- QR: 0.9.42 over-enlarged it; bring the show-once peer QR back to a balanced
~240px (still crispEdges on a white quiet-zone frame) so it scans on a phone
without dominating the modal.
- Download filename now becomes a useful tunnel name on import: build it from
the endpoint host + peer name (e.g. "10.10.90.165-laptop.conf") instead of the
generic "clusev-wireguard.conf" — WireGuard apps name a tunnel after the file.
A QR scan can't carry a name (the app prompts for one); the import hint now
explains both paths.
Tests: download-filename cases (host+peer, fallback); 349 pass, Pint clean,
/wireguard loads 200, lang parity 83/83.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Verified dead-code + duplication cleanup over the WireGuard feature surface
(found via an audit workflow, every item adversarially re-verified by grep):
Dead code removed:
- lang keys not_configured_title / not_configured_body (both locales) — orphaned
when the unconfigured empty state became the in-page setup form (setup_title /
setup_intro). 0 references anywhere. de/en parity kept (83/83).
- WgTraffic::series() 'buckets' return key — written, never read by blade/route/test.
- blade $fmtB byte-formatter — byte-identical duplicate of the top-level $fmtBytes
already in scope; collapsed onto $fmtBytes.
DRY / readability (behavior-preserving):
- Index: PEER_NAME_RE constant (was the same regex literal at 5 sites), portInRange()
+ clampWindow() helpers (window default now self::WINDOWS[0]), openConfirm() helper
(5 confirm-modal openers shared one dispatch), onFlag() helper (2 apply handlers).
- WgBridge: validPort() helper (port check was duplicated verbatim).
- clusev-wg.sh: _write_server_conf() shared by both setup paths (the byte-identical
server bring-up was copy-pasted); single CIDR_RE constant for the 3 subnet checks;
fixed a stale header comment that still claimed SSH is "NEVER matched" (the v0.9.40
ssh-lock can match 22); documented the defence-in-depth re-validation in _set_*.
- WgStatus: documented server.pubkey is part of the /wg-status.json contract (kept).
No DB/migration changes (peer_name write-only column left intact — needs a
coordinated migration). 348 tests pass, shellcheck clean, Pint clean, R12 verified
in both the configured + unconfigured states (200, no console errors, no leaked
keys, traffic formatter renders 1.5 MB / 200 KB correctly).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two dashboard additions to the WireGuard page:
- Peer config download: the show-once new-client view gets a "Download"
button next to the QR code (streams clusev-wireguard.conf) plus an
inline hint explaining QR-on-phone vs download-on-PC import.
- SSH lock (port 22): an optional toggle in WireGuard settings that walls
off host SSH to the tunnel via a dedicated CLUSEV-WG-SSH chain on the
host INPUT chain. Fail-open by construction: ESTABLISHED,RELATED + lo +
wg0 + WG-subnet RETURN before the DROP (live sessions survive, SSH over
the tunnel stays open); _ssh_gate_on refuses while wg0 is down; the boot
unit's ConditionPathExists=wg0 and an in-function self-guard keep a
broken tunnel from ever applying the DROP; ssh_gate_apply re-validates
the subnet shape and fails open on a corrupt wg.env. Strong lock-out
warning shown inline AND in the confirm modal (recommend a backup peer).
New CLI escapes: clusev wg ssh-lock / ssh-unlock; clusev wg down clears
both gates. Panel gate and SSH gate are independent toggles.
Write-bridge: new gate-ssh-on/gate-ssh-off actions (no args, host
whitelist + ConfirmToken wgSshGate, single-use uid-bound). Status collector
now reports gate.ssh. Adversarial lock-out review: all 8 failure modes
refuted. 348 tests pass, shellcheck clean, Pint clean, R12 verified.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Update-progress phases were a pure time guess, so a fast update sat on "fetch"
then snapped all four green at once. Now the host updater publishes its real
macro-stage and the page tracks it:
- update.sh / install.sh write the current stage (fetch|build|restart|migrate|
done) to run/update-phase.json — best-effort (|| true, never aborts an update).
- new public GET /update-status.json serves that stage (whitelisted) to the page.
- update-progress.blade.php drives the checklist from the feed in REAL order
(fetch → build → restart → migrate), falling back to the time heuristic when no
feed is present, and completes on the feed's 'done' (or the version flip, with a
25s grace fail-safe). Like the 502 fix, the live experience lands one update
after this ships (the page shown DURING an update is the old version's).
Also: Versions changelog series + page are now #[Url]-synced (?series=&page=),
so a series/page is shareable and survives reload / back-button.
Tests: /update-status.json (null / whitelisted / rejected stage), the page polls
the feed, and the changelog deep-link reads ?series=&page=.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replace the flat 48-item changelog list with a series browser: releases are
grouped by major.minor (e.g. "0.9"), a rail (vertical from xl, horizontal pills
below) selects the series, and the active series is paginated (8/page) with the
newest release open by default. The installed series is marked; each row shows
its change categories as toned glance-dots.
Also fixes, surfaced by an adversarial review of the change:
- icon: add the missing 'chevron-right' Lucide path — the accordion disclosure
caret and the pagination "Next" button were rendering an empty <svg>.
- blade: wire:ignore.self on each <details> so a user's open/closed toggle is not
reset by an unrelated re-render (autoCheck / check-updates / in-update poll); a
series/page change still re-defaults to first-open via a fresh wire:key.
- blade: 44px touch targets (series pills + pagination) below lg (R7).
- i18n: localised 'Other' series label; pluralised series_count (no "1 Releases").
