Metric history: the per-minute sampler (clusev:sample-metrics) now reads
cpu/mem/disk from the `servers` DB row — the same source the live gauges read,
shared via MariaDB — instead of a cross-container Redis cache the poller may
not share in prod. It gates on last_seen_at freshness (skip offline/unpolled)
and keeps `load` as a best-effort cache read. History now fills whenever the
gauges have data, independent of the cache driver or container split — the
prod detail page no longer shows "Noch keine Verlaufsdaten" after hours.
Service-action failures are persisted: a failed systemctl start/stop/restart
writes a red service.<op>.failed AuditEvent with the FULL systemctl reason in
meta['output'] (mb_scrub-ed, 4000-cap), shown expandable in the audit log — a
truncated, ephemeral toast is no longer the only trace. The failure toast is a
short pointer to the audit log, level=error, and error toasts now linger 9s.
Alert delivery: a warning banner appears on the alerts page when NO channel
would reach anyone (no SMTP + no safe webhook + no Gotify). A new Gotify push
channel (server URL + encrypted app token) posts title/message/priority with
the token in X-Gotify-Key; a self-hosted LAN Gotify is allowed (scheme-checked,
not private-range-blocked like the SSRF-guarded webhooks) — a real push when a
service goes down, no e-mail needed.
Secret-retarget hardening (Codex-found class): changing a target while leaving
its secret blank could send the OLD secret to the NEW endpoint. Closed for the
Gotify token, the SMTP password (save + test-send + the runtime mailer), and
the host-terminal SSH credential (username/port change) — each drops/forbids
the stale secret before the new target is stored. Setting::uncached() reads the
security-sensitive keys DB-direct so a cache-repopulation race can't re-pair an
old secret with a new target. Three Codex rounds, clean; 778 tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Docker container display names drop the compose replica suffix ("clusev-app-1"
-> "clusev-app") in the host page and per-server tab; the real name/id still
drives every action/log call and shows on hover. The logs modal title now
shows the display name instead of the raw hex id.
Dashboard chart: the x-axis label row moves outside the relative chart wrapper
so the y-rail spans only the plot -> the "0" tick lands on the bottom gridline
instead of colliding with "-15 Min", and the 75/50/25 ticks align to their
gridlines.
Uptime + Certificates empty states become a centered icon-chip stack
(matching the threats/audit pattern) instead of a centered title with a
left-anchored hint.
Server-detail tab strip: overflow-y-hidden so the -mb-px overhang can no
longer make it scroll vertically; only the x-axis scrolls.
App-wide badge/button height sweep: x-badge gains a size prop (md = h-8) so
status chips that sit beside h-8 pills/buttons line up (SSH auth-type chip,
WireGuard SSH-lock, settings role). x-btn gains a "field" size (h-9, no coarse
min-h-11 bump) for form-row submit buttons that must match their h-9 input on
every device (audit/system/health/certs/groups/webauthn/commands). Topbar
Ctrl-K + language switch pinned to h-8; the triplicated pagination prev/next
buttons switched from py-sizing to h-11/lg:h-7 to match the page-number
buttons in the same row.
Codex-reviewed (one finding: h-9 class override lost to the coarse min-h-11
on touch -> fixed with the dedicated "field" size). 761 tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Prod metrics poller: docker-compose.prod.yml gains a `metrics` service
(clusev:poll-metrics --interval=15). The poller previously existed only in the
dev supervisor config, so on a customer install no process ever promoted a
server out of 'pending' (Initialisierung) or refreshed CPU/MEM — fresh
installs sat at 0% forever. The service inherits the hardened *image anchor.
Installer output: new run_logged() helper routes noisy steps (apt, docker
build/pull, compose up, migrate, caches) into install.log at the repo root —
TTY gets a spinner + "ok" lines, non-TTY gets start/ok lines, failures tail
the last 40 log lines and abort. Secret-bearing steps (APP_KEY, admin
password) deliberately stay out of the log. update.sh shares the same log via
CLUSEV_INSTALL_LOG and redirects git pull/verify-commit detail into it. The
log is initialized symlink-safely (mktemp + atomic rename -T) because the
repo root belongs to the unprivileged clusev user after install (Codex
finding); /install.log is gitignored so updates never conflict.
Server switcher: an empty fleet now renders an explanatory empty state with a
role-gated "Server hinzufügen" CTA instead of an empty dropdown panel.
Servers/groups headers: the raw <a> buttons (unconditional min-h-11) are
replaced with x-btn, aligning them with the h-8 accent button + status pill.
