memory, and turning that into an error page to make a point about
hostnames helps nobody. Empty keeps today's behaviour, which every development
machine reached by IP depends on.
The console is unaffected — its routes are registered first and win on their
own host, the ordering the status page above already documents.
The legal pages are deliberately not bound. An imprint has to be reachable from
wherever the reader is standing, and a mail footer links to it from whichever
host sent the mail.
Also drops "just reply to this message" from two mails. A reply lands in the
billing or provisioning mailbox rather than in the support queue somebody
actually works through — so it now says to raise it in the portal, where it
gets a place in that queue instead of getting lost.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
An earlier edit removed the ADMIN_HOSTS example line and left its
"Beispiel:" dangling into the VPN_CONFIG_KEY block, so the file
documented neither properly. SECRETS_KEY was never in here at all —
without it the console silently stores no credentials, which is exactly
the kind of thing an example file exists to prevent.
Without ADMIN_HOST_EXCLUSIVE the default is false, and https://admin.…/
then serves the PORTAL. That reads as a fault and is not one, so the
example file now says which setting decides it and why the host list must
hold nothing but the console's own name once it is on.
Symfony's mailer only knows the schemes smtp and smtps; the example's
MAIL_SCHEME=tls (and the "tls | smtps (465)" comment naming it as an
option) made the default mailer unconstructible. .env itself is left
alone — that is the operator's live file.
The console announced an update for "spätestens um 15:21" while the clock on
the wall said 17:21. Not a formatting slip in one string: fourteen views and
four components printed database values straight out, so every absolute time in
the product was two hours out all summer and one hour out all winter.
Two of those views looked as though they had handled it. They called
->timezone(config('app.timezone'))
which reads like "convert to local time" and, app.timezone being the STORAGE
zone that must stay UTC, converts to UTC — a no-op wearing the costume of a
fix, which is worse than no call at all because it stops the next person
looking. That exact string is now banned by test.
Worse than the labels were two FORMS. Maintenance windows and plan versions
filled their datetime-local fields from UTC and parsed what came back as UTC. A
datetime-local field carries no offset — it is the digits a person reads off
their own clock — so an operator typing 21:00 scheduled a window for 23:00
their time, and nothing anywhere said so. App\Support\LocalTime now holds
toField() and fromField() side by side, because getting one end right is not
half a fix, it is a fresh bug.
The mechanism is one Carbon macro, ->local(). It copies before converting:
Illuminate\Support\Carbon is mutable, so without that, rendering a timestamp
would rewrite the model attribute as a side effect and anything comparing or
saving it afterwards would be an hour or two out. Both Carbon classes get the
same body — Carbon keeps macros in one global table, so the second registration
replaces the first for every Carbon class, and two different bodies meant the
immutable version, safe for itself, silently became the mutable one's
implementation too. My own test caught that.
The existing tests had not caught any of this because they built their expected
values with the same wrong call the views used — a test that recomputes the
implementation asserts nothing. They now assert the wall clock, and the queued
update additionally asserts that the UTC time is NOT shown.
Recorded as R19 in CLAUDE.md and enforced by tests/Feature/DisplayTimezoneTest:
no Blade or Livewire component may format an absolute time without ->local(),
the UTC no-op is banned, storage stays UTC, both sides of the DST boundary are
checked, ->local() must not mutate, and a form field must round-trip to the
same instant.
APP_DISPLAY_TIMEZONE, default Europe/Vienna. 615 tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
An empty 404 is itself information: it says something terminates TLS here and
chose not to answer. The console and the websocket endpoint now close the
connection instead, which is what a hostname that serves nothing looks like.
The websocket endpoint answers a genuine upgrade — verified live, 101 — and
nothing else; a browser opening it gets a closed connection.
Reviewing that turned up two holes that mattered more than the thing being
reviewed.
The compose defaults published the application and Reverb on every interface.
Docker publishes ports ahead of UFW, so those backends were reachable from the
internet with the firewall closed — and reaching a backend directly skips the
proxy, and with it every hostname and address rule keeping the console private.
