fix(security): constant-time password-reset (flatten account-enumeration timing)

Queues the reset-link notification so sendResetLink returns in constant time regardless
of account existence; resetPassword does equivalent dummy verify work for unknown/no-2FA
users. Closes the timing side-channels flagged on the forgot-password review.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
feat/v1-foundation
boban 2026-06-15 19:16:07 +02:00
parent 9035078ac0
commit 217189598b
6 changed files with 216 additions and 6 deletions

View File

@ -11,10 +11,17 @@ use Illuminate\Validation\Rules\Password;
use Illuminate\Validation\ValidationException; use Illuminate\Validation\ValidationException;
use Livewire\Attributes\Layout; use Livewire\Attributes\Layout;
use Livewire\Component; use Livewire\Component;
use PragmaRX\Google2FAQRCode\Google2FA;
#[Layout('layouts.auth')] #[Layout('layouts.auth')]
class ForgotPassword extends Component class ForgotPassword extends Component
{ {
/** Fixed throwaway base32 secret for the dummy TOTP verify on the no-user/no-2FA branch. */
private const DUMMY_TOTP_SECRET = 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOP';
/** Fixed throwaway bcrypt hash (cost 12) for the dummy password comparison on that branch. */
private const DUMMY_PASSWORD_HASH = '$2y$12$d9GooWgw17GrZ703OLFEDuuCXPvJs0vc/YLflA2JA70Mm6.I.3f.W';
public string $email = ''; public string $email = '';
public string $code = ''; public string $code = '';
@ -40,7 +47,15 @@ class ForgotPassword extends Component
} }
$this->validate(['email' => ['required', 'email']]); $this->validate(['email' => ['required', 'email']]);
// The notification is queued (see User::sendPasswordResetNotification), so this only ever
// pushes a job — no synchronous SMTP. Swallow any transport/queue error so that neither
// latency nor an exception can distinguish a known address from an unknown one.
try {
\Illuminate\Support\Facades\Password::sendResetLink(['email' => $this->email]); \Illuminate\Support\Facades\Password::sendResetLink(['email' => $this->email]);
} catch (\Throwable) {
// Intentionally ignored — the response is identical regardless (auth.reset_link_sent).
}
// Generic — never reveal whether the email exists. // Generic — never reveal whether the email exists.
$this->dispatch('notify', message: __('auth.reset_link_sent')); $this->dispatch('notify', message: __('auth.reset_link_sent'));
@ -64,9 +79,15 @@ class ForgotPassword extends Component
$user = User::where('email', $this->email)->first(); $user = User::where('email', $this->email)->first();
$ok = $user if ($user && $user->hasTwoFactorEnabled()) {
&& $user->hasTwoFactorEnabled() $ok = $user->verifyTotp($this->code) || $user->useRecoveryCode($this->code);
&& ($user->verifyTotp($this->code) || $user->useRecoveryCode($this->code)); } else {
// No account, or one without 2FA: run equivalent dummy crypto so this branch costs
// about as much as a real wrong-code attempt — the verification path must not be a
// timing oracle that distinguishes a known address.
$this->burnVerificationTime();
$ok = false;
}
if (! $ok) { if (! $ok) {
RateLimiter::hit($key, 60); RateLimiter::hit($key, 60);
@ -95,6 +116,24 @@ class ForgotPassword extends Component
return $this->redirect(route('login'), navigate: true); return $this->redirect(route('login'), navigate: true);
} }
/**
* Constant dummy verification for the no-account / no-2FA branch: mirrors the crypto work a
* real wrong-code attempt does (a Google2FA HMAC verify + a bcrypt comparison) so response
* time can't be used to enumerate accounts. The results are deliberately discarded.
*/
private function burnVerificationTime(): void
{
// Stand-in for User::verifyTotp() — a throwaway HMAC against a fixed dummy secret.
try {
(new Google2FA)->verifyKey(self::DUMMY_TOTP_SECRET, preg_replace('/\s+/', '', $this->code) ?? '');
} catch (\Throwable) {
// ignore — verifyTotp swallows the same failure
}
// Stand-in for the recovery-code path's cost — a bcrypt compare against a fixed hash.
Hash::check($this->code, self::DUMMY_PASSWORD_HASH);
}
public function render() public function render()
{ {
return view('livewire.auth.forgot-password')->title(__('auth.title_forgot')); return view('livewire.auth.forgot-password')->title(__('auth.title_forgot'));

