The capacity park could not survive its own first poll. ReserveResources
polls every 120 s and declared a maxDuration of 60, and RunRunner measures
a step's budget from a started_at it deliberately does not reset on a poll
— so every re-entry was ruled timed out before the body ran, a timeout
consumes an attempt, and five of them failed a paid order in about six
minutes. The fourteen-day promise, the console's capacity queue and the
"go and buy a server" workflow were unreachable code. maxDuration is now
the whole park plus one poll interval, and a test drives a park through
the runner rather than calling execute() directly, which is why this was
invisible.
Every guest occ call ran as root. `docker compose exec` defaults to root
and the Nextcloud image's console.php exits 1 unless the caller owns
config/config.php, so all five call sites were failing on every instance.
There is now one builder, App\Support\NextcloudOcc, and a test refuses a
second: nothing in app/ may spell the invocation out by hand. deploy/
update.sh had learned this for our own container and nobody carried it
across.
RunAcceptanceChecks was terminal on the first no. certReachable() answers
false for a connect timeout as readily as for a missing certificate, so
one bad second ended a finished, certified Nextcloud as a failed order
with the instance released. The probes retry now and the run still fails
for good with the probe's own reason once the budget is spent; the two
facts a retry cannot change stay terminal.
The in-flight guard asked whether anything was running, not whether it
would do the work. App\Provisioning\WorkInFlight asks the second question,
reading the step lists the runner executes: a domain proven during a
restart is routed, and a storage pack booked during an address run is
delivered instead of charged monthly and forgotten.
The address pipeline ran its steps in the wrong order for the direction it
exists for. Nextcloud before the router in `address` and `plan-change`, as
in `customer`, because a run that got the certificate and then failed left
the customer's own domain serving an untrusted-domain error under a valid
certificate while the portal called it live. Safe in both directions; the
reasoning is written above the pipeline.
A stale guest_ip could never be corrected. ConfigureDnsAndTls compared the
hostnames but never the backend, and nothing re-read the address after the
build. It now records and compares `routed_backend`, and ConfigureNetwork
joins the `restart` pipeline — a cold boot is what moves a DHCP lease — and
asks for the address to be re-applied when the guest has actually moved.
Also: HetznerDnsClient::upsertRecord read only the first page of a zone
that pages at 100, so past a hundred records it created a second A record
for the same name and the cloud was up about half the time; the console's
retry left a live customer's order in `provisioning` for ever for any
maintenance pipeline; and a revived run's first pass burned an attempt on a
timeout that had already happened, because the clause written for it used
`??=`.
Seven test sites wrote config('provisioning.plans.*'), a key that has not
existed since the catalogue moved into the database. Every write was a
no-op, so each test proved something other than its name: the missing
template, the two snapshot regressions and the grandfathered-price scenario
are now actually constructed, ValidateOrder's reasons are asserted rather
than only its type, and the end-to-end run checks that the quota step
delivered something.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A paid order that no host has room for used to FAIL at the reservation
step. The customer has paid by then, so that turned a sale into an
incident and left somebody holding money against nothing. The estate is
finite and booked thick, so "no host has room right now" is an ordinary
Tuesday — it means a machine has to be bought, which takes days.
So the order waits instead. poll(), not retry(): the wait is measured in
days and must not eat the run's attempt budget. It only fails after
PARK_DAYS (14) — long enough to buy, rack and onboard a server over a
weekend, short enough that a forgotten order surfaces instead of waiting
for ever.
Then say so, in the same words on both sides of the payment:
- The price sheet marks each package "wird sofort ausgeliefert" or
"Bereitstellung in 2-3 Werktagen", read from free capacity rather
than written into the page.
- The customer's own overview says their cloud is being prepared while
it is parked, instead of a stepper standing still for two days under
"wird eingerichtet" — which reads as broken.
- The console front page shows the same per-package answer, so an
operator can see what visitors are being promised.
And a capacity page for the decision that follows: who is waiting, what
the roomiest host still has, what the queue needs ("3x Start, 1x
Business" - the LARGEST parked package sets the minimum machine, because
an instance lives on one host), and what such a machine costs today from
the provider's live list. It orders nothing: buying a server is a
contract, and a bug in a capacity calculation must not sign one.
The operator can also say where each parked order goes. A pin is
honoured or it waits — never quietly redirected — because placing it
elsewhere answers a different question than the one they answered, and
they would find out from the finished instance.
Two things this shook out:
- `current_step` is an INDEX into the pipeline, not the step's key, and
it is cast to integer. `where('current_step', 'reserve_resources')`
reads as correct and matches step 0 of EVERY pipeline instead. Both
lookups go through HostCapacity::parkedRuns() now, which resolves the
index and filters by pipeline.
- The auction feed sends `hdd_hr` as a list, not a string. Casting it
printed "Array" into the console and raised a warning that took the
page down with it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The password no longer travels through third-party mail servers or sits
forever in an inbox: it moves onto the instance (encrypted, same as
nc_admin_ref) and shows on the dashboard until the customer clicks
"Notiert", which deletes it for good.
The pipeline re-resolved config('provisioning.plans') by order.plan, so the
subscription snapshot protected a customer's price but not their machine:
shrinking a plan resized an existing customer's VM on its next run. Nothing
created a subscription either, so closing this meant opening the contract at
purchase and pointing provisioning at it.
- OpenSubscription freezes the catalogue onto a subscription when a checkout
is paid; StartCustomerProvisioning calls it inside the order transaction.
- CustomerStep::plan() reads the frozen snapshot. ValidateOrder and
ReserveResources fail closed with no_subscription rather than falling back
to the catalogue, which is the bug itself.
