2 Commits (f9993a1f486333fbc3b251f8390bfca8f06f90ce)
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0e25fe88d4 |
Keep a register of what was sent, and answer the customer from here
Three complaints, one shape: the console knew things and could not act on them, so the work happened somewhere else and left no trace. The header said "4 Hinweis(e)" and led nowhere. Whoever read it had to know that the list was a card further down the same page, and then go looking for the host or the failed run by hand. The count is a link now, every notice carries the page that shows the thing it is about, and the plural is a word rather than a bracket. Nothing recorded what this installation had sent. "Hat der Kunde die Zugangsdaten je bekommen, und wann?" was answered on the mail server — a different machine, a different program, and nothing an operator can put in front of somebody who says nothing ever arrived. Every mail now writes a row: when, to whom, which mailable, and the customer it belongs to. Written from MessageSent, so a row means the transport accepted it; that is the strongest thing an application can honestly claim, and a column called "delivered" would be pretending otherwise. Verification and reset mails are left out on purpose — they go to unconfirmed addresses and anybody who can type into a form can send them, so recording them would hand the register to whoever wants to fill it. And the customer list was the end of the road. There is a page behind it now: what they bought, what they asked in their own words, what we sent them, and a box to write the next message. It goes out from the support mailbox and is recorded on the way — with its body, because an operator typed it and "what exactly did I write to them in March" is a question the mail server's log cannot answer either. Answering a request from here closes it, which is the reason to answer from here at all: answering from a mail client leaves it open for ever, because nothing tells it otherwise. Found on the way, by a test that sent a real mail rather than asserting it was queued: resources/views/mail/reset-password.blade.php was missing its closing </x-mail.layout>. The component's contents were never terminated, the layout's own @if ran off the end of the file, and the mail raised a Blade syntax error instead of rendering. Password reset has therefore never delivered a link since it was built. Closed, plus a test that renders it and one that counts opening against closing tags across every mail view. Reading INCOMING mail in the console is not in this: it needs the mailbox polled over IMAP, which is a credential and a dependency. Requests filed through the portal appear here in full; a customer who writes by mail instead still has to be read in the mail client. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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3a4324fb6f |
Give people a way back in, and put the URL in English
tests / pest (push) Failing after 7m54s
Details
tests / assets (push) Successful in 21s
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tests / release (push) Has been skipped
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── The hole ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── There was no password reset. Fortify's feature was commented out, so there was no link on the sign-in form, no page and no route — a customer who forgot their password was locked out of their own cloud until somebody opened a shell. On a product whose selling point is that you can ring somebody, that is a support call a week and an embarrassing one. Two pages of ours under Fortify's route names (R1/R2), because with views off Fortify registers only the POST endpoints. The mail is a Mailable in this product's design rather than the framework's MailMessage: somebody who has just been locked out is exactly the person a phishing mail is aimed at, and a message that looks nothing like the rest of our post is one they cannot check — ours carries the footer that names our domains. Three decisions worth stating, each with a test: The answer is identical whether the address is known or not. "No account with that address" turns the form into a way of finding out who is a customer. The reset kills every other session. Whoever knew the old password may still be signed in somewhere, and a reset that leaves them there has fixed nothing. It does NOT sign the visitor in. The link arrived by email, and a mailbox somebody else can read would otherwise be a session somebody else gets. ── /sicherheit → /security ───────────────────────────────────────────────── R13: paths are English. Mine was not. The old path stays as a permanent redirect because it has already gone out in mail footers. ── One wordmark ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── "Sometimes it says Cloud and sometimes it does not" — correct. It was on the footer, the placeholder and the maintenance screen, and absent from the header, the sidebar and the sign-in plate. The product is called CluPilot Cloud; that is the name on the invoices and in every mail, so it is now the name everywhere. The console sidebar takes the small size so the lockup, the ADMIN badge and the close button still share one line (R18). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |