Add a host-watcher-backed update button on Version & Releases. The container
(no Docker socket) writes an update sentinel; a new root-run systemd unit
(clusev-update.path/.service) runs watch.sh update -> update.sh (git pull +
idempotent install). The sentinel is consumed before running so a persistent
failure can't loop the path unit.
The button only appears once a check finds a newer release, is per-user
throttled (3/10min, auto-expiring) and audited (deploy.update_request); the UI
warns the dashboard is briefly down during the rebuild. install.sh now installs
both the restart and update host units (update unit runs as root for
docker/systemd/apt).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
For the common case where a domain was configured before its DNS pointed here, the
operator can now request the Let's Encrypt cert from System -> Domain & TLS instead of
waiting for the first HTTPS visitor:
- DeploymentService::requestCertificate() does a DNS pre-check (domainResolvesHere via
dns_get_record vs serverPublicIp) and, only when DNS is NOT a clear mismatch, triggers
Caddy's on-demand issuance with an internal handshake (probeCertificate:
`curl --connect-to <domain>:443:caddy:443` — the dial target is pinned to the caddy
service, the domain only sets SNI/Host, so no SSRF). A clear mismatch returns early and
never calls ACME (Let's Encrypt rate-limit protection). The outcome is persisted to the
`tls_cert_status` Setting so the page shows a status without an ACME-triggering probe on
every load.
- System\Index::requestCertificate() is per-user throttled (cert-request:<id>, 5/10min,
auto-expiring -> never a control-plane lockout) and audited (tls.cert_request). The
status line + button render only in caddy mode with an active domain; external mode
shows a note; bare IP hides it.
Automatic on-demand still works on the first HTTPS handshake regardless — this only adds
explicit control + a status. Tests cover the no-handshake-on-mismatch guard, the
issued/failed/not-applicable states, and the per-user throttle. Full suite 192 green;
Codex clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Journal was a one-time snapshot mislabeled "journalctl -f": it loaded the last
N lines once and never refreshed, so it was neither live nor complete.
- FleetService: `journalctl --show-cursor` + new journalSince() reads only entries
after the stored journald cursor (no gaps, no dup appends), capped to a bounded
live tail; parseJournal split into splitJournalCursor + parseJournalLines.
- Services\Index: pollJournal() (wire:poll.5s) appends new entries since the cursor
and caps retained rows at 300 (fetch ceiling == display ceiling).
- Honest labels: drop the misleading "-f"; badge stays "live" (now true).
Command palette (Strg/⌘ K) can now jump to a server: the fleet feeds the Alpine
cmdk x-data; servers surface only while searching, matched on name OR IP, and
selecting one navigates to /servers/<uuid>.
Cursor is validated (^[a-z0-9;=]+$) and single-quoted before the remote shell —
no injection (Codex-reviewed: no P1, no security findings). Removes stock
ExampleTest (asserted 200 on an auth-gated route → always 302).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Swap the strict counter checker for a zero-tolerant one so platform
authenticators / synced passkeys (which always report counter 0) can assert,
while non-zero counters still must strictly increase (clone detection).
- Guard registration (options + register) and the UI on hasTwoFactorEnabled, so a
key is never created against a disabled/reset second factor.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- credential_id can exceed the unique-index key length; store it in TEXT and
enforce uniqueness on an auto-derived sha256 hash column (lookups use the hash).
