33 Commits (30b1d41c2e73fb4f62b1b9fdae4c0a7eccc740fa)

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
nexxo	30b1d41c2e	Release 1.3.26 ... Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-29 18:30:27 +02:00
nexxo	98d884727a	Warn that a package cannot be placed, before somebody pays for it ... The platform books thick: a package reserves its whole disk_gb — the sold quota plus the machine's own overhead — on ONE host at placement. That is the right choice for a small operator, because nothing can quietly overfill. It has one consequence nobody was being told about: the catalogue goes on offering a package no host has room for, and the first anyone hears of it is a PAID order failing at the reservation step. On the machine this was found on the numbers are stark. 2 x 512 GB NVMe in a mirror is about 400 GB usable; Start reserves 120, Team 540, Business 1050, Enterprise 2100. Three of the four packages on sale cannot be placed at all, and the fourth fits three times. So the console says so now, per package, with the shortfall — "Team needs 540 GB, the roomiest host has 260" — because "buy a server" is not the decision. "Buy a server big enough for what I am selling" is. Two things it deliberately does not do. It does not warn on an installation with no host at all: that is a machine nobody has onboarded yet, it has its own notice, and without the guard a fresh console greeted its operator with one warning per package before they had done anything. And it does not take the overview down when the catalogue cannot be read — a capacity warning does not get to break the page somebody opens when something is already wrong. The largest FREE HOST, never the sum: an instance goes on one machine, so two hosts with 300 GB each cannot take a 540 GB package between them. And when placement does fail, the log now names the shortfall instead of only 'no_capacity'. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-29 18:20:51 +02:00
nexxo	82f95df04c	Stop the 503 page appearing during an update ... Reported with the network panel open: `update` and `state` both answering 503, then the overlay, then Laravel's 503 page, then a reload. Three different screens for one event. Livewire's default on a failed request is to render the response body. So a wire:poll that happened to fire while the application was in maintenance mode swapped the whole console for the 503 page — the panel the operator was watching, replaced by an error page, for something that is not an error. A deployment IS maintenance mode; that is the event, not a fault. Three changes, and they are three because the request came from three places: The status endpoint is exempt from maintenance mode. It is the deployment's own status, read by the overlay every three seconds, and behind maintenance mode it answered 503 for the entire run — so the overlay could never name the step it was on. Safe to exempt: version, commit and a step name, behind the console's host and network guards, and it writes nothing. Livewire swallows a 503 instead of rendering it. For every request, not only the poll: any action taken in that window did the same thing. And the settings card stops polling for the duration. The overlay's own watcher is a plain fetch with no component state behind it, which is why it survives the restart; this poll cannot, and every attempt was a request that answered 503. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-29 17:50:15 +02:00
nexxo	98afd1d7e0	Re-apply what the last release commit silently reverted ... The English paths and the zone migration went out in 5f74a5f and were gone again in the tag. Reported for the fourth time, and the fourth report was right: nothing had changed on the server. What happened is mine and worth writing down. I have been building commits in a private index (GIT_INDEX_FILE) to avoid staging a parallel session's in-flight work, and moving the branch with `git update-ref`. That moves HEAD without touching the shared index — so the index still described the PREVIOUS commit. The very next ordinary `git commit` (the version bump) wrote that stale index as a tree, which reverted every file of the commit before it. The tag was cut from the revert. Two things follow. The private-index technique is only safe while the branch is not checked out; once it is, `git branch -f` refuses for exactly this reason and `update-ref` is the same operation with the safety removed. And a release is not verified by a green push — it is verified by reading the tag, which is what finally found this. Content unchanged from 5f74a5f: English fragments and legal paths with permanent redirects, the guarded zone migration, and the test that walks every route and fragment so a German path fails the suite instead of being reported again. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-29 17:36:43 +02:00
nexxo	1620cb9395	Release 1.3.22 ... v1.3.21 was taken by a parallel release between reading main and writing the commit; the version file went out saying 1.3.21 on a commit that is not that tag. Corrected here rather than by rewriting a pushed commit. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-29 17:26:46 +02:00
nexxo	6c3cdffc4e	Release 1.3.21 ... Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-29 17:20:19 +02:00
