The re-audit's top finding (HIGH): update.sh runs as root, pulled + re-exec'd its own new copy +
ran install.sh's `docker compose build` on the pulled tree with NO signature check, so a
compromised/redirected origin or a transport MITM could feed attacker commits into a root RCE. The
branch-pin (bc2f2b5) stops a local `git checkout` redirect but not a remote origin compromise —
only a signature does.
- update.sh: after the pull and BEFORE the self-update re-exec / install.sh build, verify the pulled
HEAD with `git -c gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile=<anchor> verify-commit HEAD`. Opt-in and safe by
default — skipped with a warning when no anchor is configured (existing installs keep updating),
but FAIL CLOSED once configured. The anchor is resolved from .env CLUSEV_ALLOWED_SIGNERS or the
gitignored .clusev-allowed-signers; a SET-but-missing anchor dies (no silent downgrade), and a
git-TRACKED anchor is refused (a pulled tree could otherwise swap in the attacker's own key).
- clusev-release.sh: opt-in SSH signing of the release commit + tag when CLUSEV_SIGNING_KEY is set,
so the verify side has provenance to check. Unsigned (identical behaviour) when unset.
- .gitignore /.clusev-allowed-signers (the trust anchor must never be pull-overwritable);
.env.example documents CLUSEV_ALLOWED_SIGNERS.
verify-commit + allowed-signers proven end-to-end in a scratch repo (signed→pass, unsigned→fail,
wrong-key→fail, tracked-anchor→refuse, set-but-missing→fail-closed). shellcheck clean. Activation
(provision the maintainer keypair + sign releases) is a documented maintainer step.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
From the whole-codebase re-audit (deferred MEDIUM findings, Codex-reviewed):
- poller: CredentialVault enforces a credential's disabled_at lock only at connect(), but
PollMetrics reuses one long-lived SSH connection per server, so a credential disabled
mid-run kept streaming metrics over the already-open session. Add Server::withActiveCredential()
(whereHas credential whereNull disabled_at); the poller selects via it and prunes any cached
client whose server left the active set, so a revocation drops the server on the next tick and
closes its session promptly.
- prod compose: add security_opt no-new-privileges:true to every service + a generous pids_limit
(fork-bomb backstop). cap_drop/read_only are deliberately left out — they need a per-service
prod smoke test (nginx :80 bind, entrypoint chown) before enabling; documented inline.
- Caddyfile + compose: strengthen the TRUSTED_PROXY_CIDR guidance — an over-broad value in
external-TLS mode lets any client forge X-Forwarded-For and defeat the IP-keyed throttles + ban.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Confirmed-security quick-wins from a full re-audit (6-agent subsystem fan-out,
Codex-reviewed). Each item ships with a regression test proven to fail pre-fix.
- files: gate file CONTENT reads (download / edit / FileEditor::load) behind the
`operate` ability so a read-only viewer keeps LISTING/browse access but can no
longer pull file bytes over the server credential (root -> /etc/shadow, keys,
.env). Hide the download/edit/delete controls from viewers in the blade, and
basename() Files::open() for parity with the other path builders.
- fail2ban: reject a leading dash/dot in validJail(). A jail name like "-h" or
"--help" was parsed by fail2ban-client as an OPTION (argument-injection) rather
than a positional jail; internal dashes ("nginx-http-auth") still pass.
- bruteforce: release the atomically-claimed ban-audit dedup slot when the
AuditEvent write throws, so a transient DB failure no longer suppresses the
auth.ip_banned audit for the whole 60s window (the ban itself is unaffected).
- update path: verify_update_request now FAILS CLOSED when UPDATE_HMAC_KEY is
unset (was fail-open -> any ./run marker could drive a root update). Pin the
self-update `git pull` to the recorded CLUSEV_BUILD_BRANCH and refuse a diverged
checkout, so a `git checkout` in the tree cannot redirect the next root update.
- wireguard: normalise the DNS input to a single comma list and QUOTE the WG_DNS
assignment in wg.env; an unquoted space previously split the assignment and
broke the next `. "$WG_ENV"`.
