Five places where the product told somebody a figure that nothing behind
it produced.
**The invoice page showed five invoices nobody was ever issued.** A mock
that outlived its purpose: CP-2026-0003 to CP-2026-0007, a prefix
belonging to no configured series, all "paid", a spend curve from 179 to
198 € and a next charge of 198 € on 01.08.2026 — behind
['auth','verified','customer.active'], so every signed-in customer saw
it. Their real invoices existed in `invoices`, were rendered as PDFs and
mailed to them, and appeared nowhere in the portal at all. The page now
lists their own documents, newest first, with the numbers, dates and
totals off the frozen snapshot, a Storno marked as one, and a download.
The PDF route resolves the document against the signed-in customer in
the query — a URL anybody can type is not made private by not printing
it. No next charge and no chart: nothing here computes what Stripe will
take next cycle, and a figure nobody has worked out is worse than a
blank space.
**The setup fee was quoted everywhere and charged nowhere.** On the
price sheet, on the booking page, set by the operator in the console —
and CompanyProfile::setupFeeCents() had no reader outside the two
sentences that quoted it. It is charged now, as a second non-recurring
line on the same checkout session, which Stripe puts on the initial
invoice only. `orders.setup_fee_cents` records how much of the charge it
was, so the whole total still goes back on a withdrawal while the
register holds the PACKAGE's charge against the contract price and the
invoice prints the fee as a line of its own. The booking page was also
quoting the fee NET under the same sentence the website quotes GROSS —
99,00 against 118,80 — and now quotes what will be taken.
**An upgrade click cancelled a booked downgrade and delivered nothing.**
Nothing in this application marks a cart order paid, so the customer
traded a downgrade they had genuinely booked for a cart line that would
never be fulfilled. The booking now stands until the upgrade actually
lands on the contract, where ApplyPlanChange clears it. The fulfilment
seam is reachable for every type that can be paid — a module and a
storage pack book through BookAddon, which was the missing path from a
paid order to a SubscriptionAddon and left AddonPrices,
SyncStripeAddonItems and clupilot:end-cancelled-addons with no caller
behind a payment. A paid traffic pack logs an error rather than pretending:
the metered allowance is a standing count of packs while a top-up is sold
for one month, and which of the two is meant is not a guess to make here.
That no path to `paid` exists yet is now stated in both places rather
than in one.
**The proof register called correct charges wrong.** expected_gross_cents
used the CUSTOMER's rate, which is zero under reverse charge, against
the domestic gross Stripe actually took — so matches_catalogue was false
for every EU business sale charged exactly the advertised amount, and
for every renewal on a contract with a module, which was held against
`price_cents` alone. It compares against TaxTreatment::chargedCents()
and against the whole term now. Where no money moved, charged and the
flag are null instead of the expected figure agreeing with itself, and a
plan change records the terms with the pro-rata figures in the snapshot
rather than money that arrives again on Stripe's proration invoice.
**The seller's own VAT id was on the invoice, unlabelled**, between the
register number and the court. Labelled — and the footer's composition
moved out of the TCPDF method, because inside one the only way to read
what it says is to render a PDF and un-subset its fonts.
One test enshrined a figure the code does not produce: a reverse-charge
purchase recorded with no charged amount, asserting 17900/0/17900, where
OpenSubscription always passes the charged figure and a real one records
21480/0/21480. Another asserted that an upgrade click cancels a booked
downgrade.
Full suite: 1676 passed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Every path on the site ended in "anfragen": a mailto: link and a promise
to answer the same working day. That is an afternoon of somebody's time
per customer, for a product whose whole point is that the machine does
the work — and it scales exactly as far as one inbox does.
Now: sign in, pick a package, pay, and provisioning starts by itself.
The pieces were already there — Stripe holds a Price per plan version
(the catalogue sync writes the ids), the webhook opens the contract, the
pipeline builds the VM — and what was missing was the checkout session
between them. CheckoutController opens one and gets out of the way; the
purchase becomes real on the webhook, which stays the only place allowed
to believe a payment happened. The success URL is a redirect target and
therefore a URL anybody can type, so it says "we are building it", not
"you have paid".