nexxo	d5b2612e24	Always name the host we are being served from, and stop promising a duration ... ── Why the domain list looked wrong ───────────────────────────────────────── Reported three times, and it was not only the setting. The list came from `admin_access.site_hosts` and the instance zone — and where SITE_HOST is not configured, site_hosts is EMPTY. So an installation reached by a name nobody wrote into the config listed ONLY the instance zone, and described it as the customers' domain: the page a visitor opened to check our addresses omitted the address they had just typed, and named the wrong thing as ours. The host serving the request is now always in the list. It is the one address that is true by construction and needs no configuration to be right. (The zone itself is still one setting, and it is now clupilot.cloud on this machine. On another installation it is Konsole → Integrationen → DNS-Zone.) ── The clock ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── "Eine Zeit angeben geht nicht — wenn es fertig ist, ist es fertig." Correct, and it was claimed three times over: an eyebrow saying "In 20 Minuten betriebsbereit", a provisioning log with minute marks down the side, and a closing line repeating it. A run waits on a hypervisor, on a certificate authority and on DNS propagating. A customer who once waits forty minutes has been told something untrue by their supplier, and the page cannot take it back. What replaces it is what actually IS promised and kept: the order of the steps, ticked off, numbered 1/5 to 5/5 — and then the sentence that answers the real question behind "how long", which is not a number but "do I have to sit here": you get an email with the address and the credentials when it is ready. The same claim is gone from the hero meta ("< 20 Min." → "automatisch"), from the figure line ("20 Minuten bis zum Betrieb" → "0 Termine bis zum Start") and from the FAQ, which now says outright that we do not name a duration and why. Kept deliberately: the 45-minute training session and the three-to-seven working days for setup. Those are appointments we schedule and commitments we control, not predictions about a machine. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-29 17:10:06 +02:00
nexxo	3a4324fb6f	Give people a way back in, and put the URL in English ... ── The hole ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── There was no password reset. Fortify's feature was commented out, so there was no link on the sign-in form, no page and no route — a customer who forgot their password was locked out of their own cloud until somebody opened a shell. On a product whose selling point is that you can ring somebody, that is a support call a week and an embarrassing one. Two pages of ours under Fortify's route names (R1/R2), because with views off Fortify registers only the POST endpoints. The mail is a Mailable in this product's design rather than the framework's MailMessage: somebody who has just been locked out is exactly the person a phishing mail is aimed at, and a message that looks nothing like the rest of our post is one they cannot check — ours carries the footer that names our domains. Three decisions worth stating, each with a test: The answer is identical whether the address is known or not. "No account with that address" turns the form into a way of finding out who is a customer. The reset kills every other session. Whoever knew the old password may still be signed in somewhere, and a reset that leaves them there has fixed nothing. It does NOT sign the visitor in. The link arrived by email, and a mailbox somebody else can read would otherwise be a session somebody else gets. ── /sicherheit → /security ───────────────────────────────────────────────── R13: paths are English. Mine was not. The old path stays as a permanent redirect because it has already gone out in mail footers. ── One wordmark ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── "Sometimes it says Cloud and sometimes it does not" — correct. It was on the footer, the placeholder and the maintenance screen, and absent from the header, the sidebar and the sign-in plate. The product is called CluPilot Cloud; that is the name on the invoices and in every mail, so it is now the name everywhere. The console sidebar takes the small size so the lockup, the ADMIN badge and the close button still share one line (R18). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-29 16:50:29 +02:00
nexxo	085b110e7f	Link the phishing page from the section people look in ... Reported: "I cannot find that under Sicherheit on the website." Fair — the page was linked from the site footer, from every mail footer and from under the sign-in form, and none of those is where somebody goes when the thought "is this really them?" occurs. They go to the section called Sicherheit. It is now the last thing in that section, as its own card: what the page is for, in one line, and where it leads. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-29 16:30:29 +02:00
nexxo	73313c4d4c	Release 1.3.17 ... Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-29 16:20:30 +02:00
nexxo	f8874f32ea	Put customer instances on their own domain, and say which domains are ours ... ── The zone ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── A fresh install now addresses customer instances under clupilot.cloud rather than clupilot.com. Not branding: a Nextcloud is third-party software that strangers sign in to, and on the same registrable domain as the portal it shares cookie scope, document.domain and CAA with it. The same reason googleusercontent.com and vercel.app exist. Existing installations keep whatever the console says — the zone has been a setting all along. `clupilot:check-zone <zone>` reports what a change would touch before anything is touched: the DNS records, the monitoring targets, the certificates and Nextcloud's trusted_domains all carry the old name and the setting reaches none of them. With no instances in service it says so and stops. Changing it later is a migration with an outage, and the command says that too. ── Which addresses are ours ──────────────────────────────────────────────── A new public page at /sicherheit: the domains that belong to us, the rule for reading an address bar, what we never do, and — the part that matters — what to do if you have already typed your password into a copy of our sign-in form. Change it, end every other session, change it wherever else you use it, tell us. In that order. Reachable without an account, deliberately: somebody who has just given their password away is signed in nowhere, and the page they need cannot be behind the thing they lost. Linked from the three places a person is when the question comes up: every mail footer (the mail is the vector), the sign-in form (this is the page a phishing kit copies, so the real one says which host you are on), and the site footer. The domain list is DERIVED from configuration and keyed by what each domain is for. A list typed into a page would eventually tell a customer that a phishing domain is one of ours, or that one of ours is not — the same two-sources-of-truth failure that had the price sheet promising an address on a domain the company does not own. The operator console is deliberately absent from it: naming it on a public page tells an attacker where to aim. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-29 16:03:13 +02:00