Firewall panel: the rules box is hidden for ANY inactive firewall (previously
only firewalld — an inactive ufw showed a misleading rules table via `ufw
show added`), with a tool-agnostic hint + Aktivieren action; the add-rule
trigger is gated on active. hardeningApplied now performs an in-place
security re-read (OS profile + hardening + firewall + fail2ban) instead of a
full-page skeleton reload, with a wire:loading cue and toggles disabled while
it runs — the state can no longer be re-toggled against stale data.
SshKeyProvision drops its redundant hardeningApplied (credentialChanged
already full-reloads).
Hardening modal: failure output limit 200 → 400 so the 202-char root-lockout
guard message renders unclipped; the root-login description now states that
PermitRootLogin no blocks both password and key logins.
Command palette: chords g o (Verfügbarkeit) + g b (Bedrohungen).
Codex-reviewed (one finding: symlink-following log init — fixed + re-verified
clean). 760 tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two findings from the Codex review of the host-Docker changes:
1. Under-gated host target (security). Listing/actioning/log-reading the
CLUSEV HOST's containers only required `operate`, but the host is the
control-plane machine — a `Stop` on clusev-mariadb takes Clusev down —
and the host TERMINAL is already `manage-fleet`-only. Align it:
- effectiveTarget() resolves to the host only for manage-fleet users;
everyone else is pinned to a fleet server (no host default, no toggle).
- action()/viewLogs() and the ContainerLogs host sentinel (serverId 0)
now abort_unless manage-fleet.
A viewer/operator can no longer reach the host, even by forcing
target=host.
2. HostCredential::toServer() dropped a key passphrase equal to the string
"0" via a falsy `if ($this->passphrase)` check, which would break key
auth. Use an explicit null/'' check.
Added tests: non-admin never targets the host, a forced target=host still
hits a fleet server, operator cannot open host logs. 751 tests green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Docker page only ever targeted fleet servers, so an operator whose
containers run ON the Clusev host itself (the clusev stack + anything
else on that machine) saw nothing — the page has "nothing to do with
the fleet" from their point of view. It now has a target switch:
• Clusev host (default when a host SSH login exists) — lists the
containers on the machine Clusev runs on, reached over the local
Docker gateway with the existing encrypted HostCredential, the same
login the host terminal uses.
• the active fleet server — the previous behaviour, still available.
Mechanics:
- HostCredential::toServer() builds a TRANSIENT Server (never persisted)
carrying the host login; DockerService/FleetService run unchanged
against it. The logs modal resolves serverId 0 to this host server.
- VerifiesHostKey only pins (writes ssh_host_key) for persisted fleet
servers now; a transient host connection no longer spawns a junk
fleet row on every request. The host is the local gateway — no
network path to MITM — so skipping the pin there is safe.
- The `app` service (dev + prod compose) gains the
host.docker.internal:host-gateway mapping the terminal sidecar already
had, so the PHP layer can reach the host's sshd. Without it the app
container cannot resolve the host at all — the real reason host Docker
never worked.
- Absent runtime still renders the clean "not installed" state; a
host target with no login yet shows a setup hint.
Verified end-to-end in a browser: the page defaults to the host and
lists the full running stack (clusev-app/mariadb/redis/… + others) with
Logs/Restart/Stop actions. 748 tests green (5 new host-target tests).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Manage the containers running ON a fleet server, agentlessly — the integrated Portainer.
List containers + state, view logs, start/stop/restart, all via `docker` over SSH.
- DockerService (over FleetService::runPrivileged → base64 transport, shell-injection-safe):
containers() parses `docker ps -a --format '{{json .}}'`; containerAction() with an op allow-list
(start|stop|restart|pause|unpause); logs() with a clamped tail; composeStacks() read-only. Every
container ref is validated `^[a-zA-Z0-9][\w.-]*$` before interpolation — blocks shell metacharacters
AND a leading-dash argument injection (mirrors serviceAction). A missing/errored docker → [] (never
throws to the UI).
- Docker\Index page (route /docker, sidebar "Docker" with a new box icon): lazy container list for the
active server, open to any role. Container actions are `operate`-gated (abort_unless per method) and
audited (docker.action). Reading LOGS is also operate-gated (container output can leak secrets —
consistent with gating file CONTENT reads); the list/state stays open. ContainerLogs modal re-gates
the read itself.
- lang/{de,en}/docker.php + audit.php docker.action + shell.nav_docker (de/en parity). No emoji.
Codex hardening applied: logs output is byte-capped (head -c 262144) AND mb_scrub'd before it reaches
a Livewire property (invalid UTF-8 / a huge line can't break the JSON snapshot); the ref regex uses
\A…\z anchors so a trailing newline can't slip past.
