Monitor the certificate expiry of configured TLS endpoints (the panel's own domain, fleet
services, anything reachable) and flag the ones due soon — before they lapse.
- CertService::check(host, port) reads the peer certificate NATIVELY via a PHP SSL stream +
openssl_x509_parse — no SSH, no shell, so `host` is never interpolated into a command. Trust is
intentionally NOT verified (verify_peer off): the goal is to report expiry even for a self-signed
or already-expired cert. certInfo() (subject/issuer/expiry/daysLeft) is split out for unit testing
against a generated cert; status() maps daysLeft → ok / warning (<30) / critical (<7) / expired.
- Certs\Index page (route /certs, `operate`-gated: route + mount + per-method). Add/remove endpoints
(host validated as a hostname/IP — rejects scheme/path/shell chars; port 1-65535). Lazy per-endpoint
scan, each guarded. Delete via signed ConfirmToken + R5 modal. Add/delete audited. Internal
endpoints are allowed on purpose (monitoring internal service certs is legitimate; the check only
reads a cert, it POSTs nothing).
- lang/{de,en}/certs.php + audit.php cert.endpoint_* + shell.nav_certs (de/en parity). No emoji.
10 new tests: service (certInfo extracts subject/expiry from a generated cert, status thresholds,
check errors on an unreachable endpoint), component (route gating, add + audit, reject scheme/
metachar host + out-of-range port, scan checks each endpoint, delete via confirmed token). 730 tests
green, Pint, lang parity, self-reviewed. LE issuance is a documented future (needs ACME on the host).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Fleet-wide package-update visibility: pending + SECURITY update counts per server, one-click patch.
Extends MaintenanceService (single-server pending/apply already existed) with the security subset
and a fleet aggregation.
- MaintenanceService::updateCounts(Server) → { pending, security } in ONE round-trip via a new
PackageManager::countsScript() (apt/dnf/zypper). Security is best-effort per family (apt path solid;
dnf/zypper degrade to 0 when the metadata isn't there) and clamped ≤ pending. Either value is null
when the query can't run (shows "unknown", never a misleading 0).
- Patch\Index page (route /patch, `operate`-gated: route + mount + per-method). Lazy per-server scan,
each guarded (an unreachable host → error row). Fleet KPIs (total pending / total security). Applying
upgrades is a stateful action → signed ConfirmToken + R5 modal (modal audits patch.apply from the
sealed token; handler does not re-audit) resolving a client uuid → the sealed server id; a forged
token is a no-op. Reuses the existing applyUpgrades; the result output is mb_scrub'd before it lands
in a Livewire prop.
- countsScript strings are STATIC per manager (no operator input) — no injection surface.
- lang/{de,en}/patch.php + audit.php patch.apply + shell.nav_patch (de/en parity). No emoji.
11 new tests: MaintenanceService (parse pending+security, clamp security≤pending, missing-sentinel /
unsupported-manager → unknown), component (route gating, scan shows counts + survives an unreachable
server, patch opens confirm, applyPatch runs upgrades over the SEALED server, forged token no-op).
720 tests green, Pint, lang parity, self-reviewed (RBAC, ConfirmToken seal, static scripts, scrub).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A per-server hardening SCORE + a fleet scoreboard, so an operator sees at a glance which servers
are hardened. Reuses the (already-reviewed) HardeningService::state gates rather than re-probing;
remediation for a failing check is the existing hardening toggle on the server-details page.
- PostureService::score(Server): aggregates the hardening state into { score 0-100, rating
strong/fair/weak, passed, applicable, checks[] }. Only real security gates count — the neutral
auto-updates preference and OS-unsupported items are excluded, so no server is penalised for a
check it can't run.
- Posture\Index page (route /posture, `operate`-gated: reading a server's posture exposes its gaps).
Lazy wire:init scan of every active-credential server, each guarded — one unreachable host shows an
error row, never blocks the scan. Fleet-average KPI + per-server score/rating + the open gates.
- lang/{de,en}/posture.php + shell.nav_posture (de/en parity). Status via the triad, no emoji.
9 new tests: service (score = passing/applicable ratio, all-secure=strong-100, neutral+unsupported
excluded, all-fail=weak, no-applicable=full), component (route gating viewer 403 / operator ok, scan
scores each server, an unscannable server shows an error row not a crash). 709 tests green, Pint,
lang parity. (No destructive actions / new SSH — a read-only aggregation of Codex-validated hardening
state; self-reviewed for RBAC, scan-loop containment, and blade escaping.)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The multi-server amplifier: run a command (ad-hoc or a saved runbook) across the whole fleet,
a group, or a selection, with a per-server result. Because it is arbitrary remote execution,
authorization + audit are the whole feature.
