11 Commits (5883989552e6ef2db6c1503069a909ee8ca05ab4)

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
nexxo	fed4acf31c	Accept terms instead of a start date, and fix the sender no server accepts ... **The test mail was rejected: "553 5.7.1 Sender address rejected: not owned by user no-reply@…".** Every purpose mailbox here has its own SMTP account, and a mail server lets an account send only from the address it owns. Mail::to() hands back a pending mail bound to the DEFAULT mailer and sendNow() then ignores the mailer the mailable asked for, so a mail addressed support@ went out over the no-reply@ login. It sends through the mailable's own mailer now, and the cloud-ready preview — the one mailable with no mailbox at all — takes the provisioning mailbox like the real notification does. Writing the test for that found the same bug in production code: **InvoiceMail and OrderConfirmationMail set their From to billing@ and never named a mailer**, so both went out over mail.default's no-reply@ login. On this installation no customer had ever received an invoice mail or an order confirmation; they rendered perfectly, queued without complaint and were refused at the door. MailSenderOwnershipTest now scans for the mismatch: a mail that takes a mailbox From must use that mailbox's mailer. **The box on the order page accepts the terms now**, not an immediate start. It used to carry the whole FAGG §16 sentence, which read like a choice between "now" and "in fourteen days" — and there is no second option. The terms are what regulate the sale, so they had to exist: resources/views/legal/terms.blade.php replaces the placeholder with fourteen sections written from what this software actually does — the delivery, the capacity queue, the full refund on withdrawal, the cancellation at period end, the deletion deadlines. The company data comes from CompanyProfile, so the page and the invoices cannot drift. No availability figure and no liability cap has been invented. No order goes through without it: the button is unusable until the box is ticked and says why, and CheckoutController still refuses server-side — the browser half refuses nothing. The request field is `terms_accepted`; the Stripe metadata key stays `immediate_start`, because a session opened before a deploy is paid after it and the webhook would find nothing under a new name. **"Wird der Account nach fünf Tagen gelöscht?"** Only an unconfirmed one. That was the whole of what we said, so the answer looked like yes. The second rule now exists and is stated: PruneDormantAccounts removes a confirmed account after a year when it never had a package — no customer record at all, which is where every order, contract and seven-year invoice hangs. A fortnight's notice goes out first, once, and `dormant_warned_at` is what permits the deletion: an account whose warning never went out is never removed. Signing in resets the clock, measured off the device rows because users has no last_login_at. Both deadlines are said in the portal settings, on the verification page, and in the terms — each reading the number off the command that enforces it. Also: the wordmark scan matched any element whose text merely BEGINS with the company name, which a paragraph of terms does. It looks for the lockup form now (no whitespace after the tag), which is what it was always about. The seven checkout tests in the parallel session's files were posting the old field name and now post the new one. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-30 15:22:35 +02:00
nexxo	c354ad1463	Make mails readable on a phone, and let an operator look at one ... Three things the owner reported, and one sentence that promised something this product does not do. **The mails had a fixed width.** components/mail/layout.blade.php set width="600" and width:600px, so every phone showed a 600px canvas in a 390px window and one had to scroll sideways to read a sentence. Now the table is width="100%" with max-width:600px — fluid, with 600 as a ceiling rather than a floor. A mail cannot fix this with a media query (Outlook renders with Word and drops <style> blocks), which is why the whole file is inline attributes and why the shrinking has to be built in. Side padding went 40px -> 24px in the layout and in all nine mail views: 40 each side leaves 278px of a 390px screen to read in. **There was no way to look at a mail.** An invoice mail needs an invoice, a maintenance announcement needs a window, and "register an account to see whether the confirmation reads well" is not a workflow — which is how the fixed width survived for months. App\Services\Mail\MailPreviews builds all nine from sample data, every record with make() and never create(), so a preview leaves no invoice, order or window behind and draws no number from a series. Two ways to see one: in a tab as the document itself, or sent to the signed-in operator's own address. There is no recipient field — that would be a form for mailing strangers. sendNow(), not send(): every mailable here implements ShouldQueue, and send() defers to the queue for those, which would have put a failure in a worker's log while the button reported success to somebody waiting for the mail. The test caught that. **The booking page had no shell.** Order declared layouts.portal — the bare shell the sign-in pages use, no navigation and no padding — so the page sat flush against the top and bottom of the window with no way back to anything. layouts.portal-app, like every other portal page. **The consent box said something untrue.** Its refusal read "otherwise we can only build your cloud once the withdrawal period has ended", which describes a path that does not exist: nothing here delivers fourteen days later, and an unticked box simply means no order. Said plainly now, and said on the page before somebody runs into the refusal. Also: GrantedPlanPortalTest asserted assertDontSee('179'), which matches any id containing those digits — and ids climb through a suite run because a rolled-back transaction does not reset an auto-increment counter. It passed alone and failed in company. Asserts on '179,00' now, which is what a leaked price would actually look like. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-30 14:50:37 +02:00
