9 Commits (c93510ffe446d66ddbfc00a219e542b600714336)

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
nexxo	19a770e1eb	Kuendigung B1, Fix-Welle: der Platz wird frei, und das Loeschen ist vollzogen ... K1 — abgebaute Instanzen zaehlten weiter als belegend. `scopeOccupyingHost` filtert jetzt `torn_down_at`: eine abgebaute Instanz behaelt `ended`, `vmid` und `disk_gb` als Nachweis, `status != 'failed'` war fuer sie also wahr. Der Knoten wurde physisch leer und die Buchhaltung blieb voll — die naechste bezahlte Bestellung derselben Groesse waere geparkt und verworfen worden. K2 — `deleteVm()` gibt die UPID zurueck, der Abbau wartet den qmdestroy-Auftrag ab und schreibt `torn_down_at` erst danach. Ein 200 heisst nur, dass Proxmox den Auftrag angenommen hat; scheitert die Zerstoerung danach, stand bisher eine laufende Maschine mit einem Datensatz da, der "abgebaut" sagte — und niemand sah sie je wieder an. Die Attrappe bildet die Asynchronitaet ab (`destroyedVmids`, `destroyExitStatus`, `destroyHangs`). Die Fristen des Auftrags wandern mit: Sichern 900 s, Zerstoeren 300 s, Summe unveraendert 1800 s unter der Uhr des Arbeiters. K3 — vor `shutdownVm()` steht derselbe `vmStatus()`-Riegel wie im Nachbarschritt. Eine wegen offener Zahlung gesperrte Cloud und jeder Wiederholungslauf nach einem Teilfehlschlag treffen einen gestoppten Gast; der Wurf haette die Instanz unheilbar gemacht und den echten Grund am Datensatz ueberschrieben. Die Attrappe weist eine Bitte gegen eine stehende Maschine jetzt ab, und ein Test faehrt erstmals einen zweiten Lauf nach einem Fehlschlag durch. W2 — der rote Kasten "Abbau haengt" filtert `status = 'ended'`. Eine wiederbelebte Instanz waere sonst fuer immer darin stehengeblieben. Neun Pruefungen im Mahnwesen lassen ihre Cloud jetzt laufen, bevor sie gesperrt wird — die geschaerfte Attrappe legt offen, dass `SuspendInstance` denselben fehlenden Riegel hat (Folgepunkt im Bericht). Zu jedem der vier Punkte eine Zusicherung, die ohne den Fix rot ist; die Rotproben stehen im Bericht.	2026-08-04 12:39:06 +02:00
nexxo	df73e558e9	Kuendigung B1, Tasks 4+5: der Zeitplan-Griff und die Sichtbarkeit ... Gekuendigte Kundenmaschinen liefen bisher fuer immer weiter. Task 3 hat den Abbau gebaut; hier kommen der Griff, der ihn faehrt, und der Ort, an dem man sieht, was passiert ist. Die Wartezeit-Frage, entschieden: ein Auftrag je Instanz auf der provisioning-Warteschlange. Das ist keine Abwaegung — nur queue-provisioning steht im Netz-Namensraum des vpn-hub, der scheduler-Container nicht. Ein Befehl, der selbst mit Proxmox spraeche, haette gar keine Route zu einem Host. Die Fristen stehen ausdruecklich ineinander: die Aktion bekommt 600+1200 = 1800 s, der Auftrag hat $timeout 2100 s, retry_after der Verbindung ist 2400 s. Nur die unterste Uhr hinterlaesst einen lesbaren Grund am Datensatz; die mittlere toetet den Arbeiterprozess stumm, die oberste startet einen ZWEITEN Abbau gegen eine Maschine mitten im vzdump. $tries=1, weil ein sofortiger zweiter Versuch am Herunterfahren einer gesperrten VM scheitern und den richtigen Grund ueberschreiben wuerde. Die Staffelung ist als Pruefung festgenagelt. Der Preis — zwanzig statt sechzig Minuten fuers Sichern — steht im Kopfkommentar ausgeschrieben. Dazu zwei Entscheidungen, nach denen niemand gefragt hat: eine Obergrenze je Lauf, weil ueber dieselbe serielle Warteschlange bezahlte Bestellungen laufen; und eine Reihenfolge, die einen Dauerfall die uebrigen nicht aushungern laesst. Zeitplan taeglich um 05:30 — der Abbau hat keinen Moment, auf den es ankommt, aber er darf nicht ins naechtliche vzdump-Fenster um 02:00 fallen. Sichtbarkeit: zwei Kaesten in der Konsole. „Abbau haengt" (rot, ganz oben) — eine Instanz mit gefuelltem teardown_error steht unbegrenzt und belegt weiter einen Platz. Und „Archiviert und abgebaut" (unter der Liste) mit archive_volid im Klartext. Beide sortieren absteigend und beide haben ein Ende: der Fehler raeumt sich beim naechsten erfolgreichen Lauf selbst ab, das Archiv faellt nach zwoelf Monaten heraus. Der Folgepunkt vom Export-Kasten also nicht noch einmal. Suite 2929 gruen. 25 neue Pruefungen, vier Mutationsproben rot gesehen. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-04 12:00:37 +02:00
