95 Commits (f961205512e1374dd5cac8fa6c8ce1fbe8bf9749)

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
nexxo	4ad1828f27	Ein reservierter Host gehoert seinem Kunden ... placeableIn() nahm jeden aktiven Host im Rechenzentrum, und hasRoomFor() sowie largestPlaceableGb() zaehlten eine exklusiv verkaufte Maschine obendrein mit — der Shop versprach damit Platz, der bereits vergeben war. Ohne diese Markierung ist 'eigener Server' ein Satz im Angebot und nirgends eine Tatsache. hosts.reserved_for_customer_id (nullable, ueberlebt den Kunden) markiert die Maschine; Host::placeableIn() und HostCapacity zaehlen sie nur noch fuer den eigenen Mieter oder gar nicht mehr zum allgemeinen Bestand. Auf der Host-Detailseite kann ein Operator reservieren und wieder loesen — Loesen laeuft ueber ein eigenes Bestaetigungsmodal (R23), das selbst nichts aendert, sondern nur an HostDetail::releaseReservation() zurueckmeldet. Host-Liste und Kapazitaetsseite weisen eine reservierte Maschine als solche aus, statt sie kommentarlos verschwinden zu lassen. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-01 16:06:14 +02:00
nexxo	d6f2aa1c9e	Fix-Runde 1: Formel-Test raus, eigene Testhilfe, Docblock nachgezogen ... Der Formel-Test rechnete dieselbe Formel nach und wich dabei vom echten Code ab (kein max(0, ...) um den neuen Summanden) — ein Test, der die Implementierung nachrechnet und dabei abweicht, ist schlechter als keiner. Der Verhaltenstest deckt die Anforderung bereits ab und bleibt als einziger Test der Datei. StoragePackHeadroomTest.php hing außerdem an reservedRun() aus CustomerStepsTest.php und brach einzeln gefahren mit einem PHP-Fatal ab, statt mit einem ehrlichen Fehlschlag. Eigene, in sich geschlossene Hilfsfunktion (packHeadroomRun()) nach dem Muster der Nachbardateien (hostRun(), restartableInstance()) — die Datei läuft jetzt auch allein grün. Der Docblock von growDisk() sprach noch vom Kopfraum, der "unchanged" mitfährt, und widersprach damit dem neuen Summanden direkt darunter. Nachgezogen. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-01 14:41:39 +02:00
nexxo	3ed80a05e0	Ein Block bringt seinen eigenen Kopfraum mit ... Ein Block gibt 20 GB und belegt 22. Ohne das haette ein Start mit drei Bloecken 90 GB auf 100 GB Platte gehabt — zehn Gigabyte Kopfraum, wo die Regel bei dieser Plattengroesse zwoelf verlangt, und der gestapelte Tarif waere genau der Fall geworden, den die Regel verhindern soll. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-01 14:31:52 +02:00
nexxo	d62a2c8ff8	Hostnamen vergibt CluPilot: ein Name statt zweier, und der Zaehler ueberlebt das Loeschen ... HostName::claim() haengt den Namen jetzt an die Rechenzentrums-Zeile (next_host_number), nicht an MAX(hosts.name)+1: der Zaehler ueberlebt so das Loeschen des zuletzt angelegten Hosts. hosts.dns_name faellt weg - name ist ab jetzt der einzige Name, den Konsole, DNS, /etc/hosts und Proxmox-Node teilen. RegisterHostDns veroeffentlicht nur noch, was StartHostOnboarding beim Anlegen vergeben hat, statt selbst zu nummerieren; PrepareBaseSystem baut den FQDN ueber HostName::fqdn() statt ueber die nirgends konfigurierte clupilot.net. Zwei Testdateien ausserhalb der Aufgabenliste (DatacenterTest, HostTakeoverPageTest) setzten ->set('name', ...) auf HostCreate, das Feld jetzt aber nicht mehr hat - im vollen Testlauf nachgezogen. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-01 13:45:43 +02:00
nexxo	9888f898b8	EnsureNetworkBridge: abbestellen nach der Nachpruefung, aufgeben ohne die Rueckfahrkarte wegzuwerfen ... Drei Enden, und jedes hat eine Reihenfolge: - Abbestellt wird erst, NACHDEM die Bruecke nachgeprueft ist. Dass der Zweig erreicht wird, ist der Beweis: SSH kam ueber den Tunnel an und vmbr0 traegt Standardroute und Adresse — bridge_proven, von aussen gefragt. Und nur, wenn DIESER Lauf den Zeitgeber auch gestellt hat; ohne Termin im Kontext gehoeren die Unit-Dateien jemand anderem. - awaitRollback pollt, bis 'rolled-back' liegt, statt sofort zu scheitern. Solange der Zeitgeber aussteht, steckt die Maschine mitten in einer Umstellung, und ein fail() liesse sie dort liegen. Gedeckelt durch die Schritt-Frist, die das Dreifache der Zeitgeber-Frist ist. - giveUp loescht den Termin (sonst wird jedes Retry nach einem Fehlschlag zum sofortigen zweiten Fehlschlag), behaelt bridge_attempts (sonst ist der Deckel von zwei Versuchen keiner) und bestellt den Zeitgeber NICHT ab — er ist die Rueckfahrkarte, und steht er noch, hat er seinen Grund. Der sh-n-Test ist gegengeprobt: mit absichtlich kaputtem Quoting faellt er. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-01 13:05:58 +02:00
nexxo	2e511899f8	EnsureNetworkBridge: Start abgekoppelt, und der Verbindungsabriss wird gepollt statt gezaehlt ... Die tragende Zeile ist das try/catch um keyLogin. RunRunner:102 verwandelt jede geworfene Ausnahme in ein retry(), und retry verbraucht das Versuchskonto — ungefangen brennt der erwartete Verbindungsabriss die fuenf Versuche in wenigen Minuten durch und laesst den Lauf scheitern, BEVOR der Host wieder da ist. Genau der Unterschied zwischen 'Wiederholung' und 'toter Server'. Unterschieden wird am Termin im Run-Kontext: ohne ihn hat dieser Lauf nichts angefasst, dann ist ein Verbindungsfehler ein gewoehnlicher und darf einen Versuch kosten. Mit ihm laeuft gerade eine Umstellung, dann wird gepollt. bridge.sh und bridge-run.sh gehen wortgleich hoch (Test vergleicht Byte fuer Byte gegen die Repo-Datei), env traegt den Hub-Schluessel mit, damit der Treiber den Handshake gegen den RICHTIGEN Peer prueft. Start per nohup setsid, PID-Datei abgewartet. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-01 13:04:03 +02:00
nexxo	91ecb382f5	EnsureNetworkBridge: schon da heisst nichts anfassen, und keine Bruecke auf einer Bruecke ... Der Schritt, aber erst sein billigster Teil. Zwei Zusicherungen: - Traegt vmbr0 schon Standardroute UND Adresse, dann advance() ohne einen einzigen veraendernden Befehl. pve-fns-1 hat die Bruecke von Hand; ein Wiederanlauf, der sie umbaut, baut ein funktionierendes Netz um. - Ist die Karte mit der Standardroute keine physische (Bond, Bridge, VLAN), dann fail() mit Klartext statt bauen. bridge_ports darauf waere falsch, und was dabei herauskommt, ist aus der Ferne nicht mehr zu reparieren. readBridgeState fragt beides in einem Rundlauf und leitet aus dem LAUFENDEN Zustand ab (ip, /sys/class/net), nie aus der Datei des Anbieters. 'up' sind absichtlich alle drei Fakten: eine vmbr0 ohne Adresse und ohne Standardroute ist eine Bruecke im Sinne von 'ip link' und sonst nichts. Start, Poll und Abbestellen folgen. Bis dahin steht dort ein fail() — gefahrlos, weil der Schritt noch nicht in der Pipeline haengt. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-01 13:02:23 +02:00
nexxo	55b749c129	Release v1.3.94 — die Kurven zeigen wieder, wie ausgelastet der Host ist ... Drei Punkte des Besitzers, und der dritte hat den eigentlichen Fehler freigelegt. Die Verlaufslinien sahen komisch aus, weil sie auf ihr EIGENES Minimum und Maximum skalierten. Ein Host mit 0,2 % CPU, der zwischen 0,1 und 0,3 schwankt, zeichnete damit einen Seismographen über die volle Höhe — und widersprach flach der Zahl direkt daneben. Dieselbe Regel stand im Chart.js-Entwurf schon ausformuliert ("eine automatisch skalierte Achse lässt 3 % wie eine Wand aussehen") und ging beim Umstieg auf die Kacheln verloren. x-ui.spark bekommt deshalb `min`/`max`. Ohne Angabe bleibt alles wie bisher — das ist, was jeder bestehende Aufrufer übergibt. Die Prozent-Kacheln geben 0 und 100 mit, die Netz-Kacheln nur die 0, weil MiB/s keine natürliche Obergrenze haben. Ein untätiger Host zeichnet jetzt vier ruhige Linien statt zweier wogender und zweier flacher — vorher wirkte CPU (0,2 %) belebter als RAM (3,6 %), also genau verkehrt herum. Dazu: Werte außerhalb der Grenzen werden geklemmt statt aus dem Kasten gezeichnet, die Fläche ist ein Verlauf statt einer harten Kante, und die Linien sind mit 120×40 statt 80×32 lesbar. Ich hatte max=100 zwischendurch selbst verworfen, weil es "zu tot" aussah — auf einem Bild, auf dem die Füllung wegen eines CSS-Fehlers gar nicht gezeichnet wurde. Ein Vergleich mit einem kaputten Bild. Der Fehler: `.spark path { fill: none }` schlägt als CSS-Regel das Präsentationsattribut fill="url(#…)". `fill: none` gehört an die Linie, nicht an jeden Pfad. Die Ausstattung ist wieder einzeilig. Sechs Felder, sechs Spalten — und die Bau-Kennung steht nur noch im Titel: als eigene Zeile zwang sie die ganze Tafel in eine zweite Reihe, für eine Zeichenkette, die fast niemand liest. Und die Wartezeit: die Seite stößt beim Öffnen eine Sammlung an, wenn noch keine Messwerte da sind, statt bis zum nächsten minütlichen Lauf leer zu bleiben. Ein leerer Kasten liest sich als "kaputt", nicht als "gleich". Der Job ist ShouldBeUnique, zwei geöffnete Seiten reihen also keine zwei ein. Codex-Befund dazu (P2): das galt auch für Hosts, die der Sammler ohnehin überspringt — ein Host mitten in der Übernahme hat keinen Token, und seine Seite hätte die ganze Flotte abgeklappert und die eigenen Kacheln trotzdem leer gelassen. Wer gesammelt wird, steht jetzt einmal am Modell (Host::collectable), gelesen von Job und Seite. Zwei Fassungen dieser Frage waren genau der Grund. Geprüft: 2307 Tests grün, Pint sauber, Codex ohne Befund. Der Test für den Maßstab prüft jetzt auch die echten Aufrufstellen und nicht nur das Bauteil — gegengeprobt durch Entfernen von max=100, dann fällt er. Im Browser beide Fälle angesehen: ruhiger Host vier flache Linien, ausgelasteter Host lesbare Form, null Konsolenfehler. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-01 11:56:10 +02:00