nexxo	0e25fe88d4	Keep a register of what was sent, and answer the customer from here ... Three complaints, one shape: the console knew things and could not act on them, so the work happened somewhere else and left no trace. The header said "4 Hinweis(e)" and led nowhere. Whoever read it had to know that the list was a card further down the same page, and then go looking for the host or the failed run by hand. The count is a link now, every notice carries the page that shows the thing it is about, and the plural is a word rather than a bracket. Nothing recorded what this installation had sent. "Hat der Kunde die Zugangsdaten je bekommen, und wann?" was answered on the mail server — a different machine, a different program, and nothing an operator can put in front of somebody who says nothing ever arrived. Every mail now writes a row: when, to whom, which mailable, and the customer it belongs to. Written from MessageSent, so a row means the transport accepted it; that is the strongest thing an application can honestly claim, and a column called "delivered" would be pretending otherwise. Verification and reset mails are left out on purpose — they go to unconfirmed addresses and anybody who can type into a form can send them, so recording them would hand the register to whoever wants to fill it. And the customer list was the end of the road. There is a page behind it now: what they bought, what they asked in their own words, what we sent them, and a box to write the next message. It goes out from the support mailbox and is recorded on the way — with its body, because an operator typed it and "what exactly did I write to them in March" is a question the mail server's log cannot answer either. Answering a request from here closes it, which is the reason to answer from here at all: answering from a mail client leaves it open for ever, because nothing tells it otherwise. Found on the way, by a test that sent a real mail rather than asserting it was queued: resources/views/mail/reset-password.blade.php was missing its closing </x-mail.layout>. The component's contents were never terminated, the layout's own @if ran off the end of the file, and the mail raised a Blade syntax error instead of rendering. Password reset has therefore never delivered a link since it was built. Closed, plus a test that renders it and one that counts opening against closing tags across every mail view. Reading INCOMING mail in the console is not in this: it needs the mailbox polled over IMAP, which is a credential and a dependency. Requests filed through the portal appear here in full; a customer who writes by mail instead still has to be read in the mail client. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-29 21:02:36 +02:00
nexxo	3a4324fb6f	Give people a way back in, and put the URL in English ... ── The hole ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── There was no password reset. Fortify's feature was commented out, so there was no link on the sign-in form, no page and no route — a customer who forgot their password was locked out of their own cloud until somebody opened a shell. On a product whose selling point is that you can ring somebody, that is a support call a week and an embarrassing one. Two pages of ours under Fortify's route names (R1/R2), because with views off Fortify registers only the POST endpoints. The mail is a Mailable in this product's design rather than the framework's MailMessage: somebody who has just been locked out is exactly the person a phishing mail is aimed at, and a message that looks nothing like the rest of our post is one they cannot check — ours carries the footer that names our domains. Three decisions worth stating, each with a test: The answer is identical whether the address is known or not. "No account with that address" turns the form into a way of finding out who is a customer. The reset kills every other session. Whoever knew the old password may still be signed in somewhere, and a reset that leaves them there has fixed nothing. It does NOT sign the visitor in. The link arrived by email, and a mailbox somebody else can read would otherwise be a session somebody else gets. ── /sicherheit → /security ───────────────────────────────────────────────── R13: paths are English. Mine was not. The old path stays as a permanent redirect because it has already gone out in mail footers. ── One wordmark ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── "Sometimes it says Cloud and sometimes it does not" — correct. It was on the footer, the placeholder and the maintenance screen, and absent from the header, the sidebar and the sign-in plate. The product is called CluPilot Cloud; that is the name on the invoices and in every mail, so it is now the name everywhere. The console sidebar takes the small size so the lockup, the ADMIN badge and the close button still share one line (R18). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-29 16:50:29 +02:00
nexxo	92bcdcd186	Send the invoice with the invoice attached ... The PDF is rendered when the mail goes out rather than fetched from anywhere, because nothing stores it — and rendering from the frozen snapshot means the attachment is the document as issued no matter when the queue gets to it or how often it retries. fromData rather than fromPath: there is no path. Three attempts at testing it, and the first two were wrong in ways worth recording. Attachment::$data does not exist — the closure lives in a protected $resolver, and reaching for it was me testing the framework's internals rather than my own code. And a byte comparison of the PDF cannot work at all: TCPDF embeds a creation time and a document id, so two renders of one invoice differ. Split into the two things that can actually go wrong. The mail carries an attachment with the right filename and type — that is metadata, and it is asserted as metadata. And the renderer produces a real PDF rather than an empty one, asserted where the renderer is, because an attachment closure that returns nothing still makes a perfectly valid mail with a nought-byte file on it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-29 02:13:41 +02:00
nexxo	b1ab0f7f31	Put every mail in one design, and confirm an order when the money arrives ... Four templates, one layout. Two of them — the maintenance announcement and its cancellation — still wore Laravel's markdown component, which brings its own logo, its own button and its own footer: the product was sending mail that looked like two different companies, one of which was the framework. New: an order confirmation, sent when the payment lands rather than when provisioning finishes. Those are minutes apart at best and can be much longer, and somebody who has just been charged and heard nothing assumes the worst about both the charge and the product. It deliberately promises no time for the cloud itself — provisioning takes what it takes, CloudReady announces the end, and a promised minute that slips is worse than no promise. Queued after the transaction, never inside it, and never allowed to fail the webhook: Stripe retries anything that is not a 2xx, and a retry would re-enter provisioning over a mail server having a bad minute. The finished-cloud mail now names what was actually built — address, plan, storage, location — because somebody who ordered a fortnight ago is checking it against what they bought, and that is a comparison rather than a sentence. Still no credential in it. Two tests earn their place. One holds every template on the shared layout, so a new one written in a hurry cannot copy-paste its way back to the framework's. The other proves the finished-cloud mail carries no password — asserted against the data the mail is given and the HTML it renders, not against the template's source, because the first version of that test tripped over the word in a comment and would have passed a template that leaked the value through a variable. It tested the prose, not the mail. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-29 00:14:04 +02:00
nexxo	5b8c28595a	Require a confirmed address before an account can use anything ... Registration opened an account that could sign in immediately on an address nobody had proved was theirs — and anybody can type a stranger's into a registration form. Both halves were commented out: the Fortify feature and MustVerifyEmail on the model. `verified` sits on the whole portal group rather than on the pages that spend money. An unconfirmed address is not a billing problem to be caught at checkout; it is an account that may not belong to the person holding it, and the servers, the users and the backups behind it are worth as much to whoever typed the address as to whoever owns it. The mail is a Mailable in this product's design rather than Laravel's notification, which would arrive with the framework's logo, button and footer as the first thing anybody ever receives from CluPilot. It also has to leave through the SYSTEM mailbox like every other account mail, which the notification path does not do on its own. The link is signed and expires, and the address is part of what is signed — so a link issued to a mistyped address stops working the moment the address is corrected, rather than confirming an address nobody can read. Tests cover the tampered link, the expired one, the corrected address, and one account trying to confirm another. The waiting page is ours (Fortify has views off) and offers the only two things that move somebody forward: send it again, or sign out and register with the address they meant. The resend is throttled, because otherwise it is a button that makes the server send mail to an arbitrary address as fast as it can be clicked. Somebody already confirmed is redirected away from it — the `verified` middleware only guards the other direction. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-28 23:43:20 +02:00
