Monitor the certificate expiry of configured TLS endpoints (the panel's own domain, fleet
services, anything reachable) and flag the ones due soon — before they lapse.
- CertService::check(host, port) reads the peer certificate NATIVELY via a PHP SSL stream +
openssl_x509_parse — no SSH, no shell, so `host` is never interpolated into a command. Trust is
intentionally NOT verified (verify_peer off): the goal is to report expiry even for a self-signed
or already-expired cert. certInfo() (subject/issuer/expiry/daysLeft) is split out for unit testing
against a generated cert; status() maps daysLeft → ok / warning (<30) / critical (<7) / expired.
- Certs\Index page (route /certs, `operate`-gated: route + mount + per-method). Add/remove endpoints
(host validated as a hostname/IP — rejects scheme/path/shell chars; port 1-65535). Lazy per-endpoint
scan, each guarded. Delete via signed ConfirmToken + R5 modal. Add/delete audited. Internal
endpoints are allowed on purpose (monitoring internal service certs is legitimate; the check only
reads a cert, it POSTs nothing).
- lang/{de,en}/certs.php + audit.php cert.endpoint_* + shell.nav_certs (de/en parity). No emoji.
10 new tests: service (certInfo extracts subject/expiry from a generated cert, status thresholds,
check errors on an unreachable endpoint), component (route gating, add + audit, reject scheme/
metachar host + out-of-range port, scan checks each endpoint, delete via confirmed token). 730 tests
green, Pint, lang parity, self-reviewed. LE issuance is a documented future (needs ACME on the host).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Fleet-wide package-update visibility: pending + SECURITY update counts per server, one-click patch.
Extends MaintenanceService (single-server pending/apply already existed) with the security subset
and a fleet aggregation.
- MaintenanceService::updateCounts(Server) → { pending, security } in ONE round-trip via a new
PackageManager::countsScript() (apt/dnf/zypper). Security is best-effort per family (apt path solid;
dnf/zypper degrade to 0 when the metadata isn't there) and clamped ≤ pending. Either value is null
when the query can't run (shows "unknown", never a misleading 0).
- Patch\Index page (route /patch, `operate`-gated: route + mount + per-method). Lazy per-server scan,
each guarded (an unreachable host → error row). Fleet KPIs (total pending / total security). Applying
upgrades is a stateful action → signed ConfirmToken + R5 modal (modal audits patch.apply from the
sealed token; handler does not re-audit) resolving a client uuid → the sealed server id; a forged
token is a no-op. Reuses the existing applyUpgrades; the result output is mb_scrub'd before it lands
in a Livewire prop.
- countsScript strings are STATIC per manager (no operator input) — no injection surface.
- lang/{de,en}/patch.php + audit.php patch.apply + shell.nav_patch (de/en parity). No emoji.
11 new tests: MaintenanceService (parse pending+security, clamp security≤pending, missing-sentinel /
unsupported-manager → unknown), component (route gating, scan shows counts + survives an unreachable
server, patch opens confirm, applyPatch runs upgrades over the SEALED server, forged token no-op).
720 tests green, Pint, lang parity, self-reviewed (RBAC, ConfirmToken seal, static scripts, scrub).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The multi-server amplifier: run a command (ad-hoc or a saved runbook) across the whole fleet,
a group, or a selection, with a per-server result. Because it is arbitrary remote execution,
authorization + audit are the whole feature.
- The command is intentionally arbitrary; it runs via FleetService::runPlain (the credential's
login user, base64 transport, NO extra sudo) — the same privilege the web terminal already
grants, batched. No injection to prevent; the concern is who may run + that every run is logged.
- CommandRunner.run: per-server runPlain, one server failing never aborts the batch, output
byte-capped (256 KiB) + mb_scrub'd before it reaches a Livewire property.
- Commands\Index page, fully `operate`-gated: route can:operate + mount() + a per-method gate() on
run/runRunbook/execute/createRunbook/confirmDeleteRunbook/deleteRunbook. Every run goes through a
signed single-use ConfirmToken + R5 confirm modal ("run on N servers?"); the modal audits
command.run from the sealed token so execute() does not re-audit. Targets resolve client UUIDs →
ids server-side (withActiveCredential + inGroup + whereIn), and {command, serverIds} is SEALED in
the token — a client can't swap the command or targets after confirm. A forged token is a no-op.