nexxo	a4626d2569	Stop root workers breaking every page, and let the panel be closed ... ── The 500 ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── "touch(): Utime failed: Operation not permitted", from BladeCompiler, on every request for the affected view. Blade compiles a view and then touch()es the compiled file to the source's mtime. touch() with an explicit time needs ownership of the file. A compose service without `user:` runs as ROOT — and queue, scheduler and reverb had none — so the first worker to render a view wrote a root-owned compiled file that the web process, as www-data, could never refresh again. The queue is what renders mails, which is why this surfaced now. queue, reverb and scheduler run as www-data. queue-provisioning stays root and says why: it brings wg0 up and runs `wg set` for every peer change, which needs NET_ADMIN on the running process. It renders no mail. And update.sh normalises ownership at the END of a run as well as at the start. The first call heals what a previous run left; the second heals what this one made — `git checkout` rewrites the tree as the service account while the old build is still serving. ── The panel that would not go away ───────────────────────────────────────── The same 500 is why it kept coming back: every poll failed, the watcher treats a failed request as "still restarting" (which it normally is), and the overlay stayed up over a console nobody could then reach to find out why. A restart is seconds. After two minutes of nothing the panel now says so and offers a way out — for an operator only, behind the same flag as the step and the log, so a customer on the 503 page is not shown a button suggesting they can call the deployment off. A successful answer clears it again: one bad minute must not leave a "something is wrong" notice sitting there for the rest of the run. Not an always-present close button. The deployment does not stop because somebody dismissed a panel, and offering that at the wrong moment is a lie. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-29 15:43:54 +02:00
nexxo	da76a260fb	Give the settings page an outline ... Reported as cramped boxes with empty space either side, and it was: one column half the window wide, eight cards of identical weight stacked in an order nobody chose — the operator's own password sitting between two platform-wide switches — and every card taking a full row to hold three lines of text. The page is wider now and has three groups, each with a heading: what belongs to the installation, what belongs to the signed-in operator, and the team. Short cards sit side by side instead of one per row. The two-factor policy moved into the installation group, where it belongs: it is a rule for everybody who signs in, set by the owner, not a setting on one account — and it fills the space the short website card was leaving beside the long allow-list. Fields are sized to what goes in them. The three password boxes were laid out three across inside a narrow card; they stack in a half-width one. The window times are four characters and were as wide as their column. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-29 15:29:07 +02:00
nexxo	6c92aa5dd7	Let an incident be deleted, and start measuring whether the hosts answer ... Three things, all from trying to actually use the incident page. ── Where the later entries go ─────────────────────────────────────────────── The form only ever creates the first one, and nothing said so — so it looked as though the stage had to be chosen up front and there was only a dropdown for the impact. The field now says what it becomes ("wird untersucht") and where the rest are added: on the incident itself, once it exists. ── Deleting ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── Asked for in order to test the thing at all, and right. A whole incident can now be removed, with its entries, behind a confirmation in the product's own dialog (R23). Deliberately not the same as editing an entry, which there is still no way to do: an update is a statement made at a time, and rewriting one afterwards is what the record exists to prevent. Removing the whole incident is a different act — it is how a test entry, or one published against the wrong service, is taken back, and it leaves nothing half-standing behind. A test holds that distinction so the delete button does not quietly become an exception to it. ── The hosts, which nothing was watching ──────────────────────────────────── `hosts.last_seen_at` drove the health dot in the console and was written exactly once, at onboarding — RegisterCapacity stamped it and that was the only write in the codebase. So every host read "offline" thirty minutes after it was added, permanently, and the dot meant nothing. It is also why host reachability could not appear on the status page: it was never being measured. PingHosts asks every host's API the cheapest question it answers, once a minute, and stamps the timestamp on success. Failure writes nothing on purpose: absence IS the signal, and a second column counting failures would be a second version of the same fact. The status page has a fifth component for it. Counts only — never a host name, never an address; the page is world-readable and the estate is not public information. A host between five and thirty minutes silent reads as degraded, not as healthy: "stale" is one of three answers healthState() gives and it is not the good one. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-29 15:16:48 +02:00
