Commit Graph

52 Commits (v1.3.12)

Author SHA1 Message Date
nexxo 864126ec7f Add the SSH identity to the vault, and give deployment config a console page
tests / pest (push) Failing after 7m28s Details
tests / assets (push) Successful in 19s Details
tests / release (push) Has been skipped Details
The SSH private key CluPilot deploys to every host is now stored through
SecretVault (ssh.private_key), preferred over CLUPILOT_SSH_PRIVATE_KEY(_PATH)
at all three real consumers — SshTraefikWriter and HostStep::keyLogin.
kuma.password/kuma.totp stay in .env: they authenticate a separate Python
container at boot, and nothing in this app reads them, so the vault would
have nothing to wire them to.

A new /admin/infrastructure page, backed by App\Support\ProvisioningSettings,
makes the non-secret deployment settings that used to force a shell —
DNS zone, WireGuard hub endpoint and public key, Traefik's dynamic-config
path, the SSH public key, and the monitoring bridge URL — visible and
editable from the console, each wired to every real consumer. WG subnet/hub
IP and Kuma's own connection details stay in .env: the compose file and a
separate container read those before this application ever does.
2026-07-29 00:52:44 +02:00
nexxo ed4167eba3 Close SSH and the Proxmox UI to the world once the tunnel is proven up
tests / pest (push) Failing after 7m48s Details
tests / assets (push) Successful in 20s Details
tests / release (push) Has been skipped Details
2026-07-28 23:57:07 +02:00
nexxo 2b1989f53d Move host DNS names off the public zone into vpn-dns's internal hostsdir
tests / pest (push) Failing after 8m2s Details
tests / assets (push) Successful in 19s Details
tests / release (push) Has been skipped Details
2026-07-28 23:44:31 +02:00
nexxo 75b4a47768 Stop mailing the initial admin password, hold it in the panel until noted
The password no longer travels through third-party mail servers or sits
forever in an inbox: it moves onto the instance (encrypted, same as
nc_admin_ref) and shows on the dashboard until the customer clicks
"Notiert", which deletes it for good.
2026-07-28 23:19:20 +02:00
nexxo 20329b176b Refuse a portal login for an address that already belongs to an operator
Customer::ensureUser() enforced uniqueness only within users, so a
customer provisioned (or registering publicly) with an operator's email
got a second, colliding identity for the same address — the exact thing
R21 exists to prevent. Checks Operator by address now, not by session
(the deleted assertNotAdmin() checked who was signed in, which could
never be the right question).

Public registration gets the same guard via a plain unique() validation
rule, reusing Laravel's stock "already taken" message rather than a
dedicated one — naming the collision specifically would tell a public
visitor an address belongs to staff, a worse leak than the generic
refusal every other collision here already gives them.

Impersonation answers 409 instead of crashing into it. The Stripe
webhook keeps recording the paid order (same principle as
openContract()'s own comment: the order is proof money changed hands)
and withholds only the colliding login, logged for an operator to
resolve by hand.

Verified the reverse direction Codex flagged as already covered: two
Admin\Settings actions and the clupilot:create-operator command all
already refuse an operator email that collides with a customer's, and
that check is sound today because every users row is created in
lockstep with a customers row of the same email (CreateNewUser and
ensureUser are the only two creation sites, both confirmed by grep) and
nothing in this app can change a user's email afterwards (Fortify's
updateProfileInformation feature is disabled, and no other code calls
that action).
2026-07-28 14:42:16 +02:00
nexxo 5e22e16291 Send a guest bounced off the console to the console's own sign-in
ApplicationBuilder::withMiddleware() defaults redirectGuestsTo() to
fn () => route('login') before bootstrap/app.php's own callback ever
runs — always the portal's Fortify page, regardless of which side of
the site turned the guest away. In non-exclusive (shared, this VM's
own mode) that sends a guest bounced off /admin to a sign-in form whose
table holds no operators: no 404 any more, but a sign-in that can never
succeed. Exclusive mode happened to self-correct only because
RestrictAdminHost 404s the wrong host before this ever ran.