- Index: render() is the single clamp authority for changelogPage.
Index.php: groupBySeries() + pageWindow() + selectSeries/gotoChangelogPage; render
builds the series list, resolves the active series, paginates. New DE+EN keys.
VersionsChangelogTest covers grouping order, default series, paging, clamp, the
installed-series cue, and the chevron-right icon regression.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The update-progress page declared completion on two consecutive 200s from
the /up health route. But the OLD container keeps answering /up 200
throughout the minutes-long rebuild, so the page redirected prematurely
back into the teardown → 502 / white screen.
Now the page polls a lightweight public /version.json probe and finishes
only when the running version has actually moved past the pre-update one
(passed as ?from=), or after an observed down→up cycle for a same-version
redeploy. The 10-minute timeout + manual-reload fallback are unchanged.
- routes/web.php: add public GET /version.json; sanitise+pass ?from= to the view
- Versions/Index.php: include the installed version as ?from= in the redirect
- update-progress.blade.php: version-gated completion (fromVersion/sawDown)
- UpdateProgressTest: probe endpoint, embedded baseline, from-sanitisation, no /up poll
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- backup field: autocomplete=off -> one-time-code (backup codes ARE one-time codes;
matches the main challenge field, the rest of the app, and the spec; restores
password-manager OTP autofill that the earlier polish broke)
- both verify() use the trait's memoised $this->pendingUser() instead of a fresh
User::find(), saving a redundant query on the failed-attempt re-render (Pint dropped
the now-unused User import in TwoFactorBackup)
- spec: align trait backing-state visibility note to the implemented 'private'
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Mount now redirects key-only users without a secure context straight to
the dedicated backup view. The main challenge form renders only for TOTP
users; a subordinate button links to two-factor.challenge.backup instead
of embedding the field inline.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
New /help full-page Livewire component with left topic nav (like Settings),
bilingual content via per-locale Blade partials, sidebar + command-palette
entries (g h). First topic: Überblick / Overview.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Mirror the update button (0.9.15): requestRestart() now returns bool and
restartNow() shows an error toast (pointing at sudo ./update.sh) when the
sentinel can't be written, instead of a 'restarting' state that never resolves.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The prod image baked the app user at uid 1002, but install.sh chowns the
bind-mounted ./run to the clusev host user. On a host where clusev != 1002 the
app process could not write the restart/update sentinel — the dashboard button
showed 'läuft' while nothing happened on the server. Pass APP_UID/APP_GID =
HOST_UID/HOST_GID into the prod build so the in-image app user matches clusev
and ./run is writable. Also surface a failed sentinel write as an error toast
instead of a stuck 'running' state (requestUpdate now returns bool).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The available-update banner + button now appear automatically when the page
opens, instead of only after clicking 'check'. autoCheck() runs via wire:init
(async, non-render-blocking) and no-ops while an update is in progress so it
never clobbers the running/poll state.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
0.9.12 derived the running state from the sentinel file, which the host
watcher consumes BEFORE update.sh runs — so a reload mid-update showed nothing.
Store an 'update in progress' marker (with the base version) in the cache
(Redis in prod) instead: it survives both the reload and the app rebuild. On
load, mount() resumes the 'running' notice + polling, or — if the running
version has already moved past the base — announces completion and clears the
marker. 15-minute TTL backstop so a failed update can't wedge the banner.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Update progress now resolves: a wire:poll detects the rebuilt container
reporting a newer version than at request time, flips the card back to
'current' and fires a success toast (survives the restart downtime; times out
after ~5min instead of spinning; resumes after a reload while the sentinel
exists). Fixes the 'Update läuft' state that never ended.
- An available update shows on page load straight from the cached check (no
re-click, no network) instead of only after pressing 'check'.
- Displayed times follow the host timezone instead of UTC: app.timezone is now
env-driven and install.sh bakes APP_TIMEZONE from the host (DB stays UTC).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A stale 30-minute update-check cache could render a latest tag below the
installed version right after an update (e.g. 'latest v0.9.9' next to
'installed v0.9.10'), which reads backwards. The passive display now discards a
cached value lower than the installed version until a fresh check resolves it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Version page read the deployed commit/branch from .git at runtime, which
the prod Docker image does not contain — so it showed 'Build —' and the channel
as the branch. install.sh now bakes the host's git short-SHA and branch into
.env (CLUSEV_BUILD_SHA / CLUSEV_BUILD_BRANCH); the page prefers those and keeps
the live .git read as the dev fallback.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add a host-watcher-backed update button on Version & Releases. The container
(no Docker socket) writes an update sentinel; a new root-run systemd unit
(clusev-update.path/.service) runs watch.sh update -> update.sh (git pull +
idempotent install). The sentinel is consumed before running so a persistent
failure can't loop the path unit.
The button only appears once a check finds a newer release, is per-user
throttled (3/10min, auto-expiring) and audited (deploy.update_request); the UI
warns the dashboard is briefly down during the rebuild. install.sh now installs
both the restart and update host units (update unit runs as root for
docker/systemd/apt).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The update check read the newest release tag from local .git, which the
production Docker image does not contain — so 'check for updates' always
reported 'no release tagged' in prod even when a newer version existed. It now
queries the public, read-only Gitea tags API (anonymous; no token leaves the
panel), keeps local .git only as a dev fallback, and caches the result so a
page render never makes a network call (only the explicit action does).