nexxo	c9fef59983	Fix-Welle: die Kuendigung sagt jedem nur das, was fuer ihn stimmt ... Vier Befunde aus dem Gesamt-Review, und alle vier hatten dieselbe Wurzel: `export_wish` fuehrt drei Zustaende, und jede Stelle, die den Kunden ansprach, kannte nur zwei. K1 — Der Streifen im Dashboard trug einen Schalter, und `(bool) null` ist `false`. Wer vor dieser Ausrollung gekuendigt hat, las unter dem Streifen „Kein Export gewuenscht" — als waere das seine eigene Antwort. Jetzt stehen dort dieselben zwei Auswahlfelder wie im Kuendigungsdialog: gleiche Frage, gleiche Form, und ein unbeantworteter Zustand markiert schlicht keines von beiden. Der Satz daneben fragt dann, statt zu behaupten, und sagt, was passiert, wenn die Frage offen bleibt. K2 — Die Vertragsseite versprach jedem den Export, auch dem, den der Dialog eine Sekunde vorher mit einem bewussten „Nein" genau dorthin umgeleitet hatte. Drei Fassungen statt einer, an `export_wish` gebunden. Die Ja-Fassung verspricht dabei nicht mehr den Export selbst, sondern dass der Wunsch vermerkt ist und sich jemand meldet — den Export gibt es nicht, und ein gebundenes, aber weiterhin unhaltbares Versprechen haette den Fehler nur verschoben. Dazu der Zustand danach: eine `ended`-Instanz holt Dashboard::render() nicht mehr, und der Kunde fiel in denselben Zweig wie jemand, der noch nie etwas bestellt hat — „Ihre Cloud wird eingerichtet." samt „Paket buchen", am Tag, an dem ihm die Adresse eingezogen wurde. Der Fall hat jetzt seinen eigenen Kasten, mit dem Datum, an dem das Paket endete. W1 — Die Erinnerungsmail behauptete im Praesens, wir bereiteten bereits einen Export vor. Der Satz sagt jetzt, was stimmt. Und die Antwort hatte in der ganzen Konsole keinen einzigen Leser: ein „Ja" landete in einer Spalte, die niemand je zu Gesicht bekam. Ueber der Instanzliste steht deshalb ein Abschnitt „Datenexport bestellt" — wer, und bis wann. Nicht als Plakette in der Zeile, weil die Liste geblaettert ist und ein alter Eintrag auf Seite acht saesse; nicht auf der Uebersicht, weil ein Hinweis, den nichts je wieder abraeumen kann, Moebel waere. W3 — Die einzige Pruefung zur Anzeige der Antwort konnte nicht fehlschlagen: `x-ui.switch` rendert beide Woerter und ueberlaesst dem CSS die Auswahl, also war `assertSee('Kein Export gewuenscht')` bei true, bei false UND bei null gruen. Nachgewiesen mit einer Wegwerf-Pruefung gegen den alten Streifen: dreimal derselbe Satz, dreimal gruen. Jetzt drei Pruefungen, je eine pro Zustand, am `checked`-Attribut der Auswahlfelder. Zu jedem der vier Punkte wurde der Fix kurz zurueckgedreht und die neue Zusicherung rot gesehen; die Ergebnisse stehen im Bericht. Ganze Suite: 2819 gruen, 2 rot — beide fremd. ReadinessPageTest scheitert an `server.private_key` aus der parallel laufenden Terminal-Arbeit im selben Baum; HostStepTest ist auf main vorbestehend rot (install-agent.sh traegt CONTRACT=3, update.sh HOST_STEP_NEEDS=2, beide unveraendert). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-04 10:00:36 +02:00
nexxo	5b63fdb86c	Deliver the storage a customer actually buys ... A booked storage pack was a row in `subscription_addons` and nothing else: priced, frozen, charged every month, and delivered nowhere. Nextcloud's quota came from `instances.quota_gb`, which is the package alone; the disk was sized for the package alone; and on the one occasion a disk did grow — a plan upgrade — the guest never saw it, because nothing stretched the partition or the filesystem over the new space. One authority for the allowance. StorageAllowance adds the package and the booked packs, and everything that needs the figure asks it: the quota step, the downgrade check, the portal, the console, the repair command. It is DERIVED rather than stored — a column would have to be rewritten by booking, cancelling, granting, a grant expiring and a plan change, and the day one of those paths forgot it would be silently wrong in whichever direction costs somebody money. `quota_applied_gb` keeps its own meaning: what the guest was last actually told, which is how a machine with the allowance enforced is told from one where the figure has only ever been a row in our database. Buying it delivers it. BookAddon asks ApplyStorageAllowance for a run on booking