count())->toBe(0) ->and(Role::where('guard_name', 'web')->count())->toBe(0) ->and(Permission::where('guard_name', 'operator')->count())->toBe(17) ->and(Role::where('guard_name', 'operator')->count())->toBe(6); }); it('keeps Owner holding every permission after the move', function () { $owner = Role::findByName('Owner', 'operator'); expect($owner->permissions()->count())->toBe(Permission::count()); }); it('lets an operator use a console capability and a user not', function () { $operator = Operator::factory()->role('Owner')->create(); expect($operator->can('console.view'))->toBeTrue() ->and(method_exists(User::factory()->create(), 'hasRole'))->toBeFalse(); }); it('carries an existing operator user across with password and two-factor intact', function () { // Simulates the pre-migration state on a live server. $hash = bcrypt('altes-passwort'); DB::table('users')->insert([ 'name' => 'Alt', 'email' => 'alt@clupilot.test', 'password' => $hash, 'two_factor_secret' => 'geheimnis', 'is_admin' => true, 'created_at' => now(), 'updated_at' => now(), ]); $userId = DB::table('users')->where('email', 'alt@clupilot.test')->value('id'); DB::table('model_has_roles')->insert([ 'role_id' => DB::table('roles')->where('name', 'Owner')->value('id'), 'model_type' => User::class, 'model_id' => $userId, ]); // Re-run only the move migration against this hand-built state. (require base_path('database/migrations/2026_07_29_100000_move_rbac_to_operator_guard.php'))->up(); $operator = Operator::where('email', 'alt@clupilot.test')->first(); expect($operator)->not->toBeNull() ->and($operator->password)->toBe($hash) ->and($operator->two_factor_secret)->toBe('geheimnis') ->and($operator->hasRole('Owner'))->toBeTrue() // Not mixed: the users row is gone. ->and(DB::table('users')->where('email', 'alt@clupilot.test')->exists())->toBeFalse(); }); it('carries across an operator who holds a permission directly and no role at all', function () { // operatorUserIds() used to look only at model_has_roles. A pre-existing // console user granted console.view straight through model_has_permissions // — never through any role — was invisible to that worklist. Meanwhile the // permission's own guard is switched to `operator` a few lines above the // worklist loop, so an account like this would silently lose console // access while staying behind as a portal user, forever. $hash = bcrypt('direkt-passwort'); $userId = DB::table('users')->insertGetId([ 'name' => 'Direkt', 'email' => 'direkt@clupilot.test', 'password' => $hash, 'is_admin' => true, 'created_at' => now(), 'updated_at' => now(), ]); $permissionId = DB::table('permissions')->where('name', 'console.view')->value('id'); DB::table('model_has_permissions')->insert([ 'permission_id' => $permissionId, 'model_type' => User::class, 'model_id' => $userId, ]); // Deliberately no model_has_roles row for this user. (require base_path('database/migrations/2026_07_29_100000_move_rbac_to_operator_guard.php'))->up(); $operator = Operator::where('email', 'direkt@clupilot.test')->first(); expect($operator)->not->toBeNull() ->and($operator->roles()->count())->toBe(0) ->and($operator->can('console.view'))->toBeTrue() ->and(DB::table('model_has_permissions') ->where('model_type', Operator::class)->where('model_id', $operator->id) ->where('permission_id', $permissionId)->exists())->toBeTrue() // Carried, and gone from `users` like any other operator — not left // behind as a still-working portal login. ->and(DB::table('users')->where('email', 'direkt@clupilot.test')->exists())->toBeFalse(); }); it('refuses to delete a users row that has a customer on it', function () { // `users` has no `customer_id` column (checked against the real schema) — // the link runs the other way, `customers.user_id`, exactly what // Customer::ensureUser() writes when it attaches a portal login. $customer = Customer::factory()->create(); $user = User::factory()->create(['email' => 'beides@clupilot.test']); DB::table('customers')->where('id', $customer->id)->update(['user_id' => $user->id]); DB::table('model_has_roles')->insert([ 'role_id' => DB::table('roles')->where('name', 'Owner')->value('id'), 'model_type' => User::class, 'model_id' => $user->id, ]); // Aborting is the point: silently deleting would take billing data with it. try { (require base_path('database/migrations/2026_07_29_100000_move_rbac_to_operator_guard.php'))->up(); $this->fail('The migration should have refused.'); } catch (RuntimeException $e) { expect($e->getMessage())->toContain('beides@clupilot.test'); } }); it('preflights every customer conflict before mutating anything, listing all of them at once', function () { // The customer-conflict check used to live only inside removeUserRow(), // reached after permissions, roles, ownership ids and the four // OWNED_COLUMNS constraints had already moved — none of which is // transactional on