The SSH private key CluPilot deploys to every host is now stored through
SecretVault (ssh.private_key), preferred over CLUPILOT_SSH_PRIVATE_KEY(_PATH)
at all three real consumers — SshTraefikWriter and HostStep::keyLogin.
kuma.password/kuma.totp stay in .env: they authenticate a separate Python
container at boot, and nothing in this app reads them, so the vault would
have nothing to wire them to.
A new /admin/infrastructure page, backed by App\Support\ProvisioningSettings,
makes the non-secret deployment settings that used to force a shell —
DNS zone, WireGuard hub endpoint and public key, Traefik's dynamic-config
path, the SSH public key, and the monitoring bridge URL — visible and
editable from the console, each wired to every real consumer. WG subnet/hub
IP and Kuma's own connection details stay in .env: the compose file and a
separate container read those before this application ever does.
The password no longer travels through third-party mail servers or sits
forever in an inbox: it moves onto the instance (encrypted, same as
nc_admin_ref) and shows on the dashboard until the customer clicks
"Notiert", which deletes it for good.
Availability is now counted from our own monitoring answers. Uptime Kuma knows
the figure, but the REST bridge in front of it only answers "healthy, yes or
no", and waiting for the bridge to grow an endpoint would have left the panel
without the number indefinitely. The sync already asks on a schedule; counting
the answers gives a percentage that is ours and explainable.
An unanswered check is not a failed one — the counter only moves when a real
answer arrived, so our monitoring going down does not become the customer's
outage on the one figure they are asked to trust. An instance nobody has ever
checked shows no availability rather than 100 %.
The downgrade path existed nowhere. Going down is not the mirror of going up:
it can ask an instance to hold more than the target plan allows. Smaller plans
are now listed even when they cannot be taken, with the obstacle in the
customer's own numbers — "you have 31 users, this package allows 10" — because
a greyed-out button that does not name what is in the way is the thing people
ring about. Storage is checked against the last real reading rather than the
contractual allowance, or anyone who once bought a large plan could never leave
it. The limit is re-checked in the action: a rule enforced only in markup is
not enforced.
And the smaller corrections from this round:
- The cloud tab carried a hardcoded "B" as the instance's initial, and the PHP
and MariaDB versions, which tell a tenant nothing they can act on.
- "EU — Serverstandort im Angebot festgehalten" under a label already reading
"Serverstandort" was two sentences saying nothing. It is the country.
- Support promised a reply "binnen 4 Std." with nothing behind it. What is true
everywhere else is an answer on the same working day.
- The actions column appeared even when no row in the table had an action.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The panel could not show the storage ring or the transfer trend because nothing
measured them. instance_traffic keeps one row per billing period — right for an
allowance, useless as a series — and storage consumption was never sampled at
all, so the card could only ever state what was sold rather than what is used.
instance_metrics holds one row per instance per day, written by the traffic
collector on the visit it already makes. A second scheduler entry against the
same Proxmox API would have doubled the load and the failure modes for no gain.
Disk usage comes from `df` inside the guest rather than from Proxmox's own disk
figure, which reports the allocated image: that would show every customer a full
500 GB from their first day.
The rule the whole thing is built on: a reading that could not be taken is not a
reading of zero. The disk columns are nullable and left untouched when the guest
agent does not answer, so yesterday's figure stands instead of the ring dropping
to empty — which would tell a customer their data had vanished. Missing days
stay missing in the series rather than being filled with zeroes, which would
draw an outage that never happened. Both are covered by tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three things the owner asked for, and one the review found underneath them.
The console leaves /admin. It has its own route file now, registered before
routes/web.php because once it has a hostname to itself it sits at the ROOT of
that host — where `/` and `/settings` also exist for the portal, and the first
matching route wins. Where it mounts is one decision in one place: `/` on the
console hostname where it has one to itself, `/admin` on any host otherwise.
Names stay admin.* in both modes, so nothing that builds a URL has to know.