16 new tests: service (json parse, empty-on-unavailable, valid-op command, reject unknown-op / shell-
metachars / leading-dash / trailing-newline ref, logs clamp+byte-cap, available probe), component
(viewer browses the list; viewer 403 on action AND on logs open + modal read; operator/admin act +
audited; logs modal tail). 685 tests green, Pint, lang parity, Codex-reviewed (fixes applied).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Confirmed-security quick-wins from a full re-audit (6-agent subsystem fan-out,
Codex-reviewed). Each item ships with a regression test proven to fail pre-fix.
- files: gate file CONTENT reads (download / edit / FileEditor::load) behind the
`operate` ability so a read-only viewer keeps LISTING/browse access but can no
longer pull file bytes over the server credential (root -> /etc/shadow, keys,
.env). Hide the download/edit/delete controls from viewers in the blade, and
basename() Files::open() for parity with the other path builders.
- fail2ban: reject a leading dash/dot in validJail(). A jail name like "-h" or
"--help" was parsed by fail2ban-client as an OPTION (argument-injection) rather
than a positional jail; internal dashes ("nginx-http-auth") still pass.
- bruteforce: release the atomically-claimed ban-audit dedup slot when the
AuditEvent write throws, so a transient DB failure no longer suppresses the
auth.ip_banned audit for the whole 60s window (the ban itself is unaffected).
- update path: verify_update_request now FAILS CLOSED when UPDATE_HMAC_KEY is
unset (was fail-open -> any ./run marker could drive a root update). Pin the
self-update `git pull` to the recorded CLUSEV_BUILD_BRANCH and refuse a diverged
checkout, so a `git checkout` in the tree cannot redirect the next root update.
- wireguard: normalise the DNS input to a single comma list and QUOTE the WG_DNS
assignment in wg.env; an unquoted space previously split the assignment and
broke the next `. "$WG_ENV"`.
13 new regression tests. 614 tests, Pint, shellcheck, Codex review all green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Password rotation is a nudge, not a wall (Install sets must_change_password=true
but EnsureSecurityOnboarded only prompts and is skippable), so calling the
generated credential a "one-time password" wrongly implied forced/single-use
rotation. Renamed the user-facing term everywhere:
- README + lang/{en,de}/accounts.php: "one-time password" / "Einmal-Passwort"
→ "initial password" / "Initialpasswort"; temp_intro "must change on first
sign-in" → "prompted to change" / "sollte … geändert werden".
- Install.php $description: "Standard-Passwort (Zwangswechsel …)" → "zufälligem
Initialpasswort (Wechsel empfohlen, nicht erzwungen)".
- Install.php / CreateUser.php comments aligned.
Kept "one-time backup codes" (2FA codes are single-use) and "shown only once"
(the summary is displayed once).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Operator decision: password strength is the user's own responsibility. Removed the
mixedCase + numbers requirement from every password rule (Password::min(6) is all that
remains), so a plain 6-char password ("abcdef") is accepted. Dropped the
"upper/lowercase + a digit" clause from the hints (de + en).
Verified: a 6-char simple password validates; a 5-char one still rejects (length); full
suite 467 pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Operator decision — 12 was too long; 6 is acceptable and password strength is the user's
own responsibility. Changed Password::min(12) → min(6) in every place that validates a
password (password change, forgot/reset, settings profile, create-user) and updated the
visible hints (de + en). The upper/lowercase + digit complexity is unchanged — only the
minimum length was flagged.
Verified: a 6-char complex password ("Abc123") now validates; too-short and complexity-less
passwords still reject; the password page shows "min. 6"; full suite 467 pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Add-account modal only ever generated a one-time password — there was no way to set
one. Add an optional password field (with a show/hide toggle):
- blank → previous behaviour: a strong one-time password is generated, the account is
flagged must_change_password, and the clear text is revealed once.
- filled → that becomes the user's own login (validated min 12 / mixed case / digit);
must_change_password stays false (no forced rotation) and nothing is revealed.
Browser-verified: the modal shows the password field + hint; both paths covered by tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The "Clusev host" terminal is for the LOCAL machine Clusev runs on. Letting the operator
point it at an arbitrary host/server makes no sense (that is what fleet servers are for)
and the pre-filled host.docker.internal read as a confusing mandatory magic value.
- the host is now FIXED to host.docker.internal server-side (HostShell::HOST), not a form
field; the modal asks only for the login — user + password|key, and the port.
- the rail tile sub-label shows just the login user (the host is implied/local).