MariaDB (see the class docblock), so that abort left a // live server's currently-deployed (web-guard) code unable to // authenticate anyone until a human resolved the conflict by hand. Two // conflicting accounts, not one: proves the preflight collects everyone // before refusing, rather than an operator fixing one conflict, running // the migration again, finding the next one, and so on. $ownerRoleId = DB::table('roles')->where('name', 'Owner')->value('id'); $customerA = Customer::factory()->create(); $userA = User::factory()->create(['email' => 'beides-a@clupilot.test']); DB::table('customers')->where('id', $customerA->id)->update(['user_id' => $userA->id]); $customerB = Customer::factory()->create(); $userB = User::factory()->create(['email' => 'beides-b@clupilot.test']); DB::table('customers')->where('id', $customerB->id)->update(['user_id' => $userB->id]); DB::table('model_has_roles')->insert([ ['role_id' => $ownerRoleId, 'model_type' => User::class, 'model_id' => $userA->id], ['role_id' => $ownerRoleId, 'model_type' => User::class, 'model_id' => $userB->id], ]); // Reset to the state up() actually starts from on a real server: nothing // migrated yet. RefreshDatabase already moved these once, so without this // reset "nothing was mutated" would read true no matter what this second // run actually did. DB::table('permissions')->where('guard_name', 'operator')->update(['guard_name' => 'web']); DB::table('roles')->where('guard_name', 'operator')->update(['guard_name' => 'web']); try { (require base_path('database/migrations/2026_07_29_100000_move_rbac_to_operator_guard.php'))->up(); $this->fail('The migration should have refused.'); } catch (RuntimeException $e) { expect($e->getMessage())->toContain('beides-a@clupilot.test') ->and($e->getMessage())->toContain('beides-b@clupilot.test'); } // Nothing mutated: still exactly the pre-migration shape, not "moved and // then rolled back" — there is nothing here to roll back on a real // server, which is the whole reason this has to be checked up front. expect(Permission::where('guard_name', 'web')->count())->toBe(17) ->and(Permission::where('guard_name', 'operator')->count())->toBe(0) ->and(Role::where('guard_name', 'web')->count())->toBe(6) ->and(Role::where('guard_name', 'operator')->count())->toBe(0) ->and(DB::table('users')->where('id', $userA->id)->exists())->toBeTrue() ->and(DB::table('users')->where('id', $userB->id)->exists())->toBeTrue() ->and(Operator::where('email', 'beides-a@clupilot.test')->exists())->toBeFalse() ->and(Operator::where('email', 'beides-b@clupilot.test')->exists())->toBeFalse(); }); it('remaps vpn_peers and maintenance_windows ownership to the new operator, not just the role tables', function () { // Simulates the live server this was written for: an operator with a VPN // peer per device and at least one scheduled maintenance window. Both // columns are foreign keys into `users` that have only ever held an // operator's id — proving they end up on the new operators.id, and not // null, is the only test that actually exercises the live case; a fresh // database has no rows in either table for the migration to get wrong. // // A throwaway operator goes first, purely to consume operators.id=1: the // in-memory test database restarts both the users and operators id // sequences near 1 every test, so without this, netzwerk@clupilot.test's // users.id and its own new operators.id would coincide — and a remap // that was skipped entirely would still leave user_id/created_by // "correct" by coincidence rather than by the migration doing its job. // (Caught this exact way, by mutation: the first version of this test had // no such guard and stayed green with the remap commented out.) Operator::factory()->create(); // consumes operators.id — see the comment above. $hash = bcrypt('netzwerk-passwort'); DB::table('users')->insert([ 'name' => 'Netzwerk-Owner', 'email' => 'netzwerk@clupilot.test', 'password' => $hash, 'is_admin' => true, 'created_at' => now(), 'updated_at' => now(), ]); $userId = DB::table('users')->where('email', 'netzwerk@clupilot.test')->value('id'); DB::table('model_has_roles')->insert([ 'role_id' => DB::table('roles')->where('name', 'Owner')->value('id'), 'model_type' => User::class, 'model_id' => $userId, ]); // RefreshDatabase already migrated once, so vpn_peers.user_id/created_by // and maintenance_windows.created_by are already constrained against // `operators` — the very thing this migration is supposed to arrange. // Hand-building the LEGACY shape (a users.id sitting in those columns) // means briefly turning that constraint off, exactly as it would have // been before this migration ever ran on a real server. Not // Schema::disableForeignKeyConstraints() — SQLite's `PRAGMA foreign_keys` // is a documented no-op while a transaction is open, and RefreshDatabase // always has one