f8874f32ea
tests / pest (push) Failing after 8m1s
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tests / assets (push) Successful in 20s
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tests / release (push) Has been skipped
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── The zone ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── A fresh install now addresses customer instances under clupilot.cloud rather than clupilot.com. Not branding: a Nextcloud is third-party software that strangers sign in to, and on the same registrable domain as the portal it shares cookie scope, document.domain and CAA with it. The same reason googleusercontent.com and vercel.app exist. Existing installations keep whatever the console says — the zone has been a setting all along. `clupilot:check-zone <zone>` reports what a change would touch before anything is touched: the DNS records, the monitoring targets, the certificates and Nextcloud's trusted_domains all carry the old name and the setting reaches none of them. With no instances in service it says so and stops. Changing it later is a migration with an outage, and the command says that too. ── Which addresses are ours ──────────────────────────────────────────────── A new public page at /sicherheit: the domains that belong to us, the rule for reading an address bar, what we never do, and — the part that matters — what to do if you have already typed your password into a copy of our sign-in form. Change it, end every other session, change it wherever else you use it, tell us. In that order. Reachable without an account, deliberately: somebody who has just given their password away is signed in nowhere, and the page they need cannot be behind the thing they lost. Linked from the three places a person is when the question comes up: every mail footer (the mail is the vector), the sign-in form (this is the page a phishing kit copies, so the real one says which host you are on), and the site footer. The domain list is DERIVED from configuration and keyed by what each domain is for. A list typed into a page would eventually tell a customer that a phishing domain is one of ours, or that one of ours is not — the same two-sources-of-truth failure that had the price sheet promising an address on a domain the company does not own. The operator console is deliberately absent from it: naming it on a public page tells an attacker where to aim. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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| .. | ||
| admin.php | ||
| admin_incidents.php | ||
| admin_settings.php | ||
| auth.php | ||
| backups.php | ||
| billing.php | ||
| cloud.php | ||
| coming_soon.php | ||
| common.php | ||
| dashboard.php | ||
| datacenters.php | ||
| devices.php | ||
| domain.php | ||
| errors.php | ||
| finance.php | ||
| hosts.php | ||
| impersonate.php | ||
| instances.php | ||
| integrations.php | ||
| invoice.php | ||
| invoice_mail.php | ||
| invoices.php | ||
| invoices_admin.php | ||
| mail.php | ||
| mail_settings.php | ||
| maintenance.php | ||
| orders.php | ||
| plans.php | ||
| provisioning.php | ||
| secrets.php | ||
| security.php | ||
| sessions.php | ||
| settings.php | ||
| status.php | ||
| support.php | ||
| two_factor_setup.php | ||
| updating.php | ||
| users.php | ||
| verify_email.php | ||
| vpn.php | ||