Fixed for both modes at once rather than depending on which one a given
deployment runs: ask AdminArea, the one place routes/web.php's own
registration and RestrictAdminHost already agree is the source of truth
for "is this the console".
2026-07-28 13:32:05 +02:00
nexxo 87c49de6e5 Move the console's identity out of the customer table 2026-07-28 10:31:43 +02:00
nexxo 0560ae743d feat(billing): Stripe owns the billing cycle, we own capability
A Product per plan family and a Price per priced row of a published version,
plus the four subscribed webhook events that were arriving and being ignored.

`stripe:sync-catalogue` mirrors the catalogue. Idempotent twice over: a stored
id is skipped, and each call carries an idempotency key derived from our own
row, so a crash between Stripe creating a Price and us recording its id gives
back the same object rather than a second one. That matters more here than
usual — a Stripe Price cannot be edited or deleted, so a duplicate is
permanent. Drafts are not synced at all: a version that has promised nothing
has no business in a price list. --dry-run shows what would be created.

The webhook now handles invoice.paid, invoice.payment_failed,
customer.subscription.updated and customer.subscription.deleted. It never
re-derives an amount: the invoice is the authority for what was charged, and
recomputing it from our catalogue would produce a second, disagreeing answer.
A failed payment is recorded and nothing else — Stripe runs the dunning
schedule, and cutting a customer off on the first failure would punish an
expired card as though it were a refusal to pay.

Only a cycle renewal moves the term on. Stripe also sends paid invoices for
prorations and manual charges, and the checkout's own invoice — which is
already in the register as the purchase, and would otherwise double every
customer's first payment.

Stripe does not guarantee delivery order, which is the source of most of the
care here:
- state changes are judged and written in one transaction with the row held,
  so two deliveries cannot both pass a check made on a stale copy;
- an older event never overwrites a newer one, with a rank breaking ties
  between events sharing a second — their timestamps have one-second
  resolution, and a failed attempt and its successful retry routinely do;
- a term is never shortened, and an ended contract is never revived;
- an event for a contract that does not exist yet is HELD and replayed the
  moment it appears, rather than acknowledged and forgotten. A cancellation
  dropped that way would leave us serving someone who had already left. Held
  rows that never match are pruned after a week.

Register entries are keyed by what they are about — the invoice, the attempt,
the subscription — with a unique index doing the work, because a check two
concurrent deliveries can both pass is not idempotency.

PlanChange is now documented as the preview shown before someone confirms, not
the invoice: Stripe's proration accounts for tax, existing credit and the exact
second the change lands, and ours cannot.

Not run against the live account — `stripe:sync-catalogue` creates objects that
cannot be deleted, so that is the owner's call. The dry run lists 12.

457 tests green. Codex review clean after seven rounds.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-26 13:36:28 +02:00
nexxo 6387c747d0 feat(billing): the plan catalogue becomes three tables, and config stops selling
Plans lived in config/provisioning.php, where the owner cannot reach them and
where a plan has no history. They now live in plan_families / plan_versions /
plan_prices — a name that never moves, what the plan WAS at a point in time,
and a price per version and term with its own Stripe Price id.

- Availability is computed on every read (available_from <= now < until,
  half-open, UTC) plus a per-family sales kill switch. Nothing schedules a plan
  into or out of sale: a job that fails to run is a plan that silently
  misbehaves.
- Overlaps crash rather than resolve. currentVersion() uses sole(), and
  scheduling takes a lock on the family and rejects an overlapping window —
  two versions on sale at once would decide a customer's price by row order.
- A version is frozen from publication, not from first sale, and so is its
  price: a checkout is not instant, and an amount edited between the session
  opening and the webhook landing would contract someone at a price they were
  never quoted. Repricing publishes a new version, as Stripe requires anyway.
- Neither a published version, its price, nor a family with customers can be
  deleted, and a family key cannot be renamed. All of those would null the
  provenance off existing contracts.
- Subscriptions and orders record plan_version_id. A historical reference
  resolved by plan NAME hands back today's terms, which is the split-brain one
  level up. A checkout that carried its version is honoured even after the
  window closes — they paid for what they were shown.

Switched atomically and failing closed: config('provisioning.plans') and
plan_features are gone, and nothing falls back to them. A fallback would
resurrect a plan the owner had just switched off. The seed lives in the
migration, and PlanCatalogueTest pins what the config catalogue sold as the
shadow comparison. `php artisan plans:check` reports overlaps, gaps and
missing prices before a customer finds them.

Contract-backed displays, which were reading the live catalogue:
seat limits, the cloud card, the plan card, and admin MRR — the last three now
divide a yearly contract down via Subscription::monthlyPriceCents(), since all
three label the figure per month.

Two recovery gaps closed along the way: the order now commits before the
contract is opened (so a contract failure can never erase the record of a
payment), a Stripe retry repairs a missing contract and restarts a run stranded
with no_subscription, and TickProvisioning sweeps runs left pending by a crash
rather than only running/waiting ones.

402 tests green. Codex review clean after thirteen rounds. Verified in the
browser: portal, billing and console render unchanged off the new catalogue.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-26 12:05:56 +02:00
nexxo 52b41bb0d5 fix(billing): a paid order opens a contract, and provisioning obeys it
The pipeline re-resolved config('provisioning.plans') by order.plan, so the
subscription snapshot protected a customer's price but not their machine:
shrinking a plan resized an existing customer's VM on its next run. Nothing
created a subscription either, so closing this meant opening the contract at
purchase and pointing provisioning at it.

- OpenSubscription freezes the catalogue onto a subscription when a checkout
  is paid; StartCustomerProvisioning calls it inside the order transaction.
- CustomerStep::plan() reads the frozen snapshot. ValidateOrder and
  ReserveResources fail closed with no_subscription rather than falling back
  to the catalogue, which is the bug itself.
- template_vmid joins the snapshot so a re-clone cannot pick up a blueprint
  published after the sale. Deliberately outside FROZEN: it is how we build
  the machine, not a term the customer is owed, and a dead template must be
  replaceable without cancelling a contract.
- TrafficMeter reads the allowance off the contract too — cutting a plan's
  traffic was otherwise enough to start throttling someone who bought more.
- The migration backfills contracts for orders that already bought something,
  reconstructed from what was actually delivered where an instance exists,
  and adopts an existing order-less contract instead of opening a second.
  Orders paid in a currency the catalogue cannot price get none, matching the
  checkout path.

price_cents stays the catalogue's NET price, which is what PlanChange
prorates against — not Order::amount_cents, which holds Stripe's GROSS total.
Reconciling the two belongs to the proof register and Stripe (phases 4/5).

Also pins STRIPE_WEBHOOK_SECRET blank in phpunit.xml: the operator's real
secret was reaching the suite from .env and rejecting every unsigned test
payload, which is why 7 webhook tests failed before any of this.

Verified in the browser: with team traffic cut from 3000 to 500 GB in the
catalogue, the customer's portal still shows 3 TB.

373 tests green. Codex review clean after three rounds.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-26 11:10:00 +02:00
nexxo 3fad319053 fix(hosts): re-read the host before deciding there is no DNS record
A registration finishing while the purge waited on the run locks wrote
dns_record_id after the purge had already loaded the host, so it skipped the
deletion and then deleted the row holding the only id.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-26 00:02:18 +02:00
nexxo 7b57ab21cb fix(hosts): retry a failed DNS registration before advancing without a name
The failure may be a lost response to a request that did create the record.
Advancing straight away stored no id, so PurgeHost could never remove it and the
host's management address stayed published. The upsert is idempotent, so a retry
recovers the id; only after the attempts run out does the onboarding continue
without a name.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-26 00:01:16 +02:00
nexxo 952e8e5d2f fix(hosts): number DNS names by the normalised label, not the raw code
Two legacy codes can normalise to the same label (eu_west and eu-west), and
separate counters then handed both of them eu-west-01 — a unique-constraint
failure inside the reservation, which blocks onboarding rather than being a DNS
problem the step can shrug off. Lock, counter and the in-use check all key off
the label now.