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@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
namespace App\Models; namespace App\Models;
use App\Notifications\QueuedResetPassword;
use Database\Factories\UserFactory; use Database\Factories\UserFactory;
use Illuminate\Database\Eloquent\Attributes\Fillable; use Illuminate\Database\Eloquent\Attributes\Fillable;
use Illuminate\Database\Eloquent\Attributes\Hidden; use Illuminate\Database\Eloquent\Attributes\Hidden;
@ -134,6 +135,16 @@ class User extends Authenticatable
} }
} }
/**
* Always queue the reset-password mail (never send synchronously), so the request that
* triggers it returns in constant time whether or not the address exists see
* {@see QueuedResetPassword} and ForgotPassword::sendResetLink().
*/
public function sendPasswordResetNotification(#[\SensitiveParameter] $token): void
{
$this->notify(new QueuedResetPassword($token));
}
public function webauthnCredentials(): HasMany public function webauthnCredentials(): HasMany
{ {
return $this->hasMany(WebauthnCredential::class); return $this->hasMany(WebauthnCredential::class);

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@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
<?php
namespace App\Notifications;
use App\Livewire\Auth\ForgotPassword;
use Illuminate\Auth\Notifications\ResetPassword;
use Illuminate\Bus\Queueable;
use Illuminate\Contracts\Queue\ShouldQueue;
/**
* Queued variant of the framework reset-password notification.
*
* Sending the mail asynchronously keeps {@see ForgotPassword::sendResetLink()}
* constant-time regardless of whether the address belongs to a real account closing the
* SMTP-latency account-enumeration side channel (the mail is only ever pushed onto the queue,
* never delivered synchronously inside the request).
*/
class QueuedResetPassword extends ResetPassword implements ShouldQueue
{
use Queueable;
}

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@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ namespace Tests\Feature;
use App\Livewire\Auth\ForgotPassword; use App\Livewire\Auth\ForgotPassword;
use App\Livewire\Auth\ResetPassword; use App\Livewire\Auth\ResetPassword;
use App\Models\User; use App\Models\User;
use Illuminate\Auth\Notifications\ResetPassword as ResetPasswordNotification; use App\Notifications\QueuedResetPassword as ResetPasswordNotification;
use Illuminate\Foundation\Testing\RefreshDatabase; use Illuminate\Foundation\Testing\RefreshDatabase;
use Illuminate\Support\Facades\Hash; use Illuminate\Support\Facades\Hash;
use Illuminate\Support\Facades\Notification; use Illuminate\Support\Facades\Notification;

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@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ namespace Tests\Feature;
use App\Livewire\Auth\ForgotPassword; use App\Livewire\Auth\ForgotPassword;
use App\Livewire\Settings\Security; use App\Livewire\Settings\Security;
use App\Models\User; use App\Models\User;
use Illuminate\Auth\Notifications\ResetPassword as ResetPasswordNotification; use App\Notifications\QueuedResetPassword as ResetPasswordNotification;
use Illuminate\Foundation\Testing\RefreshDatabase; use Illuminate\Foundation\Testing\RefreshDatabase;
use Illuminate\Support\Facades\Hash; use Illuminate\Support\Facades\Hash;
use Illuminate\Support\Facades\Notification; use Illuminate\Support\Facades\Notification;