AND on cancellation; the new `storage` pipeline grows the virtual disk to the allowance plus the package's own overhead (read off the package — 20/40/50/100 GB on the four catalogue packages — never a ratio invented here), then GrowGuestFilesystem makes the guest see it, then the quota is applied. No cold boot is involved: the data disk is scsi0 and Proxmox's resize on a running guest is a qemu block_resize, so the capacity reaches the guest while it runs. The new step rescans, growparts and grows the filesystem with the tool its type actually needs — ext2/3/4, xfs, btrfs — and fails loudly on one it does not know rather than handing it to resize2fs and hoping. Idempotent end to end: NOCHANGE from growpart is not a failure, and every tool here exits 0 when there is nothing left to grow. The same step now runs in the plan-change pipeline, where an upgrade used to stop one step short of the customer. A downgrade blocked by data gets a way out. The block stays — it is correct — but the check now measures against the target package PLUS the packs the customer already owns, and reports the numbers behind the refusal: what is stored, what would be allowed, how much has to go, and how many packs would cover it instead. The portal offers both routes: book exactly those packs (confirmed in a modal, R23), or delete data and have the fill level measured on demand rather than waiting for the nightly sampler. That reading is taken by DiskUsageProbe, which CollectInstanceTraffic now uses too, so there is one notion of "how full is it" and not two. A plan change keeps booked packs. They were paid for separately and have nothing to do with which package the customer is on; the new package's disk and quota are sized with them included. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-29 19:13:10 +02:00
nexxo	d76de5ada3	Restart a machine, enforce the quota that was sold, end a route that ended ... Three places where the product said one thing and did another. **Nothing could restart a virtual machine.** ProxmoxClient had startVm and no way to stop anything, so `restart_required_since` — set by every plan change that grows a running guest — could only ever be cleared by a resize step that happened to find the machine stopped, which nothing in the product could arrange. A paid upgrade's cores and RAM could stay unreached for the life of the contract, and the cloud page's "Neu starten" was a toast. There is now a `restart` pipeline: shutdown, start, wait for the agent, confirm. A shutdown and a start rather than a reboot, because only a cold boot makes qemu read the VM definition again — a reset would take the machine round and bring it back exactly as small as it was. The shutdown is a REQUEST, bounded at ten minutes, and there is no escalation: ProxmoxClient deliberately does not expose Proxmox's forceStop, because the guest is a Nextcloud and cutting power to a database mid-write to apply a CPU change trades an inconvenience for a restore from backup. A guest that ignores ACPI for ten minutes fails the run instead, and a person decides what happens to it. `restart_required_since` is cleared by the last step, from what the RUNNING guest reports (`cpus`/`maxmem`) — not by the button, and not by the run merely finishing. A machine that comes back smaller than it was sold fails the run. Started by App\Actions\RestartInstance, which re-checks authorisation itself rather than trusting a hidden button: an operator holding the new `instances.restart` may restart anything, a portal user their own machine and nothing else. Refused while another run is in flight against the same order. Confirmed in a modal on both sides (R23), addressed by uuid (R11). **Existing instances had no storage quota.** ApplyStorageQuota reaches new and changed machines; everything built before it kept the whole disk whatever it had paid for, and nothing recorded which was which. `instances.quota_applied_gb` is now what the guest was actually told, written by the step only after the occ call succeeds — so "sold" and "enforced" are separate facts and can be compared. `clupilot:apply-quotas` sweeps the estate: one `quota` run per instance through the same step the pipelines use, skipping what it should and saying why, a no-op once an allowance is enforced, and inert under --dry-run. Deliberately NOT scheduled — a nightly sweep would quietly cover for the pipeline step the day it stopped working, which is how the original hole survived this long. **A Traefik router was never torn down.