Channel-aware (stable = vX.Y.Z only; beta also sees prereleases) and degrades
silently when the host is unreachable.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
For the common case where a domain was configured before its DNS pointed here, the
operator can now request the Let's Encrypt cert from System -> Domain & TLS instead of
waiting for the first HTTPS visitor:
- DeploymentService::requestCertificate() does a DNS pre-check (domainResolvesHere via
dns_get_record vs serverPublicIp) and, only when DNS is NOT a clear mismatch, triggers
Caddy's on-demand issuance with an internal handshake (probeCertificate:
`curl --connect-to <domain>:443:caddy:443` — the dial target is pinned to the caddy
service, the domain only sets SNI/Host, so no SSRF). A clear mismatch returns early and
never calls ACME (Let's Encrypt rate-limit protection). The outcome is persisted to the
`tls_cert_status` Setting so the page shows a status without an ACME-triggering probe on
every load.
- System\Index::requestCertificate() is per-user throttled (cert-request:<id>, 5/10min,
auto-expiring -> never a control-plane lockout) and audited (tls.cert_request). The
status line + button render only in caddy mode with an active domain; external mode
shows a note; bare IP hides it.
Automatic on-demand still works on the first HTTPS handshake regardless — this only adds
explicit control + a status. Tests cover the no-handshake-on-mismatch guard, the
issued/failed/not-applicable states, and the per-user throttle. Full suite 192 green;
Codex clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adversarial audit of the auth surface confirmed several exploitable gaps. Every fix
auto-expires and never permanently locks the control plane (bare-IP recovery host and
the clusev:reset-admin CLI stay open).
Login:
- per-IP (20/min) + per-account (30/15min) buckets on top of the existing email+IP 5/min,
so a distributed multi-IP brute-force of the single admin account is capped instead of
scaling linearly with IPs. ip/acct counters decay on their own (a valid login doesn't
reset a flood's budget).
- constant-time: the unknown-email branch now runs one bcrypt against a fixed DUMMY_HASH
(evaluated before the `! $user ||` short-circuit), closing the account-enumeration
timing oracle.
2FA:
- TOTP replay protection — verifyTotp uses verifyKeyNewer with a persisted last-used step
(two_factor_last_used_step migration), so each 30s code is single-use. Passes 0 (never
null) as the old step, since null makes verifyKeyNewer return bare `true` not the step.
- challenge + 2FA-proof reset gain an IP-independent per-account backstop, capping the
distributed TOTP/backup brute-force surface.
Defense-in-depth / DoS:
- global throttle on /livewire/update (180/min per user-id-or-IP) via setUpdateRoute,
keeping 'web' + the persistent EnsureSecurityOnboarded gate intact.
- reauth throttle (5/min per user) on password change/profile; SMTP test-send capped
(3/10min per user) so the panel can't relay spam.
- SshClient gets a short, separate connect timeout (~5s) so a dead/tarpit host can't hold
a worker across several sequential 15s reads (the observed 8.3s /livewire/update DoS).
- profile password policy raised to 12 chars + mixed case + numbers (was 10).
Tests: BruteForceHardeningTest covers TOTP replay, per-email + per-IP login caps,
identical unknown/known rejection, and reauth throttling. Full suite 187 green; Codex
clean; verified in a real browser (login/polls/Livewire updates unaffected by the throttle).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Follow-up hardening on top of 2171895 (which v0.9.2 shipped). That first pass
introduced a cost-12 bcrypt dummy that was *slower* than the real verify path —
a reverse timing oracle plus CPU-DoS amplification. Replace it with work that
mirrors the real path instead of exceeding it, and close the remaining query /
exception asymmetries:
- resetPassword(): resolve 2FA with a uniform lookup — always exactly one
webauthn-existence query (even for a TOTP user, and for a missing account) so
its presence/absence can't tell accounts apart. Every path now does one users
lookup + one webauthn query + one Google2FA HMAC + one locked recovery-code
transaction (real data when present, throwaway data otherwise).
- Split burnVerificationTime() into dummyTotpVerify() (HMAC) and
dummyRecoveryLookup() (locked SELECT in a transaction); drop the bcrypt
Hash::check entirely. A webauthn-only account spends an equivalent throwaway
HMAC so its crypto cost matches a TOTP account.
- dummyRecoveryLookup() no longer catches DB errors: a DB failure must surface
identically to the real useRecoveryCode(), else an outage is an error-response
oracle (generic for unknown, 500 for a real account).
- sendResetLink(): report() the swallowed Throwable so a broken queue/token
store is detectable instead of silently "succeeding" for every address.
Tests: ForgotPasswordTimingTest now asserts an identical (users,
webauthn_credentials) query fingerprint across TOTP, no-2FA, webauthn-only, and
unknown-email branches, plus queued-mail and rate-limiter parity. Codex re-review
verdict: clean (residual sub-microsecond crypto differences are below the
network/DB noise floor for this self-hosted single-admin threat model).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Queues the reset-link notification so sendResetLink returns in constant time regardless
of account existence; resetPassword does equivalent dummy verify work for unknown/no-2FA
users. Closes the timing side-channels flagged on the forgot-password review.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The 2fa.codes_fresh reveal flag is now a timestamp (set at enrollment) and
RecoveryCodes::mount() only reveals within [now-600s, now], symmetric to the
download-grant window. A reveal flag whose modal never opened can no longer
re-reveal the codes later in the session. FirstFactorCodesTest asserts the
flag is an int.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two hardening features completed in parallel (each with its own spec + tests),
sharing call sites (TwoFactorSetup, WebauthnKeys, routes) so committed together:
- ConfirmAction token hardening: destructive confirm flows now carry a server-issued,
single-use, signed token (App\Support\Confirm\ConfirmToken) instead of trusting a
client-mutable event/params/auditTarget. Every #[On] apply handler consumes + validates
the token (forged/replayed/direct-bypass calls no-op). Server-scoped per action; closes
the codebase-wide confirm-bypass + audit-forgery vector across Security, Sessions, Users,
WebauthnKeys, Servers\Show, Services, System, Files.