13 new regression tests. 614 tests, Pint, shellcheck, Codex review all green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Security re-audit + adversarial red-team of the honeypot deception and
brute-force ban layer. Fixes (all with regression tests):
HoneypotController::trap
- BAN EVASION: keyed ban off getRealMethod() not isMethod('post') — the
latter honors _method / X-HTTP-Method-Override, so a POST spoofed as PUT
dodged the ban entirely. Now any non-safe verb to a decoy bans.
- REFLECTED-BAN vs EVASION: removed the Origin-based skip; the Origin header
is attacker-controlled, so it was a trivial universal ban-evasion (send a
foreign Origin) worse than the narrow griefing it prevented.
- UNMASK/500: mb_scrub all attacker-controlled meta (ua/query/path/creds) so
invalid UTF-8 can't throw JsonEncodingException on the array-cast column.
- Ban now runs FIRST and independently of the audit (separate guarded
try/catch) so a failing audit can never skip the ban; deceive() always 200.
- AUDIT DoS: per-IP hourly cap via atomic Cache::add(0)+increment.
DetectHoneytoken::trip
- Same guarded ban-first / audit-second structure + per-IP audit cap
(bounds an exempt or rotating source) + mb_scrub on the path.
BruteforceGuard::banNow
- Dedup the auth.ip_banned audit per IP+reason on a 60s window (was
full bantime): collapses the scanner flood without masking a legitimate
re-ban after an operator unban, and still audits distinct reasons.
Supply-chain / release / dashboard
- Pin prod base images (caddy/mariadb/redis) by @sha256 digest.
- Atomic branch+tag push in clusev-release.sh (no orphan untagged commit).
- Route github.ref_name through a validated $TAG env in ci-staging.yml.
- Strip inline credentials from the origin URL in set-repository-url.sh
(greedy match handles an @ inside the password).
- WireGuard peer name via Js::from in wire:click; settings badge shows the
real role; Threats pill/top_ip account for honeypot_login attempts.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
nginx's `location ~ \.php$` fastcgi-passed EVERY .php path to php-fpm, which 404'd the classic
attacker probes (/wp-login.php, /xmlrpc.php, /admin.php, /vendor/…/eval-stdin.php) with 'File not
found' BEFORE they could reach the Laravel honeypot route — so those decoys never trapped behind
nginx (the feature tests hit the Laravel route directly, bypassing nginx, and missed this). Add
`try_files $uri /index.php?$query_string` to the php location so a non-existent .php falls through
to the front controller (only index.php actually exists in public/, so nothing else executes).
Verified through nginx: all .php + non-.php + dotfile decoys now serve the deceptive 200.
The first hardening pass created the update-phase.json temp with mktemp INSIDE ./run (the
container-writable bind mount) and reopened it by pathname (`> "$tmp"`). A container racing the root
writer could unlink that temp and drop a symlink in its place before the reopen, redirecting the root
write outside ./run. All THREE status-writers now build the temp at the repo ROOT — same filesystem as
./run (so the follow-up mv -f is an atomic, symlink-safe rename(2)) but NOT mounted into any container,
so it cannot be tampered mid-write: watch.sh run_write_json, update.sh set_stage, AND install.sh
set_stage (reachable as root directly and via update.sh -> exec install.sh). The transient /.phase.*
temps are gitignored.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Security audit (12-angle adversarial workflow) findings on the container→host boundary:
- .env was created world-readable (cp of a 644 .env.example, never chmod'd) exposing the APP_KEY
that decrypts the whole fleet's SSH vault. Now chown clusev + chmod 0600 before any secret write.
- The root updater followed attacker-planted symlinks in the container-writable ./run (update-phase.json,
update.log) → arbitrary root file write. Status writes now go via a temp + rename(2) (never follow a
link); the update transcript moved to the repo root (not the ./run bind mount).
- The generated UPDATE_HMAC_KEY was dead. The app now HMAC-signs the update-request marker
(config/clusev.php update_hmac_key; DeploymentService) and watch.sh verifies it before running a
root update, so a stray/limited write to ./run can't drive one (a full container compromise holds
the key, so this is a bar-raise + integrity check; the standing guarantee is the marker only ever
re-installs the trusted remote's code, never attacker code).
