40 Commits (25bcab345dabbdabd4e2b74faa865caf56771de2)

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
nexxo	880b5f1998	Merge main into the operating-mode branch ... Three real conflicts, and one file that did not conflict and mattered more. Overview::notices(): both sides added notices. Kept all of them, and pointed main's mail check at MailboxTransport::NON_DELIVERING — its own comment already named the constant while the code carried a copy of the list. billing.blade.php: main wrapped the page in a contract branch. The "payment is not set up" error moved OUTSIDE it, because the customer most likely to meet that message is the one buying for the first time, who has no contract yet and would never have seen it from inside the @else. ConsoleReportsRealDataTest: kept both sides rather than choosing. The renamed test and its docblock explain why admin.systems_ok can no longer be asserted on a bare install; main's mail pin still keeps "clean" clean in the mail dimension. Picking one would have quietly weakened the other's claim. HostStepsTest: git combined main's config()->set('provisioning.dns.zone', 'clupilot.com') with this branch's assertion on clupilot.cloud, and produced a test that contradicted itself with no marker. Main's approach is the better one — it pins the zone in the test and asserts the SHAPE of the name rather than this box's domain — so its assertion stands. HttpStripeClient merged silently and correctly: secret() still throws, isConfigured() still reads the vault directly. Had it taken main's filled($this->secret()), six callers that ask in order NOT to get an exception would have become exception throwers, and the suite would have stayed green. CheckoutWithoutStripeKeyTest is the lock that would have caught it. StripeIdempotencyKeyTest (new on main) leaned on the environment fallback for stripe.secret. That entry is strict now — no fallback in either direction, so the .env cannot be a back door for a live key in test mode. It stores a real vault row instead. 1966 tests pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-30 17:53:20 +02:00
nexxo	955f1b874f	Deliver the processing agreement, and hold the proof it was accepted ... Art. 28(3) GDPR wants a contract wherever personal data is processed on somebody else's behalf, which is the whole of what this product does. "In writing" there includes electronic form (Art. 28(9)), so a document the customer can read plus a recorded acceptance is enough — no signature on paper. The website already promises "AV-Vertrag inklusive", which means it has to be obtainable without asking us for it. It was not obtainable at all. **The text is never this application's.** An operator uploads the document their lawyer wrote, names the version, and publishes it; the measures ride along as a second file, because they are an annex to the agreement and "which measures applied when this customer accepted" has to have one answer. Inventing the text here would have been worse than having none. **Uploading and publishing are two acts.** Acceptance is per version, so publishing leaves every customer who accepted the previous one outstanding again — correct, and far too expensive to trigger by dropping a file on a form. It goes through a confirmation modal that says exactly that (R23). **The customer's side** is a card in the contract tab: read the agreement, read the measures, one press to conclude it. What that press records is what makes it evidence rather than a flag — the version, the moment, the address it came from, and the login that pressed. Pressing twice is one agreement (unique index, not a check somebody can forget), and a superseded acceptance is kept rather than overwritten: it was true when it was made, and the history is the point. Nothing renders until a version is in force. A card offering an agreement that does not exist is worse than the silence. The files live on the private disk and are served through routes that check who is asking — an agreement is not a public asset, and a guessable URL to one would be a list of who our customers are. The customer route takes no version parameter: which document applies is ours to say. `dpa.manage` is its own capability on the OPERATOR guard. Whoever keeps the platform running does not thereby decide what every customer is asked to agree to — and a capability written under `web` since the 2026-07-29 move lands in a guard nothing authenticates against, which is how this one first shipped answering 403 to a role that visibly had it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-30 16:56:57 +02:00
nexxo	e83b17ec37	Put every missing field on one page before a customer pays ... Admin\Readiness renders App\Support\Readiness::byGroup() end to end: state, label, breaks sentence and a fix link for every check, a button on the four that have to ask a real service (DnsTokenCheck, WireguardEndpointCheck, VmTemplateCheck, StripeCheck) and only ever run on demand, and one headline line — ready for the operator's current mode, or how many blocking items are still open. Wired into the nav and into Overview's own notice list beside the same gate as Admin\Integrations, since both halves it configures come back together on this page. Fixed two check keys the guard test caught for real: onboarding.ssh_key and delivery.inbound_password did not textually contain the vault key they check (ssh.private_key, inbound_mail.password), which is exactly the kind of silent gap this whole task exists to catch. Renamed to onboarding.ssh_private_key and delivery.inbound_mail_password, with the two existing test files that referenced the old keys updated to match. Also fixed the guard test's own assertion: Pest's toContain() is variadic, so a second string argument is a second required substring, not a failure message (the same trap tests/Feature/ModalHeightTest.php already documents about itself) — it failed on every entry, including ones already covered. Replaced with str_contains()+toBeTrue(), which keeps the check and the message both. Two pre-existing Overview tests assumed a bare install has nothing to report; it now correctly always starts with a readiness gap, so both were narrowed to what they actually test — no invented data, no invented incident. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-30 15:59:34 +02:00
nexxo	c354ad1463	Make mails readable on a phone, and let an operator look at one ... Three things the owner reported, and one sentence that promised something this product does not do. **The mails had a fixed width.** components/mail/layout.blade.php set width="600" and width:600px, so every phone showed a 600px canvas in a 390px window and one had to scroll sideways to read a sentence. Now the table is width="100%" with max-width:600px — fluid, with 600 as a ceiling rather than a floor. A mail cannot fix this with a media query (Outlook renders with Word and drops <style> blocks), which is why the whole file is inline attributes and why the shrinking has to be built in. Side padding went 40px -> 24px in the layout and in all nine mail views: 40 each side leaves 278px of a 390px screen to read in. **There was no way to look at a mail.** An invoice mail needs an invoice, a maintenance announcement needs a window, and "register an account to see whether the confirmation reads well" is not a workflow — which is how the fixed width survived for months. App\Services\Mail\MailPreviews builds all nine from sample data, every record with make() and never create(), so a preview leaves no invoice, order or window behind and draws no number from a series. Two ways to see one: in a tab as the document itself, or sent to the signed-in operator's own address. There is no recipient field — that would be a form for mailing strangers. sendNow(), not send(): every mailable here implements ShouldQueue, and send() defers to the queue for those, which would have put a failure in a worker's log while the button reported success to somebody waiting for the mail. The test caught that. **The booking page had no shell.