Two from Codex:
- The job accepted any stored instance with a host. A closed one's VMID can have
been reused on the same machine, and the reset would then land on another
customer's VM. It now requires a live instance, and the action is not offered
for anything else.
- An unreachable Proxmox or guest agent throws rather than returning an exit
code, so nothing was ever written to the handoff and the modal polled forever.
The throw is caught, and a failed() handler covers anything that still escapes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Impersonation borrows the customer's portal session; this is access to their
installation, which is a different thing and now a different button.
Nextcloud has no passwordless admin jump, so this does the only honest thing it
offers: it resets OUR managed admin account inside that installation and hands
the credentials over once. The customer's own accounts are untouched, and the
next request sets a new password again.
- New capability instances.adminlogin, Owner and Admin only — stronger than
impersonation, because it hands over control rather than a session.
- The operator's own password is required every time, rate-limited: taking over
a customer's installation is not something an unattended browser should manage
on its own.
- The reset runs on the provisioning worker (it owns the tunnel and the Proxmox
credentials); the console polls a handoff token, so the credentials never
enter a Livewire snapshot.
- A silent instance is reported as such instead of appearing to succeed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Once a key is free, someone can legitimately create a new access with it. The
forced revocation looked the key up and would have deleted that person's access
and pulled their key off the hub. It now acts only on an adoption artifact — a
system peer with no owner and no creator — and leaves anything else alone.
Re-issuing also threw when VPN_CONFIG_KEY was missing, which is exactly the
situation the console tells people to fix by re-issuing. It now hands the new
config over once instead of storing it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Codex found that a sync landing between the key swap and its removal would see
the old key as unknown. Writing the test showed something worse than the
duplicate he predicted: the adoption cannot even happen — the address still
belongs to the live access — so the insert violated the unique index and took
the ENTIRE reconciliation down with it. One stale key would have stopped every
peer's state from updating.
The sync now recognises that case and queues the removal instead of adopting,
and a key with no row of its own is revoked with force: it can only ever be
removed, never kept, so the removal cannot be talked out of it by a row that
should not exist.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
An access created without storing its config had no download button and no
explanation — it looked broken. It now shows a dimmed button that says why
(the private key only exists on your device), and every staff access gets
"Re-issue": a new keypair, old key off the hub before the new one goes on,
so two peers never claim the same tunnel address at once. A stored config is
re-encrypted in step, or the owner would download a key the hub no longer
accepts.
Host peers are excluded: their key belongs to the machine's own wg0, and
swapping it here would cut the host off with nothing left to repair it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
alpha_dash accepted eu_west, -edge and edge-, none of which are valid DNS
labels — every host in such a datacenter would have failed registration and,
because DNS is non-fatal, silently ended up without a name. The console now
requires a proper label, and the step normalises anything created before that
rule so existing rows still get a usable name.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
While the product is still being built, the marketing site and the customer
portal should not be reachable — but they must stay reachable for us.
- A toggle in the console (site.manage, Owner/Admin) stored in a new
app_settings table, because this has to be flippable without a deploy.
- Outsiders get a placeholder with 503 + noindex, not 200: a 200 invites search
engines to index the placeholder as the site's content, which is far harder
to undo than to prevent.
- Anyone on the management VPN, and any signed-in operator, sees the real site.
The console, Livewire's endpoint, the Stripe webhook and the health check are
always reachable — otherwise the switch could only be flipped once.
- robots.txt is generated by the app and follows the switch. It had to stop
being a static file: nginx short-circuited it and Laravel's stock file said
'Disallow:' with an empty value, so crawlers were never told anything.
- Settings reads fall back to the default when the table is unavailable. The
gate reads one on every request, so a deploy running new code before migrate
would otherwise answer the entire site with a 500.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The action labels wrapped to two lines and crushed the column — now icon
buttons with tooltips, like every other admin table. The form column was too
narrow for its content: the datetime fields silently clipped their own value,
so they are stacked and full width now, with duration chips because typing an
end timestamp by hand is the fiddliest part of the form. Host rows show a real
selected state and a per-datacenter count, and the impact column says
"1 Host · 1 Kunde" instead of "Host(s) · Kunde(n)".
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Encryption and the write ran after the transaction had committed and the peer
had been dispatched to the hub. A failure there left a live access whose config
was never stored — unrecoverable, and the operator would create a second one
not knowing why. Both now happen in the same insert; nothing is dispatched
unless it succeeded.