- The command is intentionally arbitrary; it runs via FleetService::runPlain (the credential's
login user, base64 transport, NO extra sudo) — the same privilege the web terminal already
grants, batched. No injection to prevent; the concern is who may run + that every run is logged.
- CommandRunner.run: per-server runPlain, one server failing never aborts the batch, output
byte-capped (256 KiB) + mb_scrub'd before it reaches a Livewire property.
- Commands\Index page, fully `operate`-gated: route can:operate + mount() + a per-method gate() on
run/runRunbook/execute/createRunbook/confirmDeleteRunbook/deleteRunbook. Every run goes through a
signed single-use ConfirmToken + R5 confirm modal ("run on N servers?"); the modal audits
command.run from the sealed token so execute() does not re-audit. Targets resolve client UUIDs →
ids server-side (withActiveCredential + inGroup + whereIn), and {command, serverIds} is SEALED in
the token — a client can't swap the command or targets after confirm. A forged token is a no-op.
- Runbooks: saved name+command, operate-gated CRUD, delete via ConfirmToken.
- lang/{de,en}/commands.php + audit.php command.run / runbook.* + shell.nav_commands (de/en). No emoji.
15 new tests: CommandRunner (runs each server, one-failing-doesn't-abort, nonzero=not-ok, byte-cap
+scrub), component (route gating, ad-hoc run opens confirm, empty-command / no-target errors, execute
runs the SEALED targets, forged token runs nothing, group scope targets only members, runbook create
+audit + run + delete-via-token). 700 tests green, Pint, lang parity, Codex-reviewed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Manage the containers running ON a fleet server, agentlessly — the integrated Portainer.
List containers + state, view logs, start/stop/restart, all via `docker` over SSH.
- DockerService (over FleetService::runPrivileged → base64 transport, shell-injection-safe):
containers() parses `docker ps -a --format '{{json .}}'`; containerAction() with an op allow-list
(start|stop|restart|pause|unpause); logs() with a clamped tail; composeStacks() read-only. Every
container ref is validated `^[a-zA-Z0-9][\w.-]*$` before interpolation — blocks shell metacharacters
AND a leading-dash argument injection (mirrors serviceAction). A missing/errored docker → [] (never
throws to the UI).
- Docker\Index page (route /docker, sidebar "Docker" with a new box icon): lazy container list for the
active server, open to any role. Container actions are `operate`-gated (abort_unless per method) and
audited (docker.action). Reading LOGS is also operate-gated (container output can leak secrets —
consistent with gating file CONTENT reads); the list/state stays open. ContainerLogs modal re-gates
the read itself.
- lang/{de,en}/docker.php + audit.php docker.action + shell.nav_docker (de/en parity). No emoji.
Codex hardening applied: logs output is byte-capped (head -c 262144) AND mb_scrub'd before it reaches
a Livewire property (invalid UTF-8 / a huge line can't break the JSON snapshot); the ref regex uses
\A…\z anchors so a trailing newline can't slip past.
16 new tests: service (json parse, empty-on-unavailable, valid-op command, reject unknown-op / shell-
metachars / leading-dash / trailing-newline ref, logs clamp+byte-cap, available probe), component
(viewer browses the list; viewer 403 on action AND on logs open + modal read; operator/admin act +
audited; logs modal tail). 685 tests green, Pint, lang parity, Codex-reviewed (fixes applied).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Turns the existing metrics into an ops tool: rules that fire when a server crosses a
threshold and resolve when it recovers, with e-mail + webhook notifications. The event
sink later features (cert-expiry, uptime-down, patch-available, posture-drop) plug into.
- alert_rules (metric cpu|mem|disk|load|offline, comparator gt|lt, threshold, scope
all|group|server) + alert_incidents (firing|resolved, FK cascade).
- AlertEvaluator — per-server state machine: opens ONE firing incident on a fresh breach
(notifies), resolves on recovery (notifies), dedups a sustained breach (one breach = one
alert). Numeric metrics skip a truly-offline server (stale reading); the `offline` rule
fires only on offline, not a reachable "warning".
- AlertNotifier — best-effort e-mail (queued Mailable to configured recipients, falls back
to admin e-mails) + generic webhook JSON POST (Slack/Discord/Mattermost/custom; only http(s)
URLs). Every channel is wrapped so a broken SMTP/unreachable hook is logged, never thrown.
- PollMetrics evaluates after each poll (online, fresh status) and on a failed poll (offline),
each guarded so an alerting error can never kill the poll loop.
