A lost response, or a retry after a later step failed, made every further
attempt a 404 — and the host impossible to purge.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Swallowing it and carrying on deleted the row that held the only reference to
that record, publishing the machine's management address for good. The purge now
fails instead — and is retried, since it re-reads the host and its other steps
are idempotent — so a broken DNS provider becomes a visible failed job rather
than a silent leak.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Codex was right that my never-reuse claim did not hold:
- The lock was released with only a candidate in hand, so two concurrent
onboardings in one datacenter could pick the same name and overwrite each
other's record. The name is now persisted on the host while still locked.
- The number was derived from the hosts that happen to exist, so removing the
highest one handed that number straight back out — a cached name would then
resolve to a different machine. The counter is stored per datacenter, floored
by what is actually in use so a wiped settings store cannot reissue live names.
- PurgeHost deleted the row that carried the record id, leaving the machine's
management address published with nothing left to clean it up.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
fsn-01.node.clupilot.com, numbered per datacenter and never reused — removing a
host must not renumber its neighbours onto its name, so the number is stored
rather than derived.
The record points at the host's WireGuard address, not its public IP: the name
exists so an operator can reach a host by name over the VPN, and publishing a
Proxmox host's public address would hand every scanner a target, which is the
one thing this network design avoids.
DNS is convenience, not a prerequisite: a failure logs an event and lets the
onboarding finish rather than stranding a host that is otherwise ready.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Defaulting missing netin/netout to zero reset the baseline, so the next real
sample added the entire cumulative counter again — a customer throttled for
traffic that was counted twice. Such a sample is skipped and logged now.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- update.sh restarted the long-lived services before clearing the caches, so
they booted from the old cached config and kept it for the life of the
process — the release's configuration never reached the workers.
- install.sh put the Gitea token in the clone URL, which is visible in the
process list to every local user while the clone runs. It goes through a
short-lived askpass helper now.
- The collector's uniqueness lock expired at exactly the collection interval,
so a delayed queue could run two collectors on the same baseline and count
the same delta twice — throttling a customer for traffic they never used.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Tying the release to the creation of the new month's row meant a single failed
call was never retried: the row exists from then on, and the current period
looks unthrottled, so nothing could detect the stale NIC limit. A customer would
have stayed slow for a whole month they had paid for. Checked on every sample
now, with a test that makes the first release fail.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- The provisioning worker boots before install.sh writes
CLUPILOT_WG_HUB_PUBKEY and holds the empty value for the life of its process,
so every host onboarded afterwards would have got an empty PublicKey in its
wg0.conf.
- A failed update left the checkout at the target, so the rerun compared a
commit with itself and skipped exactly the dependency and image steps that had
not finished. The comparison base is now the last commit actually deployed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two from Codex:
- A throttled instance kept its NIC limit into the new month: the new period
row starts unthrottled, so neither branch of enforce() fired and nothing ever
took the limit off. A customer would have stayed slow through a month they
had already paid for.
- PublicSiteGate exempted livewire/* wholesale. That endpoint is shared by the
console and the portal, so a signed-in customer could keep driving portal
components — billing included — while the portal was supposed to be offline.
Operators pass the normal check anyway, which is all the console needed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Customers can now see what they have used and what is left, and the service
slows down rather than stopping when the allowance is gone — a slow Nextcloud
gets a top-up, a dead one gets a cancellation.
- instance_traffic keeps one row per instance per month. Proxmox counters are
cumulative since the VM last started, so usage is the difference between two
samples, and a counter that went backwards means a restart, not a refund.
- Outbound is what counts: inbound is free at our providers and egress is what
Hetzner's 20 TB per server applies to.
- CollectInstanceTraffic samples every 15 minutes, warns once per threshold
(80/95 %) rather than on every run, and at 100 % limits the VM's NIC via
Proxmox — released again as soon as the customer tops up or the month rolls
over.
- The dashboard gets a full-width band (it throttles the service, so it is not
a tile among tiles) with the top-up offer right next to the warning.
- Bytes are formatted in SI units now: allowances are computed in SI, so
dividing by 1024 made a 1000 GB plan read as "931 GB".
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The installer still needs root for apt and the firewall, but it now creates a
clupilot service account that owns the checkout and runs Docker, maps the
container user to it (HOST_UID/GID), and update.sh refuses to run as root —
root-owned files in the checkout are files the application cannot write.