nexxo	2609393e3a	Recognise the devices an account signs in from, and warn about a new one ... Sessions lived in Redis, where they cannot be enumerated — one key per session, no index by user — so "where am I signed in" and "end that one" were not answerable at all. The database driver keeps a row per session and makes ending one a delete. It costs every currently signed-in person one forced sign-in, once, which is why it is happening now rather than later. The warning is only worth anything if it is rare, so the two obvious signals are deliberately not used. Not the IP: it changes on every train, every café, every mobile handover, and behind a VPN it is not theirs to begin with. Not the user-agent: Chrome ships every four weeks and the string changes each time, which would be twelve warnings a year per customer, describing nothing. A device is a long-lived signed cookie holding a random token, and nothing else is consulted. The honest cost — cleared cookies, a private window, a second browser — is written into the mail itself, because a reader who thinks the warning is wrong stops reading the next one. Three things the tests found or hold: The first device on an account is new and must not warn. Replying to somebody creating an account by telling them they signed in from a new device is noise on the one message that has to stay worth reading. token_hash was globally unique, and the shared-browser test failed on it. Two people on one machine share one cookie and must each own a device row against it; the obvious repair — issue a fresh token for the second — would orphan the first person's row and warn them about their own desk. Unique is now per identity. Recording a device may never block a sign-in. A safeguard that locks the owner out when it breaks has stopped being one, so the listener logs and swallows, and a test drops the tables to prove it. Sessions are linked by a uuid carried inside the session payload rather than by the session id, which Laravel rotates on every sign-in and every regenerate(). Laravel's own sessions.user_id cannot carry the link either: it is filled from the default guard, while operators and customers are two guards and two tables (R21) — operator 1 and customer 1 would each be offered the other's sessions. Also lands the shared mail layout the rest of the templates will use: tables and inline styles for Outlook, no image and no web font because half of all clients block remote content, and the button in --accent-active rather than the brand orange, which is 2.9:1 against white. Not tagged: the session list is not built yet, and without a tag no server can install this. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-28 23:28:34 +02:00
nexxo	bd779f00e5	Show times on the operator's clock, keep storing them in UTC ... The console announced an update for "spätestens um 15:21" while the clock on the wall said 17:21. Not a formatting slip in one string: fourteen views and four components printed database values straight out, so every absolute time in the product was two hours out all summer and one hour out all winter. Two of those views looked as though they had handled it. They called ->timezone(config('app.timezone')) which reads like "convert to local time" and, app.timezone being the STORAGE zone that must stay UTC, converts to UTC — a no-op wearing the costume of a fix, which is worse than no call at all because it stops the next person looking. That exact string is now banned by test. Worse than the labels were two FORMS. Maintenance windows and plan versions filled their datetime-local fields from UTC and parsed what came back as UTC. A datetime-local field carries no offset — it is the digits a person reads off their own clock — so an operator typing 21:00 scheduled a window for 23:00 their time, and nothing anywhere said so. App\Support\LocalTime now holds toField() and fromField() side by side, because getting one end right is not half a fix, it is a fresh bug. The mechanism is one Carbon macro, ->local(). It copies before converting: Illuminate\Support\Carbon is mutable, so without that, rendering a timestamp would rewrite the model attribute as a side effect and anything comparing or saving it afterwards would be an hour or two out. Both Carbon classes get the same body — Carbon keeps macros in one global table, so the second registration replaces the first for every Carbon class, and two different bodies meant the immutable version, safe for itself, silently became the mutable one's implementation too. My own test caught that. The existing tests had not caught any of this because they built their expected values with the same wrong call the views used — a test that recomputes the implementation asserts nothing. They now assert the wall clock, and the queued update additionally asserts that the UTC time is NOT shown. Recorded as R19 in CLAUDE.md and enforced by tests/Feature/DisplayTimezoneTest: no Blade or Livewire component may format an absolute time without ->local(), the UTC no-op is banned, storage stays UTC, both sides of the DST boundary are checked, ->local() must not mutate, and a form field must round-trip to the same instant. APP_DISPLAY_TIMEZONE, default Europe/Vienna. 615 tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-27 17:32:21 +02:00
nexxo	52fa7a34a2	feat(admin): email affected customers when maintenance is cancelled (ledger-guarded) ... Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-25 16:07:21 +02:00
nexxo	eff8c08258	feat(admin): maintenance windows — schedule once, assign many hosts, notify ... - maintenance_windows + host pivot + notification ledger; derived state (never stored); affected-customer + banner queries live off instances - admin /maintenance: create draft/publish, multi-host select, impact counts, cancel; capability-gated (maintenance.manage) - publish emails affected customers once (queued Mailable, ledger-idempotent) - customer portal maintenance banner (upcoming <=72h + active) merged per window Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-25 15:53:50 +02:00