<?php

namespace App\Livewire\Admin;

use App\Models\Customer;
use App\Models\User;
use App\Models\VpnPeer;
use App\Services\Deployment\UpdateChannel;
use App\Support\Settings as AppSettings;
use App\Provisioning\Jobs\ApplyVpnPeer;
use Illuminate\Support\Facades\DB;
use Illuminate\Support\Facades\Hash;
use Illuminate\Support\Str;
use Spatie\Permission\Models\Role;
use Livewire\Attributes\Layout;
use Livewire\Attributes\Validate;
use Livewire\Component;

/**
 * Operator settings: the signed-in operator's own account plus (Owner-only)
 * staff management. All staff mutations are capability-gated server-side and
 * protect the last-Owner and self-role invariants transactionally.
 */
#[Layout('layouts.admin')]
class Settings extends Component
{
    use \App\Livewire\Concerns\ChangesOwnPassword;

    // My account
    #[Validate('required|string|max:255')]
    public string $name = '';

    #[Validate('required|email|max:255')]
    public string $email = '';

    // Invite staff
    #[Validate('required|string|max:255')]
    public string $staffName = '';

    #[Validate('required|email|max:255')]
    public string $staffEmail = '';

    #[Validate('required|in:Owner,Admin,Support,Billing,Read-only')]
    public string $staffRole = 'Support';

    /** Shown once after inviting, since email delivery is still mocked. */
    public ?string $invitedEmail = null;

    public ?string $invitedPassword = null;

    public function mount(): void
    {
        $this->name = auth()->user()->name;
        $this->email = auth()->user()->email;
    }

    /**
     * Take the marketing site and the customer portal offline, or back online.
     * The console keeps working either way — otherwise this switch could only
     * ever be flipped once.
     */
    public function toggleSiteVisibility(): void
    {
        $this->authorize('site.manage');

        $public = ! AppSettings::bool('site.public', true);
        AppSettings::set('site.public', $public);

        $this->dispatch('notify', message: $public
            ? __('admin_settings.site_now_public')
            : __('admin_settings.site_now_hidden'));
    }

    public function saveAccount(): void
    {
        $user = auth()->user();
        $data = $this->validate([
            'name' => 'required|string|max:255',
            'email' => 'required|email|max:255|unique:users,email,'.$user->id,
        ]);

        // An operator email must never collide with a customer's — that would
        // block the customer from ever obtaining a portal login (ensureUser).
        if (Customer::query()->where('email', $data['email'])->exists()) {
            $this->addError('email', __('admin_settings.is_customer'));

            return;
        }

        $user->update($data);
        $this->dispatch('notify', message: __('admin_settings.account_saved'));
    }

    public function inviteStaff(): void
    {
        $this->authorize('staff.manage');
        $data = $this->validate([
            'staffName' => 'required|string|max:255',
            'staffEmail' => 'required|email|max:255|unique:users,email',
            'staffRole' => 'required|in:Owner,Admin,Support,Billing,Read-only',
        ]);

        // Only an Owner may create another Owner.
        if ($data['staffRole'] === 'Owner' && ! auth()->user()->hasRole('Owner')) {
            $this->addError('staffRole', __('admin_settings.owner_only'));

            return;
        }
        // Never turn a customer's portal login into an operator.
        if (Customer::query()->where('email', $data['staffEmail'])->exists()) {
            $this->addError('staffEmail', __('admin_settings.is_customer'));

            return;
        }

        // Email/password-setup delivery is still mocked, so generate a temporary
        // password and surface it once to the Owner to share securely — the
        // account is usable immediately (a proper invite link follows with mail).
        $temp = Str::password(14);
        $user = User::create([
            'name' => $data['staffName'],
            'email' => $data['staffEmail'],
            'password' => Hash::make($temp),
            'is_admin' => true,
        ]);
        $user->assignRole($data['staffRole']);

        $this->invitedEmail = $data['staffEmail'];
        $this->invitedPassword = $temp;
        $this->reset('staffName', 'staffEmail');
        $this->staffRole = 'Support';
        $this->dispatch('notify', message: __('admin_settings.staff_invited'));
    }

    public function setStaffRole(int $id, string $role): void
    {
        $this->authorize('staff.manage');
        if (! in_array($role, User::OPERATOR_ROLES, true)) {
            return;
        }