Exclusivity is its own switch, not a consequence of having a hostname. The
first attempt made "this host is the console" follow from ADMIN_HOSTS, and a
development machine lists its own IP there so the console works without DNS —
which took the public site and the portal off that machine entirely. The
switch also registers the console on every listed hostname, canonical last, so
the alternates that exist as recovery paths keep working.
The status page moves out of /legal, where it sat beside the imprint and the
terms. Nothing about the current health of the platform is a legal document. It
is a real page now: portal, instances, provisioning and backups, each derived
from records, aggregate only, and a component with no signal reports "unknown"
rather than "operational".
That last rule is what exposed the real bug. monitoring_targets.status was
written once — 'up', at provisioning — and nothing ever updated it. Both the
console's notices and the new public page read it, so an outage would have been
published as healthy indefinitely. There is a sync job now, on a five-minute
schedule, and a checked_at column so a verdict can go stale instead of standing
forever.
The monitoring contract had to grow a third state for that to be honest.
isHealthy() answers true when no monitoring is configured and false when the
monitor is unreachable; recording that boolean would have published either a
fleet-wide all-clear nobody measured or a fleet-wide outage that was really one
broken monitor. health() returns null for both, the recorder leaves the old
verdict to go stale, and isHealthy() keeps its forgiving semantics for the one
caller that wants them — the provisioning acceptance check, which must not fail
a delivery because monitoring is not set up.
Backups are counted from the instances that need protecting rather than from
the backup rows that exist, so an instance with no schedule at all cannot be
missing from the arithmetic that declares the estate protected.
Also: the update panel polls itself, offers the button only when there is
something to install, and opens the log while a run is in progress.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The pipeline re-resolved config('provisioning.plans') by order.plan, so the
subscription snapshot protected a customer's price but not their machine:
shrinking a plan resized an existing customer's VM on its next run. Nothing
created a subscription either, so closing this meant opening the contract at
purchase and pointing provisioning at it.
- OpenSubscription freezes the catalogue onto a subscription when a checkout
is paid; StartCustomerProvisioning calls it inside the order transaction.
- CustomerStep::plan() reads the frozen snapshot. ValidateOrder and
ReserveResources fail closed with no_subscription rather than falling back
to the catalogue, which is the bug itself.
- template_vmid joins the snapshot so a re-clone cannot pick up a blueprint
published after the sale. Deliberately outside FROZEN: it is how we build
the machine, not a term the customer is owed, and a dead template must be
replaceable without cancelling a contract.
- TrafficMeter reads the allowance off the contract too — cutting a plan's
traffic was otherwise enough to start throttling someone who bought more.
- The migration backfills contracts for orders that already bought something,
reconstructed from what was actually delivered where an instance exists,
and adopts an existing order-less contract instead of opening a second.
Orders paid in a currency the catalogue cannot price get none, matching the
checkout path.
price_cents stays the catalogue's NET price, which is what PlanChange
prorates against — not Order::amount_cents, which holds Stripe's GROSS total.
Reconciling the two belongs to the proof register and Stripe (phases 4/5).
Also pins STRIPE_WEBHOOK_SECRET blank in phpunit.xml: the operator's real
secret was reaching the suite from .env and rejecting every unsigned test
payload, which is why 7 webhook tests failed before any of this.
Verified in the browser: with team traffic cut from 3000 to 500 GB in the
catalogue, the customer's portal still shows 3 TB.
373 tests green. Codex review clean after three rounds.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two from Codex:
- The job accepted any stored instance with a host. A closed one's VMID can have
been reused on the same machine, and the reset would then land on another
customer's VM. It now requires a live instance, and the action is not offered
for anything else.
- An unreachable Proxmox or guest agent throws rather than returning an exit
code, so nothing was ever written to the handoff and the modal polled forever.
The throw is caught, and a failed() handler covers anything that still escapes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Impersonation borrows the customer's portal session; this is access to their
installation, which is a different thing and now a different button.
Nextcloud has no passwordless admin jump, so this does the only honest thing it
offers: it resets OUR managed admin account inside that installation and hands
the credentials over once. The customer's own accounts are untouched, and the
next request sets a new password again.
