Commit Graph

2 Commits (55c3975d5377779ab2be44f25db3255032e34e8b)

Author SHA1 Message Date
boban e38409bf31 security: harden proxy trust + model mass-assignment + terminal-token log hygiene
Fixes from the security audit (the brute-force/rate-limiting angle matters more now that the
password policy is min(6)/no-complexity, so IP-keyed throttles must not be spoofable):

- bootstrap/app.php: trustProxies(at: '*') → trust only PRIVATE ranges in prod. Caddy reaches
  app:80 from the docker bridge (private IP) so it stays trusted, but a public/off-network source
  can no longer forge X-Forwarded-For to spoof request()->ip() and bypass the login/2FA/forgot
  throttles + the brute-force ban.
- TerminalSession + HostCredential: replace $guarded=[] with an explicit $fillable allowlist; add
  $hidden=[secret,passphrase] to HostCredential so it never serializes its credential fields.
- nginx /terminal/ws: access_log off — the single-use session token rode the query string into the
  access log.

Verified: full suite 467 pass; all panel pages 200 with zero console errors; server terminal still
connects + runs commands.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-26 07:16:10 +02:00
boban 07fe404ce9 feat(terminal): web terminal — per-server SSH + Clusev host PTY (xterm.js + node sidecar)
A dedicated /terminal page with a target rail: one terminal per fleet server (SSH)
plus one for the Clusev host itself. php-fpm cannot hold an interactive PTY, so a
small Node sidecar (ws + ssh2 + node-pty) bridges xterm.js to the PTY.

Flow: the Livewire page mints a single-use, 60s TerminalSession token and dispatches
it to an Alpine xterm island; the browser opens a same-origin WS (/terminal/ws,
proxied by nginx in dev / Caddy in prod to terminal:3000); the sidecar burns the
token at an internal resolve endpoint (shared-secret header, private network only)
for a connection spec, then opens an SSH PTY (decrypted credential, never sent to the
browser) or a local host PTY. Real shell = native Tab/Shift-Tab completion.

Security:
- token burned ATOMICALLY (single conditional UPDATE) — no double-open race
- resolve endpoint guarded by hash_equals shared secret, exempt from CSRF + PanelScheme
  host enforcement (private net only), returns decrypted creds over the internal net
- sidecar enforces same-origin on the WS upgrade (hostname match, port-agnostic)
- single-use 60s tokens, swept daily so the table can't grow unbounded

Verified in-browser (R12): host + server terminals connect, accept keyboard input,
run commands, Tab-complete; cross-origin WS rejected; zero console errors. 9 feature
tests cover minting, the resolve spec, single-use burn, expiry, and locked creds.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-25 03:21:10 +02:00