        $result = DB::transaction(function () use ($id, $role) {
            // Serialize on the Owner role so the global owner count can't be
            // raced to zero by concurrent demotions of different owners.
            Role::query()->where('name', 'Owner')->lockForUpdate()->first();

            $target = User::query()->whereKey($id)->lockForUpdate()->first();
            if ($target === null) {
                return 'gone';
            }
            if ($target->id === auth()->id()) {
                return 'self';
            }
            // Only existing operators may be re-roled — never escalate a customer
            // (or any non-staff) user into the console via a tampered id.
            if (! $target->isOperator() || Customer::query()->where('email', $target->email)->exists()) {
                return 'not_staff';
            }
            // Granting or revoking Owner is Owner-only.
            if (($role === 'Owner' || $target->hasRole('Owner')) && ! auth()->user()->hasRole('Owner')) {
                return 'owner_only';
            }
            // Never demote the last Owner.
            if ($target->hasRole('Owner') && $role !== 'Owner' && $this->ownerCount() <= 1) {
                return 'last_owner';
            }
            $target->syncRoles([$role]);

            return 'ok';
        });

        $this->flash($result);
    }

    public function revokeStaff(int $id): void
    {
        $this->authorize('staff.manage');

        $revokedPeers = [];

        $result = DB::transaction(function () use ($id, &$revokedPeers) {
            Role::query()->where('name', 'Owner')->lockForUpdate()->first();

            $target = User::query()->whereKey($id)->lockForUpdate()->first();
            if ($target === null || ! $target->isOperator()) {
                return 'gone';
            }
            if ($target->id === auth()->id()) {
                return 'self';
            }
            if ($target->hasRole('Owner') && $this->ownerCount() <= 1) {
                return 'last_owner';
            }
            $target->syncRoles([]);
            $target->update(['is_admin' => false]);

            // Taking away the console but leaving the tunnel would be the worst
            // of both: no access to the panel, still a route into the
            // management network. Same revocation path as the VPN page uses.
            foreach (VpnPeer::query()->where('user_id', $target->id)->get() as $peer) {
                $peer->purgeSecret();
                $peer->delete();
                $revokedPeers[] = $peer->public_key;
            }

            return 'revoked';
        });

        // Dispatched only once the rows are committed: a worker picking the job
        // up mid-transaction would still see the peer as active, leave it on the
        // hub, and never be asked again — a revoked colleague would keep their
        // tunnel until the next reconciliation happened to notice.
        foreach ($revokedPeers as $publicKey) {
            ApplyVpnPeer::dispatch($publicKey, null, false);
        }

        $this->flash($result);
    }

    private function flash(string $result): void
    {
        $msg = match ($result) {
            'ok' => __('admin_settings.role_updated'),
            'revoked' => __('admin_settings.staff_revoked'),
            'self' => __('admin_settings.not_self'),
            'owner_only' => __('admin_settings.owner_only'),
            'last_owner' => __('admin_settings.last_owner'),
            'not_staff' => __('admin_settings.not_staff'),
            default => null,
        };
        if ($msg !== null) {
            $this->dispatch('notify', message: $msg);
        }
    }

    private function ownerCount(): int
    {
        return User::query()->whereHas('roles', fn ($q) => $q->where('name', 'Owner'))->count();
    }

    /** A new entry for the console allowlist: a single address or a CIDR range. */
    public string $consoleIp = '';

    /**
     * Add a network that may reach the console without the VPN.
     *
     * Validated as an address or CIDR before it is stored: a typo that silently
     * matches nothing is how someone locks themselves out while believing they
     * have not.
     */
    public function addConsoleIp(): void
    {
        $this->authorize('site.manage');

        $value = trim($this->consoleIp);

        if (! \App\Http\Middleware\RestrictConsoleNetwork::isNetwork($value)) {
            $this->addError('consoleIp', __('admin_settings.console_ip_invalid'));

            return;
        }

        $list = (array) AppSettings::get('console.allowed_ips', []);

        if (! in_array($value, $list, true)) {
            $list[] = $value;
            AppSettings::set('console.allowed_ips', array_values($list));
        }

