Commit Graph

2 Commits (1d4e98eb0672fe2b79a856e443d8ca4dd151b6f8)

Author SHA1 Message Date
nexxo 0a89695189 R24: a modal is never taller than the screen
tests / pest (push) Failing after 11m6s Details
tests / assets (push) Successful in 20s Details
tests / release (push) Has been skipped Details
A modal grew with its content, so a form ran off the bottom of the window
and took its own save button with it — reachable only by scrolling the page
BEHIND the backdrop, which on a phone means not reachable at all. The
customer form with its eight fields is what made it obvious, but it was
true of every long modal in the console.

Two halves. The panel is capped once, in the published package view, so no
modal can opt out of it and none has to remember to: max-h in dvh rather
than vh, because on a phone the browser's own chrome counts towards vh and
that is exactly the case where the last centimetre decides whether the
button can be reached. And x-ui.modal is the other half — a header slot, a
scrolling body, a footer slot. min-h-0 on the body is the line that makes it
work: a flex child will not shrink below its content without it, and the
overflow never engages.

Fourteen modals converted: the ones that carry a field, which are the ones
that can grow. A two-line confirmation with one button has nothing that
needs to stay put, and the rule says so rather than leaving a footnote —
the test's criterion is the field, so the moment somebody adds an input to a
confirmation it fails and tells them.

A submit button in a footer sits outside the form it submits, so it carries
form="…". That is the price of a footer that does not scroll away, and an
HTML attribute rather than a workaround; there is a test for it, because
without it the button silently does nothing.

Two traps met on the way, both now scanned for. A Blade directive in a
component tag's attribute list (a conditional wire:poll on x-ui.modal)
compiles into the attribute bag and breaks the view outright — the same
mistake as @disabled on x-ui.button, which cost a debugging round earlier
this session; such attributes go on an element of their own. And Pest's
toContain() is variadic, so the second argument I passed as a failure
message was read as another needle: the assertion demanded that a footer
contain its own filename, and failed on a file that was correct.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-29 23:33:57 +02:00
nexxo f00cbf18d3 Let an operator correct a customer's details
tests / pest (push) Failing after 7m59s Details
tests / assets (push) Successful in 23s Details
tests / release (push) Has been skipped Details
The console could show them and not touch them, so a moved office or a new
contact person meant impersonating the customer or editing the database by
hand. Both are worse than a form. R20: a modal, opened from the Stammdaten
tab, authorising again and reading the record itself rather than trusting
anything the browser hydrated.

Most of the work is in what saving must NOT quietly do.

The customer type is never reset to "nobody asked". The field opens on
"leave unchanged" precisely so that saving an address correction cannot
undo it — that answer decides whether a withdrawal right exists, and losing
it silently would be the expensive kind of quiet.

A changed VAT number is unverified from the moment it is stored — the
verification is bound to the value, so that happens by itself — but
`vat_id_verified_value` is left alone: it is the record of what WAS checked,
and clearing it would destroy the evidence rather than the claim.

The address is also the sign-in address and the key inbound mail is matched
by, so changing it moves the linked portal login in the same transaction and
puts it back to unverified, which is what Laravel's own profile update does
for the same reason: nobody has shown they can read the new address. No mail
is sent from here — the portal asks for the confirmation at the next
sign-in, and a mail an operator did not knowingly send is a surprise.

Three addresses are refused: one belonging to an operator (R21 — no index
spans the two tables, so it is checked), one belonging to another customer,
and one belonging to somebody else's user row, which can outlive or predate
a matching customer.

Not offered here, each for its own reason: `status`, because suspending has
consequences for access and a lifecycle switch hidden among address fields
is one somebody flips by accident; `stripe_customer_id`, because a wrong one
does not move a contract, it points our records at somebody else's payments;
the brand fields, because the customer sets those for themselves and an
operator overwriting a logo is not a correction. There is a test that fails
if any of them appears — with the comments stripped first, since the class
documents at length why they are absent and that documentation is not the
offence. This repository has fallen into that trap three times.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-29 23:18:46 +02:00