- New capability instances.adminlogin, Owner and Admin only — stronger than
impersonation, because it hands over control rather than a session.
- The operator's own password is required every time, rate-limited: taking over
a customer's installation is not something an unattended browser should manage
on its own.
- The reset runs on the provisioning worker (it owns the tunnel and the Proxmox
credentials); the console polls a handoff token, so the credentials never
enter a Livewire snapshot.
- A silent instance is reported as such instead of appearing to succeed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Once a key is free, someone can legitimately create a new access with it. The
forced revocation looked the key up and would have deleted that person's access
and pulled their key off the hub. It now acts only on an adoption artifact — a
system peer with no owner and no creator — and leaves anything else alone.
Re-issuing also threw when VPN_CONFIG_KEY was missing, which is exactly the
situation the console tells people to fix by re-issuing. It now hands the new
config over once instead of storing it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Codex found that a sync landing between the key swap and its removal would see
the old key as unknown. Writing the test showed something worse than the
duplicate he predicted: the adoption cannot even happen — the address still
belongs to the live access — so the insert violated the unique index and took
the ENTIRE reconciliation down with it. One stale key would have stopped every
peer's state from updating.
The sync now recognises that case and queues the removal instead of adopting,
and a key with no row of its own is revoked with force: it can only ever be
removed, never kept, so the removal cannot be talked out of it by a row that
should not exist.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A registration finishing while the purge waited on the run locks wrote
dns_record_id after the purge had already loaded the host, so it skipped the
deletion and then deleted the row holding the only id.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The failure may be a lost response to a request that did create the record.
Advancing straight away stored no id, so PurgeHost could never remove it and the
host's management address stayed published. The upsert is idempotent, so a retry
recovers the id; only after the attempts run out does the onboarding continue
without a name.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two legacy codes can normalise to the same label (eu_west and eu-west), and
separate counters then handed both of them eu-west-01 — a unique-constraint
failure inside the reservation, which blocks onboarding rather than being a DNS
problem the step can shrug off. Lock, counter and the in-use check all key off
the label now.
(The helper was also called label(), which HostStep already declares as the
step's display name — renamed.)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
alpha_dash accepted eu_west, -edge and edge-, none of which are valid DNS
labels — every host in such a datacenter would have failed registration and,
because DNS is non-fatal, silently ended up without a name. The console now
requires a proper label, and the step normalises anything created before that
rule so existing rows still get a usable name.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Swallowing it and carrying on deleted the row that held the only reference to
that record, publishing the machine's management address for good. The purge now
fails instead — and is retried, since it re-reads the host and its other steps
are idempotent — so a broken DNS provider becomes a visible failed job rather
than a silent leak.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Codex was right that my never-reuse claim did not hold:
- The lock was released with only a candidate in hand, so two concurrent
onboardings in one datacenter could pick the same name and overwrite each
other's record. The name is now persisted on the host while still locked.
- The number was derived from the hosts that happen to exist, so removing the
highest one handed that number straight back out — a cached name would then
resolve to a different machine. The counter is stored per datacenter, floored
by what is actually in use so a wiped settings store cannot reissue live names.
- PurgeHost deleted the row that carried the record id, leaving the machine's
management address published with nothing left to clean it up.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
fsn-01.node.clupilot.com, numbered per datacenter and never reused — removing a
host must not renumber its neighbours onto its name, so the number is stored
rather than derived.
The record points at the host's WireGuard address, not its public IP: the name
exists so an operator can reach a host by name over the VPN, and publishing a
Proxmox host's public address would hand every scanner a target, which is the
one thing this network design avoids.
DNS is convenience, not a prerequisite: a failure logs an event and lets the
onboarding finish rather than stranding a host that is otherwise ready.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Defaulting missing netin/netout to zero reset the baseline, so the next real
sample added the entire cumulative counter again — a customer throttled for
traffic that was counted twice. Such a sample is skipped and logged now.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- update.sh restarted the long-lived services before clearing the caches, so
they booted from the old cached config and kept it for the life of the
process — the release's configuration never reached the workers.