Browser-verified: modal has no HOST/IP field (user/port/auth/password only); saving shows
the user on the tile; opening the host reaches the real host sshd (a wrong password yields
an SSH auth error, proving the connection), zero console errors. 16 terminal tests pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The "Clusev host" terminal was a shell inside the sidecar container (node@clusev, no
sudo, not the host). It is now a REAL SSH login into the host machine, like any fleet
server — so it shows the real root@<host> prompt with full rights.
- HostCredential (encrypted singleton) holds the host SSH login; a HostShell modal lets
the operator set host/port/user + password|key. The clear-text secret is never echoed
back; on edit a blank secret keeps the stored one, and switching auth method requires a
fresh secret (no password silently reused as a key).
- open('host') mints a kind=host token only when a login is configured, else opens the
setup modal; the internal resolve endpoint returns a server-shaped SSH spec (decrypted,
internal-net only) for kind=host, or 404 when unconfigured.
- compose: extra_hosts host.docker.internal:host-gateway so the sidecar reaches the host
sshd; Caddy now 404s /_internal/* at the public edge (the sidecar uses app:80 directly).
- rail gains a debounced search box past 5 servers; removed the now-obvious PTY hint line.
Browser-verified (R12): host tile shows "not configured" + gear → modal → SSH login as
root runs commands, zero console errors; search filters; resolve returns the host spec.
15 terminal tests pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The "add SSH key" modal had no name field — keys appeared only by comment +
fingerprint, so additional keys weren't tellable apart. Add a name field; the name
becomes the key's OpenSSH comment (what the server list shows), for both generated
and pasted keys. Sanitised (control chars stripped, whitespace collapsed, capped at
64 chars) so a crafted name cannot inject a second authorized_keys line — proven by
test, on top of addAuthorizedKey()'s own whitespace-collapse + base64 encoding.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Opening a binary / non-UTF-8 file in the file manager threw "undefined is not
valid JSON". The editor bound the raw file bytes to its public $content
property; Livewire JSON-encodes the component snapshot, and invalid UTF-8 makes
PHP's json_encode return false, so the client received an empty response and
JSON.parse("undefined") failed (the trace in mergeNewSnapshot/deepClone).
Fixed at both layers: FleetService::readFile blanks the content when it detects
binary/non-UTF-8 (returns the binary flag instead), and FileEditor::load only
binds content for non-binary, non-oversize files. Binary/oversize files show
their existing notice; the snapshot is always valid UTF-8.
Tests: load blanks binary content (keeps the snapshot valid) and keeps valid
text content. 374 pass, Pint clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The 2fa.codes_fresh reveal flag is now a timestamp (set at enrollment) and
RecoveryCodes::mount() only reveals within [now-600s, now], symmetric to the
download-grant window. A reveal flag whose modal never opened can no longer
re-reveal the codes later in the session. FirstFactorCodesTest asserts the
flag is an int.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two hardening features completed in parallel (each with its own spec + tests),
sharing call sites (TwoFactorSetup, WebauthnKeys, routes) so committed together:
- ConfirmAction token hardening: destructive confirm flows now carry a server-issued,
single-use, signed token (App\Support\Confirm\ConfirmToken) instead of trusting a
client-mutable event/params/auditTarget. Every #[On] apply handler consumes + validates
the token (forged/replayed/direct-bypass calls no-op). Server-scoped per action; closes
the codebase-wide confirm-bypass + audit-forgery vector across Security, Sessions, Users,
WebauthnKeys, Servers\Show, Services, System, Files.
- Backup-code airtight reveal: codes are revealed via a transient channel, not a persisted
Livewire property, so a captured/replayed snapshot can't re-render them; the recovery
download is grant-gated.
Full suite green (162).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Stored recovery codes were re-viewable two ways after their one-time
reveal. Both paths are now closed so codes are only viewable/downloadable
right after a fresh generation (enrollment or regenerate).
HOLE 1 — RecoveryCodes::$revealed was a mutable public Livewire prop, so
a crafted /livewire/update could flip it to true and make render() emit
stored codes. Annotated with #[Locked]; Livewire now rejects any
client-side write (set still happens server-side in mount()/regenerate()).
HOLE 2 — two-factor.recovery.download was auth-gated only, so any authed
user could GET it anytime to re-download stored codes. Added a one-time
session grant (2fa.download_grant) put alongside the existing
2fa.codes_fresh wherever codes are freshly generated (TwoFactorSetup,
WebauthnKeys, RecoveryCodes::regenerate); the route now
abort_unless(pull(grant), 403) before streaming — one download per fresh
generation, later direct hits 403.
