Customer::ensureUser() enforced uniqueness only within users, so a
customer provisioned (or registering publicly) with an operator's email
got a second, colliding identity for the same address — the exact thing
R21 exists to prevent. Checks Operator by address now, not by session
(the deleted assertNotAdmin() checked who was signed in, which could
never be the right question).
Public registration gets the same guard via a plain unique() validation
rule, reusing Laravel's stock "already taken" message rather than a
dedicated one — naming the collision specifically would tell a public
visitor an address belongs to staff, a worse leak than the generic
refusal every other collision here already gives them.
Impersonation answers 409 instead of crashing into it. The Stripe
webhook keeps recording the paid order (same principle as
openContract()'s own comment: the order is proof money changed hands)
and withholds only the colliding login, logged for an operator to
resolve by hand.
Verified the reverse direction Codex flagged as already covered: two
Admin\Settings actions and the clupilot:create-operator command all
already refuse an operator email that collides with a customer's, and
that check is sound today because every users row is created in
lockstep with a customers row of the same email (CreateNewUser and
ensureUser are the only two creation sites, both confirmed by grep) and
nothing in this app can change a user's email afterwards (Fortify's
updateProfileInformation feature is disabled, and no other code calls
that action).
It checked Auth::guard('operator')->check() instead of the users row it
was handed, so with an operator's own session still attached (shared
mode carries the same cookie through both legs of impersonation) it
threw the moment a customer's email already had a users row — a 500 on
the first impersonation of anyone who had signed into the portal
themselves. Deleting it rather than fixing the check: operators live in
`operators` now, never in `users` (R21), so a users row can no longer
BE an operator account for this to guard against. Also drops the dead
`'is_admin' => false` write — the column reads from nowhere any more.
redirect()->to(AdminArea::home()) resolved against whatever host the
leave() POST itself arrived on — the portal's, once the console has a
hostname of its own — landing the operator on the portal's dashboard
instead of back at the console. route('admin.overview') is domain-bound
to the console and generates the correct cross-host URL, matching what
this line did before this branch. The test named after this behaviour
now actually asserts it.
nexxo