nexxo	dc35e5310f	Release v1.3.93 — die Seite konnte den Host gar nicht fragen ... Auf echter Hardware blieb jede Messkachel leer, während der Host sichtbar online war und vor zwei Minuten geantwortet hatte. Kein Zufall und kein Aussetzer: ein Entwurfsfehler. Nur der queue-provisioning-Container hängt im WireGuard-Netz — NET_ADMIN, /dev/net/tun, das wireguard-Volume. Der app-Container, der die Konsole rendert, hat überhaupt keine Route zu 10.66.0.x. Ich hatte den Proxmox-Aufruf in render() gelegt, also in den einen Container, der die Management-Adresse nicht erreichen kann. Ein Aufruf von dort konnte nie etwas anderes sein als eine Zeitüberschreitung. PingHosts schreibt dieselbe Regel seit Langem in seinen Kopf: "runs on the provisioning queue, which is where the Proxmox credentials are usable." Ich habe sie gelesen und nicht angewendet. Verschlimmert hat es mein eigenes catch (Throwable): der Grund wurde verschluckt, und die Kachel sagte "keine Messwerte" — ununterscheidbar davon, dass der Host schweigt. Auf dem Testhost fiel nichts auf, weil TEST-NET ohnehin nie antwortet. Jetzt zwei Hälften: - HostLoadSeries::collect() holt und legt ab, aus Jobs\CollectHostLoad auf der provisioning-Warteschlange, minütlich — der Takt, in dem Proxmox einen frischen Messwert schreibt. Ein Fehlschlag wird protokolliert, mit Host, Node und Grund. - HostLoadSeries::forHost() liest nur aus dem Zwischenspeicher und öffnet nie eine Verbindung. Ein Test hält das mit Http::assertNothingSent() fest. Der Eintrag lebt fünf Minuten bei minütlichem Sammeln: länger als der Takt, damit ein ausgefallener Lauf keine Seite leert, die eine Sekunde vorher in Ordnung war — und kurz genug, dass ein stehengebliebener Sammler die Zahlen mitnimmt, statt eine alte Stunde als aktuell stehenzulassen. Der Sammler ist ShouldBeUnique (Codex-Befund, P1). Die provisioning-Warteschlange ist DIESELBE, auf der Kunden-Bereitstellung läuft; ein stiller Host kostet den vollen HTTP-Zeitablauf, und ohne diese Sperre stauten sich minütlich neue Läufe hinter dem alten und verzögerten bezahlte Arbeit. Dasselbe Mittel, das CollectInstanceTraffic nebenan schon benutzt. Dazu: der Zustands-Punkt war mit 62 px so groß wie der Speicher-Ring nebenan. Eine gefüllte Scheibe wiegt optisch weit mehr als ein dünner Ring und erschlug die Kachel — jetzt 32 px. Und ein Test, der aus Versehen recht behielt: die Kachel-Prüfung verglich mit "50", was auch die 500 GB in der Instanzenliste darunter trifft. Sie prüft jetzt Zahlen, die sonst nirgends auf der Seite vorkommen. Noch offen, nicht hier angefasst: VmTemplateCheck fragt die Proxmox-API ebenfalls aus dem app-Container heraus, von der Bereitschaftsseite aus. Selber Fehler, Bestand, eigener Punkt. Geprüft: 2299 Tests grün, Pint sauber, Codex ohne Befund. Im Browser mit eingespielten Messwerten: sechs gefüllte Kacheln, Zustands-Scheibe in Proportion. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-01 11:23:00 +02:00
nexxo	665a0c4e08	Release v1.3.91 — die Host-Seite zeigt Last statt Ausstattung ... Die Karte "Rechenleistung" zeigte keine Leistung. 12 Kerne und 63 GB sind die Ausstattung des Blechs und ändern sich nie — sie standen aber im selben Kartenraster wie "Zustand" und "Speicher", die beide leben. Wer die Seite öffnete, um zu sehen, wie es dem Host geht, las dort eine Zahl, die das nie sagen konnte. An ihrer Stelle steht jetzt die Last: CPU und RAM als Stundenkurve, beide in Prozent auf EINER Achse, dazu die aktuellen Werte als beschriftete Zahlen. Die Geschichte kommt aus Proxmox' eigener Aufzeichnung (/nodes/{node}/rrddata), nicht aus einem eigenen Sampler. Ein Sampler hieße neue Tabelle, minütlicher Job, Aufräum-Job und ~1440 Zeilen je Host und Tag — um weniger genau nachzubauen, was ohnehin auf der Platte liegt. Die RRD ist ab der ersten Sekunde gefüllt, auch für die Stunde vor dem ersten Hinsehen, und kann nicht von dem abweichen, was Proxmox' eigene Oberfläche zeigt. Eine Lücke bleibt eine Lücke: ein Punkt ohne Messwert wird null, nie 0, und spanGaps steht auf false. Dieselbe Regel wie in instance_metrics. Antwortet der Host gar nicht, sagt die Tafel das in einem Satz, statt eine ruhige Stunde zu zeichnen — auf dem Testhost live bestätigt. Der Fehler, den das ans Licht gebracht hat ------------------------------------------ x-ui.chart steht überall unter wire:ignore, sonst zerstört Livewire das Canvas. Ein Poll erreicht den Chart also nie. Dafür bekam das Bauteil ein optionales update-on: es hört auf ein Fenster-Ereignis und tauscht die Daten IM bestehenden Chart.js-Objekt. Das lief nicht. Die Zahlen neben der Kurve wanderten, die Kurve nicht, und chart.update() starb still im Legenden-Plugin: TypeError: Cannot set properties of undefined (setting 'fullSize') Grund: die Chart.js-Instanz lag als Eigenschaft im Alpine-Objekt und wurde damit reaktiv umhüllt. Chart.js' Plugin-Innenleben überlebt das Proxy nicht. Gemessen statt geschlossen: dieselbe Instanz wirft über das Proxy und läuft über Alpine.raw(). Sie liegt jetzt in der Closure. Aufgefallen ist es nie, weil bis zum ersten Live-Chart kein einziger Chart in diesem Repo je update() gerufen hat — konstruieren und Erstzeichnen gehen durch die Hülle noch. tests/Feature/ChartLiveUpdateTest.php hält die Regel fest, damit der nächste Live-Chart nicht denselben Nachmittag kostet. Der Rest -------- - Version lesbar: "Proxmox VE 9.2.6" statt pve-manager/9.2.6/7f8d…, mitten in der Bau-Kennung abgeschnitten. Die Kennung steht klein darunter. Eine unerwartete Form wird unverändert durchgereicht statt verschluckt. - Vier Kleinkarten (Mgmt-IP, Node, Version, Instanzen) sind eine Ausstattungs-Tafel geworden. Die Instanzen-Anzahl steht in der Überschrift der Liste, die sie ohnehin zeigt. - Der Übernahme-Fortschritt klappt zu, sobald sie durch ist. Fünfzehn abgehakte Schritte sind auf einem laufenden Host kein Dauerinhalt — aufklappbar über <details>, ohne JavaScript. - PlanVersion::requiredTemplateVmids() ersetzt die dritte Kopie derselben Fensterlogik. - BuildVmTemplate sagt nicht mehr "this takes 10–20 minutes". Das war eine Schätzung vor dem ersten Lauf; gemessen waren es unter zwei. Eine Konsole, die falsch vorhersagt, erzieht dazu, sie zu ignorieren. Geprüft: 2281 Tests grün, Pint sauber, Codex ohne Befund. Die Farbwahl gegen den Validator gerechnet (ΔE 28,3 protan / 39,2 normal; der Akzent liegt unter 3:1 gegen die Fläche, deshalb tragen beide Reihen sichtbare Beschriftung). Im Browser: null Konsolenfehler über einen vollen Poll-Zyklus, und die Kurve wandert auf dem echten Poll ohne Neuladen — mit eingespielten Messwerten belegt, weil die Testhosts in TEST-NET liegen und nie antworten. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-01 10:24:21 +02:00
nexxo	db125781ed	Release v1.3.88 — die Vorlage baut sich selbst ... Der letzte Handgriff in der Host-Übernahme fällt weg. VerifyVmTemplate meldete bisher nur, dass eine Vorlage fehlt, weil niemand entschieden hatte, was in die goldene Vorlage gehört. Entschieden ist es längst und steht in deploy/bootstrap/lib/template.sh — der neue Schritt BuildVmTemplate lädt genau diese Datei auf den Host und führt sie dort aus, statt ihre Prüfungen ein zweites Mal in PHP zu haben. Er läuft abgekoppelt und wird abgefragt: Abbild laden und drei virt-customize-Läufe brauchen zehn bis zwanzig Minuten, ein einzelner SSH-Aufruf liefe gegen den Befehlszeitablauf von 2000 s. "Läuft noch" heißt dabei, dass der Prozess lebt (kill -0 gegen die hinterlegte PID) — in der Statusdatei steht "running" auch dann noch, wenn niemand mehr da ist, der sie ändert. Fünf Fehler, die dabei aufgefallen sind und Geld gekostet hätten: - qm importdisk hängte die Platte unter ${storage}:vm-9000-disk-0 ein. Der Name gilt nur bei Block-Ablagen; auf einer Verzeichnis-Ablage heißt sie local:9000/vm-9000-disk-0.qcow2 — also genau auf dem per Debian aufgesetzten Proxmox, um das es hier geht. Jetzt qm set --import-from, und Proxmox benennt selbst. - growpart war nie installiert. GrowGuestFilesystem ruft es auf, und es lief bisher, weil Debians Cloud-Abbild es zufällig mitbringt. Fiele es heraus, läge jedes gekaufte Kontingent über einem Dateisystem, das nie gewachsen ist. Jetzt ausdrücklich eingebaut und als vierte Falle nachgewiesen. - local nimmt ab Werk keine Platten an. Ohne das stirbt nicht nur der Bau, RegisterCapacity meldet danach Kapazität 0: ein Host, der fertig aussieht und nie einen Kunden tragen kann. ensure_image_storage greift nur ein, wenn keine Ablage Platten annimmt, hängt images an die vorhandene Liste an statt sie zu ersetzen, und schreibt über pvesm set statt in die pmxcfs-Datei. - Ein abgebrochener Download blieb unter dem Zielnamen liegen und wäre beim nächsten Lauf ungeprüft weiterbenutzt worden. Jetzt .part, umbenannt erst nach geprüfter Summe. - VerifyVmTemplate und VmTemplateCheck fragten nur, ob VMID 9000 existiert. Ein abgebrochener Bau hinterlässt eine gewöhnliche VM mit dieser Nummer, und beide sagten dazu "passt" — der Fehler kam beim ersten bezahlten Klon zurück. Jetzt template: 1. isTemplate() stellt zwei Anfragen, weil die falsche Antwort hier etwas zerstört: false heißt "Vorlage fehlt", und der Bau fängt mit qm destroy --purge an. Proxmox beantwortet die Konfiguration einer nicht vorhandenen VM mit 500 — demselben Code wie einen Knoten in Not. Die VM-Liste klärt deshalb die Abwesenheit, alles darunter wirft und landet im Wiederholungs-Zweig. Aufgeben beendet erst die Prozessgruppe, dann räumt es auf, und gebaut wird nur die Fehlliste: create_proxmox_template räumt eine VMID weg, bevor es sie anlegt, also hätte "alles Verlangte" eine gesunde zweite Vorlage auf dem Weg zerstört. Geprüft: 2267 Tests grün, Pint sauber, sh -n über alle drei Shell-Dateien, die storage.cfg-Auswertung gegen eine echte Beispieldatei durchgespielt, und jeder Befehl, den der Schritt absetzt, geht durch sh -n — keine andere Prüfung führt diese Shell je aus. Drei Codex-Runden (R15), alle Befunde behoben. Nicht geprüft: nichts davon lief je gegen echte Hardware. Die erste Übernahme auf einem Proxmox-Host ist die Abnahme. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-01 05:01:44 +02:00
