Commit Graph

3 Commits (05f8ce49b48d42548a2d73b39ab0b2ad39739912)

Author SHA1 Message Date
boban 05f8ce49b4 feat: add-server, apt updates, fail2ban config; clean modals; drop storage internals
Operator feedback: no way to add servers; irrelevant storage-internals text; fail2ban
only on/off; raw shell commands shown; no apt update/upgrade.

- Add server: CreateServer modal (name, IP/host, SSH port, user, password|key, optional
  label) on the Servers index → creates server + encrypted credential ATOMICALLY (DB
  transaction). Strict IP/hostname validation (filter_var + hostname; rejects 999.x, ':').
- System updates (Debian/Ubuntu only): MaintenanceService + SystemUpdate modal — shows the
  pending-update count (or "unbekannt" when undeterminable) and runs apt update && upgrade
  as root; gated to apt hosts.
- fail2ban configuration: Fail2banConfig modal — Sperrdauer / Max. Fehlversuche / Zeitfenster,
  written to a Clusev-owned jail.d drop-in (zz-clusev.local, last-wins; never touches the
  operator's jail.local/jails). Durations kept verbatim in fail2ban's native grammar
  (600, 10m, 1h 30m, -1). Reads the EFFECTIVE [DEFAULT] across files; refuses to save when the
  current policy couldn't be read (no overwrite with unseen defaults); reloads fail2ban only
  when already active (never starts it).
- Modals: removed the raw "Befehle (als root)" preview + raw stdout dumps from the hardening
  modal — clean German description + result only.
- System page: dropped the .env/Datenbank storage-internals callout (irrelevant to the user).

R15 — Codex gate: `codex review --uncommitted` run iteratively; fixed every finding across 9
rounds (fail2ban jail clobbering, section/precedence, composite/-1 durations, reload-starting-
inactive, read-failure propagation, glob exit code, apt-count failure, atomic server create,
IP validation) until clean — 0 security issues throughout. Live-verified on 10.10.90.162;
R12: Servers/Detail/System 200 / 0 console errors, modals open, hardening modal shows no commands.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-13 12:19:55 +02:00
boban 3fc2edf4fc feat(hardening): bidirectional on/off toggles, real state read, UFW install, Codex-clean
Rework the server-hardening UX per operator feedback ("only activate, can't
deactivate or adjust, UFW won't even activate, is the existing state read?").

- Bidirectional toggles: each item (SSH root-login, SSH password-login, fail2ban,
  UFW, unattended-upgrades) is a clean Aktivieren/Deaktivieren toggle driven by the
  live feature state, not a one-shot "Anwenden".
- Real state read (HardeningService::state, privileged): SSH from `sshd -T` (the
  EFFECTIVE config — honours Include order + Match blocks), UFW from `ufw status`,
  unattended from `apt-config dump` (effective periodic value), packages via dpkg —
  so nicht-installiert / inaktiv / aktiv are detected; a feature counts as "secure"
  only when installed AND active.
- UFW activation installs ufw if missing (fixes "ufw: not found"); opens the detected
  sshd port + 80/443 before `ufw --force enable`; adds disable().
- SSH drop-in renamed 00-clusev.conf (sorts + wins first); apt periodic written to a
  last-winning 99zz-clusev file. Long timeout for apt installs.
- preview() returns the EXACT command apply() runs (single source — no drift between
  the confirmation preview and the executed mutation). Password-disable lock-out guard
  intact (refused when Clusev uses password auth or no key exists).

R15 — Codex review gate: `codex review --uncommitted` run iteratively; fixed every
finding across 5 rounds (drop-in precedence, apt periodic config, preview/apply drift,
ufw status detection, privileged-read error handling, stale-config secure state) until
"no actionable regressions". 0 security issues throughout.

Live-verified on 10.10.90.162: state via sshd -T (effective), fail2ban + unattended
toggled on/off both ways, ufw installed + state reflects, lock-out guard refuses
disabling password auth. R12: server detail 200 / 0 console errors, toggles render.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-13 03:52:53 +02:00
boban a64bd39c6c feat(security): dashboard hardening, credential mgmt, system domain/TLS + channel, self-hardening
Security pivot — make server hardening, SSH access, firewall, dashboard domain/TLS
and the release channel controllable from the dashboard (no SSH needed), with guards
so a remote change can never lock the operator out.

Foundation
- ssh_credentials gains name + disabled_at + last_used_at; CredentialVault refuses a
  disabled credential. New key/value Setting model. FleetService::runPrivileged() /
  runPlain() — central sudo-aware exec (base64-wrapped sh -c), live-verified as root.

A · control-plane self-hardening
- SecurityHeaders middleware: env-aware CSP (allows the Vite dev origin in dev, strict
  same-origin in prod), X-Frame-Options DENY, nosniff, Referrer/Permissions-Policy,
  HSTS when secure. 2FA brute-force throttle (5/60s). install.sh sets
  SESSION_SAME_SITE=strict + EXPIRE_ON_CLOSE + SECURE_COOKIE (only behind TLS).

B · SSH credential management
- name/label on the access; a credential card on the server page with Bearbeiten /
  Sperren-Entsperren (kill-switch) / Löschen (R5), all audited.

C · server hardening from the dashboard (guards + confirmation)
- HardeningService (PermitRootLogin no, PasswordAuthentication no, fail2ban,
  unattended-upgrades) + FirewallService (UFW). HardeningAction modal previews the
  exact root commands before applying. GUARDS: refuse to disable password-login when
  Clusev itself logs in by password or no key exists; UFW opens the real sshd port +
  80/443 before enabling. Live-verified non-destructively (previews, the password
  guard refusing, ufw status read).

D+E · System page (/system)
- Dashboard Domain + Let's-Encrypt email (Setting) -> DeploymentService renders the
  matching Caddy site block (honest: stages the file + shows the reload command, never
  fakes TLS). Release channel (stable|beta|dev) configurable; Versions reads it.

Built largely by 4 parallel agents into disjoint files; shared files integrated + the
security-critical bits hardened by hand (the password-auth lock-out guard + env-aware CSP).

Verified (R12): /system + server detail + all 8 routes 200 / 0 console errors (CSP does
not break Livewire/Alpine/Vite); credential card + 5 hardening "Anwenden" buttons render;
the hardening modal opens with the command preview; System persists domain/channel +
renders valid Caddy config; runPrivileged runs as root + the vault refuses disabled creds.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-13 02:25:23 +02:00