open. `defer_foreign_keys` is the pragma meant for // exactly this: it can be toggled mid-transaction and only checks at // commit — which this test's wrapping transaction never reaches. DB::statement('PRAGMA defer_foreign_keys = ON'); DB::table('vpn_peers')->insert([ 'uuid' => (string) Str::uuid(), 'name' => 'Notebook', 'kind' => 'staff', 'user_id' => $userId, 'created_by' => $userId, 'public_key' => 'PUBKEYAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=', 'allowed_ip' => '10.66.0.199', 'enabled' => true, 'present' => false, 'created_at' => now(), 'updated_at' => now(), ]); DB::table('maintenance_windows')->insert([ 'uuid' => (string) Str::uuid(), 'title' => 'Netz-Wartung', 'starts_at' => now()->addDay(), 'ends_at' => now()->addDay()->addHours(2), 'state' => 'draft', 'created_by' => $userId, 'created_at' => now(), 'updated_at' => now(), ]); (require base_path('database/migrations/2026_07_29_100000_move_rbac_to_operator_guard.php'))->up(); $operatorId = Operator::where('email', 'netzwerk@clupilot.test')->value('id'); expect($operatorId)->not->toBeNull() // The decoy operator above is what makes this a real assertion: it // took operators.id 1, so netzwerk's own operator cannot be 1 too — // the id genuinely has to have changed, not merely be numerically // unchanged by coincidence. ->and($operatorId)->not->toBe($userId); $peer = DB::table('vpn_peers')->where('name', 'Notebook')->first(); expect($peer->user_id)->not->toBeNull()->and($peer->user_id)->toBe($operatorId) ->and($peer->created_by)->not->toBeNull()->and($peer->created_by)->toBe($operatorId); $window = DB::table('maintenance_windows')->where('title', 'Netz-Wartung')->first(); expect($window->created_by)->not->toBeNull()->and($window->created_by)->toBe($operatorId); }); it('finishes the move on a second run after a customer conflict is resolved by hand, instead of quietly no-opping', function () { // Reproduces the exact live-server sequence this migration's own docblock // promises: run 1 aborts on the customer conflict (by design), the // operator resolves it by hand exactly as the exception says to, and a // second run of the SAME migration is expected to actually finish the // job — not silently succeed while leaving every `users` row it was // supposed to remove still sitting there. // // Before the fix, operatorUserIds() drove BOTH which `users` rows to // carry across AND which to delete. carryAcross() repoints // model_has_roles to Operator for EVERY operator in the first loop, // before a single deletion is attempted — so by the time run 2 starts, // model_has_roles has nothing left with model_type=User, the removal // loop iterates zero times, and `migrate` marks the migration applied // with BOTH users rows still there: a live portal login for an operator, // on their operator password. $ownerRoleId = DB::table('roles')->where('name', 'Owner')->value('id'); // Given the smaller users.id so it is the first one removeUserRow() // reaches once the worklist is ordered (see the ordering test below) — // matching the live repro, where the conflicted operator's removal // aborted before ANY other operator's users row was touched. $conflictedId = DB::table('users')->insertGetId([ 'name' => 'Beides', 'email' => 'beides@clupilot.test', 'password' => bcrypt('beides-passwort'), 'is_admin' => true, 'created_at' => now(), 'updated_at' => now(), ]); $plainId = DB::table('users')->insertGetId([ 'name' => 'Nur-Operator', 'email' => 'nur-operator@clupilot.test', 'password' => bcrypt('nur-operator-passwort'), 'is_admin' => true, 'created_at' => now(), 'updated_at' => now(), ]); DB::table('model_has_roles')->insert([ ['role_id' => $ownerRoleId, 'model_type' => User::class, 'model_id' => $conflictedId], ['role_id' => $ownerRoleId, 'model_type' => User::class, 'model_id' => $plainId], ]); $customer = Customer::factory()->create(); DB::table('customers')->where('id', $customer->id)->update(['user_id' => $conflictedId]); // Run 1: aborts on the conflict, exactly as designed. try { (require base_path('database/migrations/2026_07_29_100000_move_rbac_to_operator_guard.php'))->up(); $this->fail('The migration should have refused.'); } catch (RuntimeException $e) { expect($e->getMessage())->toContain('beides@clupilot.test'); } // Both survive run 1 — including the operator who was never in // conflict, which is the bug this test guards against. expect(DB::table('users')->where('id', $conflictedId)->exists())->toBeTrue() ->and(DB::table('users')->where('id', $plainId)->exists())->toBeTrue(); // Resolved by hand, exactly as the exception instructs. DB::table('customers')->where('id', $customer->id)->update(['user_id' => null]); // Run 2 must not silently no-op: it has to actually finish the move. (require base_path('database/migrations/2026_07_29_100000_move_rbac_to_operator_guard.php'))->up(); expect(DB::table('users')->where('id', $conflictedId)->exists())->toBeFalse() ->and(DB::table('users')->where('id', $plainId)->exists())->toBeFalse(); $beides = Operator::where('email', 'beides@clupilot.test')->first(); $nurOperator = Operator::where('email', 'nur-operator@clupilot.test')->first(); expect($beides)->not->toBeNull()->and($beides->hasRole('Owner'))->toBeTrue() ->and($nurOperator)->not->toBeNull()->and($nurOperator->hasRole('Owner'))->toBeTrue(); // The exact failure mode this bug allowed: a leftover `users` row that // Auth::guard('web') would still accept, on the operator's own password. expect(Auth::guard('web')->attempt(['email' => 'beides@clupilot.test', 'password' => 'beides-passwort']))->toBeFalse(); }); it('orders operatorUserIds so a remapped operators.id cannot collide with an unprocessed users.id', function () { // The consequence of an unordered worklist (I3): a later operator's // freshly assigned operators.id can equal an earlier operator's // still-unprocessed users.id, and the second UPDATE ... WHERE user_id = X // then catches a row the first one already rewrote — one operator // silently inherits another operator's VPN peer, and // VpnPeerPolicy::downloadConfig is owner-only, so it would hand over // someone else's private key. // // Not testable end-to-end on SQLite: `model_has_roles` carries a // covering index on (model_id, model_type), and the query this migration // runs — WHERE model_type = ? — is satisfied entirely from that index // regardless of insertion order or of whether ->orderBy('model_id') is // present in the code. SQLite always hands back ascending model_id // "by luck", exactly as the finding says MariaDB does normally; MariaDB // only reveals the bug when forced onto its PRIMARY index instead. So // this asserts the one thing that actually distinguishes the fix on this // engine: the SQL sent to the database carries an explicit ORDER BY. $migration = require base_path('database/migrations/2026_07_29_100000_move_rbac_to_operator_guard.php'); $queries = []; DB::listen(function ($query) use (&$queries) { $queries[] = $query->sql; }); (new ReflectionMethod($migration, 'operatorUserIds'))->invoke($migration); $worklistQueries = array_values(array_filter( $queries, fn (string $sql) => str_contains($sql, 'model_has_roles') && str_starts_with(strtolower($sql), 'select'), )); expect($worklistQueries)->not->toBeEmpty(); expect(strtolower(end($worklistQueries)))->toContain('order by'); }); it('restores direct permissions on rollback, not only role-granted ones', function () { // The forward move carries BOTH model_has_roles and model_has_permissions // (carryAcross() above) — down() only restored the first, so an operator // holding a permission directly (never through any role) silently lost it // on a rollback. $operator = Operator::factory()->role('Read-only')->create(); // 'hosts.manage' is not part of Read-only's set (see the seed migration's // matrix) — granted directly, so this is only present because of the // direct grant, not because of the role. $operator->givePermissionTo('hosts.manage'); (require base_path('database/migrations/2026_07_29_100000_move_rbac_to_operator_guard.php'))->down(); $userId = DB::table('users')->where('email', $operator->email)->value('id'); $permissionId = DB::table('permissions')->where('name', 'hosts.manage')->value('id'); expect($userId)->not->toBeNull() ->and(DB::table('model_has_permissions') ->where('model_type', User::class)->where('model_id', $userId) ->where('permission_id', $permissionId) ->exists())->toBeTrue(); }); it('survives a deep rollback and re-migrate without fatal-ing on a stale User role reference', function () { // seed_roles_and_permissions used to bootstrap legacy is_admin users into // the Owner role via User::OPERATOR_ROLES / hasAnyRole() / assignRole() // — all three gone from User now (see R21; Operator::OPERATOR_ROLES is // the current home for the constant). Harmless on an ordinary `migrate` // (that loop only ever ran historically, back when User still had them) // and on a fresh install (no is_admin users exist yet at that point in // the migration order) — but move_rbac_to_operator_guard's own down() // recreates `users` rows with is_admin => true, so a deep rollback // through both migrations followed by `migrate` used to fatal on the // very first is_admin row it found. $rbacMove = require base_path('database/migrations/2026_07_29_100000_move_rbac_to_operator_guard.php'); $seedRoles = require base_path('database/migrations/2026_07_25_133900_seed_roles_and_permissions.php'); Operator::factory()->role('Owner')->create(); $rbacMove->down(); // recreates a `users` row with is_admin => true $seedRoles->down(); // deletes the roles/permissions this migration owns $seedRoles->up(); // must not fatal on the stale reference expect(DB::table('roles')->where('name', 'Owner')->where('guard_name', 'web')->exists())->toBeTrue(); });