- install.sh put the Gitea token in the clone URL, which is visible in the
process list to every local user while the clone runs. It goes through a
short-lived askpass helper now.
- The collector's uniqueness lock expired at exactly the collection interval,
so a delayed queue could run two collectors on the same baseline and count
the same delta twice — throttling a customer for traffic they never used.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Tying the release to the creation of the new month's row meant a single failed
call was never retried: the row exists from then on, and the current period
looks unthrottled, so nothing could detect the stale NIC limit. A customer would
have stayed slow for a whole month they had paid for. Checked on every sample
now, with a test that makes the first release fail.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two from Codex:
- A throttled instance kept its NIC limit into the new month: the new period
row starts unthrottled, so neither branch of enforce() fired and nothing ever
took the limit off. A customer would have stayed slow through a month they
had already paid for.
- PublicSiteGate exempted livewire/* wholesale. That endpoint is shared by the
console and the portal, so a signed-in customer could keep driving portal
components — billing included — while the portal was supposed to be offline.
Operators pass the normal check anyway, which is all the console needed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Customers can now see what they have used and what is left, and the service
slows down rather than stopping when the allowance is gone — a slow Nextcloud
gets a top-up, a dead one gets a cancellation.
- instance_traffic keeps one row per instance per month. Proxmox counters are
cumulative since the VM last started, so usage is the difference between two
samples, and a counter that went backwards means a restart, not a refund.
- Outbound is what counts: inbound is free at our providers and egress is what
Hetzner's 20 TB per server applies to.
- CollectInstanceTraffic samples every 15 minutes, warns once per threshold
(80/95 %) rather than on every run, and at 100 % limits the VM's NIC via
Proxmox — released again as soon as the customer tops up or the month rolls
over.
- The dashboard gets a full-width band (it throttles the service, so it is not
a tile among tiles) with the top-up offer right next to the warning.
- Bytes are formatted in SI units now: allowances are computed in SI, so
dividing by 1024 made a 1000 GB plan read as "931 GB".
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Codex spotted the migration labelling sync-adopted peers as staff with no
owner, which breaks the invariant the same migration introduces. The live sync
had the identical hole — it never set kind at all, so every adopted peer landed
on the 'staff' default. Both now use system for a peer nobody is behind, and
promote it to host once the link is known.
.env.example carried ADMIN_HOSTS twice; phpdotenv keeps the first, so a fresh
checkout would have got the list without localhost and 404'd its own console.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The FK only nulled host_id, so the adopted peer stayed enabled-but-absent: shown
as "wird angewendet" forever, and re-enabling it would have put the deleted
host's key and address back on the hub. PurgeHost now tombstones that row, which
hands it to the same revocation machinery as everything else.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- A host's wg_pubkey may not be in vpn_peers yet, so the duplicate check passed
and an operator could create an access with it. ApplyVpnPeer would then run
wg set with a freshly allocated address, rewriting that host's allowed-ip and
cutting CluPilot's management tunnel to a live machine. Creation now rejects
keys already held by a host, checked under the allocation lock.
- A sync landing between addPeer() and the step storing wg_pubkey adopted the
peer as "unknown", and a later sync filled in host_id but left the name, so
the page showed that host as unknown forever. The name is now filled in when
the link becomes known — only for sync-adopted rows, so an access an operator
named keeps its name.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- ConfigureWireguard and RemoveWireguardPeer mutate the hub too, and were not
taking the lock, so a sync could still read the interface around them and
write stale state. Both now hold wireguard:hub, which is what makes the
read/mutation guarantee actually hold.