Nothing in the request may decide the price. The plan key arrives from a
form and everything else is re-derived from the catalogue, including the
plan VERSION, so a version published while the customer types their card
number cannot change what they were quoted.
Two cases that are not errors: no capacity is a parked order (already
built), and an existing customer is sent to the plan change rather than
sold a second, empty cloud that bills twice.
The site says what it can keep. "danach wissen Sie … wie Ihre Daten
sicher umziehen" was a promise made before seeing the thing it is about:
we do not know where a visitor's data is, what shape it is in, or whether
it can be moved at all. Migration is named as its own question, looked at
first and quoted afterwards.
The integrations page gets the settings page's treatment for the same
reason: it was one narrow column of six cards, so an operator connecting
DNS scrolled past Stripe to reach it and the raw .env editor sat at the
bottom of everything. Three tabs by what a section is FOR — services we
buy from outside, our own machines, the file underneath — the same axis
the page was rebuilt around when it stopped being split by storage
mechanism. The tab is in the query string; unlocking survives a switch,
because a confirmed password is a session fact and not a property of a
tab. The .env tab is Owner-only, like the editor it holds.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The English paths and the zone migration went out in 5f74a5f and were gone
again in the tag. Reported for the fourth time, and the fourth report was
right: nothing had changed on the server.
What happened is mine and worth writing down. I have been building commits in
a private index (GIT_INDEX_FILE) to avoid staging a parallel session's
in-flight work, and moving the branch with `git update-ref`. That moves HEAD
without touching the shared index — so the index still described the PREVIOUS
commit. The very next ordinary `git commit` (the version bump) wrote that
stale index as a tree, which reverted every file of the commit before it. The
tag was cut from the revert.
Two things follow. The private-index technique is only safe while the branch
is not checked out; once it is, `git branch -f` refuses for exactly this
reason and `update-ref` is the same operation with the safety removed. And a
release is not verified by a green push — it is verified by reading the tag,
which is what finally found this.
Content unchanged from 5f74a5f: English fragments and legal paths with
permanent redirects, the guarded zone migration, and the test that walks every
route and fragment so a German path fails the suite instead of being reported
again.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
v1.3.21 was taken by a parallel release between reading main and writing the
commit; the version file went out saying 1.3.21 on a commit that is not that
tag. Corrected here rather than by rewriting a pushed commit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
── The zone, for the fourth time ────────────────────────────────────────────
"Change it in the console" was the wrong answer three times running. An
installation with nothing to migrate should simply arrive on the new zone, so
a migration does it — guarded by exactly the condition clupilot:check-zone
reports on: no instance in service, therefore nothing carrying the old name in
DNS, in a certificate or in trusted_domains. With even one instance it does
nothing and logs why, because re-addressing a running Nextcloud is a migration
with an outage and a migration is not the place to start one. It leaves an
installation already on another zone alone: the setting exists so somebody
else can run this on their own domain.
That fixes both reports at once — the security page and the price sheet read
the same setting, which is the entire reason neither of them has the domain
typed into it.
── R13, applied to all of them this time ────────────────────────────────────
"Ich schreibe das nun zum dritten Mal" — fair. The rule was cited, I changed
the one route that had been pointed at, and left every other German path
standing. A fragment is part of a URL too.
#produkt → #product /legal/impressum → /legal/imprint
#ablauf → #process /legal/datenschutz → /legal/privacy
#preise → #pricing /legal/agb → /legal/terms
#fragen → #faq (old paths redirect, permanently — they have been
#kontakt → #contact in the footer and in mail for weeks)
The headings stay German. "Impressum" is the legal term an Austrian company
has to use; the address is not part of the copy.
A test now walks every registered route and every fragment the site links to,
so the next German path fails the suite instead of being reported a fourth
time.