- Disabling 2FA now also deletes the user's security keys + backup codes, so
re-enrolling starts clean and old factors never silently revive.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Persist the updated PublicKeyCredentialSource (not just the sign_count column)
so the next assertion validates against the latest counter — keeping the
library's cloned-authenticator / counter-rollback detection effective.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
WebauthnService builds creation/request options (rpId = active domain, ES256/RS256,
attestation none, exclude/allow lists) via web-auth/webauthn-lib v5, stores the
challenge in the session, and verifies attestation/assertion responses (allowed
origin = https://<rpId>, sign-count tracked). Option building + serialization are
unit-tested; the cryptographic verify path is browser-verified on a domain host.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
WebAuthn is offered only with an active domain (the rpId) over HTTPS; bare-IP/HTTP
returns false so a ceremony never runs with an invalid IP rpId.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Auth success alone does not prove the server can run commands (a server that
authenticates but rejects exec channels would be accepted, yet every fleet
operation runs commands). The probe now echoes a unique marker and requires it
in the output — proving exec works, while still tolerating servers that omit
the optional exit-status packet.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
testConnection gated success on `exit code === 0`, but phpseclib returns false
from getExitStatus() when a server omits the optional exit-status message, which
would reject a valid login with an empty error. A successful connect() already
proves the credential (it throws on auth failure), so the probe now succeeds on
any exception-free connect + exec.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Connect + trivial exec against a server's stored credential; never throws,
returns {ok,error}. Used by the create-server guard to verify the SSH login
before persisting.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Automatic updates are a choice, not a security gate: the unattended row now
reports secure=true always and carries a `neutral` flag. The checklist renders
it muted (aktiv/inaktiv) instead of the green/orange SICHER/OFFEN verdict, so
"off" is never flagged as insecure. Detection is unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The hardening checklist read "installed" from the package manager alone
(dpkg `^ii` / rpm `-q`), so it disagreed with the live fail2ban/firewall
panels, which use `command -v` + `systemctl is-active`. On a host where the
component is genuinely present but not recorded as an apt `^ii` package —
installed from source, or left in dpkg `rc` (config-only) state — the
checklist showed `nicht installiert` while the panel reported it active with
real bans (the reported contradiction).
The installed probe now ORs three conditions: the package-manager test, the
client binary on PATH, and the service already running. Since a component can
never be active without being installed, this only removes FALSE negatives —
it can never produce a false positive. Detection is now consistent with
Fail2banService::status and FirewallTool. Applies to both fail2ban and the
firewall (ufw/firewalld).
Adds HardeningServiceTest covering the Debian/apt source-install fallback:
the emitted probe gains `command -v fail2ban-client` and `dpkg -l ufw`, and an
active component reads as featureOn.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The panel domain is editable on the System page again — safely this time. It is
stored in the DB (Setting `panel_domain`, overriding install-time APP_DOMAIN) and
APPLIED ON RESTART, never mid-session: a snapshot file (storage/framework/active-domain)
is frozen at container start by the entrypoint (`clusev:snapshot-domain`), so saving a
new domain only takes effect after `docker compose ... restart`.
How it works
- DeploymentService: pending (configuredDomain, DB) vs active (domain(), snapshot file);
setDomain() persists; restartPending() drives the UI notice. Snapshot reads the DB
DIRECTLY (cache-independent) and retries until the settings table is readable; if it
never is, it freezes the env fallback so the active domain is always a FIXED value
(never a live one that could shift after startup).
- AppServiceProvider: derives app.url from the active domain at boot; pins server->Reverb
publishing to the internal reverb:8080 (domain/cert-independent).
- Caddy: on-demand TLS gated by /_caddy/ask (issues a cert only for the configured
domain); HTTP always served for bare-IP recovery; /app,/apps forced to HTTPS for any
hostname (plaintext only on a bare IP).
- Reverb client endpoint is derived from the live request and rides the same front door
(/app tunnel — Caddy in prod, nginx in dev), so realtime follows a domain change with
no JS rebuild and no stale .env value.
- System page: domain form + R5 confirm + "restart required" notice with the exact
command; DE/EN strings (R16).
Anti-lockout / security
- session.secure + the HTTPS redirect follow the real request scheme; bare-IP HTTP is
always a recovery path. trustProxies('*') only in production (dev can't be tricked into
faking HTTPS via X-Forwarded-*). When a domain is active only that domain (HTTPS) and
the literal server IP (HTTP) serve the panel; any other/stale host is refused (404),
and IP-recovery redirects stay on the IP.
Bump 0.3.0 -> 0.4.0; CHANGELOG. Follow-up tracked: make the public `metrics` broadcast
channel private (wire broadcasting auth).
Verified: Pint clean; npm build; Caddyfile validates; R12 all routes 200 + 0 console
errors; Echo connects via the unified /app tunnel; domain set/clear + restart-gating +
/_caddy/ask (200 active / 403 other) + host-enforcement matrix all confirmed in dev;
Codex review iterated to no actionable in-scope findings; 14-agent adversarial
lockout/security review (real trustProxies finding fixed).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Per operator feedback ("das soll automatisch sein, die Caddy-Config muss man nicht
sehen, nur 'SSL steht'"):
- TLS is fully automatic via Caddy (auto-issue + auto-renew + HTTP→HTTPS). The System
page now shows only the STATUS (domain + access URL) — the generated Caddy config and
the manual `caddy reload` command are gone, and the domain/email edit form is removed.
- The panel domain is an INSTALL-TIME value (APP_DOMAIN → config('clusev.domain')), so it
stays consistent with APP_URL, the Reverb (wss) endpoint and cookie security — none of
which can be re-derived at runtime (Caddy's site address + the browser's Reverb host are
fixed at install/build, and .env is never rewritten). DeploymentService is now read-only.
- Removed AppServiceProvider's runtime app.url override (it let a stale DB value shadow the
install-time URL). Migration drops the inert empty dashboard_domain/dashboard_email rows
(a real configured value is preserved as history; re-apply via install.sh — see CHANGELOG).
- Hardening checklist: all toggle buttons share one style (secondary/bordered) instead of
varying with state (R10).
Bump 0.2.0 -> 0.2.1 + CHANGELOG. Pint clean; Codex reviewed (the remaining note is a
deliberate install-time-domain tradeoff — a runtime/DB domain cannot be served by the
templated Caddy without a false "TLS active" status); R12 — system/server-show/dashboard
HTTP 200, 0 console errors, raw config + edit form gone, buttons uniform.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Addresses "ich sehe nicht welche IPs gebannt sind / entsperren / whitelist". The
server-detail page gains a "fail2ban-Status" panel.
New Fail2banService (owns all fail2ban I/O):
- status(): jails with currently/total failed+banned + the banned IP list, plus the
whitelist; sentinel-guarded, and a CLIENT_OK marker so an active service whose
fail2ban-client query fails is reported as a read error, not "0 jails".
- unban() (idempotent: "not banned" = success), manual ban() GUARDED against loopback
(whole 127.0.0.0/8 + ::1) and Clusev's own SSH source (canonical inet_pton compare).
- readConfig()/writeTuning()/writeIgnoreip(): tuning and whitelist live in SEPARATE
zz- drop-ins and each writes only its own keys, so a whitelist change can never
rewrite the ban policy (and vice-versa). The legacy single-file zz-clusev.local is
removed on tuning save (migration). ignoreip is preserved VERBATIM (hostnames/CIDRs,
continuation lines) — loopback always re-seeded; add/remove report no-ops so the
audit only records real changes.
UI: jails + banned IPs each with "Entsperren" (direct, audited), whitelist editor
(add/remove, audited), "IP sperren" via an R5 modal (modals.fail2ban-ban). Jail/IP
args are Js::from()-encoded (remote-sourced, injection-safe). Direct handlers catch
SSH failures. Tuning modal migrated to Fail2banService.writeTuning.
MaintenanceService slimmed to package updates only (fail2ban moved out).
Pint clean; Codex review clean (IPv6 guard, verbatim ignoreip, decoupled drop-ins,
legacy migration, read-error detection all hardened); R12 — server-detail HTTP 200,
0 console errors, fail2ban panel + jail + whitelist render.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The server-detail page gains a "Firewall-Regeln" panel — addressing "ich kann nur
aktivieren, sonst nichts": list rules, add, and delete, with hard SSH-lockout guards.
FirewallService:
- status(): one privileged read — installed/active, default policies, and the rule
list. ufw rules come from `ufw show added` (add-syntax, works active OR inactive),
defaults from /etc/default/ufw; a CLUSEV_FWREAD_OK sentinel + a "Status:" check
distinguish a real read from a failed/empty one.
- addRule(): validated action/proto/port/from (proto before `from`, ufw grammar);
refuses deny/reject on the SSH port or portless (would block all inbound).
- deleteRule(): whitelists the spec against rules ufw actually reported (injection-
proof — a forged spec can't match), deletes by spec (race-free, no rule number),
guards SSH-port allow rules incl. ranges and trailing comments, distinguishes
not_found from a real deletion so the audit only records true deletions.
firewalld is READ-ONLY this release: status() reads the runtime state of every active
zone (ports/services/rich rules, zone-attributed), rule mutation is refused with a
German note. on/off + hardening (Phase A) still work.