** Order declared layouts.portal — the bare shell the sign-in pages use, no navigation and no padding — so the page sat flush against the top and bottom of the window with no way back to anything. layouts.portal-app, like every other portal page. **The consent box said something untrue.** Its refusal read "otherwise we can only build your cloud once the withdrawal period has ended", which describes a path that does not exist: nothing here delivers fourteen days later, and an unticked box simply means no order. Said plainly now, and said on the page before somebody runs into the refusal. Also: GrantedPlanPortalTest asserted assertDontSee('179'), which matches any id containing those digits — and ids climb through a suite run because a rolled-back transaction does not reset an auto-increment counter. It passed alone and failed in company. Asserts on '179,00' now, which is what a leaked price would actually look like. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-30 14:50:37 +02:00
nexxo	f49f1dca09	Say when no mail is being delivered at all ... "Ich versuche mich zu registrieren, erhalte aber keine Verify-Mail, auch nicht beim erneuten Senden." Traced rather than guessed, and the evidence is in storage/logs: the address appears three times, so the mails were built and handed to a transport that writes them to a file. MAIL_MAILER=log. MailboxTransport::resolution() short-circuits on it — NON_DELIVERING is ['log', 'array', null] — so every purpose mailer becomes the log transport however well the five mailboxes are configured, which is correct for a development machine and exactly what was happening here. The reason it deserves a notice is that the failure is silent in every direction an operator would look. Mail::queue() succeeds. No job fails. The queue empties. And the console's own mailbox test reports SUCCESS, because MailboxTester builds its own transport on purpose — a check that honoured MAIL_MAILER=log would report success while writing to a file. So every instrument on the page said fine. Now the front page says it, linked to the mail page, and the mail page says it above the mailboxes it makes decorative. All three swallowing values are named, not only 'log': array and an unset default do the same thing, and a notice that only knew about one would be silent in the two cases nobody thinks to check. Two existing tests asserted that a clean installation raises no notice, and went red — correctly, because phpunit.xml forces MAIL_MAILER=array so a suite cannot send mail. They pin a delivering mailer now: the warning is about the environment, those tests are about the estate. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-30 13:55:55 +02:00
nexxo	70fa136e22	Say on the front page that the site is switched off ... "Ich komme auf dem lokalen Dev-Server nicht auf www.dev." Diagnosed rather than guessed: Laravel answers 200 on that host, and the request never reaches it — site.public is false, so PublicSiteGate returns the placeholder with a 503 to every visitor who is not on the management VPN and not signed in as an operator. Which is precisely what a broken deployment looks like from outside, and the only place that said so was the switch itself, on another page. So the console says it now, on the page an operator opens when something looks wrong, and the notice links to the switch. The second half of the same report — being sent to app.… — is the missing SITE_HOST. Without it the marketing site is registered without a hostname: it answers on the PORTAL's host as well, and every route() it generates points at APP_URL, so a link on the site lands on the portal's domain. Also said, also with the host named. Only where the installation is host-separated at all, though. A fresh checkout binds nothing to a hostname by design — RestrictAdminHost: "upgrading must not lock anyone out of a system that was working" — and a warning there is furniture. My first version fired on every clean installation and two existing tests said so immediately; they were right. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-30 13:36:42 +02:00
nexxo	33566cd404	Show the customer, and write the answers once ... Two complaints, one cause: the customer page was a compose box with three lists under it. It showed nothing ABOUT the customer, and every answer was typed from scratch. The page is five tabs now. Stammdaten — contact, phone, since when, language, and the tax standing: consumer or business, with "nobody asked" saying so rather than passing for business, because that answer decides whether a withdrawal right exists at all. Paket — the contract's own FROZEN figures, the modules at the price they were booked at, and the machine: address, state, host, datacenter. Zahlungen — invoices with net, gross and their PDF, and the orders beside them, because an order is a purchase and an invoice is a document about one. Nachrichten — the portal requests in the customer's own words, the mail they sent, the mail we sent. Schreiben — last, because it is what you do after reading. The tab is in the query string, like Settings and Integrations: a reload, a bookmark and the back button all land where the operator was, and a link can point at the tab that matters. And templates, under Betrieb → E-Mail-Vorlagen. Most customer questions are the same five questions, and typing the answer again every time is how two customers get told two different things about one subject. A template is INSERTED into the compose field with the customer's own details filled in — never sent as it stands, because the last two sentences always belong to the person asking. What goes out is what the operator saw and edited. Three decisions worth naming. {{contact}} takes the contact person where one is on record and the company name otherwise, because "Guten Tag Beispiel GmbH" is the line that gives away a mail written by a database. {{amount}} is the gross figure — what the price sheet quoted them and what their bank statement says. And a typo comes out as {{kunde}}, standing there in the field where the operator sees it, rather than as an empty string that produces "Guten Tag ,". A placeholder with no value for this customer stays empty; nothing is invented. Placeholders are named in English because they are identifiers, not prose: a template has to survive somebody switching the console's language. The list the page documents is the renderer's own, so a token added in one place appears in the other without being written down twice. Blade's echo tag ends at the first }} it finds, which turned a literal placeholder in the documentation into compiled nonsense. Assembled in PHP now, and caught by the test that renders the page rather than by somebody opening it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-29 22:37:30 +02:00