The account has no password login: docker group membership is root-equivalent
on the host, so it is reachable only via sudo -u or an SSH key.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- update.sh recreated the app container only at the very end, so an update that
changes the PHP runtime would have installed dependencies and migrated inside
the old one.
- install.sh randomised DB_PASSWORD but left DB_ROOT_PASSWORD at the value
committed in .env.example — the same root credential on every installation,
reachable from any container on the compose network.
- Settings cached the fallback after a database failure, so one blip could
leave a hidden site publicly visible until someone cleared the cache. Only a
successful read is cached now, proven by a test that drops the table and
brings it back.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Codex was right on all three, and the first was a design error on my part: the
checkout is bind-mounted into every container, so 'git merge' swaps the running
code instantly — 'migrations before traffic' was not achievable by ordering.
The updater now goes down → merge → dependencies → migrate → assets → restart →
up, trading a short deliberate outage for never serving code whose schema does
not exist yet. If a step fails the site STAYS down: coming back up with new code
on an old schema is worse than staying dark until someone looks.
It also records the last successfully deployed commit. A run that died halfway
left the checkout ahead, so the next run said 'already up to date' and skipped
the rest forever.
And it installs dependencies when a lockfile moved: vendor/ and node_modules/
live in the bind mount and shadow the image, so rebuilding the image never
updated them — migrations could run against stale packages.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
install.sh sets up a bare Debian/Ubuntu server end to end: Docker, git,
WireGuard, clone, generated secrets, stack, migrations, hub keypair, the Owner
account and a closed firewall. Re-runnable: it keeps an existing .env and never
regenerates the hub key, which would disconnect every onboarded host.
update.sh pulls and applies. Migrations run before the new containers take
traffic, the image is rebuilt only when its definition changed, and the queue
workers are restarted — they are long-running processes that otherwise keep the
old classes in memory, which cost us an hour during development.
clupilot:create-admin creates or promotes an Owner, so re-running the installer
fixes a lost role instead of failing on a taken address.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
While the product is still being built, the marketing site and the customer
portal should not be reachable — but they must stay reachable for us.
- A toggle in the console (site.manage, Owner/Admin) stored in a new
app_settings table, because this has to be flippable without a deploy.
- Outsiders get a placeholder with 503 + noindex, not 200: a 200 invites search
engines to index the placeholder as the site's content, which is far harder
to undo than to prevent.
- Anyone on the management VPN, and any signed-in operator, sees the real site.
The console, Livewire's endpoint, the Stripe webhook and the health check are
always reachable — otherwise the switch could only be flipped once.
- robots.txt is generated by the app and follows the switch. It had to stop
being a static file: nginx short-circuited it and Laravel's stock file said
'Disallow:' with an empty value, so crawlers were never told anything.
- Settings reads fall back to the default when the table is unavailable. The
gate reads one on every request, so a deploy running new code before migrate
would otherwise answer the entire site with a 500.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The action labels wrapped to two lines and crushed the column — now icon
buttons with tooltips, like every other admin table. The form column was too
narrow for its content: the datetime fields silently clipped their own value,
so they are stacked and full width now, with duration chips because typing an
end timestamp by hand is the fiddliest part of the form. Host rows show a real
selected state and a per-datacenter count, and the impact column says
"1 Host · 1 Kunde" instead of "Host(s) · Kunde(n)".
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Encryption and the write ran after the transaction had committed and the peer
had been dispatched to the hub. A failure there left a live access whose config
was never stored — unrecoverable, and the operator would create a second one
not knowing why. Both now happen in the same insert; nothing is dispatched
unless it succeeded.
Re-verified in the browser afterwards: create with storage, wrong password
refused, right password reveals the config.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Ownership alone kept download, block and delete reachable for someone whose
roles were removed by any path other than revokeStaff() — a direct role edit,
say. Being staff is now part of ownership, so revocation closes these doors
without depending on whoever removed the role also remembering the tunnel.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The download counter was read-modify-written, so two concurrent retrievals
recorded one. It is an audit trail — under-reporting is the failure mode it
must not have.
The creation-race test broke when issuing moved into a transaction: its
simulated competitor writes inside our transaction, so the rollback removes
that row too. It now asserts what actually matters (the loser is told, and
creates nothing) and states what a single-connection sqlite test cannot show.
This test was red in the previous commit — my mistake for committing before
reading the run.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A revocation committing between the operator check and the insert would find no
peer to remove and still leave the revoked colleague with a brand-new tunnel.
Issuing now runs in a transaction that locks the owner row — the same row
revokeStaff() locks — so the two cannot interleave.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Every five-second poll re-rendered the page, putting the private key into
another HTTP response — the handoff kept it out of the snapshot but not out of
the responses. Traffic figures can wait the minute it takes to copy a key.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Creating a second access with a supplied key skipped the config branch, so the
first access's private configuration stayed on screen under the new name — and
someone would have handed it out.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two modules is below the minimum, and against a bordered card some readers fail
to locate the symbol at all.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Once revealed, the plaintext sits in the handoff cache for ten minutes, and the
modal read it from the token alone. A former owner could keep pulling the key
out of an open modal after revocation — the exact window purgeSecret() exists to
close. Every request now re-checks the policy and drops the handoff when it no
longer holds.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The sidebar still gated the VPN entry on vpn.manage, which the split deleted —
so the page would have vanished from the console for every role, Owner
included. Every operator can hold their own access, so the entry is shown to
all of them and the page itself shows only what the policy allows. Guarded by a
test across all five roles, which is the assertion my rewrite had dropped.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A worker could pick the job up mid-transaction, still see the peer as active,
leave it on the hub — and never be asked again, because the committed state is
only a soft delete. A revoked colleague would keep their tunnel until some
later reconciliation noticed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Codex spotted the migration labelling sync-adopted peers as staff with no
owner, which breaks the invariant the same migration introduces. The live sync
had the identical hole — it never set kind at all, so every adopted peer landed
on the 'staff' default. Both now use system for a peer nobody is behind, and
promote it to host once the link is known.
.env.example carried ADMIN_HOSTS twice; phpdotenv keeps the first, so a fresh
checkout would have got the list without localhost and 404'd its own console.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Reworked after a design consultation with Codex, which pushed back on my first
proposal in three useful ways.
Ownership and rights:
- vpn.manage split into vpn.view.all and vpn.manage.all. Seeing an access is
not managing it, and neither is holding its private key.
- Record-level rules live in VpnPeerPolicy, not in permissions: an access
belongs to a person, and ownership is what grants sight of it. Every operator
reaches the page, but sees only their own unless they may see all.
- Issuing an access is not self-service — it reaches the management network, so
it needs vpn.manage.all even for oneself.
- New Developer role: sees everything, manages nothing. Writing code does not
imply authority over other people's access.
- kind (staff|host|system) replaces a null user_id that had to mean two
different things at once.
Config storage, opt-in per access:
- Downloading is owner-only — explicitly NOT for view.all or manage.all. An
admin who needs access revokes this one and issues their own, which keeps the
record of who holds what honest.
- The password is asked on EVERY retrieval, rate-limited. Laravel's
password.confirm keeps a 15-minute session stamp, which would authorise
unlimited later downloads from an unattended browser.
- Stored under VPN_CONFIG_KEY, not APP_KEY: a leaked application key must not
also hand over the management network. Purged on revocation and when a staff
member is revoked — console taken away, tunnel left open was the worst case.
- The plaintext never enters a Livewire snapshot (the page polls every five
seconds); the component carries an opaque handle instead.
Also: copy button works without HTTPS again (navigator.clipboard only exists in
a secure context, so over http it silently did nothing), plus config download
as a file and a QR code for the mobile apps.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The FK only nulled host_id, so the adopted peer stayed enabled-but-absent: shown
as "wird angewendet" forever, and re-enabling it would have put the deleted
host's key and address back on the hub. PurgeHost now tombstones that row, which
hands it to the same revocation machinery as everything else.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- A host's wg_pubkey may not be in vpn_peers yet, so the duplicate check passed
and an operator could create an access with it. ApplyVpnPeer would then run
wg set with a freshly allocated address, rewriting that host's allowed-ip and
cutting CluPilot's management tunnel to a live machine. Creation now rejects
keys already held by a host, checked under the allocation lock.
- A sync landing between addPeer() and the step storing wg_pubkey adopted the
peer as "unknown", and a later sync filled in host_id but left the name, so
the page showed that host as unknown forever. The name is now filled in when
the link becomes known — only for sync-adopted rows, so an access an operator
named keeps its name.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- ConfigureWireguard and RemoveWireguardPeer mutate the hub too, and were not
taking the lock, so a sync could still read the interface around them and
write stale state. Both now hold wireguard:hub, which is what makes the
read/mutation guarantee actually hold.