- Backup-code airtight reveal: codes are revealed via a transient channel, not a persisted
Livewire property, so a captured/replayed snapshot can't re-render them; the recovery
download is grant-gated.
Full suite green (162).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Stored recovery codes were re-viewable two ways after their one-time
reveal. Both paths are now closed so codes are only viewable/downloadable
right after a fresh generation (enrollment or regenerate).
HOLE 1 — RecoveryCodes::$revealed was a mutable public Livewire prop, so
a crafted /livewire/update could flip it to true and make render() emit
stored codes. Annotated with #[Locked]; Livewire now rejects any
client-side write (set still happens server-side in mount()/regenerate()).
HOLE 2 — two-factor.recovery.download was auth-gated only, so any authed
user could GET it anytime to re-download stored codes. Added a one-time
session grant (2fa.download_grant) put alongside the existing
2fa.codes_fresh wherever codes are freshly generated (TwoFactorSetup,
WebauthnKeys, RecoveryCodes::regenerate); the route now
abort_unless(pull(grant), 403) before streaming — one download per fresh
generation, later direct hits 403.
Tests: lock rejection + download-grant lifecycle (forbidden → granted ok
→ consumed forbidden). Full suite 137 passed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Backup (recovery) codes must be viewable ONLY at the moment they are
generated — at first-factor enrollment or on regenerate — and NEVER
re-viewable afterward from "Backup-Codes verwalten".
- Modals\RecoveryCodes: add server-gated $revealed. mount() pulls a
one-time session flag (2fa.codes_fresh); regenerate() sets it. render()
emits codes ONLY when revealed, so a client cannot tamper a flag to
re-view stored codes.
- View: revealed state shows codes grid + download + warning + close;
hidden state shows a security notice + Neu erzeugen + close (no codes,
no download).
- TwoFactorSetup::confirm() and WebauthnKeys::register() put
2fa.codes_fresh on first-factor code generation (put, survives the
redirect + later openModal request).
- Add recovery_hidden_notice (DE/EN parity).
- Tests: manage view hides codes; fresh flag reveals once; regenerate
reveals the new set; first-factor paths set the flag.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The "Gesperrte IPs ansehen" modal did its SSH Fail2banService::status read
in mount(), so clicking the trigger blocked for seconds with no spinner
before the modal appeared.
Split mount() into an instant mount() (stores serverId only) plus a
load() method fired by wire:init, mirroring Services\Index. While
! $loaded the view renders a 4-row skeleton inside the max-h-96 scroll
container; once loaded it renders the real jail/IP list (or empty/error).
The unban flow still re-reads via loadJails() and dispatches
fail2banChanged, keeping #[Locked] $serverId and the audit intact.
Adds Fail2banBansModalTest covering the instant mount (status never
called), load() rendering the list, read-error surfacing, and both
unban success (audit + refresh + dispatch) and failure paths.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Codex P2: concurrent deletes could both pass the >1 check. Now the count + delete run in
one transaction under a row lock.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Opening an image now renders it (SFTP base64 data-URI, 5 MB cap, save disabled for
images) instead of the text editor. Recovery-codes modal buttons realigned + the
close button relabeled 'Schließen' (it only closes). All modal textareas resize-none.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The fail2ban-Status panel listed every jail + banned IP inline (very long). Now a
compact summary + 'Gesperrte IPs ansehen' opens a scrollable modal (Fail2banBans)
that reuses Fail2banService::status/unban and dispatches fail2banChanged. serverId
is #[Locked].
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Guard the TOTP verifyKey call behind hasTotp() so a key-only user's null
two_factor_secret never reaches Google2FA::verifyKey(); they reset via a
backup code. Also adds the reset_no_2fa_note lang key (EN + DE) rendered
on the forgot-password form explaining the no-2FA recovery options.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- TwoFactorSetup: move to app layout (hosts wire-elements/modal), guard on hasTotp() not hasTwoFactorEnabled(), redirect to settings and flash open_recovery_modal on first TOTP enrollment
- WebauthnKeys.register(): drop hasTwoFactorEnabled() guard (first key may be the sole factor), generate codes + dispatch openModal on first key enrollment
- Settings\Index: add #[Url] on $tab, add $openRecoveryModal flag, mount() reads the flash and lands on the security tab
- settings/index.blade.php: x-init block dispatches openModal when $openRecoveryModal is set
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Journal was a one-time snapshot mislabeled "journalctl -f": it loaded the last
N lines once and never refreshed, so it was neither live nor complete.
- FleetService: `journalctl --show-cursor` + new journalSince() reads only entries
after the stored journald cursor (no gaps, no dup appends), capped to a bounded
live tail; parseJournal split into splitJournalCursor + parseJournalLines.
- Services\Index: pollJournal() (wire:poll.5s) appends new entries since the cursor
and caps retained rows at 300 (fetch ceiling == display ceiling).
- Honest labels: drop the misleading "-f"; badge stays "live" (now true).
Command palette (Strg/⌘ K) can now jump to a server: the fleet feeds the Alpine
cmdk x-data; servers surface only while searching, matched on name OR IP, and
selecting one navigates to /servers/<uuid>.