** TraefikWriter::remove() had no caller anywhere. What was missing was the moment: ConfirmCancelPackage wrote a date into `service_ends_at` and nothing ever went back to it, so every route this platform ever wrote was written for good — pointing at a guest address the host is free to reassign. `clupilot:end-due-services` (hourly) keeps that appointment through App\Actions\EndInstanceService. "Ended" means cancellation_scheduled AND `service_ends_at` passed, never the day a cancellation is scheduled: that customer has paid to the end of the term and is working in it. The DNS record goes with the route — it is in our zone, pointing at a host that serves other people, which is the shape of every subdomain takeover there has ever been. The customer's own domain is in their zone and is not ours to touch; the virtual machine is left alone, because the cancellation flow promises a data export first and destroying disks is not this change's decision. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-29 18:28:28 +02:00
nexxo	34874adec3	Apply a bought plan change instead of only pricing it ... PlanChange could say what a move would cost and whether it was allowed, and that was all it could do. Billing::purchase() wrote an upgrade order and nothing ever consumed it: same snapshot, same machine, same quota. A customer could pay for a bigger package and receive nothing. ApplyPlanChange is now the single place a change lands — it moves the contract onto the target's current version, writes one register row, settles the custom domain, and starts a run that resizes the machine. Applying the same order twice is a no-op, enforced by a unique event key rather than by a check two callers could both pass. Two things a plan change must not do, and now does not. A disk is never shrunk — Proxmox cannot, so the QUOTA shrinks instead, which is what was sold anyway. And a live machine is never rebooted as a side effect: cores and RAM are written, and where they need a restart the instance says so where an operator and the customer can both see it. The storage allowance also joins the build pipeline. ApplyStorageQuota was written for plan changes and ran only there, so a brand-new customer still got no quota at all — quota_gb reached the instance row and stopped, and every package delivered the whole disk. The test guarding that pipeline only counted its steps, which is how a list missing the one step that makes a package's storage real stayed green for its whole life. It now names the step. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-29 17:18:55 +02:00
nexxo	ea643b5e73	Prove a custom domain before serving it, and keep proving it ... Two things. ── The update screen, still opening twice ─────────────────────────────────── Reported again on 1.3.9, and the cause was not the one fixed in 1.3.8. The agent consumes the request file BEFORE it resolves the release — deliberately, because update.sh may kill the shell and a request left in place would loop — and writes `state: running` only once it has decided to go ahead. In between, the request is gone and the status does not say running yet, so the endpoint honestly answers "nothing is running". The watcher read that as "the run has finished" and reloaded the page: overlay on the click, gone a poll later, 503 after it. The overlay now closes only once the server has BOTH confirmed a run and then stopped reporting it. Before the confirmation, silence means the agent has not got there yet. Bounded at twenty polls so a request the agent refuses does not leave the console covered forever. ── Custom domains, proven and re-proven ───────────────────────────────────── `custom_domain` was a free-text field and everything downstream believed it: the proxy served it, the certificate was issued for it, Nextcloud trusted it. Anyone who pointed any hostname at the platform got somebody else's files under their own name. The proof is a TXT record at _clupilot-challenge.