- Alerts\Index page, manage-panel (admin): route can:-mw + mount() + per-method gate() on every
mutation. Rule delete via signed ConfirmToken + R5 modal (no double audit). Scope group/server
resolves a client UUID to an id server-side (never trusts a client id). Channels saved to
Settings. Sidebar "Alarme" nav + firing-incident badge (cached 60s).
- lang/{de,en}/alerts.php + audit.php alert.* + shell.nav_alerts (de/en parity). No emoji.
Codex review raised three MEDIUMs, all fixed here:
- Webhook SSRF: strict http(s) scheme + reject hosts resolving to loopback/private/link-local/
reserved ranges (blocks the 169.254.169.254 cloud-metadata classic), validated at save AND send,
redirects disabled — so an admin-configured hook can't be pointed at an internal service.
- Incident dedup is now a DB invariant: a unique `firing_key` ("{rule}:{server}" while firing,
null on resolve) means two concurrent poll ticks can't both open a duplicate incident (the loser
hits a unique violation, caught → no-op).
- `load` is float-safe: threshold + incident value are decimal, compared as floats, so load 1.5 vs
threshold 1 fires (it used to truncate to 1 > 1 = false).
31 new tests: evaluator (fire/resolve/dedup, offline vs warning, scope all/group/server, disabled,
fractional-load, firing_key unique, key-freed-on-resolve), notifier (email/fallback/webhook/
non-http-ignored/failure-swallowed/SSRF-reject/public-accept), component (RBAC route gating, rule
CRUD, uuid→id scope resolve, offline→threshold 0, toggle, delete via token, channels, unsafe-webhook
rejected, incidents render). 669 tests green, Pint, lang parity, Codex-reviewed (fixes applied).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Foundation for the feature program (groups are the scoping primitive alerts, ad-hoc
commands, bulk actions and patch/posture will target). Lean by design: named groups,
no hierarchy, no per-group RBAC.
- server_groups (uuid route key, unique name, color = a @theme token key coerced to a real
token on save) + server_server_group M2M pivot (cascade on delete; servers survive a group
delete). Server::groups() + a `scopeInGroup`.
- Servers\Groups full-page component, manage-fleet (admin) only — route can:-mw + mount()
abort_unless + a per-method gate() on every mutation (create/rename/setColor/toggleMember/
confirmDelete/deleteGroup), since /livewire/update does not re-run route mw. create/rename/
recolour/membership audit directly; DELETE goes through the signed single-use ConfirmToken +
the R5 confirm modal (which writes group.delete from the sealed descriptor, so the handler
does not double-audit). 'groupConfirmed' added to ConfirmToken::ACTIONS.
- /servers/groups is registered BEFORE /servers/{server} so "groups" isn't captured as a uuid.
- Servers\Index: a #[Url] group filter (uuid; shareable) — an unknown uuid falls back to all,
never errors. Filtering is open to every role; only management is admin-gated. A "Gruppen"
button (admin) on the fleet header; colour pills use a literal @theme token map (R3).
- lang/{de,en}/groups.php + audit.php group.* labels (de/en parity). No emoji.
19 new tests (model + component: uuid/colour-allow-list/relations/cascade, RBAC route gating,
create/rename/recolour/membership, delete-via-confirmed-token, forged-token no-op, filter).
638 tests green, Pint, lang parity, Codex-reviewed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
From the re-audit's design/perf pass (Codex-reviewed):
- WithFleetContext::fleet() memoises per request (protected, not serialised by Livewire) —
activeServer() calls it several times per render (Files ~6x, Services ~4x), so it was re-running
the fleet query each time.
- Wireguard: cache WgTraffic->series() (60s) keyed on the window + a data fingerprint
(MAX(id) + COUNT) so a new/pruned sample busts it, but the 5s wire:poll no longer re-buckets the
whole sample history every tick (samples only land once a minute).
- dashboard: the systemd table headers (Unit/Status/Boot) were hard-coded English while a sibling
column used __(); move all four through lang keys (de+en parity).
- update-progress: localise the phase-list aria-label.
- btn: the compact `sm` size grows to the 44px R7 touch target on a coarse pointer only, so dense
row/toolbar buttons are tappable on mobile while desktop density is unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
From the whole-codebase re-audit (deferred MEDIUM findings, Codex-reviewed):
- poller: CredentialVault enforces a credential's disabled_at lock only at connect(), but
PollMetrics reuses one long-lived SSH connection per server, so a credential disabled
mid-run kept streaming metrics over the already-open session. Add Server::withActiveCredential()
(whereHas credential whereNull disabled_at); the poller selects via it and prunes any cached
client whose server left the active set, so a revocation drops the server on the next tick and
closes its session promptly.