nexxo	4f04d9d29d	Release v1.3.86 — der Grund von pveum, nicht nur die Feststellung ... „could not converge the Proxmox automation role privileges", fünfmal hintereinander. Die Meldung sagte, WAS scheiterte, und verschwieg das Einzige, was weiterhilft: was `pveum` dazu geschrieben hat. Der Betreiber musste sich auf den Host melden und den Befehl von Hand nachstellen, um eine Zeile zu lesen, die daneben schon dastand. Die Fehlerausgabe von `pveum role modify` steht jetzt in der Meldung — erste Zeile, gekürzt: `pveum` stellt den Grund voran und breitet danach seine Aufrufhilfe aus, und die wäre ein Bildschirm Text in einer Ereigniszeile. 2244 Tests grün. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-01 03:38:02 +02:00
nexxo	b9fb401823	Release v1.3.85 — Handshake-Prüfung hing an einem Programm, das es nicht gibt ... Die Übernahme brach in "WireGuard einrichten" ab: fünf Wiederholungen, "WireGuard handshake not up yet". Geprüft wurde mit `ping -c1 -W2 <hub-ip>`. Das fragte drei Dinge auf einmal und nannte nur eines: ob der Handshake steht, ob ICMP durchkommt — und ob es `ping` auf der Maschine überhaupt GIBT. Auf Hetzners `Debian-trixie-latest-amd64-base` gibt es das nicht. `iputils-ping` ist im Image nicht dabei, und PrepareBaseSystem installiert `curl gnupg ifupdown2 chrony`. Der Schritt scheiterte damit über einem Tunnel, der stehen konnte. Auf dem alten Proxmox-Image war ping dabei, deshalb lief es dort durch — dieselbe Pipeline, anderes Grundsystem. Gefragt wird jetzt WireGuard selbst: `date +%s; wg show wg0 latest-handshakes`. Die Uhr des HOSTS kommt in derselben Antwort mit, weil `latest-handshakes` eine absolute Zeit ausgibt und ein Vergleich gegen UNSERE Uhr eine Zeitverschiebung zwischen zwei Maschinen als Tunnelzustand läse. `date` ist in coreutils und überall da. Codex, zwei Runden: - P1: `> 0` hiesse "hat jemals". WireGuard behält den Zeitstempel unbegrenzt, also meldete ein Wiederholungslauf über einem toten Tunnel "steht", und die Schritte danach wählten die Tunneladresse für SSH. Jetzt muss der Handshake frisch sein (180 s) und vom KONFIGURIERTEN Hub kommen — ein fremder Peer auf wg0 ist kein Beweis dafür, dass wir erreichbar sind. - P1: Der neue Host-Versatz (.100) liess die Vergabe in einem Subnetz kleiner als /26 "erschöpft" melden, obwohl unten alles frei war. Der Versatz ist eine Bevorzugung, keine Bedingung: zweiter Durchgang von vorn. Ausserdem, wie gewünscht: Hosts bekommen ihre Tunneladresse ab .100 (CLUPILOT_WG_HOST_OFFSET), Personen zählen weiter von unten. Fortlaufend vergeben landete der erste Host zwischen zwei Notebooks, und wer eine Adresse in einem Protokoll las, konnte nicht sagen, ob dahinter ein Mensch oder eine Maschine steht. 2243 Tests grün. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-01 03:00:19 +02:00
nexxo	8ab50f5650	Release v1.3.81 — Host anlegen scheiterte am WireGuard-Peer ... Das Anlegen eines Hosts endete in der Konsole mit einem 500, bevor der Betreiber den Einmal-Code je zu sehen bekam. Ursache war nicht das Anlegen, sondern der Tunnel-Peer: HostEnrolment::issueWithKeys() rief `wg set wg0` selbst auf — im Web-Request, also im `app`-Container. Der hat weder NET_ADMIN noch /dev/net/tun; wg0 lebt im Provisioning-Container. Die Antwort war "Unable to modify interface: Operation not permitted". Der Peer geht jetzt als ApplyHostVpnPeer auf die Provisioning-Queue — genau dorthin, wo ApplyVpnPeer es für die VPN-Zugänge längst richtig macht, mit derselben `wireguard:hub`-Sperre und demselben Grundsatz: der Sollzustand kommt beim Ausführen aus der Zeile, nicht aus dem beim Einreihen festgehaltenen Wert. Der abgelöste Schlüssel reist als Wert mit, weil in der Zeile zu diesem Zeitpunkt schon der neue steht. Aufgefallen ist es nie, weil die Testsuite den Hub gegen FakeWireguardHub tauscht — der bestehende Test blieb grün, während der echte Weg seit jeher fehlschlug. Die zwei neuen Tests prüfen deshalb den WEG statt des Ergebnisses: in der Anfrage bleibt der Hub unberührt, und der Auftrag liegt auf der Provisioning-Queue. Codex: 0 Fehler, 0 Sicherheitsbefunde. Dazu sein P2 — /.claude/ stand weder im Index noch in .gitignore, ein `git add -A` hätte 153 MB als verschachteltes Repo eingebettet. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-01 00:43:10 +02:00
nexxo	ba4996f316	Keep the platform on .com and the customers on .cloud ... The owner caught me putting the archive on clupilot.cloud. That is the customer zone, and looking into it turned up the same confusion already sitting in the code — in the one place that matters most. RegisterHostDns says "fsn-01.node.clupilot.com" in its own docblock. The validation comment in Datacenters says it. ServicesTest writes it out verbatim. The step itself built the name from config('provisioning.dns.zone') — the CUSTOMER zone — so on this installation a host was actually called fsn-01.node.clupilot.cloud. Three places asserting one thing and the code doing another. OfficialDomains explains why that matters and is worth not weakening: two registrable domains by design, the company's for site, portal and console, the instance zone for customer workloads. A Nextcloud is third-party software that strangers sign into, and on the same registrable domain as the portal it shares cookie scope with it. A host name in that zone does not break the separation, but it puts it in question, and the next slip is more expensive. So there is now a platform_zone, derived from APP_URL when unset, and RegisterHostDns uses it. My own archiveUrl was broken for a second reason. It fell back to url() when APP_HOST is empty — and APP_HOST is empty on most installations, because empty means "the portal answers on any hostname" and that is the default. Called from the console, url() would have produced the CONSOLE hostname, and the line would have 404'd on a machine that is not allowed to reach the admin area at all. It takes the host from APP_URL now. The script no longer guesses its own name. It used reverse DNS, then the tunnel address, then a hard-coded clupilot.net — a third domain that appears nowhere else in this project and was simply invented. PrepareBaseSystem has the same invention. A guessed name does not stay guessed: it ends up in /etc/hostname, in /etc/hosts, in every log line and in every certificate request the machine ever makes. CluPilot knows the name because it just assigned it, so it passes --fqdn and the script refuses without it. The value now also survives the reboot in the arguments file, which it would not have. The ACME contact moved to .com for the same reason it was wrong: the operator does not live in the customer zone. Open, and NOT decided here: the owner also wants the host to get a public DNS record and a certificate on the .com name. RegisterHostDns deliberately writes host names only into the tunnel's dnsmasq, and says why — publishing them hands every scanner the internal subnet and roughly how many hosts sit behind it. Nothing in the current design needs a public certificate for a host's own name; Traefik serves customer domains, not this one. Reversing that is a security decision and belongs to the owner, not to this commit. 1992 tests pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-30 21:04:08 +02:00
nexxo	6ca3e6ef4a	Notice when nobody is picking up the queue ... Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-30 14:32:09 +02:00
nexxo	889b401faf	Fix nine defects in the provisioning pipelines ... The capacity park could not survive its own first poll. ReserveResources polls every 120 s and declared a maxDuration of 60, and RunRunner measures a step's budget from a started_at it deliberately does not reset on a poll — so every re-entry was ruled timed out before the body ran, a timeout consumes an attempt, and five of them failed a paid order in about six minutes. The fourteen-day promise, the console's capacity queue and the "go and buy a server" workflow were unreachable code. maxDuration is now the whole park plus one poll interval, and a test drives a park through the runner rather than calling execute() directly, which is why this was invisible. Every guest occ call ran as root. `docker compose exec` defaults to root and the Nextcloud image's console.php exits 1 unless the caller owns config/config.php, so all five call sites were failing on every instance. There is now one builder, App\Support\NextcloudOcc, and a test refuses a second: nothing in app/ may spell the invocation out by hand. deploy/ update.sh had learned this for our own container and nobody carried it across. RunAcceptanceChecks was terminal on the first no. certReachable() answers false for a connect timeout as readily as for a missing certificate, so one bad second ended a finished, certified Nextcloud as a failed order with the instance released. The probes retry now and the run still fails for good with the probe's own reason once the budget is spent; the two facts a retry