Three existing tests set config('provisioning.dns.zone') and read it back
through the accessor. That worked while the setting was empty and stopped the
moment the migration filled it — they set the setting now, and the one whose
premise is "nothing saved yet" establishes that premise itself.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
── The hole ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
There was no password reset. Fortify's feature was commented out, so there
was no link on the sign-in form, no page and no route — a customer who forgot
their password was locked out of their own cloud until somebody opened a
shell. On a product whose selling point is that you can ring somebody, that
is a support call a week and an embarrassing one.
Two pages of ours under Fortify's route names (R1/R2), because with views off
Fortify registers only the POST endpoints. The mail is a Mailable in this
product's design rather than the framework's MailMessage: somebody who has
just been locked out is exactly the person a phishing mail is aimed at, and a
message that looks nothing like the rest of our post is one they cannot check
— ours carries the footer that names our domains.
Three decisions worth stating, each with a test:
The answer is identical whether the address is known or not. "No account with
that address" turns the form into a way of finding out who is a customer.
The reset kills every other session. Whoever knew the old password may still
be signed in somewhere, and a reset that leaves them there has fixed nothing.
It does NOT sign the visitor in. The link arrived by email, and a mailbox
somebody else can read would otherwise be a session somebody else gets.
── /sicherheit → /security ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
R13: paths are English. Mine was not. The old path stays as a permanent
redirect because it has already gone out in mail footers.
── One wordmark ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
"Sometimes it says Cloud and sometimes it does not" — correct. It was on the
footer, the placeholder and the maintenance screen, and absent from the
header, the sidebar and the sign-in plate. The product is called CluPilot
Cloud; that is the name on the invoices and in every mail, so it is now the
name everywhere. The console sidebar takes the small size so the lockup, the
ADMIN badge and the close button still share one line (R18).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
── The zone ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
A fresh install now addresses customer instances under clupilot.cloud rather
than clupilot.com. Not branding: a Nextcloud is third-party software that
strangers sign in to, and on the same registrable domain as the portal it
shares cookie scope, document.domain and CAA with it. The same reason
googleusercontent.com and vercel.app exist.
Existing installations keep whatever the console says — the zone has been a
setting all along. `clupilot:check-zone <zone>` reports what a change would
touch before anything is touched: the DNS records, the monitoring targets,
the certificates and Nextcloud's trusted_domains all carry the old name and
the setting reaches none of them. With no instances in service it says so and
stops. Changing it later is a migration with an outage, and the command says
that too.
── Which addresses are ours ────────────────────────────────────────────────
A new public page at /sicherheit: the domains that belong to us, the rule for
reading an address bar, what we never do, and — the part that matters — what
to do if you have already typed your password into a copy of our sign-in
form. Change it, end every other session, change it wherever else you use it,
tell us. In that order.
Reachable without an account, deliberately: somebody who has just given their
password away is signed in nowhere, and the page they need cannot be behind
the thing they lost.
Linked from the three places a person is when the question comes up: every
mail footer (the mail is the vector), the sign-in form (this is the page a
phishing kit copies, so the real one says which host you are on), and the
site footer.
The domain list is DERIVED from configuration and keyed by what each domain
is for. A list typed into a page would eventually tell a customer that a
phishing domain is one of ours, or that one of ours is not — the same
two-sources-of-truth failure that had the price sheet promising an address on
a domain the company does not own. The operator console is deliberately
absent from it: naming it on a public page tells an attacker where to aim.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two things.
── The update screen, still opening twice ───────────────────────────────────
Reported again on 1.3.9, and the cause was not the one fixed in 1.3.8. The
agent consumes the request file BEFORE it resolves the release — deliberately,
because update.sh may kill the shell and a request left in place would loop —
and writes `state: running` only once it has decided to go ahead. In between,
the request is gone and the status does not say running yet, so the endpoint
honestly answers "nothing is running". The watcher read that as "the run has
finished" and reloaded the page: overlay on the click, gone a poll later, 503
after it.
The overlay now closes only once the server has BOTH confirmed a run and then
stopped reporting it. Before the confirmation, silence means the agent has not
got there yet. Bounded at twenty polls so a request the agent refuses does not
leave the console covered forever.