- The duplicate-key check ran before the allocation lock, so two concurrent
creations with the same key both passed it and the loser hit the unique index
as an unhandled 500. The check moved inside the lock, with the index kept as
a caught backstop for any writer that does not take it — reproduced in a test
by inserting a colliding row from within the allocation call.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A sync could read the hub snapshot just before ApplyVpnPeer removed a peer and
purged its tombstone, then adopt what it had seen as a fresh enabled access —
restoring a revoked one. Both jobs now hold Cache::lock('wireguard:hub') around
read-decide-mutate, so a reconciliation can never straddle a removal. Retry
removals are dispatched after the lock is released, because the sync queue
driver runs them inline and they take the same lock.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
If an add job was retried after the access had been revoked and its tombstone
purged, it found no row and trusted its own enabled=true payload — re-adding a
key that no longer had a row anyone could revoke it with. A missing row can only
mean the access is gone, so the captured payload may now remove but never
enable.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two more from Codex:
- Addresses come from one subnet but live in two tables (hosts.wg_ip and
vpn_peers.allowed_ip), so a concurrent host onboarding and console creation
could each see the same address as free and both insert — neither unique
index sees the other. Creation now waits on Cache::lock('wireguard:allocate'),
the same lock ConfigureWireguard already holds while reserving a host address.
- mount() runs once, so revoking vpn.manage left an open tab polling every five
seconds and still receiving fresh peer state. Authorization now also runs on
hydration, which is what the poll goes through.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
With the Vite dev server off by default, a fresh checkout had no public/build
(gitignored, and the image does not build it), so every @vite page failed with
ViteManifestNotFoundException. The entrypoint now builds once when the manifest
is absent, non-fatally — a broken build must not wedge the container into a
restart loop where the logs are unreachable.
Proven by deleting public/build and restarting: assets rebuilt automatically,
page 200.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two lifecycle holes Codex found in the new VPN management:
1. Delete removed the row before the hub knew. If the removal job was delayed
or failed, SyncVpnPeers saw a peer it did not recognise and adopted it back
as a live access — silently restoring what an operator had just revoked, and
with no row left to revoke it again. Deletion is now a soft-delete
tombstone: the row survives until the hub confirms the peer is gone, the
sync retries the removal instead of adopting, and the tombstone is purged
only once the peer is really absent. It also keeps the key and the tunnel
address reserved meanwhile, so neither is handed out twice.
2. ApplyVpnPeer applied the state captured at dispatch. A retried block job
could therefore undo a later unblock, and nothing would repair it — the sync
only observes state, it never re-applies intent. The job now resolves the
current desired state from the row and treats its payload as a fallback for
the case where the row is already gone.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The console can now create, block and remove VPN accesses, and shows who is
actually connected — traffic counters, source endpoint and last handshake.
Design notes:
- The web container has no wg0, so the page never talks to WireGuard. Live
state is copied in by SyncVpnPeers on the provisioning queue (the only worker
whose container owns the interface); the page polls the database and merely
nudges that job, throttled so many open tabs cannot flood the queue.
- enabled (operator intent) and present (observed on the hub) are stored
separately, so a sync can never quietly undo a block and drift stays visible
as "wird angewendet".
- The sync adopts peers the host pipeline registered, naming them after their
host — otherwise "who is on the VPN" would have blind spots.
- Keypairs are generated in PHP via libsodium rather than shelling out to
wg genkey (no interface in this container, and it keeps generation testable).
The private key is shown once and never stored.
- allocateIp() now also considers vpn_peers, which would otherwise be handed a
tunnel address a host already holds.
- vpn.manage is a new capability held by Owner/Admin only, and it hides the nav
entry too — a VPN access reaches the management network.
Verified end to end against the real hub, not just mocks: created an access in
the browser, connected with the generated config, watched the console flip to
"Verbunden" with real counters, then blocked it and confirmed the peer was
gone from wg0 and the client could no longer handshake.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Setting the real APP_URL made route() build https://app.dev.clupilot.com/...,
which ADMIN_HOSTS does not list, so 30 admin tests 404'd. The suite must not
depend on operator hostnames.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The cancel buttons were dead: wire-elements registers Livewire.on('closeModal'),
but the buttons used Alpine's $dispatch, which fires a DOM event. Livewire
bridges its own events TO the DOM, not back, so nothing ever received them.
Proven in the browser both ways — before: modal stays open after Abbrechen;
after: it closes.