Cursor is validated (^[a-z0-9;=]+$) and single-quoted before the remote shell —
no injection (Codex-reviewed: no P1, no security findings). Removes stock
ExampleTest (asserted 200 on an auth-gated route → always 302).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Revert the hydrate-on-every-request sync — writing the single global active-server
session on every async request (slow load(), polls, parallel tabs) is inherently
last-writer-wins and races. Setting it only at mount (once per deliberate
navigation) is race-free and fixes the visible drift. bfcache restore + multi-tab
remain inherent edges of the single-session model — documented in the handoff.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add a hydrate() hook so Show re-asserts its server as active on the wire:poll tick
and any action — covering a wire:navigate bfcache restore that skips mount(),
without the earlier racy client-side POST. Idempotent + server-side, no race.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two "current server" notions diverged: the sidebar switcher (session active_server_id)
vs the server-details URL. Now viewing a server's details sets it active (sidebar
always matches the page), and switching the sidebar while on a details page navigates
to the chosen server (instead of reloading the old one). One current server, in sync.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Swap the strict counter checker for a zero-tolerant one so platform
authenticators / synced passkeys (which always report counter 0) can assert,
while non-zero counters still must strictly increase (clone detection).
- Guard registration (options + register) and the UI on hasTwoFactorEnabled, so a
key is never created against a disabled/reset second factor.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- credential_id can exceed the unique-index key length; store it in TEXT and
enforce uniqueness on an auto-derived sha256 hash column (lookups use the hash).
- Disabling 2FA now also deletes the user's security keys + backup codes, so
re-enrolling starts clean and old factors never silently revive.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
options() now validates the label before returning creation options, so clicking
Add with a blank/invalid name aborts before navigator.credentials.create() and
never leaves an orphaned credential on the authenticator.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A "Security-Keys" panel in Settings → Security: add (name + navigator.credentials
.create via resources/js/webauthn.js), list (name/added/last-used), remove (R5
confirm modal), all audited. Hidden with a hint when domain+HTTPS is absent.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
When the panel runs on a domain+HTTPS and the user has a registered key, the 2FA
challenge offers "Mit Security-Key anmelden" alongside the TOTP/backup-code field.
A verified assertion completes login exactly like a TOTP success; rate-limit +
session gate reused. TOTP and backup codes remain fully usable.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Codex review follow-ups: extract the notify toaster into a shared partial and
include it in the auth layout too, so sendResetLink + recovery-code regenerate
actually surface their confirmation (the auth layout had no toaster). Record an
AuditEvent for password resets via the email-token path, matching the 2FA path.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Address Codex security review:
- ForgotPassword + clusev:reset-admin now rotate remember_token, so a stolen
remember-me cookie cannot survive a password reset (the email-token path
already did this).
- useRecoveryCode reads/checks/removes under a row lock (DB transaction +
lockForUpdate), so two concurrent requests can't both spend the same one-time
code (replay).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
ForgotPassword gains sendResetLink() + a ResetPassword component at
/reset-password/{token} using Laravel's password broker. The email option is
shown only when mail.default is a real mailer (hidden while MAIL_MAILER=log), so
it activates automatically once SMTP is configured. Tested with Notification::fake.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
"Passwort vergessen?" on login -> a reset view that proves identity with a TOTP
or one-time backup code (no email needed), then sets a new password under the
min(12) mixedCase numbers policy. Rate-limited, generic messages (no account
enumeration), audited.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2FA confirm now generates 8 backup codes and redirects to a show-once recovery
view (download as .txt, regenerate). Reachable again from Settings. Codes are
shown before the onboarding gate so a fresh enrollee can save them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The challenge now falls back to consuming a one-time recovery code when the TOTP
check fails. Relaxed the code input (was numeric, maxlength 6) so a backup code
is typable, and added a hint. Bilingual.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Branding assets (public/, served directly):
- favicon.svg (scalable, primary), favicon.ico (16/32/48 PNG-embedded),
apple-touch-icon.png (180), icon-192/512.png, site.webmanifest. The mark is
the in-app brand glyph (orange Lucide "server" on dark). Wired into both
layouts via a shared partials/head-icons (rel=icon svg+ico, apple-touch,
manifest, theme-color #06080A). nginx serves the manifest as
application/manifest+json.
Never show raw error text (custom messages only):
- Custom branded resources/views/errors/{403,404,419,429,500,503}.blade.php on a
self-contained error layout (design tokens, brand mark, bilingual via
lang/errors.php) — replaces Laravel's default Symfony/whoops pages.
- docker-compose.prod.yml pins APP_DEBUG=false so a prod error can never render a
stack trace (the custom pages show instead).
- Files download error dispatched a bare $e->getMessage(); wrap it in the
localized files.download_failed (consistent with upload/delete).
Verified in-browser: icon links present + all assets 200; custom 404 renders the
branded German message (no raw "Not Found"/trace), responsive at 375, 0 console.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
CreateServer now probes the entered SSH login inside the create transaction; a
failed probe throws and rolls back (no half-registered server), surfacing the
SSH reason on the form. Successful creation starts the server as `pending`
("Initialisierung") instead of red/offline until first contact promotes it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The panel domain is editable on the System page again — safely this time. It is
stored in the DB (Setting `panel_domain`, overriding install-time APP_DOMAIN) and
APPLIED ON RESTART, never mid-session: a snapshot file (storage/framework/active-domain)
is frozen at container start by the entrypoint (`clusev:snapshot-domain`), so saving a
new domain only takes effect after `docker compose ... restart`.