── Custom domains, proven and re-proven ─────────────────────────────────────
`custom_domain` was a free-text field and everything downstream believed it:
the proxy served it, the certificate was issued for it, Nextcloud trusted it.
Anyone who pointed any hostname at the platform got somebody else's files
under their own name.
The proof is a TXT record at _clupilot-challenge.<domain> holding a token only
this instance has. Nothing is served until it has been read. Every reader now
goes through Instance::address(), which is the one place the decision is
made — `custom_domain ?: subdomain` was the hole, written out four times.
It is re-read every night at 03:40, because a token checked once can be taken
straight back out and a domain that later lapses keeps resolving here. Three
consecutive misses before a live domain is withdrawn: one failed lookup is a
nameserver having a bad minute, and withdrawing takes a working Nextcloud off
its own address. The domain and its token stay on the row so the customer can
put the record back rather than start over.
Changing the domain mints a NEW token. Reusing it would let somebody who once
verified example.com claim any other domain later without touching its DNS —
the old record is still sitting there and only the value is compared.
The domain is changeable at any time, and removable. Fixing it once set was
considered and rejected: adding or moving an address is a proxy entry, a
certificate and one line in trusted_domains.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
SITE_HOST takes a comma-separated list now, the first name canonical. It serves
the site; every other name in the list redirects there permanently, path and
query intact. An apex domain and its www are two names for one thing, and
answering on both without picking one splits search rankings and cookies
between them.
The redirect is a host-bound catch-all rather than middleware. Middleware that
only some routes carry is the same half-measure this file already made once,
and a catch-all registered without a host would swallow every path in the
application — which is what the third test is there to stop.
The test harness needed fixing too, and the fix is the finding. Router::dispatch
on a standalone router does not rebind the container's request, so a route
reading one — through the helper OR through an injected parameter, both of which
resolve from the container — gets the test's request rather than the one being
answered. The redirect silently lost its query string in the test while working
in production. dispatchOn() binds it where the framework would.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The previous release bound the landing page and stopped there. The website duly
vanished from the portal — and the portal stayed reachable from the website:
www.clupilot.com/dashboard, /login, /settings all kept working. Half a
separation is no separation, and it was reported back within the hour.
APP_HOST binds every portal route, Fortify's own POST actions included through
fortify.domain — a sign-in form on the website's hostname would otherwise post
to a route that answers there. SITE_HOST now takes the legal pages and
robots.txt with the landing page rather than leaving them everywhere; binding
them is also what makes route('legal.impressum') produce a www URL from inside
a queued mail, where there is no request to take a hostname from.
There is no clever middleware here and there should not be. Route::domain() is
the mechanism: a route registered for one host does not exist on another, and a
request for it gets the 404 it deserves. The only deliberate exception is "/" on
the portal host, which redirects to the dashboard or the sign-in page — that is
what people type from memory, and turning it into an error page to make a point
about hostnames helps nobody. The Stripe webhook and /up stay host-agnostic:
Stripe posts to whichever URL it was given, and a mismatch there loses payments.
Both are opt-in and empty by default, which every development machine reached
by a bare IP depends on.
The tests now check BOTH directions for every path rather than only the one
that was reported. That is the mistake this commit exists to correct.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The landing page was registered host-agnostically, so app.clupilot.com served
it: marketing copy, a pricing table and a "sign up" call to action, at the
address where a customer's servers live. Reported exactly that way.
SITE_HOST binds the website to its own hostname. Every other host — the portal,
a bare IP — answers "/" with the product: the dashboard for somebody signed in,
the sign-in page for everybody else. Never a 404 there: "/" is what people type
from memory, and turning that into an error page to make a point about
hostnames helps nobody. Empty keeps today's behaviour, which every development
machine reached by IP depends on.
The console is unaffected — its routes are registered first and win on their
own host, the ordering the status page above already documents.
The legal pages are deliberately not bound. An imprint has to be reachable from
wherever the reader is standing, and a mail footer links to it from whichever
host sent the mail.