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@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
<?php
namespace Tests\Feature;
use App\Livewire\Auth\ForgotPassword;
use App\Models\User;
use App\Notifications\QueuedResetPassword;
use Illuminate\Contracts\Queue\ShouldQueue;
use Illuminate\Foundation\Testing\RefreshDatabase;
use Illuminate\Support\Facades\Hash;
use Illuminate\Support\Facades\Notification;
use Illuminate\Support\Facades\RateLimiter;
use Livewire\Features\SupportTesting\Testable;
use Livewire\Livewire;
use PragmaRX\Google2FAQRCode\Google2FA;
use Tests\TestCase;
/**
* Hardening of the two low-severity account-enumeration *timing* side channels on the
* forgot-password screen (the message-level leak is already closed via generic copy):
* (a) sendResetLink() must enqueue the reset mail (never send synchronously), so SMTP
* latency/exceptions can't distinguish a known address;
* (b) resetPassword() must spend comparable crypto time whether the account exists / has
* 2FA or not, so the verification branch isn't a timing oracle.
* These tests assert the *structural* equivalence of the branches (and that mail is queued),
* not wall-clock timing (which would be flaky).
*/
class ForgotPasswordTimingTest extends TestCase
{
use RefreshDatabase;
private function twoFactorUser(string $email = 'admin@clusev.local'): User
{
return User::factory()->create([
'email' => $email,
'two_factor_secret' => (new Google2FA)->generateSecretKey(),
'two_factor_confirmed_at' => now(),
]);
}
private function attemptReset(string $email, string $code = '123456'): Testable
{
return Livewire::test(ForgotPassword::class)
->set('email', $email)->set('code', $code)
->set('password', 'NewPassw0rd123')->set('password_confirmation', 'NewPassw0rd123')
->call('resetPassword');
}
// ── (a) the reset-link mail is queued ────────────────────────────────
public function test_reset_link_notification_is_queued(): void
{
config(['mail.default' => 'smtp']);
Notification::fake();
$user = User::factory()->create(['email' => 'admin@clusev.local']);
Livewire::test(ForgotPassword::class)
->set('email', $user->email)
->call('sendResetLink')
->assertHasNoErrors();
Notification::assertSentTo(
$user,
QueuedResetPassword::class,
fn ($notification) => $notification instanceof ShouldQueue,
);
}
public function test_send_link_swallows_transport_errors_and_stays_generic(): void
{
config(['mail.default' => 'smtp']);
// No user exists → Password::sendResetLink hits the INVALID_USER path; the screen must
// still report the generic message with no error, exactly like the existing-user case.
Livewire::test(ForgotPassword::class)
->set('email', 'ghost@clusev.local')
->call('sendResetLink')
->assertHasNoErrors()
->assertDispatched('notify', message: __('auth.reset_link_sent'));
}
// ── (b) the verification branch does constant dummy work ─────────────
public function test_unknown_email_invalid_branch_burns_verification_time(): void
{
Hash::spy();
$this->attemptReset('ghost@clusev.local')->assertHasErrors('code');
// The no-account branch must still run a bcrypt comparison (dummy work), matching the
// crypto cost of a real wrong-code attempt — otherwise it returns measurably faster.
Hash::shouldHaveReceived('check')->atLeast()->once();
}
public function test_no_2fa_user_invalid_branch_burns_verification_time(): void
{
$user = User::factory()->create(['email' => 'plain@clusev.local']);
$this->assertFalse($user->hasTwoFactorEnabled());
Hash::spy();
$this->attemptReset('plain@clusev.local')->assertHasErrors('code');
Hash::shouldHaveReceived('check')->atLeast()->once();
}
public function test_two_factor_user_wrong_code_does_not_burn_dummy_time(): void
{
// The real-verification branch uses verifyTotp/useRecoveryCode, NOT the dummy Hash::check.
$this->twoFactorUser();
Hash::spy();
$this->attemptReset('admin@clusev.local', '000000')->assertHasErrors('code');
Hash::shouldNotHaveReceived('check');
}
// ── structural equivalence of the invalid branches ──────────────────
public function test_missing_and_no_2fa_branches_are_structurally_identical(): void
{
User::factory()->create(['email' => 'real@clusev.local']);
$missing = $this->attemptReset('ghost@clusev.local');
$no2fa = $this->attemptReset('real@clusev.local');
foreach ([$missing, $no2fa] as $component) {
$component->assertHasErrors('code');
$component->assertNoRedirect();
}
}
public function test_unknown_email_hits_the_rate_limiter_like_a_real_account(): void
{
RateLimiter::spy();
$this->attemptReset('ghost@clusev.local')->assertHasErrors('code');
// The no-account path must increment the limiter exactly like a real account would —
// no fast, un-throttled enumeration loop.
RateLimiter::shouldHaveReceived('hit')->atLeast()->once();
}
}