Tests: lock rejection + download-grant lifecycle (forbidden → granted ok
→ consumed forbidden). Full suite 137 passed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Backup (recovery) codes must be viewable ONLY at the moment they are
generated — at first-factor enrollment or on regenerate — and NEVER
re-viewable afterward from "Backup-Codes verwalten".
- Modals\RecoveryCodes: add server-gated $revealed. mount() pulls a
one-time session flag (2fa.codes_fresh); regenerate() sets it. render()
emits codes ONLY when revealed, so a client cannot tamper a flag to
re-view stored codes.
- View: revealed state shows codes grid + download + warning + close;
hidden state shows a security notice + Neu erzeugen + close (no codes,
no download).
- TwoFactorSetup::confirm() and WebauthnKeys::register() put
2fa.codes_fresh on first-factor code generation (put, survives the
redirect + later openModal request).
- Add recovery_hidden_notice (DE/EN parity).
- Tests: manage view hides codes; fresh flag reveals once; regenerate
reveals the new set; first-factor paths set the flag.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The "Gesperrte IPs ansehen" modal did its SSH Fail2banService::status read
in mount(), so clicking the trigger blocked for seconds with no spinner
before the modal appeared.
Split mount() into an instant mount() (stores serverId only) plus a
load() method fired by wire:init, mirroring Services\Index. While
! $loaded the view renders a 4-row skeleton inside the max-h-96 scroll
container; once loaded it renders the real jail/IP list (or empty/error).
The unban flow still re-reads via loadJails() and dispatches
fail2banChanged, keeping #[Locked] $serverId and the audit intact.
Adds Fail2banBansModalTest covering the instant mount (status never
called), load() rendering the list, read-error surfacing, and both
unban success (audit + refresh + dispatch) and failure paths.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Opening an image now renders it (SFTP base64 data-URI, 5 MB cap, save disabled for
images) instead of the text editor. Recovery-codes modal buttons realigned + the
close button relabeled 'Schließen' (it only closes). All modal textareas resize-none.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The fail2ban-Status panel listed every jail + banned IP inline (very long). Now a
compact summary + 'Gesperrte IPs ansehen' opens a scrollable modal (Fail2banBans)
that reuses Fail2banService::status/unban and dispatches fail2banChanged. serverId
is #[Locked].
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
CreateServer now probes the entered SSH login inside the create transaction; a
failed probe throws and rolls back (no half-registered server), surfacing the
SSH reason on the form. Successful creation starts the server as `pending`
("Initialisierung") instead of red/offline until first contact promotes it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Addresses "ich sehe nicht welche IPs gebannt sind / entsperren / whitelist". The
server-detail page gains a "fail2ban-Status" panel.
New Fail2banService (owns all fail2ban I/O):
- status(): jails with currently/total failed+banned + the banned IP list, plus the
whitelist; sentinel-guarded, and a CLIENT_OK marker so an active service whose
fail2ban-client query fails is reported as a read error, not "0 jails".
- unban() (idempotent: "not banned" = success), manual ban() GUARDED against loopback
(whole 127.0.0.0/8 + ::1) and Clusev's own SSH source (canonical inet_pton compare).
- readConfig()/writeTuning()/writeIgnoreip(): tuning and whitelist live in SEPARATE
zz- drop-ins and each writes only its own keys, so a whitelist change can never
rewrite the ban policy (and vice-versa). The legacy single-file zz-clusev.local is
removed on tuning save (migration). ignoreip is preserved VERBATIM (hostnames/CIDRs,
continuation lines) — loopback always re-seeded; add/remove report no-ops so the
audit only records real changes.
UI: jails + banned IPs each with "Entsperren" (direct, audited), whitelist editor
(add/remove, audited), "IP sperren" via an R5 modal (modals.fail2ban-ban). Jail/IP
args are Js::from()-encoded (remote-sourced, injection-safe). Direct handlers catch
SSH failures. Tuning modal migrated to Fail2banService.writeTuning.
MaintenanceService slimmed to package updates only (fail2ban moved out).
Pint clean; Codex review clean (IPv6 guard, verbatim ignoreip, decoupled drop-ins,
legacy migration, read-error detection all hardened); R12 — server-detail HTTP 200,
0 console errors, fail2ban panel + jail + whitelist render.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The server-detail page gains a "Firewall-Regeln" panel — addressing "ich kann nur
aktivieren, sonst nichts": list rules, add, and delete, with hard SSH-lockout guards.
FirewallService:
- status(): one privileged read — installed/active, default policies, and the rule
list. ufw rules come from `ufw show added` (add-syntax, works active OR inactive),
defaults from /etc/default/ufw; a CLUSEV_FWREAD_OK sentinel + a "Status:" check
distinguish a real read from a failed/empty one.