Also drops "just reply to this message" from two mails. A reply lands in the
billing or provisioning mailbox rather than in the support queue somebody
actually works through — so it now says to raise it in the portal, where it
gets a place in that queue instead of getting lost.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Registration opened an account that could sign in immediately on an address
nobody had proved was theirs — and anybody can type a stranger's into a
registration form. Both halves were commented out: the Fortify feature and
MustVerifyEmail on the model.
`verified` sits on the whole portal group rather than on the pages that spend
money. An unconfirmed address is not a billing problem to be caught at
checkout; it is an account that may not belong to the person holding it, and
the servers, the users and the backups behind it are worth as much to whoever
typed the address as to whoever owns it.
The mail is a Mailable in this product's design rather than Laravel's
notification, which would arrive with the framework's logo, button and footer
as the first thing anybody ever receives from CluPilot. It also has to leave
through the SYSTEM mailbox like every other account mail, which the
notification path does not do on its own.
The link is signed and expires, and the address is part of what is signed — so
a link issued to a mistyped address stops working the moment the address is
corrected, rather than confirming an address nobody can read. Tests cover the
tampered link, the expired one, the corrected address, and one account trying
to confirm another.
The waiting page is ours (Fortify has views off) and offers the only two things
that move somebody forward: send it again, or sign out and register with the
address they meant. The resend is throttled, because otherwise it is a button
that makes the server send mail to an arbitrary address as fast as it can be
clicked. Somebody already confirmed is redirected away from it — the `verified`
middleware only guards the other direction.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Clicking Save made every button on the console's settings page appear to fire.
Seven `wire:loading.attr="disabled"` had no `wire:target`, and without one
Livewire applies the loading state to ANY request on the component — so one save
put all of them into their disabled state simultaneously. Each names its own
action now.
Two-factor for customers. Fortify's endpoints already existed; only the screen
was missing. Setting up requires re-entering the password first, and every
action re-checks that server-side rather than relying on the button not being on
screen — a Livewire action is reachable by anyone who can post to
/livewire/update. The confirmation marker is Laravel's own session key, so it
and the framework's password.confirm middleware mean the same thing rather than
drifting apart.
The secret never enters a Livewire property. Component state travels to the
browser and back in the snapshot; the QR image is derived from the secret, the
secret is not in it — and there is a test that says so.
The status page moves to the ROOT of its hostname: status.clupilot.com/status
says the same word twice. That needed the domain-bound `/` registered BEFORE the
landing page, because Laravel takes the first match and the landing route is
host-agnostic — so the status host would have served the marketing site.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
STATUS_HOST binds /status to a single hostname. Every other host redirects
there rather than 404ing: a status page is the one address people keep in a
bookmark and reach for when something is already wrong, so breaking old links
to prove a point about separation would be exactly backwards. Unset, nothing
changes.
The /legal/status redirect goes through route() instead of a literal path. A
relative redirect lands on whatever host the visitor is already on — which,
once the page has a hostname of its own, is precisely where it no longer
answers.
The installer told the operator to point Stripe's webhook at the customer
portal. Stripe posts server-to-server and never sees the portal; the endpoint
is the api hostname, which the installer never even asked for. It asks now, and
prints the address that actually receives the events. Getting this wrong does
not fail loudly — payments simply stop being recorded.
It also writes ADMIN_HOST_EXCLUSIVE=false on a fresh install. Switching the
console onto its own hostname before the DNS for it exists makes the console
unreachable under any other name, and that is not a thing to have on by default.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Registering the console once per accepted hostname reused one set of route
names, and Laravel refuses to serialise two routes under the same name — so
`artisan optimize` failed on the live server the moment the separation was
switched on, mid-deploy.
Only the canonical registration carries the `admin.` names now; the alternates
answer under `admin.viaN.*`. They exist to be MATCHED — they are the addresses
someone locked out reaches for — never to have URLs generated for them, so
route() keeps producing the canonical hostname.