- The duplicate-key check ran before the allocation lock, so two concurrent
creations with the same key both passed it and the loser hit the unique index
as an unhandled 500. The check moved inside the lock, with the index kept as
a caught backstop for any writer that does not take it — reproduced in a test
by inserting a colliding row from within the allocation call.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A sync could read the hub snapshot just before ApplyVpnPeer removed a peer and
purged its tombstone, then adopt what it had seen as a fresh enabled access —
restoring a revoked one. Both jobs now hold Cache::lock('wireguard:hub') around
read-decide-mutate, so a reconciliation can never straddle a removal. Retry
removals are dispatched after the lock is released, because the sync queue
driver runs them inline and they take the same lock.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
If an add job was retried after the access had been revoked and its tombstone
purged, it found no row and trusted its own enabled=true payload — re-adding a
key that no longer had a row anyone could revoke it with. A missing row can only
mean the access is gone, so the captured payload may now remove but never
enable.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two lifecycle holes Codex found in the new VPN management:
1. Delete removed the row before the hub knew. If the removal job was delayed
or failed, SyncVpnPeers saw a peer it did not recognise and adopted it back
as a live access — silently restoring what an operator had just revoked, and
with no row left to revoke it again. Deletion is now a soft-delete
tombstone: the row survives until the hub confirms the peer is gone, the
sync retries the removal instead of adopting, and the tombstone is purged
only once the peer is really absent. It also keeps the key and the tunnel
address reserved meanwhile, so neither is handed out twice.
2. ApplyVpnPeer applied the state captured at dispatch. A retried block job
could therefore undo a later unblock, and nothing would repair it — the sync
only observes state, it never re-applies intent. The job now resolves the
current desired state from the row and treats its payload as a fallback for
the case where the row is already gone.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The console can now create, block and remove VPN accesses, and shows who is
actually connected — traffic counters, source endpoint and last handshake.
Design notes:
- The web container has no wg0, so the page never talks to WireGuard. Live
state is copied in by SyncVpnPeers on the provisioning queue (the only worker
whose container owns the interface); the page polls the database and merely
nudges that job, throttled so many open tabs cannot flood the queue.
- enabled (operator intent) and present (observed on the hub) are stored
separately, so a sync can never quietly undo a block and drift stays visible
as "wird angewendet".
- The sync adopts peers the host pipeline registered, naming them after their
host — otherwise "who is on the VPN" would have blind spots.
- Keypairs are generated in PHP via libsodium rather than shelling out to
wg genkey (no interface in this container, and it keeps generation testable).
The private key is shown once and never stored.
- allocateIp() now also considers vpn_peers, which would otherwise be handed a
tunnel address a host already holds.
- vpn.manage is a new capability held by Owner/Admin only, and it hides the nav
entry too — a VPN access reaches the management network.
Verified end to end against the real hub, not just mocks: created an access in
the browser, connected with the generated config, watched the console flip to
"Verbunden" with real counters, then blocked it and confirmed the peer was
gone from wg0 and the client could no longer handshake.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- MONITORING_ATTEMPTS is capped by the run's max_attempts, so a large value can
no longer burn the retry budget and fail the very provisioning the degradation
exists to protect (covered by a new test at the budget boundary)
- /health is now dependency-free (200 in ~2ms with Kuma absent, verified: the
container healthcheck stays healthy); Kuma state is exclusively in /ready
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- attempt is 0-based, so compare one-based: ATTEMPTS=2 really means two tries
- bridge accepts add_monitor returning {monitorID}|{id}|int (v1.2.1 returns a
dict — re-verified: first create on a fresh Kuma is HTTP 200 with the id)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Kuma has no write REST API (monitor CRUD is Socket.IO only), so docker/kuma-bridge
translates the exact generic REST contract HttpMonitoringClient already speaks —
no PHP client change needed. Opt-in compose profile 'monitoring'.
Verified end-to-end against a real Uptime Kuma 1.x:
create -> id, create again -> same id (idempotent), list, status, delete
and PHP MonitoringClient -> bridge -> Kuma round-trip.
The e2e run caught a real bug: add_monitor takes 'maxretries', not 'retries'.
Monitoring is now observability, not a delivery gate:
- RegisterMonitoring retries MONITORING_ATTEMPTS times on an outage, then
continues degraded with a visible 'info' event
- RunAcceptanceChecks no longer fails when monitoring isn't green (a fresh Kuma
monitor legitimately reports 'pending' — confirmed in the e2e run); it records
the gap instead. MONITORING_REQUIRED=true restores strict gating.
