Customer::ensureUser() enforced uniqueness only within users, so a
customer provisioned (or registering publicly) with an operator's email
got a second, colliding identity for the same address — the exact thing
R21 exists to prevent. Checks Operator by address now, not by session
(the deleted assertNotAdmin() checked who was signed in, which could
never be the right question).
Public registration gets the same guard via a plain unique() validation
rule, reusing Laravel's stock "already taken" message rather than a
dedicated one — naming the collision specifically would tell a public
visitor an address belongs to staff, a worse leak than the generic
refusal every other collision here already gives them.
Impersonation answers 409 instead of crashing into it. The Stripe
webhook keeps recording the paid order (same principle as
openContract()'s own comment: the order is proof money changed hands)
and withholds only the colliding login, logged for an operator to
resolve by hand.
Verified the reverse direction Codex flagged as already covered: two
Admin\Settings actions and the clupilot:create-operator command all
already refuse an operator email that collides with a customer's, and
that check is sound today because every users row is created in
lockstep with a customers row of the same email (CreateNewUser and
ensureUser are the only two creation sites, both confirmed by grep) and
nothing in this app can change a user's email afterwards (Fortify's
updateProfileInformation feature is disabled, and no other code calls
that action).
redirect()->to(AdminArea::home()) resolved against whatever host the
leave() POST itself arrived on — the portal's, once the console has a
hostname of its own — landing the operator on the portal's dashboard
instead of back at the console. route('admin.overview') is domain-bound
to the console and generates the correct cross-host URL, matching what
this line did before this branch. The test named after this behaviour
now actually asserts it.
Three things the owner asked for, and one the review found underneath them.
The console leaves /admin. It has its own route file now, registered before
routes/web.php because once it has a hostname to itself it sits at the ROOT of
that host — where `/` and `/settings` also exist for the portal, and the first
matching route wins. Where it mounts is one decision in one place: `/` on the
console hostname where it has one to itself, `/admin` on any host otherwise.
Names stay admin.* in both modes, so nothing that builds a URL has to know.
Exclusivity is its own switch, not a consequence of having a hostname. The
first attempt made "this host is the console" follow from ADMIN_HOSTS, and a
development machine lists its own IP there so the console works without DNS —
which took the public site and the portal off that machine entirely. The
switch also registers the console on every listed hostname, canonical last, so
the alternates that exist as recovery paths keep working.
The status page moves out of /legal, where it sat beside the imprint and the
terms. Nothing about the current health of the platform is a legal document. It
is a real page now: portal, instances, provisioning and backups, each derived
from records, aggregate only, and a component with no signal reports "unknown"
rather than "operational".
That last rule is what exposed the real bug. monitoring_targets.status was
written once — 'up', at provisioning — and nothing ever updated it. Both the
console's notices and the new public page read it, so an outage would have been
published as healthy indefinitely. There is a sync job now, on a five-minute
schedule, and a checked_at column so a verdict can go stale instead of standing
forever.
The monitoring contract had to grow a third state for that to be honest.
isHealthy() answers true when no monitoring is configured and false when the
monitor is unreachable; recording that boolean would have published either a
fleet-wide all-clear nobody measured or a fleet-wide outage that was really one
broken monitor. health() returns null for both, the recorder leaves the old
verdict to go stale, and isHealthy() keeps its forgiving semantics for the one
caller that wants them — the provisioning acceptance check, which must not fail
a delivery because monitoring is not set up.
Backups are counted from the instances that need protecting rather than from
the backup rows that exist, so an instance with no schedule at all cannot be
missing from the arithmetic that declares the estate protected.
Also: the update panel polls itself, offers the button only when there is
something to install, and opens the log while a run is in progress.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three console pages were fiction. The front page claimed 42 customers, 39
instances, four hosts named pve-fsn-1..3 and €7,842 a month, over a twelve-month
growth curve; the instance list held seven invented machines; the revenue page
reported churn and a trend for a business with no recorded history. All of it
was hard-coded. It read like a running company and measured nothing.
They now read the database. Two figures are gone rather than approximated —
the revenue trend, which needs a monthly history nobody records, and churn,
which needs a base the data cannot supply. ARR stays, labelled as the
projection it is. The green "all systems normal" badge is computed from the
notice list instead of asserted, and the notices themselves come from failed
runs, hosts reporting errors or gone quiet, and monitoring that is down.