That renaming then broke every exact route-name check, which is how the console
navigation decides what is active: reached through a recovery address, nothing
in the sidebar was marked, exactly when something is already going wrong. The
check goes through AdminArea now and matches either form.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three things the owner asked for, and one the review found underneath them.
The console leaves /admin. It has its own route file now, registered before
routes/web.php because once it has a hostname to itself it sits at the ROOT of
that host — where `/` and `/settings` also exist for the portal, and the first
matching route wins. Where it mounts is one decision in one place: `/` on the
console hostname where it has one to itself, `/admin` on any host otherwise.
Names stay admin.* in both modes, so nothing that builds a URL has to know.
Exclusivity is its own switch, not a consequence of having a hostname. The
first attempt made "this host is the console" follow from ADMIN_HOSTS, and a
development machine lists its own IP there so the console works without DNS —
which took the public site and the portal off that machine entirely. The
switch also registers the console on every listed hostname, canonical last, so
the alternates that exist as recovery paths keep working.
The status page moves out of /legal, where it sat beside the imprint and the
terms. Nothing about the current health of the platform is a legal document. It
is a real page now: portal, instances, provisioning and backups, each derived
from records, aggregate only, and a component with no signal reports "unknown"
rather than "operational".
That last rule is what exposed the real bug. monitoring_targets.status was
written once — 'up', at provisioning — and nothing ever updated it. Both the
console's notices and the new public page read it, so an outage would have been
published as healthy indefinitely. There is a sync job now, on a five-minute
schedule, and a checked_at column so a verdict can go stale instead of standing
forever.
The monitoring contract had to grow a third state for that to be honest.
isHealthy() answers true when no monitoring is configured and false when the
monitor is unreachable; recording that boolean would have published either a
fleet-wide all-clear nobody measured or a fleet-wide outage that was really one
broken monitor. health() returns null for both, the recorder leaves the old
verdict to go stale, and isHealthy() keeps its forgiving semantics for the one
caller that wants them — the provisioning acceptance check, which must not fail
a delivery because monitoring is not set up.
Backups are counted from the instances that need protecting rather than from
the backup rows that exist, so an instance with no schedule at all cannot be
missing from the arithmetic that declares the estate protected.
Also: the update panel polls itself, offers the button only when there is
something to install, and opens the log while a run is in progress.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The marketing page was a generic centred hero in the system font stack: it
neither used the design system the console is built on nor looked like the
product it sells. Rebuilt around what CluPilot actually promises — security you
can produce evidence for — so the page reads as a controlled technical
document: a specification plate instead of a hero image, numbered sections, an
audit register with rhythm and proof per measure, and a price sheet rather than
floating cards. IBM Plex Serif joins Sans and Mono as the display voice, self
hosted as static files so the public page renders even without the Vite build.
The prices were written into the page by hand, and the page and the catalogue
had already drifted apart on three of four plans: the site advertised 249 € for
a plan the checkout charges 399 € for. The sheet now reads the catalogue, like
every other caller — including the currency, which is configurable and was also
hard-coded here.
The catalogue fails loudly on purpose; a public website must not. A broken or
overlapping catalogue is caught in the controller alone: the page still
renders, the sheet is replaced by "on request", and nobody is quoted a number
the checkout would not honour.
The sign-in and registration panels shared a copy-pasted orange gradient. They
now share one component and the same ink plate as the site, so the two halves
of the product no longer look like two companies.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The owner can now do from the console what only a config edit could do before:
create a plan line, draft a version, price it, publish it into a window, and
pull a plan out of the shop.
Two pages and one modal, because the catalogue has exactly two levels. The
plan list is a name, a rank and a kill switch. Everything that can be got
wrong — capabilities, prices, windows — lives on the versions, where the page
is built around the one rule that matters: a draft is freely editable, a
published version is not touchable at all. So drafting and publishing are
separate acts, and publishing says plainly that it is final.
The console refuses everything the catalogue refuses, on the form rather than
as a stack trace: an overlapping window, a window that ends before it starts,
a version with no price for a term we sell on, and — new here — a version with
no VM template, which would be bought and then fail provisioning every time.