cannot change stay terminal. The in-flight guard asked whether anything was running, not whether it would do the work. App\Provisioning\WorkInFlight asks the second question, reading the step lists the runner executes: a domain proven during a restart is routed, and a storage pack booked during an address run is delivered instead of charged monthly and forgotten. The address pipeline ran its steps in the wrong order for the direction it exists for. Nextcloud before the router in `address` and `plan-change`, as in `customer`, because a run that got the certificate and then failed left the customer's own domain serving an untrusted-domain error under a valid certificate while the portal called it live. Safe in both directions; the reasoning is written above the pipeline. A stale guest_ip could never be corrected. ConfigureDnsAndTls compared the hostnames but never the backend, and nothing re-read the address after the build. It now records and compares `routed_backend`, and ConfigureNetwork joins the `restart` pipeline — a cold boot is what moves a DHCP lease — and asks for the address to be re-applied when the guest has actually moved. Also: HetznerDnsClient::upsertRecord read only the first page of a zone that pages at 100, so past a hundred records it created a second A record for the same name and the cloud was up about half the time; the console's retry left a live customer's order in `provisioning` for ever for any maintenance pipeline; and a revived run's first pass burned an attempt on a timeout that had already happened, because the clause written for it used `??=`. Seven test sites wrote config('provisioning.plans.*'), a key that has not existed since the catalogue moved into the database. Every write was a no-op, so each test proved something other than its name: the missing template, the two snapshot regressions and the grandfathered-price scenario are now actually constructed, ValidateOrder's reasons are asserted rather than only its type, and the end-to-end run checks that the quota step delivered something. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-30 01:34:55 +02:00
nexxo	336ca9d88c	Make host onboarding survive the machine it runs on ... Nine defects in the host pipeline, every one of which either stopped an install or let a host reach `active` while it could not do its job. The install-stoppers: - InstallProxmoxVe hard-coded `bookworm`. A server ordered today boots Debian 13 trixie, so it added the PVE 8 repo and keyring to a trixie base. The codename now comes from /etc/os-release, the suite and keyring are looked up per release, and an unknown one fails naming what it found instead of guessing. Keys land in /usr/share/keyrings with Signed-By rather than in the deprecated trusted.gpg.d, where they would vouch for every other repository on the machine too. - keyLogin() dialled wg_ip whenever it was filled, but wg_ip is persisted inside the allocation lock BEFORE the handshake is ever proven. Attempt 1 reserved the address and failed at the handshake; every later attempt, including a console Retry, died connecting to a tunnel that did not work — before reaching the only code that could repair wg0.conf. Recovery meant nulling hosts.wg_ip by hand. SSH now uses the tunnel only once the `wg_peer` breadcrumb proves a handshake succeeded, which also rescues the same shape in RebootIntoPveKernel, ConfigureProxmox, CreateAutomationToken and SecureHostFirewall. Not a hole: 22 on the public IP is open until SecureHostFirewall runs, that step runs last, and by then the tunnel is necessarily proven. And nothing validated the hub key/endpoint, so renderConfig() would emit `PublicKey = ` — now refused before anything is installed, allocated or written. - `systemctl enable --now wg-quick@wg0 || wg-quick up wg0` brought the interface up without the enablement, so the tunnel did not come back after the step-6 reboot; on the next attempt both halves failed with "wg0 already exists" and the step retried forever on a working tunnel. The three states are handled separately now, and a changed wg0.conf is actually applied instead of only written. - RebootIntoPveKernel removed the Debian kernel with `|| true`, ignored update-grub's exit status, and rebooted. A /boot that filled up during the full-upgrade could leave a machine only the provider's console can reach. The pve kernel image, its initramfs and update-grub's exit status are all proven first; anything missing fails loudly and does not reboot. - ConfigureProxmox ran `ip link show vmbr0` and threw the result away (its comment claimed it recorded the absence; it recorded nothing), then repeated a rm -f, and always advanced. Proxmox on top of Debian does not create vmbr0, so onboarding reported `active` with no bridge. It now fails with the default route in the message and deliberately does not build the bridge over the primary NIC from a remote shell. The things that were quietly inert: - Proxmox applies a guest's firewall rules only while the firewall is enabled at datacenter level, and it ships disabled — so applyFirewall()'s "80/443 only" rules were inert on every customer VM. Enabling it blindly is the opposite trap (input policy defaults to DROP, node firewall defaults to on, and its management ipset is seeded from the PUBLIC subnet, not the tunnel), so: policy ACCEPT and the node firewall off first, master switch last, read back to confirm. nftables stays the one owner of the host's input policy. - role_privs lacked Sys.Modify, which POST /cluster/backup requires (pve-manager's PVE/API2/Backup.pm), so RegisterBackup 403'd and failed EVERY customer run. And `pveum role add … || true` only ever applied the privilege list on the run that created the role — it converges now, above the token short-circuit so a replay reaches it. - The nftables ruleset dropped all ICMP and ICMPv6. On a real host that breaks IPv6 outright once the neighbour cache expires and black-holes large transfers through PMTUD. Both families accept the types they need, policy drop stays, and a DHCP client reply is allowed so a rebind cannot lose the IPv4 address. - api_token_ref used the `encrypted` cast, i.e. APP_KEY, against SecretVault's own written rule. One rotation would have made every host's Proxmox token undecryptable at once. Moved onto SecretCipher with a migration that leaves any value it cannot read exactly as it is and says so, rather than destroying a credential that exists nowhere else. - Every plan version points at template_vmid 9000 and nothing created or verified it, so the first paid order died in CloneVirtualMachine after the customer had paid. VerifyVmTemplate reports that during onboarding instead. It does not build a template: what goes into the golden image is a product decision. Three tests that proved nothing, fixed: `ran(…emergency-open-firewall.sh)` only ever matched the `chmod 700` above it, because putFile() is not recorded — the script's contents are now asserted, including that nothing in it reopens the firewall on a timer or in the background. The port policy was tested one-sidedly, so a mutation adding `tcp dport { 8006 } accept` passed the suite; the ruleset is now read as a list of what it opens to an unrestricted source. And the end-to-end test says in writing that it proves sequencing only. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-30 00:54:16 +02:00
nexxo	5b63fdb86c	Deliver the storage a customer actually buys ... A booked storage pack was a row in `subscription_addons` and nothing else: priced, frozen, charged every month, and delivered nowhere. Nextcloud's quota came from `instances.quota_gb`, which is the package alone; the disk was sized for the package alone; and on the one occasion a disk did grow — a plan upgrade — the guest never saw it, because nothing stretched the partition or the filesystem over the new space. One authority for the allowance. StorageAllowance adds the package and the booked packs, and everything that needs the figure asks it: the quota step, the downgrade check, the portal, the console, the repair command. It is DERIVED rather than stored — a column would have to be rewritten by booking, cancelling, granting, a grant expiring and a plan change, and the day one of those paths forgot it would be silently wrong in whichever direction costs somebody money. `quota_applied_gb` keeps its own meaning: what the guest was last actually told, which is how a machine with the allowance enforced is told from one where the figure has only ever been a row in our database. Buying it delivers it. BookAddon asks ApplyStorageAllowance for a run on booking AND on cancellation; the new `storage` pipeline grows the virtual disk to the allowance plus the package's own overhead (read off the package — 20/40/50/100 GB on the four catalogue packages — never a ratio invented here), then GrowGuestFilesystem makes the guest see it, then the quota is applied. No cold boot is involved: the data disk is scsi0 and Proxmox's resize on a running guest is a qemu block_resize, so the capacity reaches the guest while it runs. The new step rescans, growparts and grows the filesystem with the tool its type actually needs — ext2/3/4, xfs, btrfs — and fails loudly on one it does not know rather than handing it to resize2fs and hoping. Idempotent end to end: NOCHANGE from growpart is not a failure, and every tool here exits 0 when there is nothing left to grow. The same step now runs in the plan-change pipeline, where an upgrade used to stop one step short of the customer. A downgrade blocked by data gets a way out. The block stays — it is correct — but the check now measures against the target package PLUS the packs the customer already owns, and reports the numbers behind the refusal: what is stored, what would be allowed, how much has to go, and how many packs would cover it instead. The portal offers both routes: book exactly those packs (confirmed in a modal, R23), or delete data and have the fill level measured on demand rather than waiting for the nightly sampler. That reading is taken by DiskUsageProbe, which CollectInstanceTraffic now uses too, so there is one notion of "how full is it" and not two. A plan change keeps booked packs. They were paid for separately and have nothing to do with which package the customer is on; the new package's disk and quota are sized with them included. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-29 19:13:10 +02:00