Host load is the one number that had to agree with something else: placement
counts the VM disk allocation, ignores a failed instance that never got a VM,
and subtracts the host's reserve. A dashboard doing its own arithmetic would
show a host as comfortable while orders were already being refused on it, so it
uses the host's own accounting — with the filter moved into a scope both share,
and the sum preloaded so listing hosts stays one query.
The instance list drops the Nextcloud version column: that version is not
recorded anywhere, and a column filled with a plausible number is worse than no
column. Statuses the lifecycle writes but nobody had translated no longer
render as "admin.status.failed".
The price sheet also gains the included traffic, which the catalogue has always
carried and the page simply never printed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The marketing page was a generic centred hero in the system font stack: it
neither used the design system the console is built on nor looked like the
product it sells. Rebuilt around what CluPilot actually promises — security you
can produce evidence for — so the page reads as a controlled technical
document: a specification plate instead of a hero image, numbered sections, an
audit register with rhythm and proof per measure, and a price sheet rather than
floating cards. IBM Plex Serif joins Sans and Mono as the display voice, self
hosted as static files so the public page renders even without the Vite build.
The prices were written into the page by hand, and the page and the catalogue
had already drifted apart on three of four plans: the site advertised 249 € for
a plan the checkout charges 399 € for. The sheet now reads the catalogue, like
every other caller — including the currency, which is configurable and was also
hard-coded here.
The catalogue fails loudly on purpose; a public website must not. A broken or
overlapping catalogue is caught in the controller alone: the page still
renders, the sheet is replaced by "on request", and nobody is quoted a number
the checkout would not honour.
The sign-in and registration panels shared a copy-pasted orange gradient. They
now share one component and the same ink plate as the site, so the two halves
of the product no longer look like two companies.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A Product per plan family and a Price per priced row of a published version,
plus the four subscribed webhook events that were arriving and being ignored.
`stripe:sync-catalogue` mirrors the catalogue. Idempotent twice over: a stored
id is skipped, and each call carries an idempotency key derived from our own
row, so a crash between Stripe creating a Price and us recording its id gives
back the same object rather than a second one. That matters more here than
usual — a Stripe Price cannot be edited or deleted, so a duplicate is
permanent. Drafts are not synced at all: a version that has promised nothing
has no business in a price list. --dry-run shows what would be created.
The webhook now handles invoice.paid, invoice.payment_failed,
customer.subscription.updated and customer.subscription.deleted. It never
re-derives an amount: the invoice is the authority for what was charged, and
recomputing it from our catalogue would produce a second, disagreeing answer.
A failed payment is recorded and nothing else — Stripe runs the dunning
schedule, and cutting a customer off on the first failure would punish an
expired card as though it were a refusal to pay.
Only a cycle renewal moves the term on. Stripe also sends paid invoices for
prorations and manual charges, and the checkout's own invoice — which is
already in the register as the purchase, and would otherwise double every
customer's first payment.
Stripe does not guarantee delivery order, which is the source of most of the
care here:
- state changes are judged and written in one transaction with the row held,
so two deliveries cannot both pass a check made on a stale copy;
- an older event never overwrites a newer one, with a rank breaking ties
between events sharing a second — their timestamps have one-second
resolution, and a failed attempt and its successful retry routinely do;
- a term is never shortened, and an ended contract is never revived;
- an event for a contract that does not exist yet is HELD and replayed the
moment it appears, rather than acknowledged and forgotten. A cancellation
dropped that way would leave us serving someone who had already left. Held
rows that never match are pruned after a week.
Register entries are keyed by what they are about — the invoice, the attempt,
the subscription — with a unique index doing the work, because a check two
concurrent deliveries can both pass is not idempotency.
PlanChange is now documented as the preview shown before someone confirms, not
the invoice: Stripe's proration accounts for tax, existing credit and the exact
second the change lands, and ours cannot.
Not run against the live account — `stripe:sync-catalogue` creates objects that
cannot be deleted, so that is the owner's call. The dry run lists 12.
457 tests green. Codex review clean after seven rounds.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Plans lived in config/provisioning.php, where the owner cannot reach them and
where a plan has no history. They now live in plan_families / plan_versions /
plan_prices — a name that never moves, what the plan WAS at a point in time,
and a price per version and term with its own Stripe Price id.