- docs/monitoring-uptime-kuma.md documents setup, failure behaviour, alternatives
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Clone recovery: once the lock clears but the task ref is lost, destroy the
possibly-incomplete VM and re-clone instead of advancing onto it.
- applyFirewall clears existing rules before adding, so retries don't accumulate
duplicate Proxmox firewall entries.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Nextcloud: parse occ status JSON (installed + not in maintenance).
- Admin: query occ user:info for the account.
- Monitoring: MonitoringClient::isHealthy checks the provider, not the local row.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
TraefikWriter now targets the host that serves the traffic (DNS points at it):
SshTraefikWriter SSHes in and writes the file-provider YAML there. Interface
takes the traffic host + guest backend.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- CompleteProvisioning scrubs admin_password whenever credentials_sent exists,
so a crash between recording and scrubbing can't leave the password in context.
- HttpMonitoringClient looks up an existing monitor by URL before creating one,
so a retry after a crashed POST doesn't create a duplicate external monitor.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Clone recovery polls until the VM lock clears instead of advancing onto a
possibly-incomplete clone.
- RegisterBackup/RegisterMonitoring create the local row BEFORE the run-resource
breadcrumb, so a crash between them can't leave the row permanently missing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- ConfigureCloudInit sets cores/memory from the plan (not the template default).
- RegisterBackup uses a deterministic Proxmox job id (ignore-exists) + firstOrCreate.
- RegisterMonitoring is idempotent by URL + firstOrCreate — no duplicate schedules
or monitors after a crash/retry.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- applyFirewall sets policy_in=DROP so only 80/443 are exposed.
- Capacity/placement account for disk_gb (the real VM allocation), not the
smaller Nextcloud user quota — no systematic overcommit.
- CloudReady sent synchronously again; the step retries on mail failure with the
password preserved (no lost credential in a failed queue job).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- CloudReady receives the ENCRYPTED password (decrypts only when rendering), so
the queued payload never holds plaintext.
- RegisterBackup uses a valid Proxmox calendar expression (02:00).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- CreateCustomerAdmin puts OC_PASS on the docker invocation (survives the &&).
- RegisterBackup creates a real vzdump job via ProxmoxClient::createBackupJob.
- RegisterMonitoring registers via a new MonitoringClient service (interface +
fake + http). Both persist the external id [E] before the breadcrumb, so
acceptance reflects a real registration, not a fabricated row.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Clone: recover via vmExists() when the task ref was lost, instead of
re-cloning the reserved vmid (which Proxmox rejects).
- Deploy: persist the DB password ENCRYPTED before compose up and reuse it on
retry, so a crash can't regenerate a mismatching credential.
- Complete: gate credential delivery on a credentials_sent breadcrumb so a
retry after a crash doesn't re-send the email.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Failed run releases the instance (status=failed) so its quota stops counting
against host capacity.
- CompleteProvisioning activates instance+order only AFTER onboarding tasks +
credential delivery succeed.
- ConfigureNetwork polls until the guest has an address (no wrong Traefik route).
- customers.email unique + race-safe customer resolution in the intake action.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
RunRunner::onPoll no longer resets started_at, so a poll step's own deadline
(WaitForGuestAgent 270s, ConfigureDnsAndTls cert 840s) actually fires instead
of resetting every poll. maxDuration raised above each own-deadline so the
step's fail wins over the generic timeout. Shared core fix (A + B).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Require a real customer email (no unknown@ fallback merging customers).
- Stripe signature: enforce 5-min replay tolerance + accept any rotating v1.
- DeployApplicationStack no longer persists the DB password in the run context.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Stripe webhook fails closed when the signing secret is missing (outside local/testing).
- ReserveResources places + creates the instance under a per-datacenter lock so
concurrent orders can't overcommit a host.
- CloneVirtualMachine reserves the vmid + breadcrumb BEFORE cloning, so a crash
can't mint a new vmid and orphan the first clone.
- CreateCustomerAdmin checks user existence and resets the password instead of
re-running user:add on retry.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
nexxo
Claude