nexxo	e376b571be	Read the support mailbox into the console ... No, not an API token: mailcow's API administers domains and mailboxes — it does not read mail. Reading a mailbox is IMAP whoever runs the server, so that is what this is. Host, user and folder are console settings; the password is a vault entry, like every other credential that opens something. IMAP by hand rather than a dependency. Four verbs are needed — LOGIN, SELECT, SEARCH UNSEEN, FETCH — and the parsing that follows is the real work either way. It is bounded by what the console shows: a sender, a subject, the words a person wrote, and the NAMES of anything attached. Real mail from real people arrives encoded, so it handles RFC 2047 subjects (every German subject with an umlaut in it), quoted-printable and base64 bodies, Windows charsets, and multipart — text wins over HTML, because a console is not a mail client and the words are in the text part. A message it cannot make sense of is skipped and logged, never guessed at: a garbled question in front of an operator is worse than one they go and read in the mailbox, where it still is. ATTACHMENTS ARE NOT STORED. Only their names and sizes, so an operator knows something was attached and can go and look if it matters. Keeping whatever a stranger chooses to send would make this application a malware store with a web interface in front of it. Whose a mail is, is decided by the sender's ADDRESS and by nothing else — not by a name in the subject, not by anything in the body. A mail is easy to write and this decision attaches a stranger's words to a real customer's file; there is a test that forges the name and the subject and still gets nothing. An address nobody recognises stays unassigned, shown FIRST and never hidden: that is a new enquiry, or a customer writing from their private account, and it is the mail that must not be missed. An operator can place it by hand from the same row. Nothing is deleted on the mail server, ever. Messages are flagged seen once the row is safely written — and only then, because flagging first and failing after would lose the message with no second copy anywhere. Filing one away is this console's own state; the mailbox is untouched. Two fixes on the way past: the customer page printed "customers.status.active" and "support.status.open" — a lang key with no file behind it renders as itself and Laravel says nothing — and the same page is now covered by a test proving each list is scoped to the customer in the URL, which was reported as "unterhalb steht immer das selbe". Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-29 21:41:29 +02:00
nexxo	0e25fe88d4	Keep a register of what was sent, and answer the customer from here ... Three complaints, one shape: the console knew things and could not act on them, so the work happened somewhere else and left no trace. The header said "4 Hinweis(e)" and led nowhere. Whoever read it had to know that the list was a card further down the same page, and then go looking for the host or the failed run by hand. The count is a link now, every notice carries the page that shows the thing it is about, and the plural is a word rather than a bracket. Nothing recorded what this installation had sent. "Hat der Kunde die Zugangsdaten je bekommen, und wann?" was answered on the mail server — a different machine, a different program, and nothing an operator can put in front of somebody who says nothing ever arrived. Every mail now writes a row: when, to whom, which mailable, and the customer it belongs to. Written from MessageSent, so a row means the transport accepted it; that is the strongest thing an application can honestly claim, and a column called "delivered" would be pretending otherwise. Verification and reset mails are left out on purpose — they go to unconfirmed addresses and anybody who can type into a form can send them, so recording them would hand the register to whoever wants to fill it. And the customer list was the end of the road. There is a page behind it now: what they bought, what they asked in their own words, what we sent them, and a box to write the next message. It goes out from the support mailbox and is recorded on the way — with its body, because an operator typed it and "what exactly did I write to them in March" is a question the mail server's log cannot answer either. Answering a request from here closes it, which is the reason to answer from here at all: answering from a mail client leaves it open for ever, because nothing tells it otherwise. Found on the way, by a test that sent a real mail rather than asserting it was queued: resources/views/mail/reset-password.blade.php was missing its closing </x-mail.layout>. The component's contents were never terminated, the layout's own @if ran off the end of the file, and the mail raised a Blade syntax error instead of rendering. Password reset has therefore never delivered a link since it was built. Closed, plus a test that renders it and one that counts opening against closing tags across every mail view. Reading INCOMING mail in the console is not in this: it needs the mailbox polled over IMAP, which is a credential and a dependency. Requests filed through the portal appear here in full; a customer who writes by mail instead still has to be read in the mail client. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-29 21:02:36 +02:00
nexxo	ec8675861e	Take the order, park it, and say when it will be delivered ... A paid order that no host has room for used to FAIL at the reservation step. The customer has paid by then, so that turned a sale into an incident and left somebody holding money against nothing. The estate is finite and booked thick, so "no host has room right now" is an ordinary Tuesday — it means a machine has to be bought, which takes days. So the order waits instead. poll(), not retry(): the wait is measured in days and must not eat the run's attempt budget. It only fails after PARK_DAYS (14) — long enough to buy, rack and onboard a server over a weekend, short enough that a forgotten order surfaces instead of waiting for ever. Then say so, in the same words on both sides of the payment: - The price sheet marks each package "wird sofort ausgeliefert" or "Bereitstellung in 2-3 Werktagen", read from free capacity rather than written into the page. - The customer's own overview says their cloud is being prepared while it is parked, instead of a stepper standing still for two days under "wird eingerichtet" — which reads as broken. - The console front page shows the same per-package answer, so an operator can see what visitors are being promised. And a capacity page for the decision that follows: who is waiting, what the roomiest host still has, what the queue needs ("3x Start, 1x Business" - the LARGEST parked package sets the minimum machine, because an instance lives on one host), and what such a machine costs today from the provider's live list. It orders nothing: buying a server is a contract, and a bug in a capacity calculation must not sign one. The operator can also say where each parked order goes. A pin is honoured or it waits — never quietly redirected — because placing it elsewhere answers a different question than the one they answered, and they would find out from the finished instance. Two things this shook out: - `current_step` is an INDEX into the pipeline, not the step's key, and it is cast to integer. `where('current_step', 'reserve_resources')` reads as correct and matches step 0 of EVERY pipeline instead. Both lookups go through HostCapacity::parkedRuns() now, which resolves the index and filters by pipeline. - The auction feed sends `hdd_hr` as a list, not a string. Casting it printed "Array" into the console and raised a warning that took the page down with it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-29 18:50:46 +02:00