Domain operation behind Zoraxy:
- trustProxies for FOR/PORT/PROTO so Laravel sees https (otherwise it builds
http:// URLs into an https page). X_FORWARDED_HOST is deliberately NOT
trusted — the console is gated on the request host, and trusting it would let
anyone reach /admin through a public domain by forging the header.
- APP_URL + VITE_REVERB_* point at the dev domains (wss via ws.dev).
- Vite dev server is now opt-in (VITE_AUTOSTART): over https the browser cannot
load assets from http://<ip>:5173. Built assets are the default, and the
entrypoint clears a stale public/hot, which otherwise 404s every asset.
Verified in the browser over https: login, styled pages, zero console errors,
zero unencrypted requests, /admin reachable only on admin.dev.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The hub lives in queue-provisioning (the only worker on the provisioning queue,
and LocalWireguardHub shells out to wg in-process). Generated the hub keypair,
wrote wg0.conf, and filled CLUPILOT_WG_ENDPOINT/HUB_PUBKEY.
Verified against the running stack rather than mocks: registered a stand-in
Proxmox peer through the app's own addPeer(), got a handshake, opened hub->peer
TCP over the tunnel (what the SSH steps actually need — a handshake alone does
not prove routed TCP), confirmed wg-quick save persisted the peer, then removed
it through removePeer(). wg0 returns after a container restart.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Only the marketing site and the customer portal are public; /admin and the
Proxmox hosts stay on the private network. nginx was a single server_name _
catch-all, so /admin was served on all four dev domains.
Two layers:
- nginx denies /admin on the known-public hostnames before PHP is reached
(denylist, so an allowlist typo cannot lock the operators out).
- ADMIN_HOSTS is now populated, making the app layer a strict allowlist that
also covers /livewire/update, which nginx cannot attribute to /admin.
Verified live against the running stack: /admin is 404 on www/app/api/ws and on
any unlisted host, 302->login on admin.dev / the private IP / localhost, while
/ and /dashboard stay reachable everywhere.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
DNS names are case-insensitive and Symfony's getHost() always returns lowercase,
so ADMIN_HOSTS=Admin.Example.com rejected every request and locked operators
out. Normalised in the config AND at the comparison, so the value is safe
whichever route it took in (env, cached config, runtime set).
operator()/admin() moved from RbacTest/HostManagementTest to tests/Pest.php:
they were only loaded when those files happened to be in the run, so a targeted
single-file run died on 'undefined function operator()'.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Admin actions post to /livewire/update, which a path-scoped guard skips — an
operator session could drive admin components through a PUBLIC hostname despite
ADMIN_HOSTS. The restriction is now registered as Livewire-persistent middleware
and listed on the admin route group, so Livewire re-applies it from the
component snapshot.
Proven by replaying a snapshot taken from the real rendered page: identical
payload -> 404 on a public host, 200 on the allowed host (positive control, so
the test cannot pass for the wrong reason).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Proxmox fleet and the operator console must never be publicly reachable. The
primary control is the reverse proxy, but nginx here is a catch-all
(server_name _), so /admin was served on EVERY hostname — a proxy
misconfiguration would expose it. ADMIN_HOSTS pins it; any other host gets 404
(not 403: a public domain must not disclose that a console exists).
Prepended to the group instead of the admin route group on purpose: route
middleware is reordered by Laravel's priority list, which runs first — a
guest would then be redirected to /login and learn the console is there. Covered
by a test for exactly that case. Empty ADMIN_HOSTS = unrestricted, so nobody is
locked out by upgrading.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- MONITORING_ATTEMPTS is capped by the run's max_attempts, so a large value can
no longer burn the retry budget and fail the very provisioning the degradation
exists to protect (covered by a new test at the budget boundary)
- /health is now dependency-free (200 in ~2ms with Kuma absent, verified: the
container healthcheck stays healthy); Kuma state is exclusively in /ready
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Verified with a reachable Kuma and deliberately wrong credentials:
/ready -> 503 'Kuma login rejected: Incorrect username or password.'
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Verified against a real Kuma by stopping it mid-test:
- get_monitors() reads the library's CACHED monitorList event, so it reported
'up' long after Kuma died. Reachability now does a real HTTP round-trip plus a
live socket check.
- the cached list could yield an id for a monitor that no longer exists; a match
is now confirmed with a live get_monitor before it is returned, so CluPilot can
never record a target that is never checked.
- liveness (/health, always 200 while serving) split from readiness (/ready, 503
when Kuma is unreachable) — the container healthcheck must not restart a
healthy bridge just because a dependency is down.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
nexxo