2 Commits (6b8412f0c394981c091fdba767fc2defe3627124)

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
nexxo	d5b2612e24	Always name the host we are being served from, and stop promising a duration ... ── Why the domain list looked wrong ───────────────────────────────────────── Reported three times, and it was not only the setting. The list came from `admin_access.site_hosts` and the instance zone — and where SITE_HOST is not configured, site_hosts is EMPTY. So an installation reached by a name nobody wrote into the config listed ONLY the instance zone, and described it as the customers' domain: the page a visitor opened to check our addresses omitted the address they had just typed, and named the wrong thing as ours. The host serving the request is now always in the list. It is the one address that is true by construction and needs no configuration to be right. (The zone itself is still one setting, and it is now clupilot.cloud on this machine. On another installation it is Konsole → Integrationen → DNS-Zone.) ── The clock ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── "Eine Zeit angeben geht nicht — wenn es fertig ist, ist es fertig." Correct, and it was claimed three times over: an eyebrow saying "In 20 Minuten betriebsbereit", a provisioning log with minute marks down the side, and a closing line repeating it. A run waits on a hypervisor, on a certificate authority and on DNS propagating. A customer who once waits forty minutes has been told something untrue by their supplier, and the page cannot take it back. What replaces it is what actually IS promised and kept: the order of the steps, ticked off, numbered 1/5 to 5/5 — and then the sentence that answers the real question behind "how long", which is not a number but "do I have to sit here": you get an email with the address and the credentials when it is ready. The same claim is gone from the hero meta ("< 20 Min." → "automatisch"), from the figure line ("20 Minuten bis zum Betrieb" → "0 Termine bis zum Start") and from the FAQ, which now says outright that we do not name a duration and why. Kept deliberately: the 45-minute training session and the three-to-seven working days for setup. Those are appointments we schedule and commitments we control, not predictions about a machine. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-29 17:10:06 +02:00
nexxo	f8874f32ea	Put customer instances on their own domain, and say which domains are ours ... ── The zone ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── A fresh install now addresses customer instances under clupilot.cloud rather than clupilot.com. Not branding: a Nextcloud is third-party software that strangers sign in to, and on the same registrable domain as the portal it shares cookie scope, document.domain and CAA with it. The same reason googleusercontent.com and vercel.app exist. Existing installations keep whatever the console says — the zone has been a setting all along. `clupilot:check-zone <zone>` reports what a change would touch before anything is touched: the DNS records, the monitoring targets, the certificates and Nextcloud's trusted_domains all carry the old name and the setting reaches none of them. With no instances in service it says so and stops. Changing it later is a migration with an outage, and the command says that too. ── Which addresses are ours ──────────────────────────────────────────────── A new public page at /sicherheit: the domains that belong to us, the rule for reading an address bar, what we never do, and — the part that matters — what to do if you have already typed your password into a copy of our sign-in form. Change it, end every other session, change it wherever else you use it, tell us. In that order. Reachable without an account, deliberately: somebody who has just given their password away is signed in nowhere, and the page they need cannot be behind the thing they lost. Linked from the three places a person is when the question comes up: every mail footer (the mail is the vector), the sign-in form (this is the page a phishing kit copies, so the real one says which host you are on), and the site footer. The domain list is DERIVED from configuration and keyed by what each domain is for. A list typed into a page would eventually tell a customer that a phishing domain is one of ours, or that one of ours is not — the same two-sources-of-truth failure that had the price sheet promising an address on a domain the company does not own. The operator console is deliberately absent from it: naming it on a public page tells an attacker where to aim. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-29 16:03:13 +02:00