<domain> holding a token only this instance has. Nothing is served until it has been read. Every reader now goes through Instance::address(), which is the one place the decision is made — `custom_domain ?: subdomain` was the hole, written out four times. It is re-read every night at 03:40, because a token checked once can be taken straight back out and a domain that later lapses keeps resolving here. Three consecutive misses before a live domain is withdrawn: one failed lookup is a nameserver having a bad minute, and withdrawing takes a working Nextcloud off its own address. The domain and its token stay on the row so the customer can put the record back rather than start over. Changing the domain mints a NEW token. Reusing it would let somebody who once verified example.com claim any other domain later without touching its DNS — the old record is still sitting there and only the value is compared. The domain is changeable at any time, and removable. Fixing it once set was considered and rejected: adding or moving an address is a proxy entry, a certificate and one line in trusted_domains. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-29 14:47:51 +02:00
Claude	30a80b6c15	Report the estate from the database, and print the traffic that is sold ... Three console pages were fiction. The front page claimed 42 customers, 39 instances, four hosts named pve-fsn-1..3 and €7,842 a month, over a twelve-month growth curve; the instance list held seven invented machines; the revenue page reported churn and a trend for a business with no recorded history. All of it was hard-coded. It read like a running company and measured nothing. They now read the database. Two figures are gone rather than approximated — the revenue trend, which needs a monthly history nobody records, and churn, which needs a base the data cannot supply. ARR stays, labelled as the projection it is. The green "all systems normal" badge is computed from the notice list instead of asserted, and the notices themselves come from failed runs, hosts reporting errors or gone quiet, and monitoring that is down. Host load is the one number that had to agree with something else: placement counts the VM disk allocation, ignores a failed instance that never got a VM, and subtracts the host's reserve. A dashboard doing its own arithmetic would show a host as comfortable while orders were already being refused on it, so it uses the host's own accounting — with the filter moved into a scope both share, and the sum preloaded so listing hosts stays one query. The instance list drops the Nextcloud version column: that version is not recorded anywhere, and a column filled with a plausible number is worse than no column. Statuses the lifecycle writes but nobody had translated no longer render as "admin.status.failed". The price sheet also gains the included traffic, which the catalogue has always carried and the page simply never printed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-27 04:48:51 +02:00
nexxo	1aa7535fc4	feat(admin): dark Tactical-Terminal operator console ... Separate admin console at /admin, gated to is_admin users (EnsureAdmin middleware + migration/seed; a plain customer user is seeded to prove the gate). Distinct dark aesthetic achieved purely by token scoping: .theme-admin overrides every CSS design token to a dark graphite / signal-orange palette, so ALL shared components (button, card, badge, table, stat, chart) render dark with zero new markup (R3). Chart island now reads tokens from its own element, so charts are theme-aware. Sections (each full-page class-based Livewire, English routes R13, localized DE/EN): - Overview: fleet KPIs, fleet-growth line, host-load bars, MRR bars, active runs, alerts. - Customers: table + plan doughnut. Instances: fleet table (vmid/host/storage). - Hosts: capacity cards (storage/CPU bars). Provisioning: runs table + live stepper. - Revenue: MRR/ARR/ARPU/churn KPIs, MRR line, plan doughnut, recent payments. - Locale-aware month labels/currency (Carbon/Number). 18 new Pest tests (guest redirect / non-admin 403 / admin render per section) → 44 green. R12 browser: all six admin pages HTTP 200, ZERO console errors (Chart.js dark). Codex (R15) — clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-25 08:35:03 +02:00