- addRule(): validated action/proto/port/from (proto before `from`, ufw grammar);
refuses deny/reject on the SSH port or portless (would block all inbound).
- deleteRule(): whitelists the spec against rules ufw actually reported (injection-
proof — a forged spec can't match), deletes by spec (race-free, no rule number),
guards SSH-port allow rules incl. ranges and trailing comments, distinguishes
not_found from a real deletion so the audit only records true deletions.
firewalld is READ-ONLY this release: status() reads the runtime state of every active
zone (ports/services/rich rules, zone-attributed), rule mutation is refused with a
German note. on/off + hardening (Phase A) still work.
UI: x-panel with default-policy badges, "+ Regel" (modal modals.firewall-rule), per-
rule delete via R5 ConfirmAction (audit deferred to the real outcome), graceful
read-error / not-installed / inactive / firewalld-read-only states.
Fix: the firewall row's tone variable was renamed $tone -> $ruleTone — the page-level
$tone is a closure used by the gauges/Volumes panel; reusing the name clobbered it and
500'd the page below the firewall block. R12 now confirms the full loaded page.
Default-policy EDITING was intentionally not exposed (highest lockout risk).
Pint clean; Codex review clean; R12 — server-detail HTTP 200, 0 console errors,
firewall panel + rules + volumes all render.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Foundation so Clusev no longer assumes Debian/apt/ufw/systemd. A host's OS is
resolved once (cached) and every package/firewall/service decision asks it.
New app/Support/Os/:
- OsProfile — family + package manager + firewall tool + service manager, plus
supports(feature) returning NULL or a German reason (graceful degradation).
- OsDetector — one unprivileged probe (/etc/os-release + `command -v` with sbin on
PATH + which firewall is RUNNING); family from ID/ID_LIKE cross-checked against
installed binaries; cached 1h (60s when nothing detected). Readability-guards the
`.` source so a host without /etc/os-release still falls back by package manager.
- PackageManager — apt/dnf/zypper command strings (pending count, apply, install,
is-installed); zypper exit 102/103 normalized to success.
- FirewallTool — ufw + firewalld enable/disable. firewalld opens ssh/80/443 in the
PERMANENT config BEFORE the daemon starts filtering (handles running + stopped),
preserving the no-lockout guard for custom SSH ports.
Integration:
- FirewallService enable/disable now OS-aware (ufw or firewalld) with a support gate.
- MaintenanceService: hasApt -> updateSupport(); pendingUpdates() + applyUpgrades()
across managers (dnf check-update exit 100 handled).
- HardeningService: state()/commandFor() per-OS (dpkg vs rpm, ufw vs firewalld, apt
periodic vs dnf-automatic; yum-only hosts gate auto-updates). Each row carries
supported/reason; unsupported features render muted with a German note instead of
a toggle. apply() refuses unsupported features gracefully.
- Server-Details surfaces the detected System / package manager / firewall.
- SystemUpdate modal + view: OS-neutral copy; audit action system.package_upgrade.
Arch (pacman) & Alpine (apk/OpenRC) are detected and gracefully disabled where
unsupported. Debian/ufw/systemd path verified behaviourally identical on the live
fleet. Pint clean; Codex review clean (fixed firewalld lockout + os-release guard +
yum/dual-firewall/zypper edge cases); R12 — 9 routes 200, 0 console errors.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Operator feedback: no way to add servers; irrelevant storage-internals text; fail2ban
only on/off; raw shell commands shown; no apt update/upgrade.
- Add server: CreateServer modal (name, IP/host, SSH port, user, password|key, optional
label) on the Servers index → creates server + encrypted credential ATOMICALLY (DB
transaction). Strict IP/hostname validation (filter_var + hostname; rejects 999.x, ':').
- System updates (Debian/Ubuntu only): MaintenanceService + SystemUpdate modal — shows the
pending-update count (or "unbekannt" when undeterminable) and runs apt update && upgrade
as root; gated to apt hosts.
- fail2ban configuration: Fail2banConfig modal — Sperrdauer / Max. Fehlversuche / Zeitfenster,
written to a Clusev-owned jail.d drop-in (zz-clusev.local, last-wins; never touches the
operator's jail.local/jails). Durations kept verbatim in fail2ban's native grammar
(600, 10m, 1h 30m, -1). Reads the EFFECTIVE [DEFAULT] across files; refuses to save when the
current policy couldn't be read (no overwrite with unseen defaults); reloads fail2ban only
when already active (never starts it).
- Modals: removed the raw "Befehle (als root)" preview + raw stdout dumps from the hardening
modal — clean German description + result only.