nexxo	d76de5ada3	Restart a machine, enforce the quota that was sold, end a route that ended ... Three places where the product said one thing and did another. **Nothing could restart a virtual machine.** ProxmoxClient had startVm and no way to stop anything, so `restart_required_since` — set by every plan change that grows a running guest — could only ever be cleared by a resize step that happened to find the machine stopped, which nothing in the product could arrange. A paid upgrade's cores and RAM could stay unreached for the life of the contract, and the cloud page's "Neu starten" was a toast. There is now a `restart` pipeline: shutdown, start, wait for the agent, confirm. A shutdown and a start rather than a reboot, because only a cold boot makes qemu read the VM definition again — a reset would take the machine round and bring it back exactly as small as it was. The shutdown is a REQUEST, bounded at ten minutes, and there is no escalation: ProxmoxClient deliberately does not expose Proxmox's forceStop, because the guest is a Nextcloud and cutting power to a database mid-write to apply a CPU change trades an inconvenience for a restore from backup. A guest that ignores ACPI for ten minutes fails the run instead, and a person decides what happens to it. `restart_required_since` is cleared by the last step, from what the RUNNING guest reports (`cpus`/`maxmem`) — not by the button, and not by the run merely finishing. A machine that comes back smaller than it was sold fails the run. Started by App\Actions\RestartInstance, which re-checks authorisation itself rather than trusting a hidden button: an operator holding the new `instances.restart` may restart anything, a portal user their own machine and nothing else. Refused while another run is in flight against the same order. Confirmed in a modal on both sides (R23), addressed by uuid (R11). **Existing instances had no storage quota.** ApplyStorageQuota reaches new and changed machines; everything built before it kept the whole disk whatever it had paid for, and nothing recorded which was which. `instances.quota_applied_gb` is now what the guest was actually told, written by the step only after the occ call succeeds — so "sold" and "enforced" are separate facts and can be compared. `clupilot:apply-quotas` sweeps the estate: one `quota` run per instance through the same step the pipelines use, skipping what it should and saying why, a no-op once an allowance is enforced, and inert under --dry-run. Deliberately NOT scheduled — a nightly sweep would quietly cover for the pipeline step the day it stopped working, which is how the original hole survived this long. **A Traefik router was never torn down.** TraefikWriter::remove() had no caller anywhere. What was missing was the moment: ConfirmCancelPackage wrote a date into `service_ends_at` and nothing ever went back to it, so every route this platform ever wrote was written for good — pointing at a guest address the host is free to reassign. `clupilot:end-due-services` (hourly) keeps that appointment through App\Actions\EndInstanceService. "Ended" means cancellation_scheduled AND `service_ends_at` passed, never the day a cancellation is scheduled: that customer has paid to the end of the term and is working in it. The DNS record goes with the route — it is in our zone, pointing at a host that serves other people, which is the shape of every subdomain takeover there has ever been. The customer's own domain is in their zone and is not ours to touch; the virtual machine is left alone, because the cancellation flow promises a data export first and destroying disks is not this change's decision. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-29 18:28:28 +02:00
nexxo	98d884727a	Warn that a package cannot be placed, before somebody pays for it ... The platform books thick: a package reserves its whole disk_gb — the sold quota plus the machine's own overhead — on ONE host at placement. That is the right choice for a small operator, because nothing can quietly overfill. It has one consequence nobody was being told about: the catalogue goes on offering a package no host has room for, and the first anyone hears of it is a PAID order failing at the reservation step. On the machine this was found on the numbers are stark. 2 x 512 GB NVMe in a mirror is about 400 GB usable; Start reserves 120, Team 540, Business 1050, Enterprise 2100. Three of the four packages on sale cannot be placed at all, and the fourth fits three times. So the console says so now, per package, with the shortfall — "Team needs 540 GB, the roomiest host has 260" — because "buy a server" is not the decision. "Buy a server big enough for what I am selling" is. Two things it deliberately does not do. It does not warn on an installation with no host at all: that is a machine nobody has onboarded yet, it has its own notice, and without the guard a fresh console greeted its operator with one warning per package before they had done anything. And it does not take the overview down when the catalogue cannot be read — a capacity warning does not get to break the page somebody opens when something is already wrong. The largest FREE HOST, never the sum: an instance goes on one machine, so two hosts with 300 GB each cannot take a 540 GB package between them. And when placement does fail, the log now names the shortfall instead of only 'no_capacity'. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-29 18:20:51 +02:00
nexxo	8f2252e81b	Book a downgrade for a date that cannot move, and sell a module once ... Two ways of charging a customer for something they did not get. A downgrade was due when `subscriptions.current_period_end` said so, and Stripe pushes that column forward on every renewal. So a downgrade booked in March was deferred to the end of April by April's renewal, and to the end of May by May's — each time by a whole term, and each time the customer was billed again for the package they had asked to leave. The due date was being re-derived from a moving target on every scheduler tick. It is decided once now, at the moment the customer decides, and stamped onto the contract: `pending_plan` and `pending_effective_at`, the two columns that have been in the schema since the first migration and were written by nothing at all. The shop stamps them, PlanChange reads them instead of the period end when a move is already booked, and clupilot:apply-due-plan-changes finds contracts by the stamped date rather than orders by a date it recomputes. The order stays what it always was — the customer's own record of the request, what the cart shows them and what they remove to change their mind — so it is still consumed with the change, and removing it unbooks the change. What it no longer does is decide when. A second downgrade replaces the first rather than queueing behind it; an upgrade clears one, or it would come due months later and undo the bigger package; a contract cancelled before the date takes the booking with it; and a customer with no contract can no longer place a downgrade at all, which was accepted before and could never be carried out. A booked change is now visible where the contract is read: on the plan card in the portal, because the cart entry disappears when it is paid for and the booking does not, and on the customer row in the console, because that is where an operator answers "what is this customer on". The second defect is the same money in one step: BookAddon guarded duplicates per ORDER — the unique index on (order_id, addon_key) — so two orders for the same module on one contract both went through. A stale tab or a double click bought priority support twice. But storage is deliberately sold in packs, and AddonCatalogue sums the quantities for exactly that reason, so "refuse the second" is only right for some of them. Which is