- Runbooks: saved name+command, operate-gated CRUD, delete via ConfirmToken.
- lang/{de,en}/commands.php + audit.php command.run / runbook.* + shell.nav_commands (de/en). No emoji.
15 new tests: CommandRunner (runs each server, one-failing-doesn't-abort, nonzero=not-ok, byte-cap
+scrub), component (route gating, ad-hoc run opens confirm, empty-command / no-target errors, execute
runs the SEALED targets, forged token runs nothing, group scope targets only members, runbook create
+audit + run + delete-via-token). 700 tests green, Pint, lang parity, Codex-reviewed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Turns the existing metrics into an ops tool: rules that fire when a server crosses a
threshold and resolve when it recovers, with e-mail + webhook notifications. The event
sink later features (cert-expiry, uptime-down, patch-available, posture-drop) plug into.
- alert_rules (metric cpu|mem|disk|load|offline, comparator gt|lt, threshold, scope
all|group|server) + alert_incidents (firing|resolved, FK cascade).
- AlertEvaluator — per-server state machine: opens ONE firing incident on a fresh breach
(notifies), resolves on recovery (notifies), dedups a sustained breach (one breach = one
alert). Numeric metrics skip a truly-offline server (stale reading); the `offline` rule
fires only on offline, not a reachable "warning".
- AlertNotifier — best-effort e-mail (queued Mailable to configured recipients, falls back
to admin e-mails) + generic webhook JSON POST (Slack/Discord/Mattermost/custom; only http(s)
URLs). Every channel is wrapped so a broken SMTP/unreachable hook is logged, never thrown.
- PollMetrics evaluates after each poll (online, fresh status) and on a failed poll (offline),
each guarded so an alerting error can never kill the poll loop.
- Alerts\Index page, manage-panel (admin): route can:-mw + mount() + per-method gate() on every
mutation. Rule delete via signed ConfirmToken + R5 modal (no double audit). Scope group/server
resolves a client UUID to an id server-side (never trusts a client id). Channels saved to
Settings. Sidebar "Alarme" nav + firing-incident badge (cached 60s).
- lang/{de,en}/alerts.php + audit.php alert.* + shell.nav_alerts (de/en parity). No emoji.
Codex review raised three MEDIUMs, all fixed here:
- Webhook SSRF: strict http(s) scheme + reject hosts resolving to loopback/private/link-local/
reserved ranges (blocks the 169.254.169.254 cloud-metadata classic), validated at save AND send,
redirects disabled — so an admin-configured hook can't be pointed at an internal service.
- Incident dedup is now a DB invariant: a unique `firing_key` ("{rule}:{server}" while firing,
null on resolve) means two concurrent poll ticks can't both open a duplicate incident (the loser
hits a unique violation, caught → no-op).
- `load` is float-safe: threshold + incident value are decimal, compared as floats, so load 1.5 vs
threshold 1 fires (it used to truncate to 1 > 1 = false).
31 new tests: evaluator (fire/resolve/dedup, offline vs warning, scope all/group/server, disabled,
fractional-load, firing_key unique, key-freed-on-resolve), notifier (email/fallback/webhook/
non-http-ignored/failure-swallowed/SSRF-reject/public-accept), component (RBAC route gating, rule
CRUD, uuid→id scope resolve, offline→threshold 0, toggle, delete via token, channels, unsafe-webhook
rejected, incidents render). 669 tests green, Pint, lang parity, Codex-reviewed (fixes applied).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Foundation for the feature program (groups are the scoping primitive alerts, ad-hoc
commands, bulk actions and patch/posture will target). Lean by design: named groups,
no hierarchy, no per-group RBAC.
- server_groups (uuid route key, unique name, color = a @theme token key coerced to a real
token on save) + server_server_group M2M pivot (cascade on delete; servers survive a group
delete). Server::groups() + a `scopeInGroup`.