(The helper was also called label(), which HostStep already declares as the
step's display name — renamed.)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 23:59:58 +02:00
nexxo e96f4c1c1a fix(datacenters): a code becomes a DNS label, so validate it as one
alpha_dash accepted eu_west, -edge and edge-, none of which are valid DNS
labels — every host in such a datacenter would have failed registration and,
because DNS is non-fatal, silently ended up without a name. The console now
requires a proper label, and the step normalises anything created before that
rule so existing rows still get a usable name.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 23:56:50 +02:00
nexxo 69043f9ffc fix(dns): deleting a record that is already gone is success
A lost response, or a retry after a later step failed, made every further
attempt a 404 — and the host impossible to purge.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 23:54:45 +02:00
nexxo 9f8659da32 fix(hosts): a failed DNS deletion must not orphan the record
Swallowing it and carrying on deleted the row that held the only reference to
that record, publishing the machine's management address for good. The purge now
fails instead — and is retried, since it re-reads the host and its other steps
are idempotent — so a broken DNS provider becomes a visible failed job rather
than a silent leak.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 23:53:14 +02:00
nexxo edf24257b5 fix(hosts): reserve the DNS name under the lock, never reuse it, clean it up
Codex was right that my never-reuse claim did not hold:

- The lock was released with only a candidate in hand, so two concurrent
  onboardings in one datacenter could pick the same name and overwrite each
  other's record. The name is now persisted on the host while still locked.
- The number was derived from the hosts that happen to exist, so removing the
  highest one handed that number straight back out — a cached name would then
  resolve to a different machine. The counter is stored per datacenter, floored
  by what is actually in use so a wiped settings store cannot reissue live names.
- PurgeHost deleted the row that carried the record id, leaving the machine's
  management address published with nothing left to clean it up.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 23:51:25 +02:00
nexxo 5db2f7fda7 feat(hosts): give each host a DNS name under the public zone
fsn-01.node.clupilot.com, numbered per datacenter and never reused — removing a
host must not renumber its neighbours onto its name, so the number is stored
rather than derived.

The record points at the host's WireGuard address, not its public IP: the name
exists so an operator can reach a host by name over the VPN, and publishing a
Proxmox host's public address would hand every scanner a target, which is the
one thing this network design avoids.

DNS is convenience, not a prerequisite: a failure logs an event and lets the
onboarding finish rather than stranding a host that is otherwise ready.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 23:49:18 +02:00
nexxo 71ca0e1394 feat(admin): VPN access management with live peer state
The console can now create, block and remove VPN accesses, and shows who is
actually connected — traffic counters, source endpoint and last handshake.

Design notes:
- The web container has no wg0, so the page never talks to WireGuard. Live
  state is copied in by SyncVpnPeers on the provisioning queue (the only worker
  whose container owns the interface); the page polls the database and merely
  nudges that job, throttled so many open tabs cannot flood the queue.
- enabled (operator intent) and present (observed on the hub) are stored
  separately, so a sync can never quietly undo a block and drift stays visible
  as "wird angewendet".
- The sync adopts peers the host pipeline registered, naming them after their
  host — otherwise "who is on the VPN" would have blind spots.
- Keypairs are generated in PHP via libsodium rather than shelling out to
  wg genkey (no interface in this container, and it keeps generation testable).
  The private key is shown once and never stored.
- allocateIp() now also considers vpn_peers, which would otherwise be handed a
  tunnel address a host already holds.
- vpn.manage is a new capability held by Owner/Admin only, and it hides the nav
  entry too — a VPN access reaches the management network.

Verified end to end against the real hub, not just mocks: created an access in
the browser, connected with the generated config, watched the console flip to
"Verbunden" with real counters, then blocked it and confirmed the peer was
gone from wg0 and the client could no longer handshake.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 21:38:12 +02:00
nexxo 46d821a047 fix(monitoring): cap monitoring retries at the run budget; dependency-free liveness probe
- MONITORING_ATTEMPTS is capped by the run's max_attempts, so a large value can
  no longer burn the retry budget and fail the very provisioning the degradation
  exists to protect (covered by a new test at the budget boundary)
- /health is now dependency-free (200 in ~2ms with Kuma absent, verified: the
  container healthcheck stays healthy); Kuma state is exclusively in /ready

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 20:19:32 +02:00
nexxo 82916167cf fix(monitoring): MONITORING_ATTEMPTS is now exact (off-by-one); accept int or dict monitor id
- attempt is 0-based, so compare one-based: ATTEMPTS=2 really means two tries
- bridge accepts add_monitor returning {monitorID}|{id}|int (v1.2.1 returns a
  dict — re-verified: first create on a fresh Kuma is HTTP 200 with the id)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 20:08:07 +02:00
nexxo 5301ce4309 feat(monitoring): Uptime Kuma support via a REST bridge + resilient monitoring policy
Kuma has no write REST API (monitor CRUD is Socket.IO only), so docker/kuma-bridge
translates the exact generic REST contract HttpMonitoringClient already speaks —
no PHP client change needed. Opt-in compose profile 'monitoring'.