nexxo	ec8675861e	Take the order, park it, and say when it will be delivered ... A paid order that no host has room for used to FAIL at the reservation step. The customer has paid by then, so that turned a sale into an incident and left somebody holding money against nothing. The estate is finite and booked thick, so "no host has room right now" is an ordinary Tuesday — it means a machine has to be bought, which takes days. So the order waits instead. poll(), not retry(): the wait is measured in days and must not eat the run's attempt budget. It only fails after PARK_DAYS (14) — long enough to buy, rack and onboard a server over a weekend, short enough that a forgotten order surfaces instead of waiting for ever. Then say so, in the same words on both sides of the payment: - The price sheet marks each package "wird sofort ausgeliefert" or "Bereitstellung in 2-3 Werktagen", read from free capacity rather than written into the page. - The customer's own overview says their cloud is being prepared while it is parked, instead of a stepper standing still for two days under "wird eingerichtet" — which reads as broken. - The console front page shows the same per-package answer, so an operator can see what visitors are being promised. And a capacity page for the decision that follows: who is waiting, what the roomiest host still has, what the queue needs ("3x Start, 1x Business" - the LARGEST parked package sets the minimum machine, because an instance lives on one host), and what such a machine costs today from the provider's live list. It orders nothing: buying a server is a contract, and a bug in a capacity calculation must not sign one. The operator can also say where each parked order goes. A pin is honoured or it waits — never quietly redirected — because placing it elsewhere answers a different question than the one they answered, and they would find out from the finished instance. Two things this shook out: - `current_step` is an INDEX into the pipeline, not the step's key, and it is cast to integer. `where('current_step', 'reserve_resources')` reads as correct and matches step 0 of EVERY pipeline instead. Both lookups go through HostCapacity::parkedRuns() now, which resolves the index and filters by pipeline. - The auction feed sends `hdd_hr` as a list, not a string. Casting it printed "Array" into the console and raised a warning that took the page down with it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-29 18:50:46 +02:00
nexxo	d76de5ada3	Restart a machine, enforce the quota that was sold, end a route that ended ... Three places where the product said one thing and did another. **Nothing could restart a virtual machine.** ProxmoxClient had startVm and no way to stop anything, so `restart_required_since` — set by every plan change that grows a running guest — could only ever be cleared by a resize step that happened to find the machine stopped, which nothing in the product could arrange. A paid upgrade's cores and RAM could stay unreached for the life of the contract, and the cloud page's "Neu starten" was a toast. There is now a `restart` pipeline: shutdown, start, wait for the agent, confirm. A shutdown and a start rather than a reboot, because only a cold boot makes qemu read the VM definition again — a reset would take the machine round and bring it back exactly as small as it was. The shutdown is a REQUEST, bounded at ten minutes, and there is no escalation: ProxmoxClient deliberately does not expose Proxmox's forceStop, because the guest is a Nextcloud and cutting power to a database mid-write to apply a CPU change trades an inconvenience for a restore from backup. A guest that ignores ACPI for ten minutes fails the run instead, and a person decides what happens to it. `restart_required_since` is cleared by the last step, from what the RUNNING guest reports (`cpus`/`maxmem`) — not by the button, and not by the run merely finishing. A machine that comes back smaller than it was sold fails the run. Started by App\Actions\RestartInstance, which re-checks authorisation itself rather than trusting a hidden button: an operator holding the new `instances.restart` may restart anything, a portal user their own machine and nothing else. Refused while another run is in flight against the same order. Confirmed in a modal on both sides (R23), addressed by uuid (R11). **Existing instances had no storage quota.** ApplyStorageQuota reaches new and changed machines; everything built before it kept the whole disk whatever it had paid for, and nothing recorded which was which. `instances.quota_applied_gb` is now what the guest was actually told, written by the step only after the occ call succeeds — so "sold" and "enforced" are separate facts and can be compared. `clupilot:apply-quotas` sweeps the estate: one `quota` run per instance through the same step the pipelines use, skipping what it should and saying why, a no-op once an allowance is enforced, and inert under --dry-run. Deliberately NOT scheduled — a nightly sweep would quietly cover for the pipeline step the day it stopped working, which is how the original hole survived this long. **A Traefik router was never torn down.** TraefikWriter::remove() had no caller anywhere. What was missing was the moment: ConfirmCancelPackage wrote a date into `service_ends_at` and nothing ever went back to it, so every route this platform ever wrote was written for good — pointing at a guest address the host is free to reassign. `clupilot:end-due-services` (hourly) keeps that appointment through App\Actions\EndInstanceService. "Ended" means cancellation_scheduled AND `service_ends_at` passed, never the day a cancellation is scheduled: that customer has paid to the end of the term and is working in it. The DNS record goes with the route — it is in our zone, pointing at a host that serves other people, which is the shape of every subdomain takeover there has ever been. The customer's own domain is in their zone and is not ours to touch; the virtual machine is left alone, because the cancellation flow promises a data export first and destroying disks is not this change's decision. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-29 18:28:28 +02:00
nexxo	98d884727a	Warn that a package cannot be placed, before somebody pays for it ... The platform books thick: a package reserves its whole disk_gb — the sold quota plus the machine's own overhead — on ONE host at placement. That is the right choice for a small operator, because nothing can quietly overfill. It has one consequence nobody was being told about: the catalogue goes on offering a package no host has room for, and the first anyone hears of it is a PAID order failing at the reservation step. On the machine this was found on the numbers are stark. 2 x 512 GB NVMe in a mirror is about 400 GB usable; Start reserves 120, Team 540, Business 1050, Enterprise 2100. Three of the four packages on sale cannot be placed at all, and the fourth fits three times. So the console says so now, per package, with the shortfall — "Team needs 540 GB, the roomiest host has 260" — because "buy a server" is not the decision. "Buy a server big enough for what I am selling" is. Two things it deliberately does not do. It does not warn on an installation with no host at all: that is a machine nobody has onboarded yet, it has its own notice, and without the guard a fresh console greeted its operator with one warning per package before they had done anything. And it does not take the overview down when the catalogue cannot be read — a capacity warning does not get to break the page somebody opens when something is already wrong. The largest FREE HOST, never the sum: an instance goes on one machine, so two hosts with 300 GB each cannot take a 540 GB package between them. And when placement does fail, the log now names the shortfall instead of only 'no_capacity'. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-29 18:20:51 +02:00