        $this->consoleIp = '';
        $this->dispatch('notify', message: __('admin_settings.console_ip_added', ['ip' => $value]));
    }

    /**
     * Remove one — unless it is the reason you can see this page.
     *
     * Refusing here rather than warning afterwards: by the time the page
     * reloads, the request that would show the warning has already been
     * rejected. The VPN is never in this list, so an operator on the VPN can
     * always clear it out.
     */
    public function removeConsoleIp(string $value): void
    {
        $this->authorize('site.manage');

        $list = array_values(array_filter(
            (array) AppSettings::get('console.allowed_ips', []),
            fn ($entry) => $entry !== $value,
        ));

        $ip = (string) request()->ip();

        if (\App\Http\Middleware\RestrictConsoleNetwork::isRestricted()
            && ! \App\Http\Middleware\RestrictConsoleNetwork::wouldStillAllow($ip, $list)) {
            $this->dispatch('notify', message: __('admin_settings.console_ip_last', ['ip' => $ip]));

            return;
        }

        AppSettings::set('console.allowed_ips', $list);
        $this->dispatch('notify', message: __('admin_settings.console_ip_removed', ['ip' => $value]));
    }

    /**
     * Switch the restriction on or off.
     *
     * Turning it ON is refused unless the address doing the switching is
     * already covered — otherwise the click that secures the console is also
     * the click that locks its owner out of it.
     */
    public function toggleConsoleRestriction(): void
    {
        $this->authorize('site.manage');

        $on = ! \App\Http\Middleware\RestrictConsoleNetwork::isRestricted();

        if ($on && ! \App\Http\Middleware\RestrictConsoleNetwork::allows((string) request()->ip())) {
            $this->dispatch('notify', message: __('admin_settings.console_lock_refused', ['ip' => (string) request()->ip()]));

            return;
        }

        AppSettings::set('console.network_restricted', $on);
        $this->dispatch('notify', message: __($on ? 'admin_settings.console_locked' : 'admin_settings.console_unlocked'));
    }


    /**
     * Ask the host-side agent to update this installation.
     *
     * Deliberately a request rather than an action: see UpdateChannel. The
     * button cannot report success, because success means this container is
     * restarted out from under the response — so it reports that the update was
     * asked for, and the page shows the outcome once the agent has written it.
     */
    public function requestUpdate(): void
    {
        $this->authorize('site.manage');

        $accepted = app(UpdateChannel::class)->request(auth()->user()->email);

        $this->dispatch('notify', message: __($accepted
            ? 'admin_settings.update_requested'
            : 'admin_settings.update_already_requested'));
    }

    public function render()
    {
        $staff = User::query()
            ->whereHas('roles', fn ($q) => $q->whereIn('name', User::OPERATOR_ROLES))
            ->with('roles')
            ->orderBy('name')
            ->get()
            ->map(fn (User $u) => [
                'id' => $u->id,
                'name' => $u->name,
                'email' => $u->email,
                'role' => $u->roles->first()?->name ?? '—',
                'self' => $u->id === auth()->id(),
            ]);

        return view('livewire.admin.settings', [
            'update' => app(UpdateChannel::class)->state(),
            'updateLog' => app(UpdateChannel::class)->lastLog(),
            'sitePublic' => AppSettings::bool('site.public', true),
            'canManageSite' => auth()->user()?->can('site.manage') ?? false,
            // Shown so nobody has to guess why they still see the real site.
            'viewerOnVpn' => \Symfony\Component\HttpFoundation\IpUtils::checkIp(
                (string) request()->ip(),
                (array) config('admin_access.trusted_ranges', []),
            ),
            // Who may reach the console, and from where the viewer is asking —
            // shown so the consequence of a change is visible before it is made.
            'consoleRestricted' => \App\Http\Middleware\RestrictConsoleNetwork::isRestricted(),
            'consoleIps' => (array) AppSettings::get('console.allowed_ips', []),
            'consoleVpnRanges' => (array) config('admin_access.trusted_ranges', []),
            'viewerIp' => (string) request()->ip(),
            'staff' => $staff,
            'roles' => User::OPERATOR_ROLES,
            'canManageStaff' => auth()->user()->can('staff.manage'),
            'isOwner' => auth()->user()->hasRole('Owner'),
        ]);
    }
}