- Servers\Groups full-page component, manage-fleet (admin) only — route can:-mw + mount()
abort_unless + a per-method gate() on every mutation (create/rename/setColor/toggleMember/
confirmDelete/deleteGroup), since /livewire/update does not re-run route mw. create/rename/
recolour/membership audit directly; DELETE goes through the signed single-use ConfirmToken +
the R5 confirm modal (which writes group.delete from the sealed descriptor, so the handler
does not double-audit). 'groupConfirmed' added to ConfirmToken::ACTIONS.
- /servers/groups is registered BEFORE /servers/{server} so "groups" isn't captured as a uuid.
- Servers\Index: a #[Url] group filter (uuid; shareable) — an unknown uuid falls back to all,
never errors. Filtering is open to every role; only management is admin-gated. A "Gruppen"
button (admin) on the fleet header; colour pills use a literal @theme token map (R3).
- lang/{de,en}/groups.php + audit.php group.* labels (de/en parity). No emoji.
19 new tests (model + component: uuid/colour-allow-list/relations/cascade, RBAC route gating,
create/rename/recolour/membership, delete-via-confirmed-token, forged-token no-op, filter).
638 tests green, Pint, lang parity, Codex-reviewed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds the dev-only Release page: a flag-gated route (config('clusev.release_controls'),
enforced by the component mount() guard) and a flag-gated sidebar item, plus the
Release Livewire component. Deploy-to-Staging is irreversible, so it goes through the
shared R5 wire-elements/modal confirm — confirmDeployStaging opens the modal and
applyDeployStaging consumes the sealed ConfirmToken and runs the deployStaging executor
(the host bridge writes the request, betaN is computed host-side). Registers the
releaseStaged confirm action in the ConfirmToken allow-list.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two dashboard additions to the WireGuard page:
- Peer config download: the show-once new-client view gets a "Download"
button next to the QR code (streams clusev-wireguard.conf) plus an
inline hint explaining QR-on-phone vs download-on-PC import.
- SSH lock (port 22): an optional toggle in WireGuard settings that walls
off host SSH to the tunnel via a dedicated CLUSEV-WG-SSH chain on the
host INPUT chain. Fail-open by construction: ESTABLISHED,RELATED + lo +
wg0 + WG-subnet RETURN before the DROP (live sessions survive, SSH over
the tunnel stays open); _ssh_gate_on refuses while wg0 is down; the boot
unit's ConditionPathExists=wg0 and an in-function self-guard keep a
broken tunnel from ever applying the DROP; ssh_gate_apply re-validates
the subnet shape and fails open on a corrupt wg.env. Strong lock-out
warning shown inline AND in the confirm modal (recommend a backup peer).
New CLI escapes: clusev wg ssh-lock / ssh-unlock; clusev wg down clears
both gates. Panel gate and SSH gate are independent toggles.
Write-bridge: new gate-ssh-on/gate-ssh-off actions (no args, host
whitelist + ConfirmToken wgSshGate, single-use uid-bound). Status collector
now reports gate.ssh. Adversarial lock-out review: all 8 failure modes
refuted. 348 tests pass, shellcheck clean, Pint clean, R12 verified.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two hardening features completed in parallel (each with its own spec + tests),
sharing call sites (TwoFactorSetup, WebauthnKeys, routes) so committed together:
- ConfirmAction token hardening: destructive confirm flows now carry a server-issued,
single-use, signed token (App\Support\Confirm\ConfirmToken) instead of trusting a
client-mutable event/params/auditTarget. Every #[On] apply handler consumes + validates
the token (forged/replayed/direct-bypass calls no-op). Server-scoped per action; closes
the codebase-wide confirm-bypass + audit-forgery vector across Security, Sessions, Users,
WebauthnKeys, Servers\Show, Services, System, Files.
- Backup-code airtight reveal: codes are revealed via a transient channel, not a persisted
Livewire property, so a captured/replayed snapshot can't re-render them; the recovery
download is grant-gated.
Full suite green (162).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
boban