UI: x-panel with default-policy badges, "+ Regel" (modal modals.firewall-rule), per-
rule delete via R5 ConfirmAction (audit deferred to the real outcome), graceful
read-error / not-installed / inactive / firewalld-read-only states.
Fix: the firewall row's tone variable was renamed $tone -> $ruleTone — the page-level
$tone is a closure used by the gauges/Volumes panel; reusing the name clobbered it and
500'd the page below the firewall block. R12 now confirms the full loaded page.
Default-policy EDITING was intentionally not exposed (highest lockout risk).
Pint clean; Codex review clean; R12 — server-detail HTTP 200, 0 console errors,
firewall panel + rules + volumes all render.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Foundation so Clusev no longer assumes Debian/apt/ufw/systemd. A host's OS is
resolved once (cached) and every package/firewall/service decision asks it.
New app/Support/Os/:
- OsProfile — family + package manager + firewall tool + service manager, plus
supports(feature) returning NULL or a German reason (graceful degradation).
- OsDetector — one unprivileged probe (/etc/os-release + `command -v` with sbin on
PATH + which firewall is RUNNING); family from ID/ID_LIKE cross-checked against
installed binaries; cached 1h (60s when nothing detected). Readability-guards the
`.` source so a host without /etc/os-release still falls back by package manager.
- PackageManager — apt/dnf/zypper command strings (pending count, apply, install,
is-installed); zypper exit 102/103 normalized to success.
- FirewallTool — ufw + firewalld enable/disable. firewalld opens ssh/80/443 in the
PERMANENT config BEFORE the daemon starts filtering (handles running + stopped),
preserving the no-lockout guard for custom SSH ports.
Integration:
- FirewallService enable/disable now OS-aware (ufw or firewalld) with a support gate.
- MaintenanceService: hasApt -> updateSupport(); pendingUpdates() + applyUpgrades()
across managers (dnf check-update exit 100 handled).
- HardeningService: state()/commandFor() per-OS (dpkg vs rpm, ufw vs firewalld, apt
periodic vs dnf-automatic; yum-only hosts gate auto-updates). Each row carries
supported/reason; unsupported features render muted with a German note instead of
a toggle. apply() refuses unsupported features gracefully.
- Server-Details surfaces the detected System / package manager / firewall.
- SystemUpdate modal + view: OS-neutral copy; audit action system.package_upgrade.
Arch (pacman) & Alpine (apk/OpenRC) are detected and gracefully disabled where
unsupported. Debian/ufw/systemd path verified behaviourally identical on the live
fleet. Pint clean; Codex review clean (fixed firewalld lockout + os-release guard +
yum/dual-firewall/zypper edge cases); R12 — 9 routes 200, 0 console errors.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Operator feedback: no way to add servers; irrelevant storage-internals text; fail2ban
only on/off; raw shell commands shown; no apt update/upgrade.
- Add server: CreateServer modal (name, IP/host, SSH port, user, password|key, optional
label) on the Servers index → creates server + encrypted credential ATOMICALLY (DB
transaction). Strict IP/hostname validation (filter_var + hostname; rejects 999.x, ':').
- System updates (Debian/Ubuntu only): MaintenanceService + SystemUpdate modal — shows the
pending-update count (or "unbekannt" when undeterminable) and runs apt update && upgrade
as root; gated to apt hosts.
- fail2ban configuration: Fail2banConfig modal — Sperrdauer / Max. Fehlversuche / Zeitfenster,
written to a Clusev-owned jail.d drop-in (zz-clusev.local, last-wins; never touches the
operator's jail.local/jails). Durations kept verbatim in fail2ban's native grammar
(600, 10m, 1h 30m, -1). Reads the EFFECTIVE [DEFAULT] across files; refuses to save when the
current policy couldn't be read (no overwrite with unseen defaults); reloads fail2ban only
when already active (never starts it).
- Modals: removed the raw "Befehle (als root)" preview + raw stdout dumps from the hardening
modal — clean German description + result only.
- System page: dropped the .env/Datenbank storage-internals callout (irrelevant to the user).