How it works
- DeploymentService: pending (configuredDomain, DB) vs active (domain(), snapshot file);
setDomain() persists; restartPending() drives the UI notice. Snapshot reads the DB
DIRECTLY (cache-independent) and retries until the settings table is readable; if it
never is, it freezes the env fallback so the active domain is always a FIXED value
(never a live one that could shift after startup).
- AppServiceProvider: derives app.url from the active domain at boot; pins server->Reverb
publishing to the internal reverb:8080 (domain/cert-independent).
- Caddy: on-demand TLS gated by /_caddy/ask (issues a cert only for the configured
domain); HTTP always served for bare-IP recovery; /app,/apps forced to HTTPS for any
hostname (plaintext only on a bare IP).
- Reverb client endpoint is derived from the live request and rides the same front door
(/app tunnel — Caddy in prod, nginx in dev), so realtime follows a domain change with
no JS rebuild and no stale .env value.
- System page: domain form + R5 confirm + "restart required" notice with the exact
command; DE/EN strings (R16).
Anti-lockout / security
- session.secure + the HTTPS redirect follow the real request scheme; bare-IP HTTP is
always a recovery path. trustProxies('*') only in production (dev can't be tricked into
faking HTTPS via X-Forwarded-*). When a domain is active only that domain (HTTPS) and
the literal server IP (HTTP) serve the panel; any other/stale host is refused (404),
and IP-recovery redirects stay on the IP.
Bump 0.3.0 -> 0.4.0; CHANGELOG. Follow-up tracked: make the public `metrics` broadcast
channel private (wire broadcasting auth).
Verified: Pint clean; npm build; Caddyfile validates; R12 all routes 200 + 0 console
errors; Echo connects via the unified /app tunnel; domain set/clear + restart-gating +
/_caddy/ask (200 active / 403 other) + host-enforcement matrix all confirmed in dev;
Codex review iterated to no actionable in-scope findings; 14-agent adversarial
lockout/security review (real trustProxies finding fixed).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Per operator feedback ("das soll automatisch sein, die Caddy-Config muss man nicht
sehen, nur 'SSL steht'"):
- TLS is fully automatic via Caddy (auto-issue + auto-renew + HTTP→HTTPS). The System
page now shows only the STATUS (domain + access URL) — the generated Caddy config and
the manual `caddy reload` command are gone, and the domain/email edit form is removed.
- The panel domain is an INSTALL-TIME value (APP_DOMAIN → config('clusev.domain')), so it
stays consistent with APP_URL, the Reverb (wss) endpoint and cookie security — none of
which can be re-derived at runtime (Caddy's site address + the browser's Reverb host are
fixed at install/build, and .env is never rewritten). DeploymentService is now read-only.
- Removed AppServiceProvider's runtime app.url override (it let a stale DB value shadow the
install-time URL). Migration drops the inert empty dashboard_domain/dashboard_email rows
(a real configured value is preserved as history; re-apply via install.sh — see CHANGELOG).
- Hardening checklist: all toggle buttons share one style (secondary/bordered) instead of
varying with state (R10).
Bump 0.2.0 -> 0.2.1 + CHANGELOG. Pint clean; Codex reviewed (the remaining note is a
deliberate install-time-domain tradeoff — a runtime/DB domain cannot be served by the
templated Caddy without a false "TLS active" status); R12 — system/server-show/dashboard
HTTP 200, 0 console errors, raw config + edit form gone, buttons uniform.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Addresses "ich sehe nicht welche IPs gebannt sind / entsperren / whitelist". The
server-detail page gains a "fail2ban-Status" panel.
New Fail2banService (owns all fail2ban I/O):
- status(): jails with currently/total failed+banned + the banned IP list, plus the
whitelist; sentinel-guarded, and a CLIENT_OK marker so an active service whose
fail2ban-client query fails is reported as a read error, not "0 jails".
- unban() (idempotent: "not banned" = success), manual ban() GUARDED against loopback
(whole 127.0.0.0/8 + ::1) and Clusev's own SSH source (canonical inet_pton compare).
- readConfig()/writeTuning()/writeIgnoreip(): tuning and whitelist live in SEPARATE
zz- drop-ins and each writes only its own keys, so a whitelist change can never
rewrite the ban policy (and vice-versa). The legacy single-file zz-clusev.local is
removed on tuning save (migration). ignoreip is preserved VERBATIM (hostnames/CIDRs,
continuation lines) — loopback always re-seeded; add/remove report no-ops so the
audit only records real changes.
UI: jails + banned IPs each with "Entsperren" (direct, audited), whitelist editor
(add/remove, audited), "IP sperren" via an R5 modal (modals.fail2ban-ban). Jail/IP
args are Js::from()-encoded (remote-sourced, injection-safe). Direct handlers catch
SSH failures. Tuning modal migrated to Fail2banService.writeTuning.
MaintenanceService slimmed to package updates only (fail2ban moved out).
Pint clean; Codex review clean (IPv6 guard, verbatim ignoreip, decoupled drop-ins,
legacy migration, read-error detection all hardened); R12 — server-detail HTTP 200,
0 console errors, fail2ban panel + jail + whitelist render.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The server-detail page gains a "Firewall-Regeln" panel — addressing "ich kann nur
aktivieren, sonst nichts": list rules, add, and delete, with hard SSH-lockout guards.