- System page: dropped the .env/Datenbank storage-internals callout (irrelevant to the user).
R15 — Codex gate: `codex review --uncommitted` run iteratively; fixed every finding across 9
rounds (fail2ban jail clobbering, section/precedence, composite/-1 durations, reload-starting-
inactive, read-failure propagation, glob exit code, apt-count failure, atomic server create,
IP validation) until clean — 0 security issues throughout. Live-verified on 10.10.90.162;
R12: Servers/Detail/System 200 / 0 console errors, modals open, hardening modal shows no commands.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Rework the server-hardening UX per operator feedback ("only activate, can't
deactivate or adjust, UFW won't even activate, is the existing state read?").
- Bidirectional toggles: each item (SSH root-login, SSH password-login, fail2ban,
UFW, unattended-upgrades) is a clean Aktivieren/Deaktivieren toggle driven by the
live feature state, not a one-shot "Anwenden".
- Real state read (HardeningService::state, privileged): SSH from `sshd -T` (the
EFFECTIVE config — honours Include order + Match blocks), UFW from `ufw status`,
unattended from `apt-config dump` (effective periodic value), packages via dpkg —
so nicht-installiert / inaktiv / aktiv are detected; a feature counts as "secure"
only when installed AND active.
- UFW activation installs ufw if missing (fixes "ufw: not found"); opens the detected
sshd port + 80/443 before `ufw --force enable`; adds disable().
- SSH drop-in renamed 00-clusev.conf (sorts + wins first); apt periodic written to a
last-winning 99zz-clusev file. Long timeout for apt installs.
- preview() returns the EXACT command apply() runs (single source — no drift between
the confirmation preview and the executed mutation). Password-disable lock-out guard
intact (refused when Clusev uses password auth or no key exists).
R15 — Codex review gate: `codex review --uncommitted` run iteratively; fixed every
finding across 5 rounds (drop-in precedence, apt periodic config, preview/apply drift,
ufw status detection, privileged-read error handling, stale-config secure state) until
"no actionable regressions". 0 security issues throughout.
Live-verified on 10.10.90.162: state via sshd -T (effective), fail2ban + unattended
toggled on/off both ways, ufw installed + state reflects, lock-out guard refuses
disabling password auth. R12: server detail 200 / 0 console errors, toggles render.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Security pivot — make server hardening, SSH access, firewall, dashboard domain/TLS
and the release channel controllable from the dashboard (no SSH needed), with guards
so a remote change can never lock the operator out.
Foundation
- ssh_credentials gains name + disabled_at + last_used_at; CredentialVault refuses a
disabled credential. New key/value Setting model. FleetService::runPrivileged() /
runPlain() — central sudo-aware exec (base64-wrapped sh -c), live-verified as root.
A · control-plane self-hardening
- SecurityHeaders middleware: env-aware CSP (allows the Vite dev origin in dev, strict
same-origin in prod), X-Frame-Options DENY, nosniff, Referrer/Permissions-Policy,
HSTS when secure. 2FA brute-force throttle (5/60s). install.sh sets
SESSION_SAME_SITE=strict + EXPIRE_ON_CLOSE + SECURE_COOKIE (only behind TLS).
B · SSH credential management
- name/label on the access; a credential card on the server page with Bearbeiten /
Sperren-Entsperren (kill-switch) / Löschen (R5), all audited.
C · server hardening from the dashboard (guards + confirmation)
- HardeningService (PermitRootLogin no, PasswordAuthentication no, fail2ban,
unattended-upgrades) + FirewallService (UFW). HardeningAction modal previews the
exact root commands before applying. GUARDS: refuse to disable password-login when
Clusev itself logs in by password or no key exists; UFW opens the real sshd port +
80/443 before enabling. Live-verified non-destructively (previews, the password
guard refusing, ufw status read).
D+E · System page (/system)
- Dashboard Domain + Let's-Encrypt email (Setting) -> DeploymentService renders the
matching Caddy site block (honest: stages the file + shows the reload command, never
fakes TLS). Release channel (stable|beta|dev) configurable; Versions reads it.
Built largely by 4 parallel agents into disjoint files; shared files integrated + the
security-critical bits hardened by hand (the password-auth lock-out guard + env-aware CSP).
Verified (R12): /system + server detail + all 8 routes 200 / 0 console errors (CSP does
not break Livewire/Alpine/Vite); credential card + 5 hardening "Anwenden" buttons render;
the hardening modal opens with the command preview; System persists domain/channel +
renders valid Caddy config; runPrivileged runs as root + the vault refuses disabled creds.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Full feedback round — all browser-verified (R12: 7 routes 200, zero console errors)
and functionally tested live against the target host.