- prod compose: add security_opt no-new-privileges:true to every service + a generous pids_limit
(fork-bomb backstop). cap_drop/read_only are deliberately left out — they need a per-service
prod smoke test (nginx :80 bind, entrypoint chown) before enabling; documented inline.
- Caddyfile + compose: strengthen the TRUSTED_PROXY_CIDR guidance — an over-broad value in
external-TLS mode lets any client forge X-Forwarded-For and defeat the IP-keyed throttles + ban.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Confirmed-security quick-wins from a full re-audit (6-agent subsystem fan-out,
Codex-reviewed). Each item ships with a regression test proven to fail pre-fix.
- files: gate file CONTENT reads (download / edit / FileEditor::load) behind the
`operate` ability so a read-only viewer keeps LISTING/browse access but can no
longer pull file bytes over the server credential (root -> /etc/shadow, keys,
.env). Hide the download/edit/delete controls from viewers in the blade, and
basename() Files::open() for parity with the other path builders.
- fail2ban: reject a leading dash/dot in validJail(). A jail name like "-h" or
"--help" was parsed by fail2ban-client as an OPTION (argument-injection) rather
than a positional jail; internal dashes ("nginx-http-auth") still pass.
- bruteforce: release the atomically-claimed ban-audit dedup slot when the
AuditEvent write throws, so a transient DB failure no longer suppresses the
auth.ip_banned audit for the whole 60s window (the ban itself is unaffected).
- update path: verify_update_request now FAILS CLOSED when UPDATE_HMAC_KEY is
unset (was fail-open -> any ./run marker could drive a root update). Pin the
self-update `git pull` to the recorded CLUSEV_BUILD_BRANCH and refuse a diverged
checkout, so a `git checkout` in the tree cannot redirect the next root update.
- wireguard: normalise the DNS input to a single comma list and QUOTE the WG_DNS
assignment in wg.env; an unquoted space previously split the assignment and
broke the next `. "$WG_ENV"`.
13 new regression tests. 614 tests, Pint, shellcheck, Codex review all green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Security re-audit + adversarial red-team of the honeypot deception and
brute-force ban layer. Fixes (all with regression tests):
HoneypotController::trap
- BAN EVASION: keyed ban off getRealMethod() not isMethod('post') — the
latter honors _method / X-HTTP-Method-Override, so a POST spoofed as PUT
dodged the ban entirely. Now any non-safe verb to a decoy bans.
- REFLECTED-BAN vs EVASION: removed the Origin-based skip; the Origin header
is attacker-controlled, so it was a trivial universal ban-evasion (send a
foreign Origin) worse than the narrow griefing it prevented.
- UNMASK/500: mb_scrub all attacker-controlled meta (ua/query/path/creds) so
invalid UTF-8 can't throw JsonEncodingException on the array-cast column.
- Ban now runs FIRST and independently of the audit (separate guarded
try/catch) so a failing audit can never skip the ban; deceive() always 200.
- AUDIT DoS: per-IP hourly cap via atomic Cache::add(0)+increment.
DetectHoneytoken::trip
- Same guarded ban-first / audit-second structure + per-IP audit cap
(bounds an exempt or rotating source) + mb_scrub on the path.
BruteforceGuard::banNow
- Dedup the auth.ip_banned audit per IP+reason on a 60s window (was
full bantime): collapses the scanner flood without masking a legitimate
re-ban after an operator unban, and still audits distinct reasons.
Supply-chain / release / dashboard
- Pin prod base images (caddy/mariadb/redis) by @sha256 digest.
- Atomic branch+tag push in clusev-release.sh (no orphan untagged commit).
- Route github.ref_name through a validated $TAG env in ci-staging.yml.
- Strip inline credentials from the origin URL in set-repository-url.sh
(greedy match handles an @ inside the password).
- WireGuard peer name via Js::from in wire:click; settings badge shows the
real role; Threats pill/top_ip account for honeypot_login attempts.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Previously a POST to a fake login hit a Laravel 419 (CSRF) or 405, unmasking the framework, and the
phpMyAdmin/generic forms even posted to real paths (/index.php, /login). Now: the decoy paths are
CSRF-exempt (bootstrap/app.php) and drop BlockBannedIp (an already-banned prober stays inside the
deception, always fed a fake — never a revealing 403 — while the ban still blocks them from the REAL
login). Every fake form posts back to its own decoy, so a submit re-serves the fake page (looks like a
failed login) and trap() records the guessed username + password as threat intel (meta.tried_user /
tried_pass). DetectHoneytoken stays on the group, so a submitted canary is still caught.