Verified end-to-end against a real Uptime Kuma 1.x:
  create -> id, create again -> same id (idempotent), list, status, delete
  and PHP MonitoringClient -> bridge -> Kuma round-trip.
The e2e run caught a real bug: add_monitor takes 'maxretries', not 'retries'.

Monitoring is now observability, not a delivery gate:
- RegisterMonitoring retries MONITORING_ATTEMPTS times on an outage, then
  continues degraded with a visible 'info' event
- RunAcceptanceChecks no longer fails when monitoring isn't green (a fresh Kuma
  monitor legitimately reports 'pending' — confirmed in the e2e run); it records
  the gap instead. MONITORING_REQUIRED=true restores strict gating.
- docs/monitoring-uptime-kuma.md documents setup, failure behaviour, alternatives

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 20:04:58 +02:00
nexxo 66e8a4bbf6 fix(engine-b): clean re-clone on lost task ref; idempotent firewall rules
- Clone recovery: once the lock clears but the task ref is lost, destroy the
  possibly-incomplete VM and re-clone instead of advancing onto it.
- applyFirewall clears existing rules before adding, so retries don't accumulate
  duplicate Proxmox firewall entries.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 13:04:48 +02:00
nexxo 9162446b1f fix(engine-b): acceptance gate verifies real health, not just breadcrumbs
- Nextcloud: parse occ status JSON (installed + not in maintenance).
- Admin: query occ user:info for the account.
- Monitoring: MonitoringClient::isHealthy checks the provider, not the local row.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 13:00:49 +02:00
nexxo 661b52dbe0 fix(engine-b): clone recovery waits for lock; register rows before breadcrumb
- Clone recovery polls until the VM lock clears instead of advancing onto a
  possibly-incomplete clone.
- RegisterBackup/RegisterMonitoring create the local row BEFORE the run-resource
  breadcrumb, so a crash between them can't leave the row permanently missing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 12:44:22 +02:00
nexxo 3c5a18b5d7 fix(engine-b): apply plan CPU/RAM; idempotent backup + monitoring registration
- ConfigureCloudInit sets cores/memory from the plan (not the template default).
- RegisterBackup uses a deterministic Proxmox job id (ignore-exists) + firstOrCreate.
- RegisterMonitoring is idempotent by URL + firstOrCreate — no duplicate schedules
  or monitors after a crash/retry.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 12:42:10 +02:00
nexxo 5cf1964d7d fix(engine-b): default-deny firewall, disk-based capacity, synchronous credential mail
- applyFirewall sets policy_in=DROP so only 80/443 are exposed.
- Capacity/placement account for disk_gb (the real VM allocation), not the
  smaller Nextcloud user quota — no systematic overcommit.
- CloudReady sent synchronously again; the step retries on mail failure with the
  password preserved (no lost credential in a failed queue job).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 12:39:15 +02:00
nexxo 64e3ca421d fix(engine-b): async stripe payments, capacity honesty, durable credential mail
- Accept checkout.session.async_payment_succeeded (async methods) and dedupe on
  the checkout session id, not the event id.
- committedGb still counts a failed instance while its VM exists (has vmid);
  releases quota only when no VM was created — no overcommit vs no leak.
- CloudReady is queued (durable). Credential delivery is documented at-least-once
  (a rare duplicate welcome email beats a lost credential; exactly-once = v1.1 outbox).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 12:29:47 +02:00
nexxo f43ade79b0 fix(engine-b): address Codex round 6 (crash-window idempotency)
- Clone: recover via vmExists() when the task ref was lost, instead of
  re-cloning the reserved vmid (which Proxmox rejects).
- Deploy: persist the DB password ENCRYPTED before compose up and reuse it on
  retry, so a crash can't regenerate a mismatching credential.
- Complete: gate credential delivery on a credentials_sent breadcrumb so a
  retry after a crash doesn't re-send the email.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 12:23:28 +02:00
nexxo e2b8f25e78 fix(engine-b): address Codex round 5 (capacity release, activate-last, guest-ip poll, email unique)
- Failed run releases the instance (status=failed) so its quota stops counting
  against host capacity.
- CompleteProvisioning activates instance+order only AFTER onboarding tasks +