- force_kv/set_kv wrote unescaped values into a sed replacement — a & | or newline in an operator's
domain/email/port could corrupt .env or inject a sed command. Values are now CR/LF-stripped and
sed-escaped, and the HTTP port is validated numeric/in-range.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A dashboard-triggered update that failed on the host left the /update-progress
page spinning to a vague 10-minute timeout — no error was ever shown, because
nothing wrote a failure marker for the page to read. Fix: make failures visible
and prevent the credential-prompt hang class.
- docker/restart-sentinel/watch.sh: run update.sh under `timeout -k 30 1800` with
its output tee'd to run/update.log; on ANY non-zero exit (update.sh or its
exec'd install.sh) — and on the early compose-missing / updater-missing paths —
write {"stage":"error"} to run/update-phase.json via write_update_error().
- update.sh: export GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT=0 + GIT_HTTP_LOW_SPEED_* and wrap the pull
in `timeout 300`, so a private-repo credential miss fails fast instead of
hanging on a non-interactive prompt.
- DeploymentService::updatePhase(): whitelist the 'error' stage.
- update-progress.blade.php: add an error state (#js-status-error) + showError();
the status-feed poll now stops and shows it on stage=error, marking the active
phase red — instead of looping.
- lang/{en,de}/update.php: error_heading / error_hint / back_button.
- UpdateProgressTest: feed surfaces stage=error; page renders the error branch.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The ssh2 sidecar connected with no host-key verification, so a MITM could present its own key
and capture the (decrypted) SSH credential — the phpseclib fleet path pins via TOFU but the
sidecar did not. The resolve endpoint now returns the server's TOFU-pinned host key; the sidecar
verifies the presented key against it (crypto.timingSafeEqual) during the handshake, before any
credential is sent.
parseHostKeyPin distinguishes three states so a corrupted record can't silently unpin:
null → no pin (Clusev host / never-contacted server) → accept, TOFU first use
false → a pin is present but malformed/undecodable → FAIL CLOSED (reject)
Buffer → enforce the pin (reject a mismatch as MITM)
Verified in-browser against a real server: valid key connects + runs; a swapped key is rejected
as MITM; a garbage non-empty key fails closed — all before any credential leaves the sidecar.
Full suite 469 pass; Codex re-review CLEAN.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The "Clusev host" terminal resolves to an SSH login now (resolve never returns kind:'host'), so the
sidecar's local-shell path was unreachable:
- docker/terminal/server.js: drop startHost(), the spec.kind==='host' branch, the node-pty require
and HOST_SHELL/HOST_CWD constants — the sidecar only ever opens an SSH PTY.
- Dockerfile: drop the python3/make/g++ toolchain (only there to compile node-pty's native addon);
package.json: drop the node-pty dependency. Leaner, faster image.
- compose (dev+prod): drop the now-unused TERMINAL_HOST_CWD env and the .:/workspace:ro mount.
- remove grep-confirmed-unused lang keys (settings 2FA/stub-tab keys, accounts twofa/cannot_remove,
auth recovery_done/regenerate_confirm, common back/retry/more/loading, servers firewall/fail2ban
unavailable variants) and the unused x-server-item Blade component.
Verified: lean sidecar rebuilds + the server terminal still connects/runs; full suite 467 pass; all
pages 200 with no raw-key leaks and no console errors.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Fixes from the security audit (the brute-force/rate-limiting angle matters more now that the
password policy is min(6)/no-complexity, so IP-keyed throttles must not be spoofable):
- bootstrap/app.php: trustProxies(at: '*') → trust only PRIVATE ranges in prod. Caddy reaches
app:80 from the docker bridge (private IP) so it stays trusted, but a public/off-network source
can no longer forge X-Forwarded-For to spoof request()->ip() and bypass the login/2FA/forgot
throttles + the brute-force ban.