The deceptive bodies were bare unstyled HTML — obvious to any human/scanner. Give each a
self-contained, offline-safe inline-CSS skin that mirrors the real thing (WordPress login grey
canvas + logo + blue button; phpMyAdmin blue theme + logo + fieldset; a clean generic admin card)
so the decoy is convincing enough to hold a probe. No external assets (CSP/airgap-safe).
Re-review (completeness sweep + Codex) found: Audit\Index::saveRetention wrote the global
audit_retention_days policy ungated (a non-admin could shrink retention and prune audit evidence)
-> manage-panel guard + @can-hidden control; Settings\Email::sendTest lacked the role guard that
mount/save already had -> manage-panel; DetectHoneytoken read only form-encoded bodies via post(),
missing a JSON {"api_key":"<canary>"} replay -> now scans json() too (still body-only, no query).
Audit leak-hygiene findings:
- The operator's real internal dev-VM/WireGuard IPs (10.10.90.136/.162/.165) were shipped in
vite.config.js (hmr.host), lang hint/placeholder strings, a code comment and the CHANGELOG.
vite HMR host is now env-driven (VITE_HMR_HOST, dev .env only); all other occurrences are replaced
with RFC5737 documentation addresses (203.0.113.x). Tests updated in lockstep.
- docs/ is export-ignored from the git tree and named in promote.sh's refuse-to-publish list, but was
never .dockerignore'd, so `COPY . .` baked the private docs (with private host/URL refs) into the
public image, which the git-tree leak-guard never inspects. Added docs/ (and art/) to .dockerignore.
- /update.log (new repo-root update transcript) gitignored.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Security audit (12-angle adversarial workflow) findings on the container→host boundary:
- .env was created world-readable (cp of a 644 .env.example, never chmod'd) exposing the APP_KEY
that decrypts the whole fleet's SSH vault. Now chown clusev + chmod 0600 before any secret write.
- The root updater followed attacker-planted symlinks in the container-writable ./run (update-phase.json,
update.log) → arbitrary root file write. Status writes now go via a temp + rename(2) (never follow a
link); the update transcript moved to the repo root (not the ./run bind mount).
- The generated UPDATE_HMAC_KEY was dead. The app now HMAC-signs the update-request marker
(config/clusev.php update_hmac_key; DeploymentService) and watch.sh verifies it before running a
root update, so a stray/limited write to ./run can't drive one (a full container compromise holds
the key, so this is a bar-raise + integrity check; the standing guarantee is the marker only ever
re-installs the trusted remote's code, never attacker code).
- force_kv/set_kv wrote unescaped values into a sed replacement — a & | or newline in an operator's
domain/email/port could corrupt .env or inject a sed command. Values are now CR/LF-stripped and
sed-escaped, and the HTTP port is validated numeric/in-range.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A dashboard-triggered update that failed on the host left the /update-progress
page spinning to a vague 10-minute timeout — no error was ever shown, because
nothing wrote a failure marker for the page to read. Fix: make failures visible
and prevent the credential-prompt hang class.
- docker/restart-sentinel/watch.sh: run update.sh under `timeout -k 30 1800` with
its output tee'd to run/update.log; on ANY non-zero exit (update.sh or its
exec'd install.sh) — and on the early compose-missing / updater-missing paths —
write {"stage":"error"} to run/update-phase.json via write_update_error().
- update.sh: export GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT=0 + GIT_HTTP_LOW_SPEED_* and wrap the pull
in `timeout 300`, so a private-repo credential miss fails fast instead of
hanging on a non-interactive prompt.
- DeploymentService::updatePhase(): whitelist the 'error' stage.
- update-progress.blade.php: add an error state (#js-status-error) + showError();
the status-feed poll now stops and shows it on stage=error, marking the active
phase red — instead of looping.
- lang/{en,de}/update.php: error_heading / error_hint / back_button.
- UpdateProgressTest: feed surfaces stage=error; page renders the error branch.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The in-panel help "First login" section still claimed you log in with the
literal default password `clusev` and that "the panel forces a password change
immediately". Both are false since this cycle: the installer generates a RANDOM
password shown once in the closing summary, and EnsureSecurityOnboarded only
nudges (skippable), never forces.
- help/overview.blade.php (en+de): rewritten — sign in with the initial
password from the installer summary; setting your own is recommended (a
banner reminds) but not forced.
- lang/{en,de}/auth.php: default-password banner → "Initial password still in
use" / "Initialpasswort noch aktiv".
- ResetAdmin.php: reset output "Einmal-Passwort" → "Neues Passwort".