nexxo	34874adec3	Apply a bought plan change instead of only pricing it ... PlanChange could say what a move would cost and whether it was allowed, and that was all it could do. Billing::purchase() wrote an upgrade order and nothing ever consumed it: same snapshot, same machine, same quota. A customer could pay for a bigger package and receive nothing. ApplyPlanChange is now the single place a change lands — it moves the contract onto the target's current version, writes one register row, settles the custom domain, and starts a run that resizes the machine. Applying the same order twice is a no-op, enforced by a unique event key rather than by a check two callers could both pass. Two things a plan change must not do, and now does not. A disk is never shrunk — Proxmox cannot, so the QUOTA shrinks instead, which is what was sold anyway. And a live machine is never rebooted as a side effect: cores and RAM are written, and where they need a restart the instance says so where an operator and the customer can both see it. The storage allowance also joins the build pipeline. ApplyStorageQuota was written for plan changes and ran only there, so a brand-new customer still got no quota at all — quota_gb reached the instance row and stopped, and every package delivered the whole disk. The test guarding that pipeline only counted its steps, which is how a list missing the one step that makes a package's storage real stayed green for its whole life. It now names the step. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-29 17:18:55 +02:00
nexxo	712803edd6	Serve the custom domain, not just announce it ... A verified custom domain was reported as the customer's address by Instance::address(), by the portal and by the credentials mail while nothing on the platform routed it: the Traefik router's rule was hard-coded to {subdomain}.{zone}. The address a customer was handed answered nothing, and a withdrawn domain stayed in Nextcloud's trusted_domains forever, because the only thing that ever wrote either was the initial provisioning run. - TraefikWriter::write() takes a LIST of hostnames under one stable router name — the platform address always, the verified domain as well when there is one. One file per instance, so a withdrawal is a rewrite rather than a second thing somebody has to remember. - ConfigureDnsAndTls records the custom domain's certificate instead of waiting on it: it depends on an A record in the customer's own zone, which may never appear, and must never fail a run. The platform address keeps its 840s deadline. instances.domain_cert_ok tells "proven" apart from "answering", and the portal now says which. - ConfigureNextcloud deletes trusted_domains 2 when there is no verified domain, so a withdrawn one stops being trusted. - New `address` pipeline (those two steps) plus ReapplyInstanceAddress, which starts one against the order and refuses to start a second while any run is in flight. The route is rewritten when the hostname list differs from what the router carries — not on route_written, which would short-circuit exactly the case a re-apply exists for. - Triggered where the address changes: verification flipping either way in clupilot:verify-domains, the customer's own domain page, and CustomDomainAccess::deactivate() on a package downgrade. - A maintenance run no longer condemns its subject: an address run that failed used to mark the order failed and release the live instance with it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-29 16:44:52 +02:00
nexxo	6c92aa5dd7	Let an incident be deleted, and start measuring whether the hosts answer ... Three things, all from trying to actually use the incident page. ── Where the later entries go ─────────────────────────────────────────────── The form only ever creates the first one, and nothing said so — so it looked as though the stage had to be chosen up front and there was only a dropdown for the impact. The field now says what it becomes ("wird untersucht") and where the rest are added: on the incident itself, once it exists. ── Deleting ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── Asked for in order to test the thing at all, and right. A whole incident can now be removed, with its entries, behind a confirmation in the product's own dialog (R23). Deliberately not the same as editing an entry, which there is still no way to do: an update is a statement made at a time, and rewriting one afterwards is what the record exists to prevent. Removing the whole incident is a different act — it is how a test entry, or one published against the wrong service, is taken back, and it leaves nothing half-standing behind. A test holds that distinction so the delete button does not quietly become an exception to it. ── The hosts, which nothing was watching ──────────────────────────────────── `hosts.last_seen_at` drove the health dot in the console and was written exactly once, at onboarding — RegisterCapacity stamped it and that was the only write in the codebase. So every host read "offline" thirty minutes after it was added, permanently, and the dot meant nothing. It is also why host reachability could not appear on the status page: it was never being measured. PingHosts asks every host's API the cheapest question it answers, once a minute, and stamps the timestamp on success. Failure writes nothing on purpose: absence IS the signal, and a second column counting failures would be a second version of the same fact. The status page has a fifth component for it. Counts only — never a host name, never an address; the page is world-readable and the estate is not public information. A host between five and thirty minutes silent reads as degraded, not as healthy: "stale" is one of three answers healthState() gives and it is not the good one. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-29 15:16:48 +02:00
nexxo	ea643b5e73	Prove a custom domain before serving it, and keep proving it ... Two things. ── The update screen, still opening twice ─────────────────────────────────── Reported again on 1.3.9, and the cause was not the one fixed in 1.3.8. The agent consumes the request file BEFORE it resolves the release — deliberately, because update.sh may kill the shell and a request left in place would loop — and writes `state: running` only once it has decided to go ahead. In between, the request is gone and the status does not say running yet, so the endpoint honestly answers "nothing is running". The watcher read that as "the run has finished" and reloaded the page: overlay on the click, gone a poll later, 503 after it. The overlay now closes only once the server has BOTH confirmed a run and then stopped reporting it. Before the confirmation, silence means the agent has not got there yet. Bounded at twenty polls so a request the agent refuses does not leave the console covered forever. ── Custom domains, proven and re-proven ───────────────────────────────────── `custom_domain` was a free-text field and everything downstream believed it: the proxy served it, the certificate was issued for it, Nextcloud trusted it. Anyone who pointed any hostname at the platform got somebody else's files under their own name. The proof is a TXT record at _clupilot-challenge.<domain> holding a token only this instance has. Nothing is served until it has been read. Every reader now goes through Instance::address(), which is the one place the decision is made — `custom_domain ?: subdomain` was the hole, written out four times. It is re-read every night at 03:40, because a token checked once can be taken straight back out and a domain that later lapses keeps resolving here. Three consecutive misses before a live domain is withdrawn: one failed lookup is a nameserver having a bad minute, and withdrawing takes a working Nextcloud off its own address. The domain and its token stay on the row so the customer can put the record back rather than start over. Changing the domain mints a NEW token. Reusing it would let somebody who once verified example.com claim any other domain later without touching its DNS — the old record is still sitting there and only the value is compared. The domain is changeable at any time, and removable. Fixing it once set was considered and rejected: adding or moving an address is a proxy entry, a certificate and one line in trusted_domains. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-29 14:47:51 +02:00
nexxo	864126ec7f	Add the SSH identity to the vault, and give deployment config a console page ... The SSH private key CluPilot deploys to every host is now stored through SecretVault (ssh.private_key), preferred over CLUPILOT_SSH_PRIVATE_KEY(_PATH) at all three real consumers — SshTraefikWriter and HostStep::keyLogin. kuma.password/kuma.totp stay in .env: they authenticate a separate Python container at boot, and nothing in this app reads them, so the vault would have nothing to wire them to. A new /admin/infrastructure page, backed by App\Support\ProvisioningSettings, makes the non-secret deployment settings that used to force a shell — DNS zone, WireGuard hub endpoint and public key, Traefik's dynamic-config path, the SSH public key, and the monitoring bridge URL — visible and editable from the console, each wired to every real consumer. WG subnet/hub IP and Kuma's own connection details stay in .env: the compose file and a separate container read those before this application ever does.	2026-07-29 00:52:44 +02:00
nexxo	ed4167eba3	Close SSH and the Proxmox UI to the world once the tunnel is proven up	2026-07-28 23:57:07 +02:00
nexxo	2b1989f53d	Move host DNS names off the public zone into vpn-dns's internal hostsdir	2026-07-28 23:44:31 +02:00
nexxo	75b4a47768	Stop mailing the initial admin password, hold it in the panel until noted ... The password no longer travels through third-party mail servers or sits forever in an inbox: it moves onto the instance (encrypted, same as nc_admin_ref) and shows on the dashboard until the customer clicks "Notiert", which deletes it for good.	2026-07-28 23:19:20 +02:00