which is declared beside each price in config/provisioning.php (`sold_as`), because it is a commercial decision about each module and not something to infer from a key: storage is a quantity; off-site backups are on or off, support is prioritised or it is not, Collabora Pro is one licence, and a machine answers to one own domain. An undeclared module counts as an entitlement — the cheaper of the two mistakes — and a test refuses to let one ship undeclared. Enforced in the action, where the portal, the console's grant screen and a webhook all pass, with the sentence the customer is shown rather than a developer's. A retried webhook for the SAME order still gets its one booking back; that is one purchase arriving twice, not two purchases. The portal stops offering what would be refused — booked, or already waiting in the cart — and goes on offering the pack. What is missing is on the Stripe side and is not invented here: nothing moves the subscription's item onto the new Price, so the renewal after a plan change still bills the old plan at Stripe. StripeClient only creates and archives catalogue objects, and swapping a price also needs the subscription ITEM id, which nothing stores. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-29 17:51:37 +02:00
nexxo	34874adec3	Apply a bought plan change instead of only pricing it ... PlanChange could say what a move would cost and whether it was allowed, and that was all it could do. Billing::purchase() wrote an upgrade order and nothing ever consumed it: same snapshot, same machine, same quota. A customer could pay for a bigger package and receive nothing. ApplyPlanChange is now the single place a change lands — it moves the contract onto the target's current version, writes one register row, settles the custom domain, and starts a run that resizes the machine. Applying the same order twice is a no-op, enforced by a unique event key rather than by a check two callers could both pass. Two things a plan change must not do, and now does not. A disk is never shrunk — Proxmox cannot, so the QUOTA shrinks instead, which is what was sold anyway. And a live machine is never rebooted as a side effect: cores and RAM are written, and where they need a restart the instance says so where an operator and the customer can both see it. The storage allowance also joins the build pipeline. ApplyStorageQuota was written for plan changes and ran only there, so a brand-new customer still got no quota at all — quota_gb reached the instance row and stopped, and every package delivered the whole disk. The test guarding that pipeline only counted its steps, which is how a list missing the one step that makes a package's storage real stayed green for its whole life. It now names the step. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-29 17:18:55 +02:00
nexxo	b85df4c141	Rebuild the status page as a status page ... Asked for after looking at how real ones are built. The shape they all share is a convention, and a convention is what lets somebody find the answer without being taught the page: banner, components each with ninety days of uptime, then the written record underneath. This page had only the banner — the version that is of no use the morning after, because "Alle Dienste in Betrieb" is true and says nothing to somebody who was locked out the evening before. Three things are new. The ninety-day bar. It cannot be reconstructed after the fact: the monitoring table holds the last verdict per instance, not a history. So a sampler (clupilot:sample-status, every five minutes beside the monitoring sync) writes counts into one row per component per day, and the page divides them. A day with no row is drawn as a gap and says "nicht aufgezeichnet" — never green. Degraded samples count as reachable in the percentage but still colour the day: folding them into downtime reports a slow morning as an outage, ignoring them loses the only trace of it. The incident record. An operator reports a disruption in the console, posts updates as it develops, and the entry that says "behoben" is the same action that closes it — two separate steps is how a page ends up with a resolved note under an incident that still reports as ongoing. There is deliberately no way to edit an update: it is a statement made at a time, corrections are a further entry. An open incident may make a component look worse than the probes found it, never better. Scheduled maintenance, from the windows the console already keeps rather than a second list somebody has to remember to fill in. The measurement moved out of the controller into ServiceHealth, shared with the sampler, so the banner and the bars cannot disagree about what "healthy" means. The page now uses the shared design system and the site's header and footer. Its self-contained stylesheet was there to survive a broken asset build; it does not survive one — if the stylesheet cannot be served the application serving this page is already failing, and mid-deployment every route answers with the maintenance page. What the exemption bought was a third design nobody maintained. Found while building: durationMinutes had its operands the wrong way round, and diffInMinutes is signed, so the public page printed "Dauer -86 Minuten". Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-29 12:45:18 +02:00
nexxo	3b85e8f1d1	Grant a package or module from the customer's row in the console ... GrantPlan is a modal (R20), opened from a "Schenken" button on the customer's own row in Admin\Customers, gated by customers.grant_plan rather than merely hidden. It offers a whole package (plan, term, datacenter, an optional quota bonus baked into the frozen snapshot) or a module on an existing contract, either free or at a discount the operator sets against today's catalogue price. Existing grants show on the same modal — who gave what, when, and until when — with a warning once a dated grant is nearing its end; nothing lapses on its own, exactly as decided. The customers list also badges a granted plan in the Paket column.	2026-07-29 12:42:21 +02:00
nexxo	86bf4f26e0	List issued invoices in the console, with no way to change one ... Read-only by design, and the absence is the feature: an issued invoice is corrected by cancelling it and issuing another, which is the only lawful way to correct one. There is no edit button here whose absence needs explaining, and a test asserts there is none. The PDF is a plain route rather than a Livewire action. A download is a download, and routing one through a component round-trip only adds a way for it to fail. Two findings on the way, and both were mine. The year filter used YEAR() in raw SQL, which is MySQL's. SQLite has no such function, so the page worked against the real database and threw against the test one — a query that only runs on one engine makes the test database a different product from the one being shipped. The years are derived in PHP now. And a test put a User on the operator guard, where EnsureAdmin calls isActive() on it and a 403 becomes a 500. Not a code defect: actingAs() calls Auth::shouldUse(), so a second actingAs() in the same test with no guard named lands on whichever guard the FIRST one named. That trap is written up in CLAUDE.md, I quoted it earlier today, and I walked into it anyway. The tests are split now and both name their guard. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-29 02:21:15 +02:00