- TerminalSession + HostCredential: replace $guarded=[] with an explicit $fillable allowlist; add
$hidden=[secret,passphrase] to HostCredential so it never serializes its credential fields.
- nginx /terminal/ws: access_log off — the single-use session token rode the query string into the
access log.
Verified: full suite 467 pass; all panel pages 200 with zero console errors; server terminal still
connects + runs commands.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The "Clusev host" terminal was a shell inside the sidecar container (node@clusev, no
sudo, not the host). It is now a REAL SSH login into the host machine, like any fleet
server — so it shows the real root@<host> prompt with full rights.
- HostCredential (encrypted singleton) holds the host SSH login; a HostShell modal lets
the operator set host/port/user + password|key. The clear-text secret is never echoed
back; on edit a blank secret keeps the stored one, and switching auth method requires a
fresh secret (no password silently reused as a key).
- open('host') mints a kind=host token only when a login is configured, else opens the
setup modal; the internal resolve endpoint returns a server-shaped SSH spec (decrypted,
internal-net only) for kind=host, or 404 when unconfigured.
- compose: extra_hosts host.docker.internal:host-gateway so the sidecar reaches the host
sshd; Caddy now 404s /_internal/* at the public edge (the sidecar uses app:80 directly).
- rail gains a debounced search box past 5 servers; removed the now-obvious PTY hint line.
Browser-verified (R12): host tile shows "not configured" + gear → modal → SSH login as
root runs commands, zero console errors; search filters; resolve returns the host spec.
15 terminal tests pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
On a phone the terminal clipped on the right: FitAddon measured the column count before
JetBrains Mono finished loading (narrower fallback metrics → too many columns → the wider real
font then overflowed and the right edge was cut). And the PTY opened at a fixed 80x24, so the
remote shell's first screenful (MOTD/prompt) was generated at 80 columns and wrapped awkwardly
on a ~43-column viewport.
- refit immediately, on the next animation frame, and again on document.fonts.ready (font race)
- refit on the 'ready' frame before sending the size
- pass the browser's cols/rows on the WS URL; the sidecar opens the host PTY / SSH shell at that
size (clamped 1..1000), so output is born at the visible width
Verified in-browser at 390px: PTY reports 43x23 (matches the box), no horizontal overflow, clean
wrapping, zero console errors; desktop server+host terminals and cross-origin rejection still pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The host terminal is a shell in the sidecar container; it opened in the read-only
repo mount (/workspace) with the prompt showing the random container id, so it read
like a stray container rather than "the Clusev host".
- give the sidecar a stable `hostname: clusev` (dev + prod) → prompt host is `clusev`
- land the host PTY in /home/node (a real, writable home) and set HOME to it, so the
shell opens at ~ like a normal terminal instead of /workspace
Server (SSH) terminals are unchanged. Verified in-browser: prompt reads node@clusev,
pwd is /home/node, HOME=/home/node, no container hash / no /workspace; server terminal
still connects and runs; zero console errors.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A dedicated /terminal page with a target rail: one terminal per fleet server (SSH)
plus one for the Clusev host itself. php-fpm cannot hold an interactive PTY, so a
small Node sidecar (ws + ssh2 + node-pty) bridges xterm.js to the PTY.
Flow: the Livewire page mints a single-use, 60s TerminalSession token and dispatches
it to an Alpine xterm island; the browser opens a same-origin WS (/terminal/ws,
proxied by nginx in dev / Caddy in prod to terminal:3000); the sidecar burns the
token at an internal resolve endpoint (shared-secret header, private network only)
for a connection spec, then opens an SSH PTY (decrypted credential, never sent to the
browser) or a local host PTY. Real shell = native Tab/Shift-Tab completion.