nexxo	85fcc154b8	Measure availability, and let a customer move down again ... Availability is now counted from our own monitoring answers. Uptime Kuma knows the figure, but the REST bridge in front of it only answers "healthy, yes or no", and waiting for the bridge to grow an endpoint would have left the panel without the number indefinitely. The sync already asks on a schedule; counting the answers gives a percentage that is ours and explainable. An unanswered check is not a failed one — the counter only moves when a real answer arrived, so our monitoring going down does not become the customer's outage on the one figure they are asked to trust. An instance nobody has ever checked shows no availability rather than 100 %. The downgrade path existed nowhere. Going down is not the mirror of going up: it can ask an instance to hold more than the target plan allows. Smaller plans are now listed even when they cannot be taken, with the obstacle in the customer's own numbers — "you have 31 users, this package allows 10" — because a greyed-out button that does not name what is in the way is the thing people ring about. Storage is checked against the last real reading rather than the contractual allowance, or anyone who once bought a large plan could never leave it. The limit is re-checked in the action: a rule enforced only in markup is not enforced. And the smaller corrections from this round: - The cloud tab carried a hardcoded "B" as the instance's initial, and the PHP and MariaDB versions, which tell a tenant nothing they can act on. - "EU — Serverstandort im Angebot festgehalten" under a label already reading "Serverstandort" was two sentences saying nothing. It is the country. - Support promised a reply "binnen 4 Std." with nothing behind it. What is true everywhere else is an answer on the same working day. - The actions column appeared even when no row in the table had an action. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-27 16:41:15 +02:00
nexxo	ee5e92c0ed	Measure what the template draws ... The panel could not show the storage ring or the transfer trend because nothing measured them. instance_traffic keeps one row per billing period — right for an allowance, useless as a series — and storage consumption was never sampled at all, so the card could only ever state what was sold rather than what is used. instance_metrics holds one row per instance per day, written by the traffic collector on the visit it already makes. A second scheduler entry against the same Proxmox API would have doubled the load and the failure modes for no gain. Disk usage comes from `df` inside the guest rather than from Proxmox's own disk figure, which reports the allocated image: that would show every customer a full 500 GB from their first day. The rule the whole thing is built on: a reading that could not be taken is not a reading of zero. The disk columns are nullable and left untouched when the guest agent does not answer, so yesterday's figure stands instead of the ring dropping to empty — which would tell a customer their data had vanished. Missing days stay missing in the series rather than being filled with zeroes, which would draw an outage that never happened. Both are covered by tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-27 16:29:28 +02:00
Claude	de6821b53e	Move the console off /admin, give the status page its own address, and measure monitoring ... Three things the owner asked for, and one the review found underneath them. The console leaves /admin. It has its own route file now, registered before routes/web.php because once it has a hostname to itself it sits at the ROOT of that host — where `/` and `/settings` also exist for the portal, and the first matching route wins. Where it mounts is one decision in one place: `/` on the console hostname where it has one to itself, `/admin` on any host otherwise. Names stay admin.* in both modes, so nothing that builds a URL has to know. Exclusivity is its own switch, not a consequence of having a hostname. The first attempt made "this host is the console" follow from ADMIN_HOSTS, and a development machine lists its own IP there so the console works without DNS — which took the public site and the portal off that machine entirely. The switch also registers the console on every listed hostname, canonical last, so the alternates that exist as recovery paths keep working. The status page moves out of /legal, where it sat beside the imprint and the terms. Nothing about the current health of the platform is a legal document. It is a real page now: portal, instances, provisioning and backups, each derived from records, aggregate only, and a component with no signal reports "unknown" rather than "operational". That last rule is what exposed the real bug. monitoring_targets.status was written once — 'up', at provisioning — and nothing ever updated it. Both the console's notices and the new public page read it, so an outage would have been published as healthy indefinitely. There is a sync job now, on a five-minute schedule, and a checked_at column so a verdict can go stale instead of standing forever. The monitoring contract had to grow a third state for that to be honest. isHealthy() answers true when no monitoring is configured and false when the monitor is unreachable; recording that boolean would have published either a fleet-wide all-clear nobody measured or a fleet-wide outage that was really one broken monitor. health() returns null for both, the recorder leaves the old verdict to go stale, and isHealthy() keeps its forgiving semantics for the one caller that wants them — the provisioning acceptance check, which must not fail a delivery because monitoring is not set up. Backups are counted from the instances that need protecting rather than from the backup rows that exist, so an instance with no schedule at all cannot be missing from the arithmetic that declares the estate protected. Also: the update panel polls itself, offers the button only when there is something to install, and opens the log while a run is in progress. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-27 06:05:40 +02:00
nexxo	52b41bb0d5	fix(billing): a paid order opens a contract, and provisioning obeys it ... The pipeline re-resolved config('provisioning.plans') by order.plan, so the subscription snapshot protected a customer's price but not their machine: shrinking a plan resized an existing customer's VM on its next run. Nothing created a subscription either, so closing this meant opening the contract at purchase and pointing provisioning at it. - OpenSubscription freezes the catalogue onto a subscription when a checkout is paid; StartCustomerProvisioning calls it inside the order transaction. - CustomerStep::plan() reads the frozen snapshot. ValidateOrder and ReserveResources fail closed with no_subscription rather than falling back to the catalogue, which is the bug itself. - template_vmid joins the snapshot so a re-clone cannot pick up a blueprint published after the sale. Deliberately outside FROZEN: it is how we build the machine, not a term the customer is owed, and a dead template must be replaceable without cancelling a contract. - TrafficMeter reads the allowance off the contract too — cutting a plan's traffic was otherwise enough to start throttling someone who bought more. - The migration backfills contracts for orders that already bought something, reconstructed from what was actually delivered where an instance exists, and adopts an existing order-less contract instead of opening a second. Orders paid in a currency the catalogue cannot price get none, matching the checkout path. price_cents stays the catalogue's NET price, which is what PlanChange prorates against — not Order::amount_cents, which holds Stripe's GROSS total. Reconciling the two belongs to the proof register and Stripe (phases 4/5). Also pins STRIPE_WEBHOOK_SECRET blank in phpunit.xml: the operator's real secret was reaching the suite from .env and rejecting every unsigned test payload, which is why 7 webhook tests failed before any of this. Verified in the browser: with team traffic cut from 3000 to 500 GB in the catalogue, the customer's portal still shows 3 TB. 373 tests green. Codex review clean after three rounds. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-26 11:10:00 +02:00
nexxo	d40113be8e	fix(admin): never reset a stranger's VM, never leave the console spinning ... Two from Codex: - The job accepted any stored instance with a host. A closed one's VMID can have been reused on the same machine, and the reset would then land on another customer's VM. It now requires a live instance, and the action is not offered for anything else. - An unreachable Proxmox or guest agent throws rather than returning an exit code, so nothing was ever written to the handoff and the modal polled forever. The throw is caught, and a failed() handler covers anything that still escapes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-26 05:32:53 +02:00
nexxo	aae0457e19	feat(admin): administrator access to a customer's Nextcloud ... Impersonation borrows the customer's portal session; this is access to their installation, which is a different thing and now a different button. Nextcloud has no passwordless admin jump, so this does the only honest thing it offers: it resets OUR managed admin account inside that installation and hands the credentials over once. The customer's own accounts are untouched, and the next request sets a new password again. - New capability instances.adminlogin, Owner and Admin only — stronger than impersonation, because it hands over control rather than a session. - The operator's own password is required every time, rate-limited: taking over a customer's installation is not something an unattended browser should manage on its own. - The reset runs on the provisioning worker (it owns the tunnel and the Proxmox credentials); the console polls a handoff token, so the credentials never enter a Livewire snapshot. - A silent instance is reported as such instead of appearing to succeed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-26 05:30:59 +02:00