nexxo	3fadaa14b0	Merge credentials and infrastructure into one Integrations page ... Zugangsdaten and Infrastruktur split the same subject by storage mechanism — SecretVault vs App\Support\Settings — instead of by what each field configures, which is not a distinction an operator setting up Stripe or DNS should have to know or care about. One page now, grouped by integration: Zahlungen (Stripe), DNS (Hetzner), Monitoring, VPN/WireGuard, SSH-Identität. A secret and a plain setting sit side by side within a section; the difference stays visible — a vault entry is write-only and shows only an outline, a setting shows its value in full — as a property of the field, not a reason for a separate page. Both storage mechanisms are unchanged underneath: this is a presentation change, not a data migration. The vault keeps its own gate (secrets.manage + a recently confirmed password); plain settings keep theirs (hosts.manage alone). Reachable with either capability, since the two are no longer two pages a role happens to see one, both, or neither of — every section and every save action still checks its own capability server-side. admin.secrets and admin.infrastructure redirect here permanently rather than 404ing a bookmark. The nav entry that replaces both is visible to either capability — Navigation's capability field now accepts an array meaning "any of these", not only a single ability. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-29 01:49:39 +02:00
nexxo	e6d2e6dc33	Give the console a Finance tab: company details, VAT rate, invoice series ... Its own tab rather than a section of Settings, as asked. What is set here appears on a legal document, and burying it beside the site-visibility switch invites somebody to change one in passing. Everything the printed invoice needs — registered name, address, Firmenbuch number and court, VAT ID, bank details, payment terms, logo — with the logo replaceable, because a company changes its mark. None of it reaches an invoice that already exists: the values are copied into each document when its number is assigned, so a corrected address is correct from the next one onwards and cannot rewrite an old one. The console refuses to consider itself ready while a name, an address or a VAT number is missing, and says which. An invoice without them is not a valid invoice in Austria, and issuing one is worse than refusing to. The series editor carries the same shape as EditDatacenter and for the same reason. The prefix is free while the series is empty and frozen once a document carries it: changing RE to AR renames nothing and leaves a series whose past says RE and whose future says AR, with no record they belong together. The counter may be raised — an operator migrating from another system needs exactly that — but never lowered, because a lower number is one already printed on a document somebody holds. Both rules are recomputed from the database on save rather than read back from the properties the browser returns. CompanyProfile drops keys that are not part of the profile. It is fed from a form, and a forged key must not be able to write an arbitrary setting into the same table the site-visibility switch lives in. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-29 01:18:43 +02:00
nexxo	864126ec7f	Add the SSH identity to the vault, and give deployment config a console page ... The SSH private key CluPilot deploys to every host is now stored through SecretVault (ssh.private_key), preferred over CLUPILOT_SSH_PRIVATE_KEY(_PATH) at all three real consumers — SshTraefikWriter and HostStep::keyLogin. kuma.password/kuma.totp stay in .env: they authenticate a separate Python container at boot, and nothing in this app reads them, so the vault would have nothing to wire them to. A new /admin/infrastructure page, backed by App\Support\ProvisioningSettings, makes the non-secret deployment settings that used to force a shell — DNS zone, WireGuard hub endpoint and public key, Traefik's dynamic-config path, the SSH public key, and the monitoring bridge URL — visible and editable from the console, each wired to every real consumer. WG subnet/hub IP and Kuma's own connection details stay in .env: the compose file and a separate container read those before this application ever does.	2026-07-29 00:52:44 +02:00
nexxo	bda61ca560	Pin the sidebar header and footer so only the nav list scrolls, and shorten two action labels that wrapped	2026-07-28 20:52:12 +02:00
nexxo	27292237c3	Move operator two-factor enrolment off admin.settings onto its own page ... RequireOperatorTwoFactor exempted the whole of admin.settings while compulsory two-factor was on, on the theory that it was "the page where two-factor is set up". That component also carries staff management, site visibility, network restrictions, account changes, and the two-factor policy switch itself, so an unenrolled operator got unrestricted access to all of that, not just enrolment. Enrolment (secret, QR, confirm, recovery codes, regenerate, disable) moves to its own route and component, admin.two-factor-setup / Admin\TwoFactorSetup, reachable by every operator regardless of capability. That is now the only page the middleware exempts besides logout, and its redirect points there instead. admin.settings goes back behind the policy like every other console page; only the policy switch itself stays there, since only someone who already satisfies it should be the one changing it.	2026-07-28 15:11:20 +02:00
nexxo	4211f3dfab	Give the mailboxes a page, and the support sender its own capability	2026-07-28 01:57:11 +02:00
nexxo	6376f5e9fa	One design system for every surface ... The console was a second product. admin-tokens.css held a complete dark set — its own surfaces, its own orange, its own status triad — so every shared component had to work in two worlds, and the two halves of the application drifted apart in ways nobody could see from inside either one. That file now carries density and nothing else: smaller type, tighter rows, tighter corners. Colour comes from one place. The tokens themselves are rebuilt around what the redesign settled on: - Radii scaled to object size (9/11/16/22) instead of one value everywhere, which is what made the interface read as a design-system specification rather than as a product. - Warm, broad, low shadows. A neutral grey drop shadow belongs to a different design language and reads as cold on this ground. - --accent-press, which several rules already referenced and nothing defined. An undefined var() does not make a browser skip the declaration; it computes to , and for background-color that is transparent — the accent button lost its fill on hover and left white text on white. - No serif. A serif headline is what made every page read as a document, which is the impression the whole redesign exists to remove. --font-serif now points at the sans so nothing breaks while call sites are cleaned up. The two shells are one shell with two configurations, and both finally have a mobile navigation: the sidebar used to simply disappear below 900px, leaving no way to move around the application at all on a phone. The customer dashboard is bound to real records — instance, seats, traffic, backups, contract — instead of the fixtures it shipped with. Where something is not measured, storage consumption, it says what was contractually agreed rather than inventing a figure. This is the sheet a customer forwards to their auditor. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-27 16:03:47 +02:00