Security:
- token burned ATOMICALLY (single conditional UPDATE) — no double-open race
- resolve endpoint guarded by hash_equals shared secret, exempt from CSRF + PanelScheme
host enforcement (private net only), returns decrypted creds over the internal net
- sidecar enforces same-origin on the WS upgrade (hostname match, port-agnostic)
- single-use 60s tokens, swept daily so the table can't grow unbounded
Verified in-browser (R12): host + server terminals connect, accept keyboard input,
run commands, Tab-complete; cross-origin WS rejected; zero console errors. 9 feature
tests cover minting, the resolve spec, single-use burn, expiry, and locked creds.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- serve-request.test.sh: the push-fail case pointed origin at a dead https remote,
so _precheck's fetch failed first and the rollback path in _do_stage was never
reached (assertions passed trivially). Use a fetch-OK / push-rejecting remote
(pre-receive exit 1) so the commit+tag are created and _rollback genuinely runs;
also assert the tree is restored clean.
- clusev-release.sh: |\| true on the version extraction (defensive under pipefail).
- install.sh: make the release-unit install best-effort (if/then/warn) like the WG
block so a systemctl failure cannot abort the installer.
- .gitignore: ignore runtime run/ contents, keep the dir via run/.gitkeep.
- docker/release/README.md: dev-watcher runbook (the manual end-to-end gate).
- ReleaseBridgeTest: assert a rejected target writes no request file.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three things the operator asked for on the WireGuard page:
- DNS is no longer hardcoded to 1.1.1.1. New host action set-dns (_set_dns +
cmd_set_dns + write-bridge branch + WgBridge validation, IPv4 list only),
stored as WG_DNS in wg.env (appended for pre-existing tunnels), surfaced via
the collector + WgStatus, baked into new peer configs (DNS = ${WG_DNS:-1.1.1.1}).
Editable in the Server tab; e.g. point clients at your own gateway.
- The page is split into two independent tabs: "Peers" (list / add / remove /
traffic) and "Server configuration" (endpoint / DNS / port / subnet / gate /
SSH lock + server identity). #[Url] $tab makes it deep-linkable (?tab=server).
- Offline detection: ONLINE_WITHIN 180s -> 150s (PersistentKeepalive=25 keeps
active peers re-handshaking well within it, so no flapping; a disconnect now
shows offline ~2.5 min sooner). Endpoint hint clarified: the port is optional
(auto-appended), no need to repeat the listen port.
Tests: set-dns (write+audit, reject), tab switch/clamp, dns in status; the two
configured-render tests now switch to the server tab for server content. 353
pass, shellcheck clean, Pint clean, both tabs load 200 with no console errors,
lang parity 89/89.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
If the operator entered an endpoint without a port (e.g. "10.10.90.165"
instead of "10.10.90.165:51820"), that value was written verbatim into every
peer config. WireGuard requires the endpoint as host:port, so the WireGuard app
rejected the QR/file import as "keine gültige WireGuard-Konfiguration" — the
real cause of the invalid-config errors (the QR-size fix in 0.9.42 was secondary).
Normalise host-side: append the listen port when the endpoint has no colon, in
both _write_server_conf (setup — covers the dashboard and interactive paths) and
_set_endpoint (later changes). Verified: bare host -> host:port, host:port left
as-is, DNS host -> host:port; write-bridge smoke test still passes; shellcheck
clean. setup_endpoint_hint (de/en) now documents the host:port format.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The host handler `clusev-wg.sh serve-request` aborted under `set -euo pipefail`
BEFORE writing run/wg-result-<id>.json, so the dashboard waited ~30s and showed
"Keine Antwort vom Host" even though the systemd watcher was running correctly.
The write-bridge had therefore never actually worked on a real deployment.
Two root causes, both fixed:
1. Field extraction: each `id/action/name/endpoint/port/subnet` value is pulled
with `grep -oE | head | sed`. A field that is empty or absent (an "auto"
endpoint at setup; gate/add-peer/remove-peer payloads that carry no
endpoint/port/subnet) makes grep fail → with pipefail the whole pipeline
fails → `set -e` aborts the handler before _write_result. Appended `|| true`
to every extraction so a non-match yields "" instead of killing the handler.
2. Action dispatch: gate-up/gate-down/gate-ssh-on/off and set-endpoint/port/
subnet (and remove-peer) called helpers that run require_setup, which `die`s
(exit) when the tunnel isn't configured yet — aborting serve-request before
the reply. Each handler now runs in a subshell `( ... )` so an internal exit
becomes a caught non-zero and still yields a clean failure result.