Re-verified in the browser afterwards: create with storage, wrong password
refused, right password reveals the config.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The download counter was read-modify-written, so two concurrent retrievals
recorded one. It is an audit trail — under-reporting is the failure mode it
must not have.
The creation-race test broke when issuing moved into a transaction: its
simulated competitor writes inside our transaction, so the rollback removes
that row too. It now asserts what actually matters (the loser is told, and
creates nothing) and states what a single-connection sqlite test cannot show.
This test was red in the previous commit — my mistake for committing before
reading the run.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A revocation committing between the operator check and the insert would find no
peer to remove and still leave the revoked colleague with a brand-new tunnel.
Issuing now runs in a transaction that locks the owner row — the same row
revokeStaff() locks — so the two cannot interleave.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Creating a second access with a supplied key skipped the config branch, so the
first access's private configuration stayed on screen under the new name — and
someone would have handed it out.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Once revealed, the plaintext sits in the handoff cache for ten minutes, and the
modal read it from the token alone. A former owner could keep pulling the key
out of an open modal after revocation — the exact window purgeSecret() exists to
close. Every request now re-checks the policy and drops the handoff when it no
longer holds.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A worker could pick the job up mid-transaction, still see the peer as active,
leave it on the hub — and never be asked again, because the committed state is
only a soft delete. A revoked colleague would keep their tunnel until some
later reconciliation noticed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Reworked after a design consultation with Codex, which pushed back on my first
proposal in three useful ways.
Ownership and rights:
- vpn.manage split into vpn.view.all and vpn.manage.all. Seeing an access is
not managing it, and neither is holding its private key.
- Record-level rules live in VpnPeerPolicy, not in permissions: an access
belongs to a person, and ownership is what grants sight of it. Every operator
reaches the page, but sees only their own unless they may see all.
- Issuing an access is not self-service — it reaches the management network, so
it needs vpn.manage.all even for oneself.
- New Developer role: sees everything, manages nothing. Writing code does not
imply authority over other people's access.
- kind (staff|host|system) replaces a null user_id that had to mean two
different things at once.
Config storage, opt-in per access:
- Downloading is owner-only — explicitly NOT for view.all or manage.all. An
admin who needs access revokes this one and issues their own, which keeps the
record of who holds what honest.
- The password is asked on EVERY retrieval, rate-limited. Laravel's
password.confirm keeps a 15-minute session stamp, which would authorise
unlimited later downloads from an unattended browser.
- Stored under VPN_CONFIG_KEY, not APP_KEY: a leaked application key must not
also hand over the management network. Purged on revocation and when a staff
member is revoked — console taken away, tunnel left open was the worst case.
- The plaintext never enters a Livewire snapshot (the page polls every five
seconds); the component carries an opaque handle instead.
Also: copy button works without HTTPS again (navigator.clipboard only exists in
a secure context, so over http it silently did nothing), plus config download
as a file and a QR code for the mobile apps.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- A host's wg_pubkey may not be in vpn_peers yet, so the duplicate check passed
and an operator could create an access with it. ApplyVpnPeer would then run
wg set with a freshly allocated address, rewriting that host's allowed-ip and
cutting CluPilot's management tunnel to a live machine. Creation now rejects
keys already held by a host, checked under the allocation lock.
- A sync landing between addPeer() and the step storing wg_pubkey adopted the
peer as "unknown", and a later sync filled in host_id but left the name, so
the page showed that host as unknown forever. The name is now filled in when
the link becomes known — only for sync-adopted rows, so an access an operator
named keeps its name.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- ConfigureWireguard and RemoveWireguardPeer mutate the hub too, and were not
taking the lock, so a sync could still read the interface around them and
write stale state. Both now hold wireguard:hub, which is what makes the
read/mutation guarantee actually hold.
- The duplicate-key check ran before the allocation lock, so two concurrent
creations with the same key both passed it and the loser hit the unique index
as an unhandled 500. The check moved inside the lock, with the index kept as
a caught backstop for any writer that does not take it — reproduced in a test
by inserting a colliding row from within the allocation call.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two more from Codex:
- Addresses come from one subnet but live in two tables (hosts.wg_ip and
vpn_peers.allowed_ip), so a concurrent host onboarding and console creation
could each see the same address as free and both insert — neither unique
index sees the other. Creation now waits on Cache::lock('wireguard:allocate'),
the same lock ConfigureWireguard already holds while reserving a host address.