nexxo	53d305340f	fix(vpn): a late revocation must not disconnect whoever holds the key now ... Once a key is free, someone can legitimately create a new access with it. The forced revocation looked the key up and would have deleted that person's access and pulled their key off the hub. It now acts only on an adoption artifact — a system peer with no owner and no creator — and leaves anything else alone. Re-issuing also threw when VPN_CONFIG_KEY was missing, which is exactly the situation the console tells people to fix by re-issuing. It now hands the new config over once instead of storing it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-26 01:24:55 +02:00
nexxo	4f9ca27732	fix(vpn): a replaced key must not stall the reconciliation ... Codex found that a sync landing between the key swap and its removal would see the old key as unknown. Writing the test showed something worse than the duplicate he predicted: the adoption cannot even happen — the address still belongs to the live access — so the insert violated the unique index and took the ENTIRE reconciliation down with it. One stale key would have stopped every peer's state from updating. The sync now recognises that case and queues the removal instead of adopting, and a key with no row of its own is revoked with force: it can only ever be removed, never kept, so the removal cannot be talked out of it by a row that should not exist. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-26 01:23:15 +02:00
nexxo	3fad319053	fix(hosts): re-read the host before deciding there is no DNS record ... A registration finishing while the purge waited on the run locks wrote dns_record_id after the purge had already loaded the host, so it skipped the deletion and then deleted the row holding the only id. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-26 00:02:18 +02:00
nexxo	7b57ab21cb	fix(hosts): retry a failed DNS registration before advancing without a name ... The failure may be a lost response to a request that did create the record. Advancing straight away stored no id, so PurgeHost could never remove it and the host's management address stayed published. The upsert is idempotent, so a retry recovers the id; only after the attempts run out does the onboarding continue without a name. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-26 00:01:16 +02:00
nexxo	952e8e5d2f	fix(hosts): number DNS names by the normalised label, not the raw code ... Two legacy codes can normalise to the same label (eu_west and eu-west), and separate counters then handed both of them eu-west-01 — a unique-constraint failure inside the reservation, which blocks onboarding rather than being a DNS problem the step can shrug off. Lock, counter and the in-use check all key off the label now. (The helper was also called label(), which HostStep already declares as the step's display name — renamed.) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-25 23:59:58 +02:00
nexxo	e96f4c1c1a	fix(datacenters): a code becomes a DNS label, so validate it as one ... alpha_dash accepted eu_west, -edge and edge-, none of which are valid DNS labels — every host in such a datacenter would have failed registration and, because DNS is non-fatal, silently ended up without a name. The console now requires a proper label, and the step normalises anything created before that rule so existing rows still get a usable name. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-25 23:56:50 +02:00
nexxo	9f8659da32	fix(hosts): a failed DNS deletion must not orphan the record ... Swallowing it and carrying on deleted the row that held the only reference to that record, publishing the machine's management address for good. The purge now fails instead — and is retried, since it re-reads the host and its other steps are idempotent — so a broken DNS provider becomes a visible failed job rather than a silent leak. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-25 23:53:14 +02:00
nexxo	edf24257b5	fix(hosts): reserve the DNS name under the lock, never reuse it, clean it up ... Codex was right that my never-reuse claim did not hold: - The lock was released with only a candidate in hand, so two concurrent onboardings in one datacenter could pick the same name and overwrite each other's record. The name is now persisted on the host while still locked. - The number was derived from the hosts that happen to exist, so removing the highest one handed that number straight back out — a cached name would then resolve to a different machine. The counter is stored per datacenter, floored by what is actually in use so a wiped settings store cannot reissue live names. - PurgeHost deleted the row that carried the record id, leaving the machine's management address published with nothing left to clean it up. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-25 23:51:25 +02:00
nexxo	5db2f7fda7	feat(hosts): give each host a DNS name under the public zone ... fsn-01.node.clupilot.com, numbered per datacenter and never reused — removing a host must not renumber its neighbours onto its name, so the number is stored rather than derived. The record points at the host's WireGuard address, not its public IP: the name exists so an operator can reach a host by name over the VPN, and publishing a Proxmox host's public address would hand every scanner a target, which is the one thing this network design avoids. DNS is convenience, not a prerequisite: a failure logs an event and lets the onboarding finish rather than stranding a host that is otherwise ready. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-25 23:49:18 +02:00
nexxo	7941935f57	fix(traffic): a sample without counters is not zero traffic ... Defaulting missing netin/netout to zero reset the baseline, so the next real sample added the entire cumulative counter again — a customer throttled for traffic that was counted twice. Such a sample is skipped and logged now. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-25 23:44:02 +02:00
nexxo	2415dde288	fix(deploy,traffic): clear caches before restarts, hide the token, widen the lock ... - update.sh restarted the long-lived services before clearing the caches, so they booted from the old cached config and kept it for the life of the process — the release's configuration never reached the workers. - install.sh put the Gitea token in the clone URL, which is visible in the process list to every local user while the clone runs. It goes through a short-lived askpass helper now. - The collector's uniqueness lock expired at exactly the collection interval, so a delayed queue could run two collectors on the same baseline and count the same delta twice — throttling a customer for traffic they never used. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-25 23:42:12 +02:00
nexxo	0135f114d3	fix(traffic): keep retrying the throttle release after a Proxmox blip ... Tying the release to the creation of the new month's row meant a single failed call was never retried: the row exists from then on, and the current period looks unthrottled, so nothing could detect the stale NIC limit. A customer would have stayed slow for a whole month they had paid for. Checked on every sample now, with a test that makes the first release fail. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-25 23:40:33 +02:00
nexxo	2b70c9226a	fix(traffic): release the throttle at month end; close the Livewire bypass ... Two from Codex: - A throttled instance kept its NIC limit into the new month: the new period row starts unthrottled, so neither branch of enforce() fired and nothing ever took the limit off. A customer would have stayed slow through a month they had already paid for. - PublicSiteGate exempted livewire/* wholesale. That endpoint is shared by the console and the portal, so a signed-in customer could keep driving portal components — billing included — while the portal was supposed to be offline. Operators pass the normal check anyway, which is all the console needed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-25 23:36:38 +02:00
nexxo	c1e81808a7	feat(traffic): meter the monthly allowance, show it, throttle instead of blocking ... Customers can now see what they have used and what is left, and the service slows down rather than stopping when the allowance is gone — a slow Nextcloud gets a top-up, a dead one gets a cancellation. - instance_traffic keeps one row per instance per month. Proxmox counters are cumulative since the VM last started, so usage is the difference between two samples, and a counter that went backwards means a restart, not a refund. - Outbound is what counts: inbound is free at our providers and egress is what Hetzner's 20 TB per server applies to. - CollectInstanceTraffic samples every 15 minutes, warns once per threshold (80/95 %) rather than on every run, and at 100 % limits the VM's NIC via Proxmox — released again as soon as the customer tops up or the month rolls over. - The dashboard gets a full-width band (it throttles the service, so it is not a tile among tiles) with the top-up offer right next to the warning. - Bytes are formatted in SI units now: allowances are computed in SI, so dividing by 1024 made a 1000 GB plan read as "931 GB". Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-25 23:33:47 +02:00