Follow-up hardening on top of 2171895 (which v0.9.2 shipped). That first pass
introduced a cost-12 bcrypt dummy that was *slower* than the real verify path —
a reverse timing oracle plus CPU-DoS amplification. Replace it with work that
mirrors the real path instead of exceeding it, and close the remaining query /
exception asymmetries:
- resetPassword(): resolve 2FA with a uniform lookup — always exactly one
webauthn-existence query (even for a TOTP user, and for a missing account) so
its presence/absence can't tell accounts apart. Every path now does one users
lookup + one webauthn query + one Google2FA HMAC + one locked recovery-code
transaction (real data when present, throwaway data otherwise).
- Split burnVerificationTime() into dummyTotpVerify() (HMAC) and
dummyRecoveryLookup() (locked SELECT in a transaction); drop the bcrypt
Hash::check entirely. A webauthn-only account spends an equivalent throwaway
HMAC so its crypto cost matches a TOTP account.
- dummyRecoveryLookup() no longer catches DB errors: a DB failure must surface
identically to the real useRecoveryCode(), else an outage is an error-response
oracle (generic for unknown, 500 for a real account).
- sendResetLink(): report() the swallowed Throwable so a broken queue/token
store is detectable instead of silently "succeeding" for every address.
Tests: ForgotPasswordTimingTest now asserts an identical (users,
webauthn_credentials) query fingerprint across TOTP, no-2FA, webauthn-only, and
unknown-email branches, plus queued-mail and rate-limiter parity. Codex re-review
verdict: clean (residual sub-microsecond crypto differences are below the
network/DB noise floor for this self-hosted single-admin threat model).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Queues the reset-link notification so sendResetLink returns in constant time regardless
of account existence; resetPassword does equivalent dummy verify work for unknown/no-2FA
users. Closes the timing side-channels flagged on the forgot-password review.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Guard the TOTP verifyKey call behind hasTotp() so a key-only user's null
two_factor_secret never reaches Google2FA::verifyKey(); they reset via a
backup code. Also adds the reset_no_2fa_note lang key (EN + DE) rendered
on the forgot-password form explaining the no-2FA recovery options.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Address Codex security review:
- ForgotPassword + clusev:reset-admin now rotate remember_token, so a stolen
remember-me cookie cannot survive a password reset (the email-token path
already did this).
- useRecoveryCode reads/checks/removes under a row lock (DB transaction +
lockForUpdate), so two concurrent requests can't both spend the same one-time
code (replay).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
ForgotPassword gains sendResetLink() + a ResetPassword component at
/reset-password/{token} using Laravel's password broker. The email option is
shown only when mail.default is a real mailer (hidden while MAIL_MAILER=log), so
it activates automatically once SMTP is configured. Tested with Notification::fake.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
"Passwort vergessen?" on login -> a reset view that proves identity with a TOTP
or one-time backup code (no email needed), then sets a new password under the
min(12) mixedCase numbers policy. Rate-limited, generic messages (no account
enumeration), audited.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
boban