- Availability is computed on every read (available_from <= now < until,
half-open, UTC) plus a per-family sales kill switch. Nothing schedules a plan
into or out of sale: a job that fails to run is a plan that silently
misbehaves.
- Overlaps crash rather than resolve. currentVersion() uses sole(), and
scheduling takes a lock on the family and rejects an overlapping window —
two versions on sale at once would decide a customer's price by row order.
- A version is frozen from publication, not from first sale, and so is its
price: a checkout is not instant, and an amount edited between the session
opening and the webhook landing would contract someone at a price they were
never quoted. Repricing publishes a new version, as Stripe requires anyway.
- Neither a published version, its price, nor a family with customers can be
deleted, and a family key cannot be renamed. All of those would null the
provenance off existing contracts.
- Subscriptions and orders record plan_version_id. A historical reference
resolved by plan NAME hands back today's terms, which is the split-brain one
level up. A checkout that carried its version is honoured even after the
window closes — they paid for what they were shown.
Switched atomically and failing closed: config('provisioning.plans') and
plan_features are gone, and nothing falls back to them. A fallback would
resurrect a plan the owner had just switched off. The seed lives in the
migration, and PlanCatalogueTest pins what the config catalogue sold as the
shadow comparison. `php artisan plans:check` reports overlaps, gaps and
missing prices before a customer finds them.
Contract-backed displays, which were reading the live catalogue:
seat limits, the cloud card, the plan card, and admin MRR — the last three now
divide a yearly contract down via Subscription::monthlyPriceCents(), since all
three label the figure per month.
Two recovery gaps closed along the way: the order now commits before the
contract is opened (so a contract failure can never erase the record of a
payment), a Stripe retry repairs a missing contract and restarts a run stranded
with no_subscription, and TickProvisioning sweeps runs left pending by a crash
rather than only running/waiting ones.
402 tests green. Codex review clean after thirteen rounds. Verified in the
browser: portal, billing and console render unchanged off the new catalogue.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- 5 operator roles (Owner/Admin/Support/Billing/Read-only) seeded via migration
with a capability catalogue; app checks capabilities via Gate, never role names
- every mutating admin action authorizes server-side (hosts/datacenters/customers/
impersonate/provisioning); is_admin reads migrated to console.view / isOperator()
- admin /settings: own account + Owner-only staff invite/role/revoke with
last-owner, self-role and customer-collision guards (transactional)
- sidebar 'zum Kundenportal' link replaced with Settings
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Accept checkout.session.async_payment_succeeded (async methods) and dedupe on
the checkout session id, not the event id.
- committedGb still counts a failed instance while its VM exists (has vmid);
releases quota only when no VM was created — no overcommit vs no leak.
- CloudReady is queued (durable). Credential delivery is documented at-least-once
(a rare duplicate welcome email beats a lost credential; exactly-once = v1.1 outbox).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Require a real customer email (no unknown@ fallback merging customers).
- Stripe signature: enforce 5-min replay tolerance + accept any rotating v1.
- DeployApplicationStack no longer persists the DB password in the run context.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Stripe webhook fails closed when the signing secret is missing (outside local/testing).
- ReserveResources places + creates the instance under a per-datacenter lock so
concurrent orders can't overcommit a host.
- CloneVirtualMachine reserves the vmid + breadcrumb BEFORE cloning, so a crash
can't mint a new vmid and orphan the first clone.
- CreateCustomerAdmin checks user existence and resets the password instead of
re-running user:add on retry.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Stripe: only checkout.session.completed with payment_status=paid (dedupes the
paired payment_intent event and blocks unpaid async sessions).
- Capture the guest IP (ConfigureNetwork) and point Traefik at the VM, not the
Proxmox host, so ACME/HTTP-01 can reach Nextcloud.
- Resize the disk to an absolute target (not '+…') so a retry can't double it.
(Codex #4 timeout was a false positive — started_at resets per step.)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed webhook (HMAC verify when secret set), CSRF-exempt route. Paid checkout
creates customer+order+run (stripe_event_id unique => duplicate webhooks start
one run) and dispatches. 5 tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
nexxo
Claude