R15 — Codex gate: `codex review --uncommitted` run iteratively; fixed every finding across 9
rounds (fail2ban jail clobbering, section/precedence, composite/-1 durations, reload-starting-
inactive, read-failure propagation, glob exit code, apt-count failure, atomic server create,
IP validation) until clean — 0 security issues throughout. Live-verified on 10.10.90.162;
R12: Servers/Detail/System 200 / 0 console errors, modals open, hardening modal shows no commands.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Rework the server-hardening UX per operator feedback ("only activate, can't
deactivate or adjust, UFW won't even activate, is the existing state read?").
- Bidirectional toggles: each item (SSH root-login, SSH password-login, fail2ban,
UFW, unattended-upgrades) is a clean Aktivieren/Deaktivieren toggle driven by the
live feature state, not a one-shot "Anwenden".
- Real state read (HardeningService::state, privileged): SSH from `sshd -T` (the
EFFECTIVE config — honours Include order + Match blocks), UFW from `ufw status`,
unattended from `apt-config dump` (effective periodic value), packages via dpkg —
so nicht-installiert / inaktiv / aktiv are detected; a feature counts as "secure"
only when installed AND active.
- UFW activation installs ufw if missing (fixes "ufw: not found"); opens the detected
sshd port + 80/443 before `ufw --force enable`; adds disable().
- SSH drop-in renamed 00-clusev.conf (sorts + wins first); apt periodic written to a
last-winning 99zz-clusev file. Long timeout for apt installs.
- preview() returns the EXACT command apply() runs (single source — no drift between
the confirmation preview and the executed mutation). Password-disable lock-out guard
intact (refused when Clusev uses password auth or no key exists).
R15 — Codex review gate: `codex review --uncommitted` run iteratively; fixed every
finding across 5 rounds (drop-in precedence, apt periodic config, preview/apply drift,
ufw status detection, privileged-read error handling, stale-config secure state) until
"no actionable regressions". 0 security issues throughout.
Live-verified on 10.10.90.162: state via sshd -T (effective), fail2ban + unattended
toggled on/off both ways, ufw installed + state reflects, lock-out guard refuses
disabling password auth. R12: server detail 200 / 0 console errors, toggles render.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- fix(hardening): fail2ban/unattended apt installs failed because the 12s SSH timeout
aborted the package download. runPrivileged/runPlain take a $timeout; apt actions use
600s. Live-verified: fail2ban installs + is active/enabled on 10.10.90.162.
- feat(release): cut the foundation as the first real semantic release v0.1.0 (no more
-dev). CHANGELOG is Keep-a-Changelog BY VERSION; the Versions page parses it by version,
reads the newest git TAG as "latest release", and honestly compares installed vs latest
in the channel. Channels reduced to stable|beta (no user-facing dev); System clamps a
legacy value back to stable. Tagged v0.1.0.
- fix(domain/.env): the panel domain lives in the DATABASE (Settings); the app never
rewrites .env. AppServiceProvider overrides config('app.url') at runtime from the Setting
(guarded against a missing table); /system states this explicitly. Caddy config is a
standalone generated file; a Caddy reload is the only infra step.
- docs(arch): Caddy is the prod-only TLS reverse proxy IN FRONT of the app container's
nginx (Internet -> Caddy:443 -> nginx:80 -> php-fpm); no Caddy in dev.
- R15 (rules.md + CLAUDE.md): Codex must review every change for errors + security before
"done". The Codex CLI is not installed in this runtime (needs `sudo npm i -g @openai/codex`
+ `/codex:setup`); an independent adversarial security review of this diff returned CLEAN
(no vulnerabilities, no bugs) as the interim gate.
Verified (R12): /system + /versions 200 / 0 console errors; channels stable|beta only,
DB-not-.env callout; versions by-version with v0.1.0; app.url override resolves from the
Setting; fail2ban live install ok.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Security pivot — make server hardening, SSH access, firewall, dashboard domain/TLS
and the release channel controllable from the dashboard (no SSH needed), with guards
so a remote change can never lock the operator out.
