The rule was decided in CustomDomainAccess but nothing asked it on the way
in: /domain answered every customer on every package, so the entry package
could set a domain it is not sold and cannot keep.
The guard sits in mount(), not on the route. A Livewire component answers
POSTs to /livewire/update by itself, so a route-only check would have left
save() and the rest reachable to exactly the customers it was meant to stop.
The sidebar asks the same question through a gate rather than a second copy
of the rule — a customer holds no permissions at all (R21 puts all seventeen
on the operator guard), so can() had nothing to filter on and the tab was
shown to everyone, leading straight into the 403 the page now raises.
Customer::forUser() carries the resolution the Livewire concern used to own,
because the gate has to answer outside any component and a second copy of
its email fallback is how the two would drift apart.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two things.
── The update screen, still opening twice ───────────────────────────────────
Reported again on 1.3.9, and the cause was not the one fixed in 1.3.8. The
agent consumes the request file BEFORE it resolves the release — deliberately,
because update.sh may kill the shell and a request left in place would loop —
and writes `state: running` only once it has decided to go ahead. In between,
the request is gone and the status does not say running yet, so the endpoint
honestly answers "nothing is running". The watcher read that as "the run has
finished" and reloaded the page: overlay on the click, gone a poll later, 503
after it.
The overlay now closes only once the server has BOTH confirmed a run and then
stopped reporting it. Before the confirmation, silence means the agent has not
got there yet. Bounded at twenty polls so a request the agent refuses does not
leave the console covered forever.
── Custom domains, proven and re-proven ─────────────────────────────────────
`custom_domain` was a free-text field and everything downstream believed it:
the proxy served it, the certificate was issued for it, Nextcloud trusted it.
Anyone who pointed any hostname at the platform got somebody else's files
under their own name.
The proof is a TXT record at _clupilot-challenge.<domain> holding a token only
this instance has. Nothing is served until it has been read. Every reader now
goes through Instance::address(), which is the one place the decision is
made — `custom_domain ?: subdomain` was the hole, written out four times.
It is re-read every night at 03:40, because a token checked once can be taken
straight back out and a domain that later lapses keeps resolving here. Three
consecutive misses before a live domain is withdrawn: one failed lookup is a
nameserver having a bad minute, and withdrawing takes a working Nextcloud off
its own address. The domain and its token stay on the row so the customer can
put the record back rather than start over.
Changing the domain mints a NEW token. Reusing it would let somebody who once
verified example.com claim any other domain later without touching its DNS —
the old record is still sitting there and only the value is compared.
The domain is changeable at any time, and removable. Fixing it once set was
considered and rejected: adding or moving an address is a proxy entry, a
certificate and one line in trusted_domains.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
nexxo