- EnsureSecurityOnboarded.php: comment wording aligned.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Password rotation is a nudge, not a wall (Install sets must_change_password=true
but EnsureSecurityOnboarded only prompts and is skippable), so calling the
generated credential a "one-time password" wrongly implied forced/single-use
rotation. Renamed the user-facing term everywhere:
- README + lang/{en,de}/accounts.php: "one-time password" / "Einmal-Passwort"
→ "initial password" / "Initialpasswort"; temp_intro "must change on first
sign-in" → "prompted to change" / "sollte … geändert werden".
- Install.php $description: "Standard-Passwort (Zwangswechsel …)" → "zufälligem
Initialpasswort (Wechsel empfohlen, nicht erzwungen)".
- Install.php / CreateUser.php comments aligned.
Kept "one-time backup codes" (2FA codes are single-use) and "shown only once"
(the summary is displayed once).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A guided tour for new operators: a dimmed+blurred overlay with an enterprise description card
(mono eyebrow "01 / 06", display title, body, progress bar, back/skip/next). A step with a
target spotlights the matching sidebar nav item (a box-shadow "hole" lights it while everything
else dims); welcome + finish are centred cards. On narrow viewports (sidebar hidden) it falls
back to centred cards.
- auto-opens once per account (users.onboarding_tour_completed_at is null → autostart); skip or
finish calls Tour::markSeen() which stamps it, so it never auto-opens again.
- relaunchable any time from Settings (a client-side 'onboarding:start' window event — no DB change).
- @persist'd in the layout + a sessionStorage guard so a wire:navigate or fast reload right after
dismissal can't re-open it before markSeen persists.
- nav-item now merges its attribute bag (data-tour passes through without duplicating class/href).
Browser-verified: auto-open → spotlight walks Dashboard/Servers/Terminal/Settings → skip stamps +
closes → navigation doesn't reopen → Settings relaunch works; zero console errors. 4 feature tests;
full suite 473 pass; Codex review CLEAN.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Rotation is optional now, so a well-known default ('clusev') would be a standing takeover
credential on a fleet-root console. The installer now creates the first admin with a random
Str::password(16), printed once on the CLUSEV_ADMIN_PASSWORD= line that install.sh already
surfaces in the closing banner. must_change_password still nudges a rotation, but even if the
operator keeps it, the secret is no longer guessable.
Verified: the printed password authenticates + differs per install; noop-when-admin-exists is
intact; Codex review APPROVED.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Fixes from the security audit (the brute-force/rate-limiting angle matters more now that the
password policy is min(6)/no-complexity, so IP-keyed throttles must not be spoofable):
- bootstrap/app.php: trustProxies(at: '*') → trust only PRIVATE ranges in prod. Caddy reaches
app:80 from the docker bridge (private IP) so it stays trusted, but a public/off-network source
can no longer forge X-Forwarded-For to spoof request()->ip() and bypass the login/2FA/forgot
throttles + the brute-force ban.
- TerminalSession + HostCredential: replace $guarded=[] with an explicit $fillable allowlist; add
$hidden=[secret,passphrase] to HostCredential so it never serializes its credential fields.
- nginx /terminal/ws: access_log off — the single-use session token rode the query string into the
access log.
Verified: full suite 467 pass; all panel pages 200 with zero console errors; server terminal still
connects + runs commands.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Operator decision: password strength is the user's own responsibility. Removed the
mixedCase + numbers requirement from every password rule (Password::min(6) is all that
remains), so a plain 6-char password ("abcdef") is accepted. Dropped the
"upper/lowercase + a digit" clause from the hints (de + en).
Verified: a 6-char simple password validates; a 5-char one still rejects (length); full
suite 467 pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Operator decision — 12 was too long; 6 is acceptable and password strength is the user's
own responsibility. Changed Password::min(12) → min(6) in every place that validates a
password (password change, forgot/reset, settings profile, create-user) and updated the
visible hints (de + en). The upper/lowercase + digit complexity is unchanged — only the
minimum length was flagged.
Verified: a 6-char complex password ("Abc123") now validates; too-short and complexity-less
passwords still reject; the password page shows "min. 6"; full suite 467 pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Add-account modal only ever generated a one-time password — there was no way to set
one. Add an optional password field (with a show/hide toggle):
- blank → previous behaviour: a strong one-time password is generated, the account is
flagged must_change_password, and the clear text is revealed once.
- filled → that becomes the user's own login (validated min 12 / mixed case / digit);
must_change_password stays false (no forced rotation) and nothing is revealed.
Browser-verified: the modal shows the password field + hint; both paths covered by tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- sidebar: the "2FA on/off" text badge next to the user name was visually noisy. Replace it
with a single status shield — a cyan shield-check when 2FA is on, a muted struck-through
shield when off; the label moves to the hover/aria title so it stays reachable.
