Commit Graph

2 Commits (feat/mailboxes)

Author SHA1 Message Date
Claude a58faf3f85 Manage the Stripe key from the console, behind a password and a test
tests / pest (push) Successful in 8m56s Details
tests / assets (push) Successful in 20s Details
tests / release (push) Successful in 4s Details
Changing a key meant a shell, a file edit and a cache rebuild — and the person
who owns the Stripe account is not necessarily the person who owns the server.

Two gates, not one. The capability decides who may open the page; every operator
has console.view, and that must not mean "can read the payment key". The
password decides whether this SESSION may see or change anything, because the
realistic threat is not a stranger but an unlocked machine, and a session is
exactly what that hands over. Both are re-checked server-side on every action —
a Livewire action is reachable by anyone who can post to /livewire/update.

The value is stored encrypted under a key of its own, SECRETS_KEY, and the vault
refuses to work without it rather than falling back to APP_KEY: rotating APP_KEY
is ordinary maintenance and would otherwise destroy every stored credential,
discovered when Stripe stops answering. It is read where it is used, not
overlaid onto config at boot — an overlay adds a query to every request
including the public site, and leaves queue workers holding whatever was true
when they started. It is never shown again, only outlined, and never enters a
Livewire property that would carry it to the browser and back in the snapshot.

A registry, not an env editor: a form that can set any environment variable is a
privilege-escalation primitive, and one bad value bricks the installation with
no way back through that same form.

The test button is the part that matters. It reports which Stripe account the
key belongs to, whether it is LIVE or test — the most expensive mistake here is
pasting one where the other belongs, and both look identical in a form — and
which webhook endpoints exist with the events each subscribes to. A key can be
perfectly valid while the endpoint listens for the wrong five events, and
nothing fails until a payment goes unrecorded.

The webhook signing secret deliberately stays in .env. It is read on every
incoming payment event; in the database, a database problem becomes silently
failing signature checks.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-27 09:01:16 +02:00
nexxo 0560ae743d feat(billing): Stripe owns the billing cycle, we own capability
A Product per plan family and a Price per priced row of a published version,
plus the four subscribed webhook events that were arriving and being ignored.

`stripe:sync-catalogue` mirrors the catalogue. Idempotent twice over: a stored
id is skipped, and each call carries an idempotency key derived from our own
row, so a crash between Stripe creating a Price and us recording its id gives
back the same object rather than a second one. That matters more here than
usual — a Stripe Price cannot be edited or deleted, so a duplicate is
permanent. Drafts are not synced at all: a version that has promised nothing
has no business in a price list. --dry-run shows what would be created.

The webhook now handles invoice.paid, invoice.payment_failed,
customer.subscription.updated and customer.subscription.deleted. It never
re-derives an amount: the invoice is the authority for what was charged, and
recomputing it from our catalogue would produce a second, disagreeing answer.
A failed payment is recorded and nothing else — Stripe runs the dunning
schedule, and cutting a customer off on the first failure would punish an
expired card as though it were a refusal to pay.

Only a cycle renewal moves the term on. Stripe also sends paid invoices for
prorations and manual charges, and the checkout's own invoice — which is
already in the register as the purchase, and would otherwise double every
customer's first payment.

Stripe does not guarantee delivery order, which is the source of most of the
care here:
- state changes are judged and written in one transaction with the row held,
  so two deliveries cannot both pass a check made on a stale copy;
- an older event never overwrites a newer one, with a rank breaking ties
  between events sharing a second — their timestamps have one-second
  resolution, and a failed attempt and its successful retry routinely do;
- a term is never shortened, and an ended contract is never revived;
- an event for a contract that does not exist yet is HELD and replayed the
  moment it appears, rather than acknowledged and forgotten. A cancellation
  dropped that way would leave us serving someone who had already left. Held
  rows that never match are pruned after a week.

Register entries are keyed by what they are about — the invoice, the attempt,
the subscription — with a unique index doing the work, because a check two
concurrent deliveries can both pass is not idempotency.

PlanChange is now documented as the preview shown before someone confirms, not
the invoice: Stripe's proration accounts for tax, existing credit and the exact
second the change lands, and ours cannot.

Not run against the live account — `stripe:sync-catalogue` creates objects that
cannot be deleted, so that is the owner's call. The dry run lists 12.

457 tests green. Codex review clean after seven rounds.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-26 13:36:28 +02:00