The defaults are loopback now, and an update rebinds an existing installation
that is behind a proxy actually running and holding 443. A development box
without one is left alone, because taking its port away would look like the
machine had broken.
And the console's own "open" switch was emitting 0.0.0.0/0 into the proxy's
allowlist. One click would have put the console on the public internet, which
is the exact state the owner's rule exists to prevent. Switching it off relaxes
the application's check; the proxy keeps its list, always.
The reference proxy config carries the arrangement: QUIC early data off, since
an address-based decision taken on 0-RTT can answer 425 and some browsers do
not retry — an intermittent lockout from the console is the worst kind — and
explicit handling for plain HTTP, whose automatic redirect otherwise announces
both hidden names to anyone who asks.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two contradicting plan upgrades sat in the cart at 799 and 399 € — no checkout
could resolve which one the customer meant. Choosing another now replaces the
pending one and says so; add-ons still stack, because buying 200 GB as two packs
is a sensible thing to want.
Every price now states net or gross and how often. The cart shows net per line
with "pro Monat" or "einmalig", then subtotal, VAT and gross — and separates
the monthly recurring amount from a one-off traffic top-up sharing the same
cart, because those are two different commitments. The rate is configurable
(CLUPILOT_TAX_PERCENT, 20 % default) since it follows the seller's country.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
While the product is still being built, the marketing site and the customer
portal should not be reachable — but they must stay reachable for us.
- A toggle in the console (site.manage, Owner/Admin) stored in a new
app_settings table, because this has to be flippable without a deploy.
- Outsiders get a placeholder with 503 + noindex, not 200: a 200 invites search
engines to index the placeholder as the site's content, which is far harder
to undo than to prevent.
- Anyone on the management VPN, and any signed-in operator, sees the real site.
The console, Livewire's endpoint, the Stripe webhook and the health check are
always reachable — otherwise the switch could only be flipped once.
- robots.txt is generated by the app and follows the switch. It had to stop
being a static file: nginx short-circuited it and Laravel's stock file said
'Disallow:' with an empty value, so crawlers were never told anything.
- Settings reads fall back to the default when the table is unavailable. The
gate reads one on every request, so a deploy running new code before migrate
would otherwise answer the entire site with a 500.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Codex spotted the migration labelling sync-adopted peers as staff with no
owner, which breaks the invariant the same migration introduces. The live sync
had the identical hole — it never set kind at all, so every adopted peer landed
on the 'staff' default. Both now use system for a peer nobody is behind, and
promote it to host once the link is known.
.env.example carried ADMIN_HOSTS twice; phpdotenv keeps the first, so a fresh
checkout would have got the list without localhost and 404'd its own console.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Reworked after a design consultation with Codex, which pushed back on my first
proposal in three useful ways.
Ownership and rights:
- vpn.manage split into vpn.view.all and vpn.manage.all. Seeing an access is
not managing it, and neither is holding its private key.
- Record-level rules live in VpnPeerPolicy, not in permissions: an access
belongs to a person, and ownership is what grants sight of it. Every operator
reaches the page, but sees only their own unless they may see all.
- Issuing an access is not self-service — it reaches the management network, so
it needs vpn.manage.all even for oneself.
- New Developer role: sees everything, manages nothing. Writing code does not
imply authority over other people's access.
- kind (staff|host|system) replaces a null user_id that had to mean two
different things at once.
Config storage, opt-in per access:
- Downloading is owner-only — explicitly NOT for view.all or manage.all. An
admin who needs access revokes this one and issues their own, which keeps the
record of who holds what honest.
- The password is asked on EVERY retrieval, rate-limited. Laravel's
password.confirm keeps a 15-minute session stamp, which would authorise
unlimited later downloads from an unattended browser.
- Stored under VPN_CONFIG_KEY, not APP_KEY: a leaked application key must not
also hand over the management network. Purged on revocation and when a staff
member is revoked — console taken away, tunnel left open was the worst case.
- The plaintext never enters a Livewire snapshot (the page polls every five
seconds); the component carries an opaque handle instead.