nexxo	0e3c50d9a1	Update on a schedule if the owner wants one, and say where incidents go ... ── Where the status page gets its data ────────────────────────────────────── Asked in as many words, and fairly: the page for maintaining incidents exists (console → Betrieb → Störungen) and nothing anywhere said so. The page now carries the answer at the top — what is written there appears publicly at once, the four components measure themselves, and there is a link straight to the live status page. ── Automatic updates, inside a window, switchable ─────────────────────────── Tick it and name the days and hours; leave it alone and nothing changes. The button stays either way: manual is always possible, at any hour. It leaves exactly the same request the button leaves — same file, same agent, same run. A second path into a deployment would be a second set of rules to keep in step with the first, and the automation must not be able to do what an operator is prevented from doing by hand: it checks the same three things the button is disabled by (agent alive, something released, nothing running). Nothing guards against having already updated by hand, and nothing needs to: an installation that is current has nothing available, so pressing the button at four leaves the five o'clock window with nothing to do. That was the owner's own question and it answers itself. Defaults are Tuesday to Thursday, 05:00–06:00. Not Monday — the week starts and every fault costs double. Not Friday — nobody wants to repair a deployment on a Friday afternoon. Not three in the morning: if it goes wrong, the person who has to fix it is asleep. A window whose end is before its start wraps past midnight, because 23:00 to 02:00 is a reasonable thing to ask for and reading it as an empty range would silently mean "never". Switched on with no weekday selected is refused rather than corrected — it is a configuration that reads as working and does nothing. The clock is the wall clock (R19): an operator who writes 05:00 means five in the morning where they live, and a window that drifts by an hour twice a year is a window nobody trusts. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-29 15:01:54 +02:00
nexxo	ea643b5e73	Prove a custom domain before serving it, and keep proving it ... Two things. ── The update screen, still opening twice ─────────────────────────────────── Reported again on 1.3.9, and the cause was not the one fixed in 1.3.8. The agent consumes the request file BEFORE it resolves the release — deliberately, because update.sh may kill the shell and a request left in place would loop — and writes `state: running` only once it has decided to go ahead. In between, the request is gone and the status does not say running yet, so the endpoint honestly answers "nothing is running". The watcher read that as "the run has finished" and reloaded the page: overlay on the click, gone a poll later, 503 after it. The overlay now closes only once the server has BOTH confirmed a run and then stopped reporting it. Before the confirmation, silence means the agent has not got there yet. Bounded at twenty polls so a request the agent refuses does not leave the console covered forever. ── Custom domains, proven and re-proven ───────────────────────────────────── `custom_domain` was a free-text field and everything downstream believed it: the proxy served it, the certificate was issued for it, Nextcloud trusted it. Anyone who pointed any hostname at the platform got somebody else's files under their own name. The proof is a TXT record at _clupilot-challenge.<domain> holding a token only this instance has. Nothing is served until it has been read. Every reader now goes through Instance::address(), which is the one place the decision is made — `custom_domain ?: subdomain` was the hole, written out four times. It is re-read every night at 03:40, because a token checked once can be taken straight back out and a domain that later lapses keeps resolving here. Three consecutive misses before a live domain is withdrawn: one failed lookup is a nameserver having a bad minute, and withdrawing takes a working Nextcloud off its own address. The domain and its token stay on the row so the customer can put the record back rather than start over. Changing the domain mints a NEW token. Reusing it would let somebody who once verified example.com claim any other domain later without touching its DNS — the old record is still sitting there and only the value is compared. The domain is changeable at any time, and removable. Fixing it once set was considered and rejected: adding or moving an address is a proxy entry, a certificate and one line in trusted_domains. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-29 14:47:51 +02:00
nexxo	17a6fabcc2	One wordmark, one typeface, and the address the server actually issues ... Reported as "logo and font are different everywhere" — maintenance page, customer panel, console, homepage. They were. Counting them up: the site header set the name in ink at -0.02em, the sidebar split it into "Clu" plus an orange "Pilot", the sign-in plate set it white at a third size, the customer two-factor page set it in MONO with no mark at all, the error pages and the placeholder each inlined their own — and the maintenance screen had no wordmark whatsoever. Nine surfaces, seven ideas of the brand. There is one now: resources/views/components/ui/brand.blade.php. Mark plus wordmark in one piece, in ink, with an optional muted "Cloud". No orange half — that made the accent a permanent fixture instead of something used sparingly. The four places that cannot use a Blade component (the two self-contained pages, the error layout, the mail layout) inline it and are held to the same shape by a test. The typeface. The console loads IBM Plex through Vite; the 503 page has no stylesheet at all, so the maintenance screen — the one page shown when somebody is already worried — was rendering in the system sans. It declares the fonts itself now. And the bold weight was missing from public/fonts entirely: the placeholder and the error pages both asked for ibm-plex-sans-latin-700-normal.woff2, which was not there. A @font-face pointing at nothing fails silently, which is why nobody noticed. The error pages carried the same two faults the placeholder shipped with: an empty gradient tile where the mark belongs, and `gap` on an inline-flex row spacing "Clu", "Pilot" and "Cloud" apart as three separate words. And the price sheet promised "Adresse auf clupilot.cloud" — a domain the company does not own — while provisioning was issuing addresses under whatever CLUPILOT_DNS_ZONE says. It is assembled from that setting now, the same reason the prices are read from the catalogue rather than typed into the page. welcome.blade.php removed: Laravel's leftover, reachable from no route. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-29 14:30:44 +02:00