- terminal: the server-target search now appears once there is more than one server (was 5+),
so it is there as soon as filtering helps; added a clear (×) button + an accent focus ring.
Browser-verified: sidebar shows just the shield (no text); search filters the rail (homelab →
only homelab-01) with a working clear button; both badge states render correctly. 465 pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The "Clusev host" terminal is for the LOCAL machine Clusev runs on. Letting the operator
point it at an arbitrary host/server makes no sense (that is what fleet servers are for)
and the pre-filled host.docker.internal read as a confusing mandatory magic value.
- the host is now FIXED to host.docker.internal server-side (HostShell::HOST), not a form
field; the modal asks only for the login — user + password|key, and the port.
- the rail tile sub-label shows just the login user (the host is implied/local).
Browser-verified: modal has no HOST/IP field (user/port/auth/password only); saving shows
the user on the tile; opening the host reaches the real host sshd (a wrong password yields
an SSH auth error, proving the connection), zero console errors. 16 terminal tests pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The seeded-password rotation was forced before the panel was reachable. It is now a
nudge, not a wall: the prompt shows once per session and can be skipped, and a standing
warning banner keeps reminding while the default password is still in use.
- EnsureSecurityOnboarded redirects to the password page only when must_change_password
AND the session has not set onboarding.password_skipped (set by PasswordChange::skip,
which lands on the dashboard WITHOUT rotating — so the flag/banner persist).
- app layout shows a default-password warning banner while must_change_password is true.
- the metrics broadcast channel no longer gates on securityOnboarded() — a deliberately
un-rotated (but authenticated) operator would otherwise lose realtime metrics;
/broadcasting/auth still runs in the web group (guest = 403), so it stays auth-gated.
- 2FA was already optional (never enforced) — only the login copy was wrong: "2FA
required/enforced" → "recommended/optional" (de + en).
Browser-verified (R12): login → skippable prompt → dashboard banner → free navigation
(no re-redirect); login copy correct; zero console errors. Full suite 465 pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The "Clusev host" terminal was a shell inside the sidecar container (node@clusev, no
sudo, not the host). It is now a REAL SSH login into the host machine, like any fleet
server — so it shows the real root@<host> prompt with full rights.
- HostCredential (encrypted singleton) holds the host SSH login; a HostShell modal lets
the operator set host/port/user + password|key. The clear-text secret is never echoed
back; on edit a blank secret keeps the stored one, and switching auth method requires a
fresh secret (no password silently reused as a key).
- open('host') mints a kind=host token only when a login is configured, else opens the
setup modal; the internal resolve endpoint returns a server-shaped SSH spec (decrypted,
internal-net only) for kind=host, or 404 when unconfigured.
- compose: extra_hosts host.docker.internal:host-gateway so the sidecar reaches the host
sshd; Caddy now 404s /_internal/* at the public edge (the sidecar uses app:80 directly).
- rail gains a debounced search box past 5 servers; removed the now-obvious PTY hint line.
Browser-verified (R12): host tile shows "not configured" + gear → modal → SSH login as
root runs commands, zero console errors; search filters; resolve returns the host spec.
15 terminal tests pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A dedicated /terminal page with a target rail: one terminal per fleet server (SSH)
plus one for the Clusev host itself. php-fpm cannot hold an interactive PTY, so a
small Node sidecar (ws + ssh2 + node-pty) bridges xterm.js to the PTY.
Flow: the Livewire page mints a single-use, 60s TerminalSession token and dispatches
it to an Alpine xterm island; the browser opens a same-origin WS (/terminal/ws,
proxied by nginx in dev / Caddy in prod to terminal:3000); the sidecar burns the
token at an internal resolve endpoint (shared-secret header, private network only)
for a connection spec, then opens an SSH PTY (decrypted credential, never sent to the
browser) or a local host PTY. Real shell = native Tab/Shift-Tab completion.
Security:
- token burned ATOMICALLY (single conditional UPDATE) — no double-open race
- resolve endpoint guarded by hash_equals shared secret, exempt from CSRF + PanelScheme
host enforcement (private net only), returns decrypted creds over the internal net
- sidecar enforces same-origin on the WS upgrade (hostname match, port-agnostic)
- single-use 60s tokens, swept daily so the table can't grow unbounded
Verified in-browser (R12): host + server terminals connect, accept keyboard input,
run commands, Tab-complete; cross-origin WS rejected; zero console errors. 9 feature
tests cover minting, the resolve spec, single-use burn, expiry, and locked creds.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The series rail synced ?series=<key> via Livewire #[Url] with a bare numeric key like
"0.10". Livewire type-juggles that to 0.1 (the trailing zero is lost), so reloading
while viewing the 0.10 series silently switched to 0.1 and rewrote the URL. Prefix the
series key with a non-numeric "v" (?series=v0.10) so it round-trips as a string; the
rail label still shows the dotted "0.10". Surfaced now that a 0.10 series exists.