  credential delivery succeed.
- ConfigureNetwork polls until the guest has an address (no wrong Traefik route).
- customers.email unique + race-safe customer resolution in the intake action.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 12:19:31 +02:00
nexxo c56aa14f9d fix(engine): don't reset started_at on poll so step deadlines accumulate
RunRunner::onPoll no longer resets started_at, so a poll step's own deadline
(WaitForGuestAgent 270s, ConfigureDnsAndTls cert 840s) actually fires instead
of resetting every poll. maxDuration raised above each own-deadline so the
step's fail wins over the generic timeout. Shared core fix (A + B).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 12:15:26 +02:00
nexxo fffcecb152 fix(engine-b): address Codex round 3 (webhook email/replay/rotation, db secret)
- Require a real customer email (no unknown@ fallback merging customers).
- Stripe signature: enforce 5-min replay tolerance + accept any rotating v1.
- DeployApplicationStack no longer persists the DB password in the run context.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 12:12:24 +02:00
nexxo e6bd6c9354 fix(engine-b): address Codex round 2 (fail-closed webhook, placement lock, clone/admin idempotency)
- Stripe webhook fails closed when the signing secret is missing (outside local/testing).
- ReserveResources places + creates the instance under a per-datacenter lock so
  concurrent orders can't overcommit a host.
- CloneVirtualMachine reserves the vmid + breadcrumb BEFORE cloning, so a crash
  can't mint a new vmid and orphan the first clone.
- CreateCustomerAdmin checks user existence and resets the password instead of
  re-running user:add on retry.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 12:09:21 +02:00
nexxo 42fa92cf20 fix(engine-b): address Codex (paid-only stripe, guest routing, absolute disk)
- Stripe: only checkout.session.completed with payment_status=paid (dedupes the
  paired payment_intent event and blocks unpaid async sessions).
- Capture the guest IP (ConfigureNetwork) and point Traefik at the VM, not the
  Proxmox host, so ACME/HTTP-01 can reach Nextcloud.
- Resize the disk to an absolute target (not '+…') so a retry can't double it.
(Codex #4 timeout was a false positive — started_at resets per step.)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 12:05:31 +02:00
nexxo a9fbb395f9 feat(engine-b): live provisioning progress (admin console + customer dashboard)
Admin /admin/provisioning bound to real runs+steps (poll+admin.runs). Embedded
CustomerProvisioning card shows the logged-in customer their own run live
(per-customer StepAdvanced channel, email-bridged authz). Shared BuildsRunSteps.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 11:57:35 +02:00
nexxo 65ba3d6588 feat(engine-b): Stripe webhook -> idempotent customer provisioning intake
Signed webhook (HMAC verify when secret set), CSRF-exempt route. Paid checkout
creates customer+order+run (stripe_event_id unique => duplicate webhooks start
one run) and dispatches. 5 tests.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 11:52:46 +02:00
nexxo 446da58061 feat(engine-b): 15-step customer pipeline + DNS/Traefik services
validate->reserve(placement)->clone->cloudinit->start->guestagent->network->
deploy->nextcloud->admin->dns/tls->backup->monitoring->acceptance->complete.
HetznerDnsClient + TraefikWriter (interface+fake+real), CloudReady notification,
hosts.node (set by RegisterCapacity). Secrets transient/encrypted, never
plaintext. 21 tests incl. mocked end-to-end + crash idempotency.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 11:50:26 +02:00
nexxo e5aeb3989e feat(engine-b): ProxmoxClient VM-lifecycle extension (interface + fake + http)
nextVmid/cloneVm/setCloudInit/resizeDisk/startVm/vmStatus/guestAgentPing/
guestExec/taskStatus/applyFirewall. Fake is deterministic with configurable
task/guest failure hooks; Http polls UPID + guest exec-status.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 11:41:48 +02:00
nexxo 770a6cf7cd feat(engine-b): CustomerStep base + shared resource trait + config
ManagesRunResources trait (host+customer), CustomerStep base (order/instance/
plan/guest helpers), config plans + 15-step customer pipeline + dns/traefik.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 11:39:56 +02:00
nexxo 406251dfde feat(engine-b): customer domain models + migrations
customers, orders (ProvisioningSubject, stripe_event_id unique), instances