nexxo	012d0f5092	Say EU, and stop promising to fix somebody else's deleted folder ... Two corrections from a read of the live pages. The location. Three public places named countries or a city — "aus deutschen und finnischen Rechenzentren" on the placeholder, "in Österreich und Deutschland" in the FAQ, "EU · Wien" in the product panel — and they did not even agree with each other. They all say EU now, which is the thing that is promised, the thing the AV-Vertrag pins down, and the thing that stays true when a host moves. The same string in the customer dashboard was worse: 'EU · Rechenzentrum Falkenstein' was hard-coded and shown to every customer whatever host their instance actually runs on. A specific claim nobody derived from the record. The closing headline asked who you call when a folder is missing on a Monday morning. It promised the wrong thing: what happens inside a customer's own Nextcloud is their own house — the recycle bin and the version history are right there — and presenting ourselves as the first call for somebody else's user error offers a service we do not run. It now asks who looks after updates, backups and outages, which is what the comparison section already says in the operator's own words and what the product is actually for. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-29 14:17:30 +02:00
nexxo	b843c10ec3	Give the update screen the product's colours, and only one window ... Two complaints, both correct, both mine. Dark blue. The panel carried a `prefers-color-scheme: dark` block — the only one in a product that has no dark mode. On a phone set to dark the update screen, and nothing else, turned dark blue. A dark mode for one page is not a dark mode; it is one page that does not match. It is gone. And even in daylight the panel was not this product's colours: it used Tailwind's slate ramp (#0f172a, #64748b, #e2e8f0), which is blue-tinted, against neutrals that are warm. Every value is now a copy of a token from portal-tokens.css, with the comment saying so, because this file cannot import them — it renders when the asset build may not exist. The small window then the big one. The settings card grew its own little "läuft gerade" block the instant a run started; up to three seconds later the full-page overlay covered it and said the same thing in a different size. The card no longer says it at all, and the overlay now opens on the button's own click — requestUpdate dispatches an event, but only once a run is actually pending, so a refused second press does not black out the console. Two more things found while looking: The panel had `min-height: 100%`, which resolves against the parent's height. On the 503 page the parent is <body>, whose height is auto — so it computed to zero, the panel was only as tall as its text, and the bottom two thirds of the screen stayed the browser's default white. Viewport units now, dvh so a phone's collapsing address bar leaves no strip either. And the mark was a plain orange tile again, the same empty-square that was just fixed on the placeholder. The real logo is inlined. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-29 14:11:01 +02:00
nexxo	4755a4f362	Redesign the pre-launch placeholder, and fix its wordmark and mark ... Reported from a phone on status.clupilot.com, which serves this page because the site is still switched to private. Two real defects behind the complaint: The wordmark read "Clu Pilot Cloud". `gap` on a flex container applies between EVERY child and a bare text node is a child — so an inline-flex row wrapped around "Clu", <i>Pilot</i> and " Cloud" put nine pixels between each of them. The wordmark is one element now and the gap only ever separates it from the mark. The logo was a plain gradient tile with nothing in it, which reads as an image that failed to load. That is a poor thing to leave somebody with on a page whose whole message is "we are building this properly". The real mark — cloud plus autopilot ascent — is inlined; it has to be in the file because this page renders when the asset build may not exist at all. The redesign itself: the card is gone. The page is now a centred composition on the open ground — the state as a pill above everything, the mark, the headline at the size the rest of the site uses, and the three promises the paragraph was already making set as their own line so there is something to look at besides one block of text. One warm bloom behind it, drawn as a gradient rather than a blurred disc, which banded into visible rings. Still self-contained, and still the only page exempt from the shared stylesheet: it is served mid-deploy and on a fresh install, where @vite would throw instead of rendering the reassurance somebody came for. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-29 13:43:56 +02:00
