Commit Graph

4 Commits (265136fc42c49fe17273616332b4f297a24b098b)

Author SHA1 Message Date
boban c914790a46 harden honeypot/ban path: close evasions, unmask & audit-DoS vectors
Security re-audit + adversarial red-team of the honeypot deception and
brute-force ban layer. Fixes (all with regression tests):

HoneypotController::trap
- BAN EVASION: keyed ban off getRealMethod() not isMethod('post') — the
  latter honors _method / X-HTTP-Method-Override, so a POST spoofed as PUT
  dodged the ban entirely. Now any non-safe verb to a decoy bans.
- REFLECTED-BAN vs EVASION: removed the Origin-based skip; the Origin header
  is attacker-controlled, so it was a trivial universal ban-evasion (send a
  foreign Origin) worse than the narrow griefing it prevented.
- UNMASK/500: mb_scrub all attacker-controlled meta (ua/query/path/creds) so
  invalid UTF-8 can't throw JsonEncodingException on the array-cast column.
- Ban now runs FIRST and independently of the audit (separate guarded
  try/catch) so a failing audit can never skip the ban; deceive() always 200.
- AUDIT DoS: per-IP hourly cap via atomic Cache::add(0)+increment.

DetectHoneytoken::trip
- Same guarded ban-first / audit-second structure + per-IP audit cap
  (bounds an exempt or rotating source) + mb_scrub on the path.

BruteforceGuard::banNow
- Dedup the auth.ip_banned audit per IP+reason on a 60s window (was
  full bantime): collapses the scanner flood without masking a legitimate
  re-ban after an operator unban, and still audits distinct reasons.

Supply-chain / release / dashboard
- Pin prod base images (caddy/mariadb/redis) by @sha256 digest.
- Atomic branch+tag push in clusev-release.sh (no orphan untagged commit).
- Route github.ref_name through a validated $TAG env in ci-staging.yml.
- Strip inline credentials from the origin URL in set-repository-url.sh
  (greedy match handles an @ inside the password).
- WireGuard peer name via Js::from in wire:click; settings badge shows the
  real role; Threats pill/top_ip account for honeypot_login attempts.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-05 15:05:35 +02:00
boban 72de7b9a22 fix(rbac,honeypot): gate audit-retention + email sendTest; honeytoken scans JSON body
Re-review (completeness sweep + Codex) found: Audit\Index::saveRetention wrote the global
audit_retention_days policy ungated (a non-admin could shrink retention and prune audit evidence)
-> manage-panel guard + @can-hidden control; Settings\Email::sendTest lacked the role guard that
mount/save already had -> manage-panel; DetectHoneytoken read only form-encoded bodies via post(),
missing a JSON {"api_key":"<canary>"} replay -> now scans json() too (still body-only, no query).
2026-07-05 02:28:13 +02:00
boban e602320c9d fix(rbac,honeypot): gate settings/release surfaces + per-install canaries, no reflected/auth-user honeypot bans
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-05 02:16:37 +02:00
boban c8e1e07a43 feat(honeypot): decoy routes + instant-ban + deceptive responses + honeytokens
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-05 01:25:07 +02:00