Claude	a58faf3f85	Manage the Stripe key from the console, behind a password and a test ... Changing a key meant a shell, a file edit and a cache rebuild — and the person who owns the Stripe account is not necessarily the person who owns the server. Two gates, not one. The capability decides who may open the page; every operator has console.view, and that must not mean "can read the payment key". The password decides whether this SESSION may see or change anything, because the realistic threat is not a stranger but an unlocked machine, and a session is exactly what that hands over. Both are re-checked server-side on every action — a Livewire action is reachable by anyone who can post to /livewire/update. The value is stored encrypted under a key of its own, SECRETS_KEY, and the vault refuses to work without it rather than falling back to APP_KEY: rotating APP_KEY is ordinary maintenance and would otherwise destroy every stored credential, discovered when Stripe stops answering. It is read where it is used, not overlaid onto config at boot — an overlay adds a query to every request including the public site, and leaves queue workers holding whatever was true when they started. It is never shown again, only outlined, and never enters a Livewire property that would carry it to the browser and back in the snapshot. A registry, not an env editor: a form that can set any environment variable is a privilege-escalation primitive, and one bad value bricks the installation with no way back through that same form. The test button is the part that matters. It reports which Stripe account the key belongs to, whether it is LIVE or test — the most expensive mistake here is pasting one where the other belongs, and both look identical in a form — and which webhook endpoints exist with the events each subscribes to. A key can be perfectly valid while the endpoint listens for the wrong five events, and nothing fails until a payment goes unrecorded. The webhook signing secret deliberately stays in .env. It is read on every incoming payment event; in the database, a database problem becomes silently failing signature checks. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-27 09:01:16 +02:00
Claude	30a80b6c15	Report the estate from the database, and print the traffic that is sold ... Three console pages were fiction. The front page claimed 42 customers, 39 instances, four hosts named pve-fsn-1..3 and €7,842 a month, over a twelve-month growth curve; the instance list held seven invented machines; the revenue page reported churn and a trend for a business with no recorded history. All of it was hard-coded. It read like a running company and measured nothing. They now read the database. Two figures are gone rather than approximated — the revenue trend, which needs a monthly history nobody records, and churn, which needs a base the data cannot supply. ARR stays, labelled as the projection it is. The green "all systems normal" badge is computed from the notice list instead of asserted, and the notices themselves come from failed runs, hosts reporting errors or gone quiet, and monitoring that is down. Host load is the one number that had to agree with something else: placement counts the VM disk allocation, ignores a failed instance that never got a VM, and subtracts the host's reserve. A dashboard doing its own arithmetic would show a host as comfortable while orders were already being refused on it, so it uses the host's own accounting — with the filter moved into a scope both share, and the sum preloaded so listing hosts stays one query. The instance list drops the Nextcloud version column: that version is not recorded anywhere, and a column filled with a plausible number is worse than no column. Statuses the lifecycle writes but nobody had translated no longer render as "admin.status.failed". The price sheet also gains the included traffic, which the catalogue has always carried and the page simply never printed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-27 04:48:51 +02:00
nexxo	e9240c1324	feat(deploy): releases you can pin to, and a version that tells the truth ... VERSION at the repository root is the release number and the only place it is written down — a file rather than `git describe`, because a source archive, a shallow CI checkout and a container built without .git have no tags to describe. Cutting a release is editing that file and merging it; CI creates the annotated v<VERSION> tag once green, only on the commit that raised the number, and never moves it. Servers are pinned to these. Two modes, and the difference is the point. RELEASE=v1.0.0 pins a server to an immutable tag, checked out detached: it moves when someone decides it moves. BRANCH=main follows the edge, where CI tags a commit only after it is pushed. The mode is remembered, so re-running the updater on a pinned box does not quietly walk it back onto main. Going backwards is refused, by commit ancestry rather than by comparing version strings — a tag can be cut from anywhere, and only ancestry says whether history is going back. The schema has already moved forward by then, and the migrations needed to reverse it are not in the older checkout at all. What the console reports comes from a manifest written atomically after every step succeeded, never from live git: git says what the files are, not whether the deployment came up. So a failed update keeps reporting the version that is actually serving — including its version number, not the newer one the checkout has already moved to. A deployment pinned to the tag reads "1.0.0 (abc1234)"; anything else reads "1.0.0-dev (abc1234) · main", because every commit after the tag still carries VERSION=1.0.0 and is not that release. Reporting it as one is how a bug gets filed against the wrong code. Codex reviewed the design before it was written and the result six times after. Its findings, all real: the version had to come from the manifest too, not just the commit; branch names need JSON escaping or the manifest silently vanishes; a `case` glob does not anchor and accepted 1x.2y.3garbage; pinning to the commit a server already sits on skipped recording the mode, and then skipped detaching; a manifest that failed to write would never be repaired; an unparseable timestamp would 500 every admin page; and an empty tag list read as a connectivity failure. 466 tests green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-26 15:21:38 +02:00
nexxo	f6ddf45dc0	feat(admin): a console for creating, pricing and scheduling plans ... The owner can now do from the console what only a config edit could do before: create a plan line, draft a version, price it, publish it into a window, and pull a plan out of the shop. Two pages and one modal, because the catalogue has exactly two levels. The plan list is a name, a rank and a kill switch. Everything that can be got wrong — capabilities, prices, windows — lives on the versions, where the page is built around the one rule that matters: a draft is freely editable, a published version is not touchable at all. So drafting and publishing are separate acts, and publishing says plainly that it is final. The console refuses everything the catalogue refuses, on the form rather than as a stack trace: an overlapping window, a window that ends before it starts, a version with no price for a term we sell on, and — new here — a version with no VM template, which would be bought and then fail provisioning every time. Numbers are bounded on both sides, because a mistyped price otherwise overflows the column and answers with a 500 instead of saying which field was wrong. Performance class and features are picked from the keys we have labels for; free text would be frozen at publication and shown to customers as a raw translation key forever. Concurrency, since two admins share one catalogue: draft numbers are allocated under a lock on the family, publication is an atomic conditional claim, and discarding a draft is one statement conditional on it still being a draft — otherwise a draft published in the meantime could be deleted out from under the customers now contracted to it. `plans.manage` (Owner and Admin) guards the pages themselves, not only the buttons, and the modal authorises itself — prices, drafts and unreleased plans are not something to leave readable to anyone who types the URL. Also fixes the shared checkbox, which ticked in the browser's own blue on every page that used one: a native checkbox ignores text colour and needs accent-color. Verified in the browser: withdrawing a plan in the console removes it from the customer's billing page immediately, and restoring it brings it back. The public landing page carries no catalogue-driven plan list, so there is nothing there to hide. 421 tests green. Codex review clean after six rounds. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-26 12:41:51 +02:00