nexxo	b85df4c141	Rebuild the status page as a status page ... Asked for after looking at how real ones are built. The shape they all share is a convention, and a convention is what lets somebody find the answer without being taught the page: banner, components each with ninety days of uptime, then the written record underneath. This page had only the banner — the version that is of no use the morning after, because "Alle Dienste in Betrieb" is true and says nothing to somebody who was locked out the evening before. Three things are new. The ninety-day bar. It cannot be reconstructed after the fact: the monitoring table holds the last verdict per instance, not a history. So a sampler (clupilot:sample-status, every five minutes beside the monitoring sync) writes counts into one row per component per day, and the page divides them. A day with no row is drawn as a gap and says "nicht aufgezeichnet" — never green. Degraded samples count as reachable in the percentage but still colour the day: folding them into downtime reports a slow morning as an outage, ignoring them loses the only trace of it. The incident record. An operator reports a disruption in the console, posts updates as it develops, and the entry that says "behoben" is the same action that closes it — two separate steps is how a page ends up with a resolved note under an incident that still reports as ongoing. There is deliberately no way to edit an update: it is a statement made at a time, corrections are a further entry. An open incident may make a component look worse than the probes found it, never better. Scheduled maintenance, from the windows the console already keeps rather than a second list somebody has to remember to fill in. The measurement moved out of the controller into ServiceHealth, shared with the sampler, so the banner and the bars cannot disagree about what "healthy" means. The page now uses the shared design system and the site's header and footer. Its self-contained stylesheet was there to survive a broken asset build; it does not survive one — if the stylesheet cannot be served the application serving this page is already failing, and mid-deployment every route answers with the maintenance page. What the exemption bought was a third design nobody maintained. Found while building: durationMinutes had its operands the wrong way round, and diffInMinutes is signed, so the public page printed "Dauer -86 Minuten". Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-29 12:45:18 +02:00
nexxo	696c8834b8	Redesign the public website instead of recolouring it ... Correctly rejected: the last pass was the old page in new paint. It kept the skeleton — eight numbered sections, a split hero, a twelve-row comparison matrix — and changed only the palette. A palette is not a design. What is actually different now: - The § numbering is gone. Numbered sections with a drawn rule are a document convention, and the document voice is exactly what the product's design system dropped. - The hero shows the product instead of describing it: centred type, then a wide panel built from the real console's own tokens, cropped by the section below. The old hero put a table of facts beside the headline, so a visitor read two columns before seeing anything. - Six identical cards, then six more, then six more became one asymmetric grid — a large panel, a dark tile, an accent tile, a wide module row — so the important thing is allowed to be bigger than the rest. - The industries are one dense two-column list instead of six cards repeating each other's shape. - The page has one dark hinge in the middle (the deployment) rather than a dark section among seven light ones. - The evidence table became rows that pair the measure with the piece of paper you can hand somebody, which is what it is for. - Prices are cards, with the full matrix folded away underneath. The matrix used to be the first thing a visitor met: twelve rows of ticks before a single price was legible. - The FAQ heading sits still while the questions scroll past it. - The footer is a real footer. The header is a floating bar rather than a full-width band, and opaque in both states — translucency plus backdrop-blur reads as a rendering fault over the dark panels that scroll under it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-29 11:43:25 +02:00
nexxo	43d58de7f8	Rebuild the public website in the shared design system ... Reported plainly: the site is still in the old style. It was — it was the last of the three surfaces the token file describes that had never been converted. landing.blade.php carried its own complete design system inside a <style> block: warm paper, IBM Plex Serif headlines, 3px corners, its own scale of greys, written before the tokens existed. Somebody who clicked "Anmelden" left one company and arrived at another. The page now draws from resources/css/portal-tokens.css like the portal and the console: same surfaces, same radii, same button hierarchy, same small-caps label, one family at weight 700 instead of a serif. What still differs is rhythm, which is what a marketing page is allowed to differ in. Content is unchanged. New: components/layouts/site.blade.php holds the header and footer for every public page, and legal.blade.php uses it too — the imprint used to be a stranded card in a third style again. Two things found on the way: - .lbl set `color: var(--muted)`, which is not a token. An undefined var() in `color` computes to `unset`, so every small-caps label on every surface was whatever colour its container happened to be. - The big figures were set in mono. Mono gives the decimal comma a full glyph cell, so "99,95" read as three separate numbers. coming-soon and the status page stay self-contained on purpose — both are served when the application may not have a built stylesheet at all. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-29 11:26:35 +02:00
nexxo	f8f0de4892	Let an update install host packages, without handing out root ... Asked for directly: "später wenn ich etwas lokal erweitere will ich mich nicht auf alle adminseiten einloggen müssen und extra rsync installieren". An update runs as the service account, so anything root-owned on the host is out of its reach and turns into "log into every server once and paste this". The obvious fix — sudo on deploy/install-agent.sh — is not a grant at all: the service account owns the checkout and can rewrite the very script it would be allowed to run as root. So the privileged part is written OUT of the checkout by install-agent.sh, to /usr/local/sbin/clupilot-host-step, root:root 0755, from a quoted here-document. The service account cannot influence a byte of it. sudoers names one exact command line including its argument, so a step added to the helper later is not covered by a grant written before it existed, and the helper refuses anything not on its own list as well. update.sh uses it only when rsync is actually missing, after the restart and never fatally: the archive is collected hours later, and an update that died over a package would be the bigger problem. A helper older than the steps the updater wants is reported through the existing one-time-setup hint — silently doing nothing is worse than an error. Existing servers still need `sudo bash deploy/install-agent.sh` once, because that is the run that puts the helper there. After it, they do not. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-29 10:27:56 +02:00