(add-peer/setup were already isolated via their $(...) command substitution.)
Verified end-to-end: all ten actions now write a result for minimal/empty-field
payloads instead of timing out. New smoke test docker/wg/serve-request.test.sh
(root-bypassed, no WireGuard needed) guards both regressions. shellcheck clean,
348 PHP tests pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Verified dead-code + duplication cleanup over the WireGuard feature surface
(found via an audit workflow, every item adversarially re-verified by grep):
Dead code removed:
- lang keys not_configured_title / not_configured_body (both locales) — orphaned
when the unconfigured empty state became the in-page setup form (setup_title /
setup_intro). 0 references anywhere. de/en parity kept (83/83).
- WgTraffic::series() 'buckets' return key — written, never read by blade/route/test.
- blade $fmtB byte-formatter — byte-identical duplicate of the top-level $fmtBytes
already in scope; collapsed onto $fmtBytes.
DRY / readability (behavior-preserving):
- Index: PEER_NAME_RE constant (was the same regex literal at 5 sites), portInRange()
+ clampWindow() helpers (window default now self::WINDOWS[0]), openConfirm() helper
(5 confirm-modal openers shared one dispatch), onFlag() helper (2 apply handlers).
- WgBridge: validPort() helper (port check was duplicated verbatim).
- clusev-wg.sh: _write_server_conf() shared by both setup paths (the byte-identical
server bring-up was copy-pasted); single CIDR_RE constant for the 3 subnet checks;
fixed a stale header comment that still claimed SSH is "NEVER matched" (the v0.9.40
ssh-lock can match 22); documented the defence-in-depth re-validation in _set_*.
- WgStatus: documented server.pubkey is part of the /wg-status.json contract (kept).
No DB/migration changes (peer_name write-only column left intact — needs a
coordinated migration). 348 tests pass, shellcheck clean, Pint clean, R12 verified
in both the configured + unconfigured states (200, no console errors, no leaked
keys, traffic formatter renders 1.5 MB / 200 KB correctly).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two dashboard additions to the WireGuard page:
- Peer config download: the show-once new-client view gets a "Download"
button next to the QR code (streams clusev-wireguard.conf) plus an
inline hint explaining QR-on-phone vs download-on-PC import.
- SSH lock (port 22): an optional toggle in WireGuard settings that walls
off host SSH to the tunnel via a dedicated CLUSEV-WG-SSH chain on the
host INPUT chain. Fail-open by construction: ESTABLISHED,RELATED + lo +
wg0 + WG-subnet RETURN before the DROP (live sessions survive, SSH over
the tunnel stays open); _ssh_gate_on refuses while wg0 is down; the boot
unit's ConditionPathExists=wg0 and an in-function self-guard keep a
broken tunnel from ever applying the DROP; ssh_gate_apply re-validates
the subnet shape and fails open on a corrupt wg.env. Strong lock-out
warning shown inline AND in the confirm modal (recommend a backup peer).
New CLI escapes: clusev wg ssh-lock / ssh-unlock; clusev wg down clears
both gates. Panel gate and SSH gate are independent toggles.
Write-bridge: new gate-ssh-on/gate-ssh-off actions (no args, host
whitelist + ConfirmToken wgSshGate, single-use uid-bound). Status collector
now reports gate.ssh. Adversarial lock-out review: all 8 failure modes
refuted. 348 tests pass, shellcheck clean, Pint clean, R12 verified.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A checkout path containing shell syntax ($(), quotes) could otherwise inject
code into /usr/local/bin/clusev, which runs as root via 'sudo clusev update'.
Render the path through printf %q into an unquoted assignment; add a test that
a hostile path does not execute injected code.
- reverbClient() now returns wss://<domain>:443 when the active domain is being
served (the HTTPS front door), instead of deriving wss://host:80 from a request
that looks like plain HTTP:80 behind an external TLS proxy. Bare-IP recovery
stays plain ws.