nexxo	71ca0e1394	feat(admin): VPN access management with live peer state ... The console can now create, block and remove VPN accesses, and shows who is actually connected — traffic counters, source endpoint and last handshake. Design notes: - The web container has no wg0, so the page never talks to WireGuard. Live state is copied in by SyncVpnPeers on the provisioning queue (the only worker whose container owns the interface); the page polls the database and merely nudges that job, throttled so many open tabs cannot flood the queue. - enabled (operator intent) and present (observed on the hub) are stored separately, so a sync can never quietly undo a block and drift stays visible as "wird angewendet". - The sync adopts peers the host pipeline registered, naming them after their host — otherwise "who is on the VPN" would have blind spots. - Keypairs are generated in PHP via libsodium rather than shelling out to wg genkey (no interface in this container, and it keeps generation testable). The private key is shown once and never stored. - allocateIp() now also considers vpn_peers, which would otherwise be handed a tunnel address a host already holds. - vpn.manage is a new capability held by Owner/Admin only, and it hides the nav entry too — a VPN access reaches the management network. Verified end to end against the real hub, not just mocks: created an access in the browser, connected with the generated config, watched the console flip to "Verbunden" with real counters, then blocked it and confirmed the peer was gone from wg0 and the client could no longer handshake. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-25 21:38:12 +02:00
nexxo	be99f413f7	feat(admin): provisioning liveness — per-run progress bar, last-activity, stale warning ... Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-25 18:11:17 +02:00
nexxo	eff8c08258	feat(admin): maintenance windows — schedule once, assign many hosts, notify ... - maintenance_windows + host pivot + notification ledger; derived state (never stored); affected-customer + banner queries live off instances - admin /maintenance: create draft/publish, multi-host select, impact counts, cancel; capability-gated (maintenance.manage) - publish emails affected customers once (queued Mailable, ledger-idempotent) - customer portal maintenance banner (upcoming <=72h + active) merged per window Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-25 15:53:50 +02:00
nexxo	c5d60340b7	feat(admin): staff RBAC (spatie) + admin settings page ... - 5 operator roles (Owner/Admin/Support/Billing/Read-only) seeded via migration with a capability catalogue; app checks capabilities via Gate, never role names - every mutating admin action authorizes server-side (hosts/datacenters/customers/ impersonate/provisioning); is_admin reads migrated to console.view / isOperator() - admin /settings: own account + Owner-only staff invite/role/revoke with last-owner, self-role and customer-collision guards (transactional) - sidebar 'zum Kundenportal' link replaced with Settings Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-25 15:47:42 +02:00
nexxo	08f61b43f5	fix(ui): modal above sidebar (z-index); datacenter edit buttons stay right; toast slides from bottom; provisioning retry action ... - modal wrapper z-10 -> z-[70] (was behind the z-40 sidebar); toasts slide up/down - datacenter inline-edit colspan fix so save/cancel stay right-aligned - admin provisioning: retry a failed run (table + panel), mirrors host-detail retry Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-25 15:29:37 +02:00
nexxo	3bf0dfb548	fix: seat limit + suspend guard per Codex; harden factory email uniqueness ... - seat limit follows the active/cancelling package, not a newer inactive record - suspend/reactivate toggle refuses closed accounts (terminal); closed shown in list - factory emails use a large unique numeric space (safeEmail pool could collide late in a full suite run) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-25 14:53:15 +02:00
nexxo	ef110b06db	feat(admin): host reserve edit + maintenance drain; customer suspend/reactivate ... Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-25 14:30:21 +02:00
nexxo	879697c6ea	feat(admin): impersonate customer portal — session login + return banner ... Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-25 13:46:48 +02:00
nexxo	eabcb98f91	feat(admin): compact redesign of /admin/provisioning current-run panel ... Progress bar + X/total, highlighted current step, faint next step, failure inline — replaces the long repetitive per-step 'done' list. Tactical-Terminal tokens, DE+EN. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-25 13:31:49 +02:00
nexxo	bc278c8fa1	feat(admin): datacenters management (create + select) ... datacenters table/model + admin CRUD (/admin/datacenters, nav). HostCreate picks from active datacenters (validated); hosts show the datacenter code. Seeded fsn/hel. 5 tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-25 13:25:17 +02:00
nexxo	a9fbb395f9	feat(engine-b): live provisioning progress (admin console + customer dashboard) ... Admin /admin/provisioning bound to real runs+steps (poll+admin.runs). Embedded CustomerProvisioning card shows the logged-in customer their own run live (per-customer StepAdvanced channel, email-bridged authz). Shared BuildsRunSteps. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-25 11:57:35 +02:00
nexxo	1aa7535fc4	feat(admin): dark Tactical-Terminal operator console ... Separate admin console at /admin, gated to is_admin users (EnsureAdmin middleware + migration/seed; a plain customer user is seeded to prove the gate). Distinct dark aesthetic achieved purely by token scoping: .theme-admin overrides every CSS design token to a dark graphite / signal-orange palette, so ALL shared components (button, card, badge, table, stat, chart) render dark with zero new markup (R3). Chart island now reads tokens from its own element, so charts are theme-aware. Sections (each full-page class-based Livewire, English routes R13, localized DE/EN): - Overview: fleet KPIs, fleet-growth line, host-load bars, MRR bars, active runs, alerts. - Customers: table + plan doughnut. Instances: fleet table (vmid/host/storage). - Hosts: capacity cards (storage/CPU bars). Provisioning: runs table + live stepper. - Revenue: MRR/ARR/ARPU/churn KPIs, MRR line, plan doughnut, recent payments. - Locale-aware month labels/currency (Carbon/Number). 18 new Pest tests (guest redirect / non-admin 403 / admin render per section) → 44 green. R12 browser: all six admin pages HTTP 200, ZERO console errors (Chart.js dark). Codex (R15) — clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-25 08:35:03 +02:00