nexxo	77bd30ca56	Answer on every name for the website, and send them all to one ... SITE_HOST takes a comma-separated list now, the first name canonical. It serves the site; every other name in the list redirects there permanently, path and query intact. An apex domain and its www are two names for one thing, and answering on both without picking one splits search rankings and cookies between them. The redirect is a host-bound catch-all rather than middleware. Middleware that only some routes carry is the same half-measure this file already made once, and a catch-all registered without a host would swallow every path in the application — which is what the third test is there to stop. The test harness needed fixing too, and the fix is the finding. Router::dispatch on a standalone router does not rebind the container's request, so a route reading one — through the helper OR through an injected parameter, both of which resolve from the container — gets the test's request rather than the one being answered. The redirect silently lost its query string in the test while working in production. dispatchOn() binds it where the framework would. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-29 01:29:33 +02:00
nexxo	21762284a7	Bind the portal to its own hostname too, so the website cannot serve it ... The previous release bound the landing page and stopped there. The website duly vanished from the portal — and the portal stayed reachable from the website: www.clupilot.com/dashboard, /login, /settings all kept working. Half a separation is no separation, and it was reported back within the hour. APP_HOST binds every portal route, Fortify's own POST actions included through fortify.domain — a sign-in form on the website's hostname would otherwise post to a route that answers there. SITE_HOST now takes the legal pages and robots.txt with the landing page rather than leaving them everywhere; binding them is also what makes route('legal.impressum') produce a www URL from inside a queued mail, where there is no request to take a hostname from. There is no clever middleware here and there should not be. Route::domain() is the mechanism: a route registered for one host does not exist on another, and a request for it gets the 404 it deserves. The only deliberate exception is "/" on the portal host, which redirects to the dashboard or the sign-in page — that is what people type from memory, and turning it into an error page to make a point about hostnames helps nobody. The Stripe webhook and /up stay host-agnostic: Stripe posts to whichever URL it was given, and a mismatch there loses payments. Both are opt-in and empty by default, which every development machine reached by a bare IP depends on. The tests now check BOTH directions for every path rather than only the one that was reported. That is the mistake this commit exists to correct. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-29 01:06:50 +02:00
nexxo	5f7b8ff81b	Cut 1.3.0 ... Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-29 00:42:06 +02:00
nexxo	4d4d1dd5d5	Stop the update agent dying on its own tag arithmetic ... Since 1.2.0 the agent has ended with a non-zero status on every tick, before writing anything. The console showed a check that never finished and a last-checked time frozen at the moment of the deployment, and the update button could not be reached at all — the one mechanism that would have delivered the fix. Two instances of the same trap, both mine, both under `set -Eeuo pipefail`: The tag count was `release_version_gt … && echo`. The LAST iteration is almost always a tag that is not newer, so the loop ended non-zero, pipefail carried it out of the pipeline, the command substitution inherited it, and set -e ended the agent. `if` rather than `&&` is the whole fix: an if whose condition is false still returns 0. The newest tag came from `git tag … | head -1`. head exits after one line, git takes SIGPIPE, pipefail does the rest. install-agent.sh has carried a written warning about exactly this since it was written; I read it and wrote it anyway. Both now live in deploy/lib/release.sh, because the reason neither was caught is that no PHP test can reach a bash pipeline. tests/Feature/ReleaseComparisonTest.php runs the real functions in a real throwaway repository under the agent's own set -Eeuo pipefail, and asserts the EXIT CODE as well as the answer — an answer nobody lives to read is not an answer. The SIGPIPE case needs four hundred tags to reproduce, because a short list finishes writing before head leaves. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-29 00:00:17 +02:00
nexxo	6998a22527	Repair ownership by looking inside, not at the door ... The ownership repair added in 1.1.1 sampled the owner of each top-level directory and skipped the recursion when it already matched. node_modules was owned by www-data; node_modules/.vite-temp, left behind by an earlier root build, was not. So the repair walked past it, `npm run build` failed with EACCES, and the deployment stopped in maintenance mode — on the release whose whole point was that this could not happen. A directory's owner says nothing about its contents. It now walks each tree once with find and changes only the entries that are wrong, which is also cheaper than the detect-then-chown-everything it replaces. Verified against the shape that actually failed: a root-owned file inside a www-data-owned node_modules, repaired. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-28 23:53:25 +02:00