(subdomain unique, encrypted nc_admin_ref), dns_records, backups,
monitoring_targets, onboarding_tasks. Host capacity: committedGb/availableGb +
datacenter placement. 7 tests.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 11:38:01 +02:00
nexxo a6a41719bb fix(engine): long SSH command timeout; wg peer removal on privileged worker
- PhpseclibRemoteShell sets a command timeout (default 2000s) so apt
  full-upgrade/install don't hit phpseclib's ~10s default and fail.
- Host removal dispatches RemoveWireguardPeer to the provisioning queue, which
  runs in the worker that owns wg0 (the web container can't manage WireGuard).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 11:01:02 +02:00
nexxo 93191f5de9 fix(engine): fail on unresolvable pipeline step; make worker the WG hub
- RunRunner catches step-resolution errors (removed/renamed pipeline) and
  fails the run terminally instead of looping forever every tick.
- queue-provisioning worker gains NET_ADMIN + tun + persistent wireguard
  volume + published UDP port so LocalWireguardHub can manage wg0.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 10:53:40 +02:00
nexxo 8a392bfd06 fix(engine): parse WireGuard CIDR for address allocation (any prefix length)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 10:48:16 +02:00
nexxo b65fe69088 fix(engine): drop wg peer on host removal; clear reboot state on deadline fail
- Removing a host now removes its WireGuard hub peer so a freed wg_ip can't
  route to the removed server via a stale peer.
- RebootIntoPveKernel clears reboot_issued/deadline when it times out, so the
  manual retry action actually re-issues a reboot instead of failing instantly.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 10:46:11 +02:00
nexxo fbe87d99d5 fix(engine): honour backoff timing + don't double-count Proxmox storage
- RunRunner returns early for a waiting run whose next_attempt_at is in the
  future, so stale/duplicate jobs can't bypass backoff.
- RegisterCapacity takes the largest VM-capable datastore instead of summing
  overlapping pools (local + local-lvm), preventing placement overcommit.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 10:32:14 +02:00
nexxo 8a2a2ee695 fix(engine): reset step timer on retry so timed-out steps recover
A retried step (manual or after a timeout) now gets a fresh started_at, so
RunRunner no longer immediately re-detects the timeout and burns the retry
budget without executing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 10:29:11 +02:00
nexxo 62c4412623 fix(engine): address Codex round 2 (poll budget, host error state, wg race)
- StepResult::poll — polling steps (reboot) wait without consuming the retry
  budget; the step owns its deadline. Reboot maxDuration > deadline.
- Failed runs move a Host subject to 'error' via ProvisioningSubject hook
  (no host stuck 'onboarding').
- ConfigureWireguard allocates + reserves the wg_ip under a global lock;
  unique index on hosts.wg_ip as a backstop against duplicate addresses.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 10:26:37 +02:00
nexxo 65717bd3bd fix(engine): address Codex review (auth token bootstrap, tunnel recheck, ssh)
- CreateAutomationToken now bootstraps the pveum role/user/token over the
  authenticated SSH session (a fresh host has no API token yet); ProxmoxClient
  is read-only in A.
- ConfigureWireguard re-verifies the handshake on the idempotent replay path,
  never advancing over a dead tunnel.
- PhpseclibRemoteShell treats a missing SSH exit status as failure (255).
- connectWithKey verifies the pinned host key fingerprint on later logins.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 10:20:59 +02:00
nexxo ac3d17cd6a feat(engine): 11-step host onboarding pipeline (SSH -> WG -> Proxmox)
Idempotent steps: validate, ssh-trust (deploy key + scrub password),
prepare base, wireguard (hub peer), install proxmox-ve, reboot-into-pve
(retry-poll), configure, automation token, verify api, register capacity,
complete. StartHostOnboarding action. 22 tests incl. mocked end-to-end +
crash idempotency.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 10:04:39 +02:00
nexxo c06ca0ae5d feat(engine): SSH / WireGuard / Proxmox service layer
RemoteShell (phpseclib + fake), WireguardHub (local wg + fake), ProxmoxClient
(REST + fake). Interfaces bound in AppServiceProvider; tests swap fakes via
fakeServices() helper.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 09:58:02 +02:00