Also: copy button works without HTTPS again (navigator.clipboard only exists in
a secure context, so over http it silently did nothing), plus config download
as a file and a QR code for the mobile apps.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The cancel buttons were dead: wire-elements registers Livewire.on('closeModal'),
but the buttons used Alpine's $dispatch, which fires a DOM event. Livewire
bridges its own events TO the DOM, not back, so nothing ever received them.
Proven in the browser both ways — before: modal stays open after Abbrechen;
after: it closes.
Domain operation behind Zoraxy:
- trustProxies for FOR/PORT/PROTO so Laravel sees https (otherwise it builds
http:// URLs into an https page). X_FORWARDED_HOST is deliberately NOT
trusted — the console is gated on the request host, and trusting it would let
anyone reach /admin through a public domain by forging the header.
- APP_URL + VITE_REVERB_* point at the dev domains (wss via ws.dev).
- Vite dev server is now opt-in (VITE_AUTOSTART): over https the browser cannot
load assets from http://<ip>:5173. Built assets are the default, and the
entrypoint clears a stale public/hot, which otherwise 404s every asset.
Verified in the browser over https: login, styled pages, zero console errors,
zero unencrypted requests, /admin reachable only on admin.dev.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Only the marketing site and the customer portal are public; /admin and the
Proxmox hosts stay on the private network. nginx was a single server_name _
catch-all, so /admin was served on all four dev domains.
Two layers:
- nginx denies /admin on the known-public hostnames before PHP is reached
(denylist, so an allowlist typo cannot lock the operators out).
- ADMIN_HOSTS is now populated, making the app layer a strict allowlist that
also covers /livewire/update, which nginx cannot attribute to /admin.
Verified live against the running stack: /admin is 404 on www/app/api/ws and on
any unlisted host, 302->login on admin.dev / the private IP / localhost, while
/ and /dashboard stay reachable everywhere.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Proxmox fleet and the operator console must never be publicly reachable. The
primary control is the reverse proxy, but nginx here is a catch-all
(server_name _), so /admin was served on EVERY hostname — a proxy
misconfiguration would expose it. ADMIN_HOSTS pins it; any other host gets 404
(not 403: a public domain must not disclose that a console exists).
Prepended to the group instead of the admin route group on purpose: route
middleware is reordered by Laravel's priority list, which runs first — a
guest would then be redirected to /login and learn the console is there. Covered
by a test for exactly that case. Empty ADMIN_HOSTS = unrestricted, so nobody is
locked out by upgrading.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Kuma has no write REST API (monitor CRUD is Socket.IO only), so docker/kuma-bridge
translates the exact generic REST contract HttpMonitoringClient already speaks —
no PHP client change needed. Opt-in compose profile 'monitoring'.
Verified end-to-end against a real Uptime Kuma 1.x:
create -> id, create again -> same id (idempotent), list, status, delete
and PHP MonitoringClient -> bridge -> Kuma round-trip.
The e2e run caught a real bug: add_monitor takes 'maxretries', not 'retries'.
Monitoring is now observability, not a delivery gate:
- RegisterMonitoring retries MONITORING_ATTEMPTS times on an outage, then
continues degraded with a visible 'info' event
- RunAcceptanceChecks no longer fails when monitoring isn't green (a fresh Kuma
monitor legitimately reports 'pending' — confirmed in the e2e run); it records
the gap instead. MONITORING_REQUIRED=true restores strict gating.
- docs/monitoring-uptime-kuma.md documents setup, failure behaviour, alternatives
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- .env.example gains a full, commented CluPilot operations block (Stripe, Hetzner
DNS, Traefik, WireGuard hub, SSH identity, monitoring, prod mail) with a note
that everything is optional for local dev
- config/provisioning.php: CLUPILOT_SSH_{PUBLIC,PRIVATE}_KEY_PATH read the key
from a file (a multi-line PEM cannot live in .env), falling back to inline vars
- documents that Uptime Kuma's REST API is read-only (monitor CRUD is Socket.IO),
so it needs a bridge rather than being drop-in for the generic REST client
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
nexxo
Claude