- mount() runs once, so revoking vpn.manage left an open tab polling every five
seconds and still receiving fresh peer state. Authorization now also runs on
hydration, which is what the poll goes through.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two lifecycle holes Codex found in the new VPN management:
1. Delete removed the row before the hub knew. If the removal job was delayed
or failed, SyncVpnPeers saw a peer it did not recognise and adopted it back
as a live access — silently restoring what an operator had just revoked, and
with no row left to revoke it again. Deletion is now a soft-delete
tombstone: the row survives until the hub confirms the peer is gone, the
sync retries the removal instead of adopting, and the tombstone is purged
only once the peer is really absent. It also keeps the key and the tunnel
address reserved meanwhile, so neither is handed out twice.
2. ApplyVpnPeer applied the state captured at dispatch. A retried block job
could therefore undo a later unblock, and nothing would repair it — the sync
only observes state, it never re-applies intent. The job now resolves the
current desired state from the row and treats its payload as a fallback for
the case where the row is already gone.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The console can now create, block and remove VPN accesses, and shows who is
actually connected — traffic counters, source endpoint and last handshake.
Design notes:
- The web container has no wg0, so the page never talks to WireGuard. Live
state is copied in by SyncVpnPeers on the provisioning queue (the only worker
whose container owns the interface); the page polls the database and merely
nudges that job, throttled so many open tabs cannot flood the queue.
- enabled (operator intent) and present (observed on the hub) are stored
separately, so a sync can never quietly undo a block and drift stays visible
as "wird angewendet".
- The sync adopts peers the host pipeline registered, naming them after their
host — otherwise "who is on the VPN" would have blind spots.
- Keypairs are generated in PHP via libsodium rather than shelling out to
wg genkey (no interface in this container, and it keeps generation testable).
The private key is shown once and never stored.
- allocateIp() now also considers vpn_peers, which would otherwise be handed a
tunnel address a host already holds.
- vpn.manage is a new capability held by Owner/Admin only, and it hides the nav
entry too — a VPN access reaches the management network.
Verified end to end against the real hub, not just mocks: created an access in
the browser, connected with the generated config, watched the console flip to
"Verbunden" with real counters, then blocked it and confirmed the peer was
gone from wg0 and the client could no longer handshake.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- ResolvesCustomer trait replaces 5 duplicated customer() lookups; portal actions
now SAY why nothing happened (operator accounts have no Customer) instead of
returning silently — the actual cause of 'dead buttons', '0/0 seats' and
'settings not saving' when signed in as admin
- portal layout: explicit notice for a login without a linked customer
- /cloud: per-instance maintenance badge + window details; seat note 'owner = seat 1'
- maintenance form: sectioned card, hints, placeholder, styled datetime fields,
grouped host picker with per-datacenter select-all + selection counter
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- isOperator()/EnsureAdmin/broadcast fall back to is_admin so a legacy admin is
never locked out by a stale permission cache
- published modal: centered max-w-lg card (dynamic modalWidth class was purged
by Tailwind → full-width)
- datacenter edit moved to a modal (no row-height jump); location is now a
country dropdown (config/countries.php) instead of free text
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- 5 operator roles (Owner/Admin/Support/Billing/Read-only) seeded via migration
with a capability catalogue; app checks capabilities via Gate, never role names
- every mutating admin action authorizes server-side (hosts/datacenters/customers/
impersonate/provisioning); is_admin reads migrated to console.view / isOperator()
- admin /settings: own account + Owner-only staff invite/role/revoke with
last-owner, self-role and customer-collision guards (transactional)
- sidebar 'zum Kundenportal' link replaced with Settings
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The DB now refuses to orphan a host; datacenter delete pre-checks for a friendly
message and catches the constraint as the race backstop.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- seat limit follows the active/cancelling package, not a newer inactive record
- suspend/reactivate toggle refuses closed accounts (terminal); closed shown in list
- factory emails use a large unique numeric space (safeEmail pool could collide
late in a full suite run)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- plans gain seats + performance class; customer views show storage/seats/
performance/features, no raw vCPU/RAM (admin keeps specs)
- billing: scoped wire:target + wire:key so one purchase no longer spins all
- chart island: line-colour->transparent gradient for filled line datasets;
MRR / backups / invoices bar charts converted to gradient line
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
nexxo