- template_vmid joins the snapshot so a re-clone cannot pick up a blueprint
published after the sale. Deliberately outside FROZEN: it is how we build
the machine, not a term the customer is owed, and a dead template must be
replaceable without cancelling a contract.
- TrafficMeter reads the allowance off the contract too — cutting a plan's
traffic was otherwise enough to start throttling someone who bought more.
- The migration backfills contracts for orders that already bought something,
reconstructed from what was actually delivered where an instance exists,
and adopts an existing order-less contract instead of opening a second.
Orders paid in a currency the catalogue cannot price get none, matching the
checkout path.
price_cents stays the catalogue's NET price, which is what PlanChange
prorates against — not Order::amount_cents, which holds Stripe's GROSS total.
Reconciling the two belongs to the proof register and Stripe (phases 4/5).
Also pins STRIPE_WEBHOOK_SECRET blank in phpunit.xml: the operator's real
secret was reaching the suite from .env and rejecting every unsigned test
payload, which is why 7 webhook tests failed before any of this.
Verified in the browser: with team traffic cut from 3000 to 500 GB in the
catalogue, the customer's portal still shows 3 TB.
373 tests green. Codex review clean after three rounds.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- MONITORING_ATTEMPTS is capped by the run's max_attempts, so a large value can
no longer burn the retry budget and fail the very provisioning the degradation
exists to protect (covered by a new test at the budget boundary)
- /health is now dependency-free (200 in ~2ms with Kuma absent, verified: the
container healthcheck stays healthy); Kuma state is exclusively in /ready
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- attempt is 0-based, so compare one-based: ATTEMPTS=2 really means two tries
- bridge accepts add_monitor returning {monitorID}|{id}|int (v1.2.1 returns a
dict — re-verified: first create on a fresh Kuma is HTTP 200 with the id)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Kuma has no write REST API (monitor CRUD is Socket.IO only), so docker/kuma-bridge
translates the exact generic REST contract HttpMonitoringClient already speaks —
no PHP client change needed. Opt-in compose profile 'monitoring'.
Verified end-to-end against a real Uptime Kuma 1.x:
create -> id, create again -> same id (idempotent), list, status, delete
and PHP MonitoringClient -> bridge -> Kuma round-trip.
The e2e run caught a real bug: add_monitor takes 'maxretries', not 'retries'.
Monitoring is now observability, not a delivery gate:
- RegisterMonitoring retries MONITORING_ATTEMPTS times on an outage, then
continues degraded with a visible 'info' event
- RunAcceptanceChecks no longer fails when monitoring isn't green (a fresh Kuma
monitor legitimately reports 'pending' — confirmed in the e2e run); it records
the gap instead. MONITORING_REQUIRED=true restores strict gating.
- docs/monitoring-uptime-kuma.md documents setup, failure behaviour, alternatives
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Clone recovery: once the lock clears but the task ref is lost, destroy the
possibly-incomplete VM and re-clone instead of advancing onto it.
- applyFirewall clears existing rules before adding, so retries don't accumulate
duplicate Proxmox firewall entries.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Nextcloud: parse occ status JSON (installed + not in maintenance).
- Admin: query occ user:info for the account.
- Monitoring: MonitoringClient::isHealthy checks the provider, not the local row.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Clone recovery polls until the VM lock clears instead of advancing onto a
possibly-incomplete clone.
- RegisterBackup/RegisterMonitoring create the local row BEFORE the run-resource
breadcrumb, so a crash between them can't leave the row permanently missing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- ConfigureCloudInit sets cores/memory from the plan (not the template default).
- RegisterBackup uses a deterministic Proxmox job id (ignore-exists) + firstOrCreate.
- RegisterMonitoring is idempotent by URL + firstOrCreate — no duplicate schedules
or monitors after a crash/retry.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Clone: recover via vmExists() when the task ref was lost, instead of
re-cloning the reserved vmid (which Proxmox rejects).
- Deploy: persist the DB password ENCRYPTED before compose up and reuse it on
retry, so a crash can't regenerate a mismatching credential.
- Complete: gate credential delivery on a credentials_sent breadcrumb so a
retry after a crash doesn't re-send the email.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Failed run releases the instance (status=failed) so its quota stops counting
against host capacity.
- CompleteProvisioning activates instance+order only AFTER onboarding tasks +
credential delivery succeed.
- ConfigureNetwork polls until the guest has an address (no wrong Traefik route).
- customers.email unique + race-safe customer resolution in the intake action.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Require a real customer email (no unknown@ fallback merging customers).
- Stripe signature: enforce 5-min replay tolerance + accept any rotating v1.
- DeployApplicationStack no longer persists the DB password in the run context.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Stripe webhook fails closed when the signing secret is missing (outside local/testing).
- ReserveResources places + creates the instance under a per-datacenter lock so
concurrent orders can't overcommit a host.
- CloneVirtualMachine reserves the vmid + breadcrumb BEFORE cloning, so a crash
can't mint a new vmid and orphan the first clone.
- CreateCustomerAdmin checks user existence and resets the password instead of
re-running user:add on retry.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Stripe: only checkout.session.completed with payment_status=paid (dedupes the
paired payment_intent event and blocks unpaid async sessions).
- Capture the guest IP (ConfigureNetwork) and point Traefik at the VM, not the
Proxmox host, so ACME/HTTP-01 can reach Nextcloud.
- Resize the disk to an absolute target (not '+…') so a retry can't double it.
(Codex #4 timeout was a false positive — started_at resets per step.)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
nexxo