nexxo	c7a3224466	Cut 1.2.0 ... Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-28 23:44:18 +02:00
nexxo	00b9107ee3	Deploy as the application's user, and take back what root already took ... The 500 on the VPN config download was never in the VPN code. storage/logs/ laravel.log was owned by root, mode 644, since 27.07 04:16 — the moment a failed `artisan optimize` wrote its error there during a deployment. From then on the application could not append to its own log: Monolog threw on every attempt, and a throw while logging is a 500 on any page that logs, with nothing written down to say why. The error page said "Er wurde protokolliert". It was not. It surfaced on the config download because that is one of the few pages writing a log line on its way through — on success and on a wrong password alike. Pages that log nothing were unaffected, which is exactly why it looked like a VPN fault for days. `docker compose exec` is root unless told otherwise, and every deployment script relied on that default — including the agent's allowlist sync, which runs every minute. docker/entrypoint.sh had it right all along and drops to www-data for precisely these commands. Now so does everything else, help text included: telling an operator to run artisan as root is how the file ends up owned by root in the first place. update.sh also repairs what an earlier run left behind, before its first unprivileged step rather than after — a root-owned log file is not self-healing, the page that trips over it is nowhere near the deployment that caused it, and with in_app unprivileged a root-owned vendor/ would break the next composer step outright. tests/Feature/DeploymentRunsAsTheAppUserTest.php holds the line. It was checked against the previous commit and finds all nine places that were wrong. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-28 22:52:09 +02:00
nexxo	21b7aaca42	Update only to a released version, never to whatever landed on main ... Asked for directly: a commit on main must change nothing on a server, and only a tag whose version is higher than the installed one may be installed. The agent asked two different questions before this. A pinned server compared tags; everything else counted commits on its branch — so a console following main offered an update for every push, verified or not, and "Jetzt aktualisieren" meant "take whatever is on the branch right now". Landing on main and being released are different events, and only the second is a decision somebody made. It is one question now, regardless of what the checkout is attached to: is there a tag whose version is higher than the deployed one? Compared with sort -V against the version in the deployment manifest — not the VERSION file, which an update moves before it migrates, so a run that failed in between would leave the checkout claiming a version it never finished installing. A run always targets that tag; the branch path is gone. A request that arrives with nothing to install is answered rather than obeyed, before anything announces a run. The console follows: the button is disabled with nothing released, says so in a line rather than leaving a grey button to be guessed at, names the version it would install rather than a count, and refuses the action server-side as well — a Livewire action is a public endpoint, and one place a rule may not live is only in the disabled attribute of a button. VERSION becomes 1.1.0, to be tagged as the first release this mechanism can see. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-28 22:32:44 +02:00
nexxo	e9240c1324	feat(deploy): releases you can pin to, and a version that tells the truth ... VERSION at the repository root is the release number and the only place it is written down — a file rather than `git describe`, because a source archive, a shallow CI checkout and a container built without .git have no tags to describe. Cutting a release is editing that file and merging it; CI creates the annotated v<VERSION> tag once green, only on the commit that raised the number, and never moves it. Servers are pinned to these. Two modes, and the difference is the point. RELEASE=v1.0.0 pins a server to an immutable tag, checked out detached: it moves when someone decides it moves. BRANCH=main follows the edge, where CI tags a commit only after it is pushed. The mode is remembered, so re-running the updater on a pinned box does not quietly walk it back onto main. Going backwards is refused, by commit ancestry rather than by comparing version strings — a tag can be cut from anywhere, and only ancestry says whether history is going back. The schema has already moved forward by then, and the migrations needed to reverse it are not in the older checkout at all. What the console reports comes from a manifest written atomically after every step succeeded, never from live git: git says what the files are, not whether the deployment came up. So a failed update keeps reporting the version that is actually serving — including its version number, not the newer one the checkout has already moved to. A deployment pinned to the tag reads "1.0.0 (abc1234)"; anything else reads "1.0.0-dev (abc1234) · main", because every commit after the tag still carries VERSION=1.0.0 and is not that release. Reporting it as one is how a bug gets filed against the wrong code. Codex reviewed the design before it was written and the result six times after. Its findings, all real: the version had to come from the manifest too, not just the commit; branch names need JSON escaping or the manifest silently vanishes; a `case` glob does not anchor and accepted 1x.2y.3garbage; pinning to the commit a server already sits on skipped recording the mode, and then skipped detaching; a manifest that failed to write would never be repaired; an unparseable timestamp would 500 every admin page; and an empty tag list read as a connectivity failure. 466 tests green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-26 15:21:38 +02:00