<?php

use App\Support\AdminArea;
use Illuminate\Foundation\Application;
use Illuminate\Foundation\Configuration\Exceptions;
use Illuminate\Foundation\Configuration\Middleware;
use Illuminate\Http\Request;

return Application::configure(basePath: dirname(__DIR__))
    ->withRouting(
        web: __DIR__.'/../routes/web.php',
        commands: __DIR__.'/../routes/console.php',
        channels: __DIR__.'/../routes/channels.php',
        health: '/up',
    )
    ->withMiddleware(function (Middleware $middleware): void {
        $middleware->alias([
            'admin' => \App\Http\Middleware\EnsureAdmin::class,
            'admin.host' => \App\Http\Middleware\RestrictAdminHost::class,
            'customer.active' => \App\Http\Middleware\EnsureCustomerActive::class,
            'operator.2fa' => \App\Http\Middleware\RequireOperatorTwoFactor::class,
        ]);

        // Runs before the whole route stack (incl. `auth`), so /admin on a public
        // hostname 404s instead of redirecting to /login and thereby revealing
        // that an operator console is hosted here. Self-scoped to /admin*.
        $middleware->prependToGroup('web', \App\Http\Middleware\RestrictAdminHost::class);

        // And WHO may reach it, by network address — the VPN plus whatever the
        // owner has listed in the console. The host guard above cannot answer
        // that question: a Host header is chosen by the caller.
        $middleware->prependToGroup('web', \App\Http\Middleware\RestrictConsoleNetwork::class);

        // Runs after the host guard: the console must stay reachable even while
        // the public site is switched off.
        $middleware->appendToGroup('web', \App\Http\Middleware\PublicSiteGate::class);

        // TLS is terminated by the reverse proxy (Zoraxy on the private LAN), so
        // without this Laravel sees plain http and builds http:// URLs into an
        // https page — every asset and redirect breaks as mixed content.
        //
        // X_FORWARDED_HOST is deliberately NOT trusted: the console is gated on
        // the request host (ADMIN_HOSTS), and trusting that header would let
        // anyone reach /admin through a public domain by sending
        // "X-Forwarded-Host: admin.…". Zoraxy passes the real Host through, so
        // nothing needs it.
        $middleware->trustProxies(
            at: ['10.0.0.0/8', '172.16.0.0/12', '192.168.0.0/16', '127.0.0.1'],
            headers: Request::HEADER_X_FORWARDED_FOR
                | Request::HEADER_X_FORWARDED_PORT
                | Request::HEADER_X_FORWARDED_PROTO,
        );

        // Stripe posts server-to-server with its own signature (no CSRF token).
        $middleware->validateCsrfTokens(except: ['webhooks/stripe']);

        // ApplicationBuilder::withMiddleware() defaults this to
        // fn () => route('login') BEFORE this callback ever runs — always the
        // PORTAL's Fortify page, regardless of which side of the site the
        // guest was actually turned away from. In non-exclusive (shared)
        // mode that sends a guest bounced off /admin to a sign-in form whose
        // table holds no operators; exclusive mode happened to self-correct
        // only because RestrictAdminHost 404s the wrong host before this
        // ever ran. Fixed for both modes at once, rather than relying on
        // which one a given deployment happens to run: ask AdminArea, which
        // both routes/web.php's own registration and RestrictAdminHost
        // already treat as the one source of truth for "is this the
        // console".
        $middleware->redirectGuestsTo(
            fn (Request $request) => AdminArea::isConsole($request) ? route('admin.login') : route('login'),
        );
    })
    ->withExceptions(function (Exceptions $exceptions): void {
        $exceptions->shouldRenderJsonWhen(
            fn (Request $request) => $request->is('api/*'),
        );
    })->create();