Numbers are bounded on both sides, because a mistyped price otherwise
overflows the column and answers with a 500 instead of saying which field was
wrong. Performance class and features are picked from the keys we have labels
for; free text would be frozen at publication and shown to customers as a raw
translation key forever.
Concurrency, since two admins share one catalogue: draft numbers are allocated
under a lock on the family, publication is an atomic conditional claim, and
discarding a draft is one statement conditional on it still being a draft —
otherwise a draft published in the meantime could be deleted out from under
the customers now contracted to it.
`plans.manage` (Owner and Admin) guards the pages themselves, not only the
buttons, and the modal authorises itself — prices, drafts and unreleased plans
are not something to leave readable to anyone who types the URL.
Also fixes the shared checkbox, which ticked in the browser's own blue on
every page that used one: a native checkbox ignores text colour and needs
accent-color.
Verified in the browser: withdrawing a plan in the console removes it from the
customer's billing page immediately, and restoring it brings it back. The
public landing page carries no catalogue-driven plan list, so there is nothing
there to hide.
421 tests green. Codex review clean after six rounds.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
While the product is still being built, the marketing site and the customer
portal should not be reachable — but they must stay reachable for us.
- A toggle in the console (site.manage, Owner/Admin) stored in a new
app_settings table, because this has to be flippable without a deploy.
- Outsiders get a placeholder with 503 + noindex, not 200: a 200 invites search
engines to index the placeholder as the site's content, which is far harder
to undo than to prevent.
- Anyone on the management VPN, and any signed-in operator, sees the real site.
The console, Livewire's endpoint, the Stripe webhook and the health check are
always reachable — otherwise the switch could only be flipped once.
- robots.txt is generated by the app and follows the switch. It had to stop
being a static file: nginx short-circuited it and Laravel's stock file said
'Disallow:' with an empty value, so crawlers were never told anything.
- Settings reads fall back to the default when the table is unavailable. The
gate reads one on every request, so a deploy running new code before migrate
would otherwise answer the entire site with a 500.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The console can now create, block and remove VPN accesses, and shows who is
actually connected — traffic counters, source endpoint and last handshake.
Design notes:
- The web container has no wg0, so the page never talks to WireGuard. Live
state is copied in by SyncVpnPeers on the provisioning queue (the only worker
whose container owns the interface); the page polls the database and merely
nudges that job, throttled so many open tabs cannot flood the queue.
- enabled (operator intent) and present (observed on the hub) are stored
separately, so a sync can never quietly undo a block and drift stays visible
as "wird angewendet".
- The sync adopts peers the host pipeline registered, naming them after their
host — otherwise "who is on the VPN" would have blind spots.
- Keypairs are generated in PHP via libsodium rather than shelling out to
wg genkey (no interface in this container, and it keeps generation testable).
The private key is shown once and never stored.
- allocateIp() now also considers vpn_peers, which would otherwise be handed a
tunnel address a host already holds.
- vpn.manage is a new capability held by Owner/Admin only, and it hides the nav
entry too — a VPN access reaches the management network.
Verified end to end against the real hub, not just mocks: created an access in
the browser, connected with the generated config, watched the console flip to
"Verbunden" with real counters, then blocked it and confirmed the peer was
gone from wg0 and the client could no longer handshake.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Admin actions post to /livewire/update, which a path-scoped guard skips — an
operator session could drive admin components through a PUBLIC hostname despite
ADMIN_HOSTS. The restriction is now registered as Livewire-persistent middleware
and listed on the admin route group, so Livewire re-applies it from the
component snapshot.
Proven by replaying a snapshot taken from the real rendered page: identical
payload -> 404 on a public host, 200 on the allowed host (positive control, so
the test cannot pass for the wrong reason).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Proxmox fleet and the operator console must never be publicly reachable. The
primary control is the reverse proxy, but nginx here is a catch-all
(server_name _), so /admin was served on EVERY hostname — a proxy
misconfiguration would expose it. ADMIN_HOSTS pins it; any other host gets 404
(not 403: a public domain must not disclose that a console exists).