FirewallService:
- status(): one privileged read — installed/active, default policies, and the rule
list. ufw rules come from `ufw show added` (add-syntax, works active OR inactive),
defaults from /etc/default/ufw; a CLUSEV_FWREAD_OK sentinel + a "Status:" check
distinguish a real read from a failed/empty one.
- addRule(): validated action/proto/port/from (proto before `from`, ufw grammar);
refuses deny/reject on the SSH port or portless (would block all inbound).
- deleteRule(): whitelists the spec against rules ufw actually reported (injection-
proof — a forged spec can't match), deletes by spec (race-free, no rule number),
guards SSH-port allow rules incl. ranges and trailing comments, distinguishes
not_found from a real deletion so the audit only records true deletions.
firewalld is READ-ONLY this release: status() reads the runtime state of every active
zone (ports/services/rich rules, zone-attributed), rule mutation is refused with a
German note. on/off + hardening (Phase A) still work.
UI: x-panel with default-policy badges, "+ Regel" (modal modals.firewall-rule), per-
rule delete via R5 ConfirmAction (audit deferred to the real outcome), graceful
read-error / not-installed / inactive / firewalld-read-only states.
Fix: the firewall row's tone variable was renamed $tone -> $ruleTone — the page-level
$tone is a closure used by the gauges/Volumes panel; reusing the name clobbered it and
500'd the page below the firewall block. R12 now confirms the full loaded page.
Default-policy EDITING was intentionally not exposed (highest lockout risk).
Pint clean; Codex review clean; R12 — server-detail HTTP 200, 0 console errors,
firewall panel + rules + volumes all render.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Foundation so Clusev no longer assumes Debian/apt/ufw/systemd. A host's OS is
resolved once (cached) and every package/firewall/service decision asks it.
New app/Support/Os/:
- OsProfile — family + package manager + firewall tool + service manager, plus
supports(feature) returning NULL or a German reason (graceful degradation).
- OsDetector — one unprivileged probe (/etc/os-release + `command -v` with sbin on
PATH + which firewall is RUNNING); family from ID/ID_LIKE cross-checked against
installed binaries; cached 1h (60s when nothing detected). Readability-guards the
`.` source so a host without /etc/os-release still falls back by package manager.
- PackageManager — apt/dnf/zypper command strings (pending count, apply, install,
is-installed); zypper exit 102/103 normalized to success.
- FirewallTool — ufw + firewalld enable/disable. firewalld opens ssh/80/443 in the
PERMANENT config BEFORE the daemon starts filtering (handles running + stopped),
preserving the no-lockout guard for custom SSH ports.
Integration:
- FirewallService enable/disable now OS-aware (ufw or firewalld) with a support gate.
- MaintenanceService: hasApt -> updateSupport(); pendingUpdates() + applyUpgrades()
across managers (dnf check-update exit 100 handled).
- HardeningService: state()/commandFor() per-OS (dpkg vs rpm, ufw vs firewalld, apt
periodic vs dnf-automatic; yum-only hosts gate auto-updates). Each row carries
supported/reason; unsupported features render muted with a German note instead of
a toggle. apply() refuses unsupported features gracefully.
- Server-Details surfaces the detected System / package manager / firewall.
- SystemUpdate modal + view: OS-neutral copy; audit action system.package_upgrade.
Arch (pacman) & Alpine (apk/OpenRC) are detected and gracefully disabled where
unsupported. Debian/ufw/systemd path verified behaviourally identical on the live
fleet. Pint clean; Codex review clean (fixed firewalld lockout + os-release guard +
yum/dual-firewall/zypper edge cases); R12 — 9 routes 200, 0 console errors.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Operator feedback: no way to add servers; irrelevant storage-internals text; fail2ban
only on/off; raw shell commands shown; no apt update/upgrade.
- Add server: CreateServer modal (name, IP/host, SSH port, user, password|key, optional
label) on the Servers index → creates server + encrypted credential ATOMICALLY (DB
transaction). Strict IP/hostname validation (filter_var + hostname; rejects 999.x, ':').
- System updates (Debian/Ubuntu only): MaintenanceService + SystemUpdate modal — shows the
pending-update count (or "unbekannt" when undeterminable) and runs apt update && upgrade
as root; gated to apt hosts.
- fail2ban configuration: Fail2banConfig modal — Sperrdauer / Max. Fehlversuche / Zeitfenster,
written to a Clusev-owned jail.d drop-in (zz-clusev.local, last-wins; never touches the
operator's jail.local/jails). Durations kept verbatim in fail2ban's native grammar
(600, 10m, 1h 30m, -1). Reads the EFFECTIVE [DEFAULT] across files; refuses to save when the
current policy couldn't be read (no overwrite with unseen defaults); reloads fail2ban only
when already active (never starts it).
- Modals: removed the raw "Befehle (als root)" preview + raw stdout dumps from the hardening
modal — clean German description + result only.
- System page: dropped the .env/Datenbank storage-internals callout (irrelevant to the user).
R15 — Codex gate: `codex review --uncommitted` run iteratively; fixed every finding across 9
rounds (fail2ban jail clobbering, section/precedence, composite/-1 durations, reload-starting-
inactive, read-failure propagation, glob exit code, apt-count failure, atomic server create,
IP validation) until clean — 0 security issues throughout. Live-verified on 10.10.90.162;
R12: Servers/Detail/System 200 / 0 console errors, modals open, hardening modal shows no commands.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Rework the server-hardening UX per operator feedback ("only activate, can't
deactivate or adjust, UFW won't even activate, is the existing state read?").