- Caddy no longer redirects the /app/* /apps/* WS paths to https when the upstream
already terminated TLS (X-Forwarded-Proto: https) — that redirect broke the
WebSocket in external-proxy mode.
- The 'TLS active' status card no longer claims Let's Encrypt issuance in
external-proxy mode; it states TLS is provided by the upstream proxy.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add a host-watcher-backed update button on Version & Releases. The container
(no Docker socket) writes an update sentinel; a new root-run systemd unit
(clusev-update.path/.service) runs watch.sh update -> update.sh (git pull +
idempotent install). The sentinel is consumed before running so a persistent
failure can't loop the path unit.
The button only appears once a check finds a newer release, is per-user
throttled (3/10min, auto-expiring) and audited (deploy.update_request); the UI
warns the dashboard is briefly down during the rebuild. install.sh now installs
both the restart and update host units (update unit runs as root for
docker/systemd/apt).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add update.sh (sudo ./update.sh): git pull --ff-only (never discards local
changes), self-update via re-exec if the script itself changed, then hand off
to the idempotent install.sh non-interactively. Sets safe.directory so a
root-run pull works on the clusev-owned tree.
Fix install.sh so a non-interactive re-run (an update) no longer wipes a
configured domain / ACME e-mail: both now default to the existing .env value
when not supplied. First install (empty = bare IP) is unchanged.
README documents 'sudo ./update.sh'; the MOTD shows the update command.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Initial admin now uses the standard default password "clusev" (operator decision) with
must_change_password forcing a new password on first login; banner/MOTD/README tell the
operator to change it immediately. Idempotent no-op when an admin already exists.
- Richer host MOTD (CLUSEV wordmark, version, live stack status, login + management hints).
- README: install block now installs git (minimal Debian/Ubuntu lack it) and lists it as a
prerequisite — found by a full fresh-VM install test (install + idempotent re-run verified).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Validated install.sh end-to-end on a fresh Debian 13 VM (Docker apt install, clusev
user, image build, stack up, migrate, admin, MOTD) and a fully idempotent re-run.
Two follow-ups from that test:
- MOTD: replace the bare two-liner with an orange CLUSEV wordmark, the version, a LIVE
stack status ("X/Y Dienste aktiv", green/red via `docker compose ps` at each login),
the dashboard URL, a login hint (where the one-time credentials come from — no secret),
and management commands. install.sh substitutes __CLUSEV_URL__, __CLUSEV_VERSION__ and
__CLUSEV_COMPOSE__; the status lookup degrades to "unbekannt" and never fails a login.
- README: minimal Debian/Ubuntu images ship without `git`, so the documented `git clone`
failed before reaching the installer. The install block now installs git first and the
requirements note it. (curl is missing too but the installer self-installs it.)
Admin password strategy confirmed correct as-is: clusev:install generates a random
20-char password with must_change_password=true (forced rotation on first login) — kept
over a guessable default like "clusev", which would be a default-credential vuln and
would nullify the brute-force hardening.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Branding assets (public/, served directly):
- favicon.svg (scalable, primary), favicon.ico (16/32/48 PNG-embedded),
apple-touch-icon.png (180), icon-192/512.png, site.webmanifest. The mark is
the in-app brand glyph (orange Lucide "server" on dark). Wired into both
layouts via a shared partials/head-icons (rel=icon svg+ico, apple-touch,
manifest, theme-color #06080A). nginx serves the manifest as
application/manifest+json.
Never show raw error text (custom messages only):
- Custom branded resources/views/errors/{403,404,419,429,500,503}.blade.php on a
self-contained error layout (design tokens, brand mark, bilingual via
lang/errors.php) — replaces Laravel's default Symfony/whoops pages.
- docker-compose.prod.yml pins APP_DEBUG=false so a prod error can never render a
stack trace (the custom pages show instead).
- Files download error dispatched a bare $e->getMessage(); wrap it in the
localized files.download_failed (consistent with upload/delete).
Verified in-browser: icon links present + all assets 200; custom 404 renders the
branded German message (no raw "Not Found"/trace), responsive at 375, 0 console.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
boban