Prepended to the group instead of the admin route group on purpose: route
middleware is reordered by Laravel's priority list, which runs first — a
guest would then be redirected to /login and learn the console is there. Covered
by a test for exactly that case. Empty ADMIN_HOSTS = unrestricted, so nobody is
locked out by upgrading.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- 5 operator roles (Owner/Admin/Support/Billing/Read-only) seeded via migration
with a capability catalogue; app checks capabilities via Gate, never role names
- every mutating admin action authorizes server-side (hosts/datacenters/customers/
impersonate/provisioning); is_admin reads migrated to console.view / isOperator()
- admin /settings: own account + Owner-only staff invite/role/revoke with
last-owner, self-role and customer-collision guards (transactional)
- sidebar 'zum Kundenportal' link replaced with Settings
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- customers gain profile + branding + closed_at; instances gain cancellation
fields; branding resolver (NULL -> CluPilot defaults) snapshotted into the
provisioning run context
- cancel package: term-end, irreversible, typed-confirm modal (R5)
- close account: guarded (no active package), typed-confirm modal (R5)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
datacenters table/model + admin CRUD (/admin/datacenters, nav). HostCreate
picks from active datacenters (validated); hosts show the datacenter code.
Seeded fsn/hel. 5 tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed webhook (HMAC verify when secret set), CSRF-exempt route. Paid checkout
creates customer+order+run (stripe_event_id unique => duplicate webhooks start
one run) and dispatches. 5 tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Real hosts list, add-host form (StartHostOnboarding), host detail with live
progress stepper (Reverb + wire:poll fallback), retry failed run, remove via
wire-elements/modal (deregister only). DE+EN. 8 tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Public www landing page (your design) as a self-contained Blade view at / — own
CSS/JS, system fonts (no CDN, R14), hero, marquee, typewriter, product mock with
scroll-zoom, security section, honest comparison, pricing gallery, FAQ, CTA. It is
intentionally outside the app token/component system (marketing page, not control
panel). Wired a sign-in link to route('login').
Robustness/a11y hardening from the Codex (R15) loop:
- reduced-motion: pin hero/reveal elements to their visible end state.
- <noscript> fallback so reveal content is visible without JS.
- login link kept visible on mobile (moved out of the hidden nav group).
- stats render their real values in HTML (correct without JS).
- footer legal links now resolve to real /legal/* routes (placeholder pages).
- reconciled contradictory data-migration pricing (add-on from €390).
48 Pest tests green; R12 browser: landing 0 console errors. Codex (R15) clean.
NOTE: the /legal/* pages (Impressum, Datenschutz, AGB) are placeholders — real
legal content must be supplied before this homepage goes public.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Separate admin console at /admin, gated to is_admin users (EnsureAdmin middleware
+ migration/seed; a plain customer user is seeded to prove the gate). Distinct dark
aesthetic achieved purely by token scoping: .theme-admin overrides every CSS design
token to a dark graphite / signal-orange palette, so ALL shared components (button,
card, badge, table, stat, chart) render dark with zero new markup (R3). Chart island
now reads tokens from its own element, so charts are theme-aware.
Sections (each full-page class-based Livewire, English routes R13, localized DE/EN):
- Overview: fleet KPIs, fleet-growth line, host-load bars, MRR bars, active runs, alerts.
- Customers: table + plan doughnut. Instances: fleet table (vmid/host/storage).
- Hosts: capacity cards (storage/CPU bars). Provisioning: runs table + live stepper.
- Revenue: MRR/ARR/ARPU/churn KPIs, MRR line, plan doughnut, recent payments.
- Locale-aware month labels/currency (Carbon/Number).
18 new Pest tests (guest redirect / non-admin 403 / admin render per section) → 44
green. R12 browser: all six admin pages HTTP 200, ZERO console errors (Chart.js dark).
Codex (R15) — clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
nexxo
Claude