- Bidirectional toggles: each item (SSH root-login, SSH password-login, fail2ban,
UFW, unattended-upgrades) is a clean Aktivieren/Deaktivieren toggle driven by the
live feature state, not a one-shot "Anwenden".
- Real state read (HardeningService::state, privileged): SSH from `sshd -T` (the
EFFECTIVE config — honours Include order + Match blocks), UFW from `ufw status`,
unattended from `apt-config dump` (effective periodic value), packages via dpkg —
so nicht-installiert / inaktiv / aktiv are detected; a feature counts as "secure"
only when installed AND active.
- UFW activation installs ufw if missing (fixes "ufw: not found"); opens the detected
sshd port + 80/443 before `ufw --force enable`; adds disable().
- SSH drop-in renamed 00-clusev.conf (sorts + wins first); apt periodic written to a
last-winning 99zz-clusev file. Long timeout for apt installs.
- preview() returns the EXACT command apply() runs (single source — no drift between
the confirmation preview and the executed mutation). Password-disable lock-out guard
intact (refused when Clusev uses password auth or no key exists).
R15 — Codex review gate: `codex review --uncommitted` run iteratively; fixed every
finding across 5 rounds (drop-in precedence, apt periodic config, preview/apply drift,
ufw status detection, privileged-read error handling, stale-config secure state) until
"no actionable regressions". 0 security issues throughout.
Live-verified on 10.10.90.162: state via sshd -T (effective), fail2ban + unattended
toggled on/off both ways, ufw installed + state reflects, lock-out guard refuses
disabling password auth. R12: server detail 200 / 0 console errors, toggles render.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- fix(hardening): fail2ban/unattended apt installs failed because the 12s SSH timeout
aborted the package download. runPrivileged/runPlain take a $timeout; apt actions use
600s. Live-verified: fail2ban installs + is active/enabled on 10.10.90.162.
- feat(release): cut the foundation as the first real semantic release v0.1.0 (no more
-dev). CHANGELOG is Keep-a-Changelog BY VERSION; the Versions page parses it by version,
reads the newest git TAG as "latest release", and honestly compares installed vs latest
in the channel. Channels reduced to stable|beta (no user-facing dev); System clamps a
legacy value back to stable. Tagged v0.1.0.
- fix(domain/.env): the panel domain lives in the DATABASE (Settings); the app never
rewrites .env. AppServiceProvider overrides config('app.url') at runtime from the Setting
(guarded against a missing table); /system states this explicitly. Caddy config is a
standalone generated file; a Caddy reload is the only infra step.
- docs(arch): Caddy is the prod-only TLS reverse proxy IN FRONT of the app container's
nginx (Internet -> Caddy:443 -> nginx:80 -> php-fpm); no Caddy in dev.
- R15 (rules.md + CLAUDE.md): Codex must review every change for errors + security before
"done". The Codex CLI is not installed in this runtime (needs `sudo npm i -g @openai/codex`
+ `/codex:setup`); an independent adversarial security review of this diff returned CLEAN
(no vulnerabilities, no bugs) as the interim gate.
Verified (R12): /system + /versions 200 / 0 console errors; channels stable|beta only,
DB-not-.env callout; versions by-version with v0.1.0; app.url override resolves from the
Setting; fail2ban live install ok.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Security pivot — make server hardening, SSH access, firewall, dashboard domain/TLS
and the release channel controllable from the dashboard (no SSH needed), with guards
so a remote change can never lock the operator out.
Foundation
- ssh_credentials gains name + disabled_at + last_used_at; CredentialVault refuses a
disabled credential. New key/value Setting model. FleetService::runPrivileged() /
runPlain() — central sudo-aware exec (base64-wrapped sh -c), live-verified as root.
A · control-plane self-hardening
- SecurityHeaders middleware: env-aware CSP (allows the Vite dev origin in dev, strict
same-origin in prod), X-Frame-Options DENY, nosniff, Referrer/Permissions-Policy,
HSTS when secure. 2FA brute-force throttle (5/60s). install.sh sets
SESSION_SAME_SITE=strict + EXPIRE_ON_CLOSE + SECURE_COOKIE (only behind TLS).
B · SSH credential management
- name/label on the access; a credential card on the server page with Bearbeiten /
Sperren-Entsperren (kill-switch) / Löschen (R5), all audited.
C · server hardening from the dashboard (guards + confirmation)
- HardeningService (PermitRootLogin no, PasswordAuthentication no, fail2ban,
unattended-upgrades) + FirewallService (UFW). HardeningAction modal previews the
exact root commands before applying. GUARDS: refuse to disable password-login when
Clusev itself logs in by password or no key exists; UFW opens the real sshd port +
80/443 before enabling. Live-verified non-destructively (previews, the password
guard refusing, ufw status read).
D+E · System page (/system)
- Dashboard Domain + Let's-Encrypt email (Setting) -> DeploymentService renders the
matching Caddy site block (honest: stages the file + shows the reload command, never
fakes TLS). Release channel (stable|beta|dev) configurable; Versions reads it.
Built largely by 4 parallel agents into disjoint files; shared files integrated + the
security-critical bits hardened by hand (the password-auth lock-out guard + env-aware CSP).
Verified (R12): /system + server detail + all 8 routes 200 / 0 console errors (CSP does
not break Livewire/Alpine/Vite); credential card + 5 hardening "Anwenden" buttons render;
the hardening modal opens with the command preview; System persists domain/channel +
renders valid Caddy config; runPrivileged runs as root + the vault refuses disabled creds.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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