Browser-verified: selecting 0.10 -> ?series=v0.10, and it survives a reload.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Reworks the Server-Details history graph from a static Livewire-rendered SVG into a
self-contained Alpine island fed by a JSON endpoint, addressing the feedback:
- Smooth Catmull-Rom curves instead of angular segments.
- Continuous line with an area gradient fill; the line breaks ONLY on a real outage
(delta-t > 2.5x the bucket), not on every empty bucket — no more dropouts.
- Hover crosshair + tooltip (time + CPU/MEM/DISK at the point).
- Instant client-side range switching (1h/24h/7d/30d) via
GET /servers/{server}/history.json — no Livewire round-trip.
- X-axis labels moved below the plot (no longer overlapping the 0 gridline).
MetricHistory::series() now returns only non-empty buckets plus from/now/bucket. The
chart wrapper is wire:ignore so the parent's 10s poll never clobbers the Alpine state;
the island self-refreshes every 60s. The old Livewire range logic is removed.
Codex review: clean (auth-gated route, range clamped, numeric-only JSON, guarded hover
bindings, R3/R4-compliant). Browser-verified: smooth curves, area fill, working tooltip
+ crosshair, instant range switch, zero console errors. 446 tests green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A CPU/RAM/Disk history graph over selectable ranges (1h/24h/7d/30d) on the server
detail page, backed by a persisted time series (the live 15s view stays cache-only).
- metric_samples table (server_id cascade, cpu/mem/disk %, load, sampled_at indexed).
- clusev:sample-metrics (scheduled every minute, mirrors clusev:wg-sample): persists
one row per server from the cached live reading, prunes beyond --retention (30d).
- MetricHistory::series() buckets + averages samples for a window; empty buckets stay
null so the chart shows gaps, not fabricated values.
- Servers/Show: range selector + a gap-aware SVG line chart (theme-token strokes,
R3-compliant, mirrors the dashboard chart). historyRange is clamped via setRange()
and the updatedHistoryRange() hook (it's a public, client-settable property).
Codex review: fixed a right-edge bucket off-by-one, clamped percentages on write, and
guarded the public range property against direct client values. Browser-verified: the
chart renders with data, range buttons, legend and gaps, zero console errors. 447
tests green, pint clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Verified live against a real Debian 12: the hardening actions work end-to-end
(root + password self-lockout guards refuse correctly, auto-updates and ufw enable,
disabling password auth persists and blocks password logins). One gap surfaced: on
a minimal image without rsyslog the distro-default fail2ban sshd jail (logpath
/var/log/auth.log) fails to start — "Have not found any log file". Pin the sshd jail
to `backend = systemd` (reads the journal) via a jail.d drop-in on enable:
log-source-agnostic and valid on every supported (systemd) target. fail2ban then
comes up active with the sshd jail reading the journal.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The "add SSH key" modal had no name field — keys appeared only by comment +
fingerprint, so additional keys weren't tellable apart. Add a name field; the name
becomes the key's OpenSSH comment (what the server list shows), for both generated
and pasted keys. Sanitised (control chars stripped, whitespace collapsed, capped at
64 chars) so a crafted name cannot inject a second authorized_keys line — proven by
test, on top of addAuthorizedKey()'s own whitespace-collapse + base64 encoding.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Disabling SSH root login (PermitRootLogin no) severs Clusev's OWN access when it
connects AS root — afterwards neither key nor password reaches root. The
password-auth toggle already guards against self-lockout; the root toggle did not.
Refuse to disable root login while the active credential's username is root, with a
clear message: add a non-root sudo user + key and switch Clusev to it first.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Follow-up to the Projekt-card change: the dev/release-control box must list its
actual update source (e.g. private Gitea) AND the public repo — the previous commit
showed only the source on dev. Replaced the single project link with projectLinks():
the public repo is always listed (validated slug, canonical fallback); the dev box
prepends its source when it is a real URL (a garbage/hostless source is dropped, never
an empty link). Staging/stable still list the public repo only — no private leak.
Codex review: no leak path on non-dev; hardened the dev source against a hostless URL.
Verified: 433 tests green (dev-both / non-dev-only / malformed-slug / garbage-source),
pint clean, /versions shows both links on the dev box with zero console errors.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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