a58faf3f85
tests / pest (push) Successful in 8m56s
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tests / assets (push) Successful in 20s
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tests / release (push) Successful in 4s
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Changing a key meant a shell, a file edit and a cache rebuild — and the person who owns the Stripe account is not necessarily the person who owns the server. Two gates, not one. The capability decides who may open the page; every operator has console.view, and that must not mean "can read the payment key". The password decides whether this SESSION may see or change anything, because the realistic threat is not a stranger but an unlocked machine, and a session is exactly what that hands over. Both are re-checked server-side on every action — a Livewire action is reachable by anyone who can post to /livewire/update. The value is stored encrypted under a key of its own, SECRETS_KEY, and the vault refuses to work without it rather than falling back to APP_KEY: rotating APP_KEY is ordinary maintenance and would otherwise destroy every stored credential, discovered when Stripe stops answering. It is read where it is used, not overlaid onto config at boot — an overlay adds a query to every request including the public site, and leaves queue workers holding whatever was true when they started. It is never shown again, only outlined, and never enters a Livewire property that would carry it to the browser and back in the snapshot. A registry, not an env editor: a form that can set any environment variable is a privilege-escalation primitive, and one bad value bricks the installation with no way back through that same form. The test button is the part that matters. It reports which Stripe account the key belongs to, whether it is LIVE or test — the most expensive mistake here is pasting one where the other belongs, and both look identical in a form — and which webhook endpoints exist with the events each subscribes to. A key can be perfectly valid while the endpoint listens for the wrong five events, and nothing fails until a payment goes unrecorded. The webhook signing secret deliberately stays in .env. It is read on every incoming payment event; in the database, a database problem becomes silently failing signature checks. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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| confirm-delete-datacenter.blade.php | ||
| confirm-delete-plan-draft.blade.php | ||
| confirm-delete-vpn-peer.blade.php | ||
| confirm-remove-host.blade.php | ||
| customers.blade.php | ||
| datacenters.blade.php | ||
| edit-datacenter.blade.php | ||
| host-create.blade.php | ||
| host-detail.blade.php | ||
| hosts.blade.php | ||
| instance-admin-access.blade.php | ||
| instances.blade.php | ||
| maintenance.blade.php | ||
| overview.blade.php | ||
| plan-versions.blade.php | ||
| plans.blade.php | ||
| provisioning.blade.php | ||
| revenue.blade.php | ||
| secrets.blade.php | ||
| settings.blade.php | ||
| vpn-config-access.blade.php | ||
| vpn.blade.php | ||