- Metrics are real AND honest: poller now stores cpu/mem/DISK/LOAD history (all
four sparklines real, not synthetic); KPIs show absolute context (Memory
"1,9 / 7,8 GB", Disk "13 / 80 GB", Load "4 Kerne"); tiles are status-coloured
and Load is rated against core count (so "yellow" actually means load≈0.7-1.0×
cores), not a fixed warning tint.
- File manager is functional: Hochladen (Livewire upload -> SFTP put), Download
(SFTP get -> streamed), and view/edit (new FileEditor modal: SFTP get, binary/
size guards, SFTP put on save + audit). File names + Bearbeiten open the editor.
- Settings redesigned (/frontend-design): account identity header + section nav
(Profil / Sicherheit) instead of flat stacked panels.
- Routes are English (R13): /einstellungen -> /settings; rule added to rules.md +
CLAUDE.md. Dummy data removed: the topbar "Flotte online / Uptime 42d" + dead
bell button are gone, replaced by a real "<online>/<total> online" pill.
New: app/Livewire/Modals/FileEditor + view; FleetService get/read/write/upload +
Sftp putFromFile/size.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Round of UX work from user feedback (browser-verified per R12 — all routes 200,
zero console errors).
- Server-Details redesign (/frontend-design): hero header band (status-tinted
server glyph + name + meta strip + actions), a full-width row of dense vital
cards (ring + label + absolute used/total) instead of 3 donuts floating in a
height-stretched panel, hardening checklist with status-colored accent borders,
and a clear section hierarchy (vitals → specs+security → volumes+net → keys).
- New user Settings page (/einstellungen): profile (name/email), password change
(current-password gated), 2FA status + enable link / disable (confirm + audit).
Sidebar "Konto" nav group + clickable user block.
- SSH key generation: "Neues Paar generieren" in the add-key modal makes an
ed25519 keypair (phpseclib) — public key installed on save, private shown once.
- Services list is height-capped + scrollable so the Journal below is reachable.
- <x-btn> now also renders <a> (href) for link-buttons.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The modal panel rendered *behind* its own backdrop (it "appeared then vanished"):
Tailwind v4 no longer turns `transform` into a stacking context, so the static
panel sat under the fixed/blurred backdrop. Fixed with `relative z-10` on the
panel (interactively verified by force-opening the modal).
- New <x-btn> component: one compact, consistent style (h-8 text-xs) with
variants (primary/accent/secondary/danger/ghost/ghost-danger). Replaced every
ad-hoc action button — modals, service start/stop/restart, file row actions +
upload, server-details (Zugang/Dateien/key add+remove). No more oversized,
inconsistent buttons.
- New EditCredential form modal + "Zugang" button on Server-Details: deposit or
update a server's SSH login (e.g. root) — this is where the privileged
credential for systemctl/journal gets stored (encrypted vault). Changing it
re-pulls the snapshot with the new login.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Make the panel actually operate the server, not just display it — for everything
that works in the SSH user's own space (no sudo required).
- FleetService: addAuthorizedKey (append, dedup, perms-safe via base64 transport),
removeAuthorizedKey (by SHA256 fingerprint, preserves every other key — never
rewrites blindly, no lockout), sshKeys (reload), deleteFile (SFTP unlink).
- AddSshKey form modal: paste a public key -> appended over SSH + AuditEvent +
list reload. Wired to the "Schlüssel hinzufügen" button on Server-Details.
- Server-Details: key removal now performs the real SSH removal then reloads;
new "Dateien" button opens the file manager scoped to this server.
- Files: delete performs the real SFTP unlink then reloads the directory.
Verified live: add+remove of a throwaway key leaves the existing key intact;
real file delete confirmed gone. systemctl start/stop/restart still need a
privileged credential (the demo account has no passwordless sudo).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add a generic ConfirmAction modal (LivewireUI\Modal\ModalComponent). On confirm
it persists exactly one AuditEvent and re-dispatches a page event so the origin
applies its own state change — domain-agnostic and reused everywhere (R5).
Wired the destructive actions, each writing an audit row:
- Services: start/stop/restart -> confirm + audit; service state reflects result
- Files: delete -> confirm + audit; entry removed
- Server-Details: revoke SSH key (new per-row trash button) -> confirm + audit
(carries server_id)
Supporting changes:
- Publish + restyle the modal container for the dark theme (void backdrop +
surface panel + shadow-pop instead of the package's gray/white defaults)
- Toaster island in the app layout that catches the `notify` browser event
- Add alert/power/rotate/trash icons to x-icon
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
boban