Automatic updates are a choice, not a security gate: the unattended row now
reports secure=true always and carries a `neutral` flag. The checklist renders
it muted (aktiv/inaktiv) instead of the green/orange SICHER/OFFEN verdict, so
"off" is never flagged as insecure. Detection is unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The hardening checklist read "installed" from the package manager alone
(dpkg `^ii` / rpm `-q`), so it disagreed with the live fail2ban/firewall
panels, which use `command -v` + `systemctl is-active`. On a host where the
component is genuinely present but not recorded as an apt `^ii` package —
installed from source, or left in dpkg `rc` (config-only) state — the
checklist showed `nicht installiert` while the panel reported it active with
real bans (the reported contradiction).
The installed probe now ORs three conditions: the package-manager test, the
client binary on PATH, and the service already running. Since a component can
never be active without being installed, this only removes FALSE negatives —
it can never produce a false positive. Detection is now consistent with
Fail2banService::status and FirewallTool. Applies to both fail2ban and the
firewall (ufw/firewalld).
Adds HardeningServiceTest covering the Debian/apt source-install fallback:
the emitted probe gains `command -v fail2ban-client` and `dpkg -l ufw`, and an
active component reads as featureOn.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
boban