Foundation
- ssh_credentials gains name + disabled_at + last_used_at; CredentialVault refuses a
disabled credential. New key/value Setting model. FleetService::runPrivileged() /
runPlain() — central sudo-aware exec (base64-wrapped sh -c), live-verified as root.
A · control-plane self-hardening
- SecurityHeaders middleware: env-aware CSP (allows the Vite dev origin in dev, strict
same-origin in prod), X-Frame-Options DENY, nosniff, Referrer/Permissions-Policy,
HSTS when secure. 2FA brute-force throttle (5/60s). install.sh sets
SESSION_SAME_SITE=strict + EXPIRE_ON_CLOSE + SECURE_COOKIE (only behind TLS).
B · SSH credential management
- name/label on the access; a credential card on the server page with Bearbeiten /
Sperren-Entsperren (kill-switch) / Löschen (R5), all audited.
C · server hardening from the dashboard (guards + confirmation)
- HardeningService (PermitRootLogin no, PasswordAuthentication no, fail2ban,
unattended-upgrades) + FirewallService (UFW). HardeningAction modal previews the
exact root commands before applying. GUARDS: refuse to disable password-login when
Clusev itself logs in by password or no key exists; UFW opens the real sshd port +
80/443 before enabling. Live-verified non-destructively (previews, the password
guard refusing, ufw status read).
D+E · System page (/system)
- Dashboard Domain + Let's-Encrypt email (Setting) -> DeploymentService renders the
matching Caddy site block (honest: stages the file + shows the reload command, never
fakes TLS). Release channel (stable|beta|dev) configurable; Versions reads it.
Built largely by 4 parallel agents into disjoint files; shared files integrated + the
security-critical bits hardened by hand (the password-auth lock-out guard + env-aware CSP).
Verified (R12): /system + server detail + all 8 routes 200 / 0 console errors (CSP does
not break Livewire/Alpine/Vite); credential card + 5 hardening "Anwenden" buttons render;
the hardening modal opens with the command preview; System persists domain/channel +
renders valid Caddy config; runPrivileged runs as root + the vault refuses disabled creds.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Service control now works with a sudo-PASSWORD credential (not only NOPASSWD):
FleetService::sudoFn() defines a remote priv() that feeds the vaulted password to
`sudo -S` over stdin (base64 over the encrypted channel, never on the argv) when not
root, else falls back to sudo -n. Verified LIVE on 10.10.90.162: cron restart/stop/
start executed for real (ActiveEnterTimestamp advanced to now, is-active=inactive
after stop, restarted clean), journal reads real entries via sudo.
- Login brand panel: removed fabricated telemetry — fake "24 Hosts erreichbar",
"cpu 31% mem 48% load 0.86", "clusev connect 10.10.90.0/24". Replaced with true
capability lines (agentless SSH/phpseclib, TOFU host-key pinning, 2FA, audit log,
AGPL). Only real claims now (per "nur eintragen was auch wirklich geht").
- New Version & Releases page (/versions, EN route per R13) with REAL data only:
version from config/clusev.php, build SHA + branch read from .git at runtime,
changelog parsed from a real CHANGELOG.md, real Gitea repo + AGPL license, honest
update path (deploy commands) — NO fake updater / stars / forks / CVEs / "update
available v2.5.0". Sidebar nav + tag/git-branch icons added.
- Dummy-data sweep (12-auditor workflow + adversarial verify): 1 confirmed finding —
removed the unused sine/cosine series() fake-sparkline generator in Dashboard.php;
also fixed a stale "static seed" chart comment and a stale "mock listing" comment;
derived the versions repo label from config (DRY). 5 false positives dismissed.
Verified (R12): /login + /versions + all 7 routes 200 / 0 console errors; login
fake-metrics gone + honest lines + fonts load; versions shows real version/build/
changelog/repo with zero fabricated stats.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Full feedback round — all browser-verified (R12: 7 routes 200, zero console errors)
and functionally tested live against the target host.
- Metrics are real AND honest: poller now stores cpu/mem/DISK/LOAD history (all
four sparklines real, not synthetic); KPIs show absolute context (Memory
"1,9 / 7,8 GB", Disk "13 / 80 GB", Load "4 Kerne"); tiles are status-coloured
and Load is rated against core count (so "yellow" actually means load≈0.7-1.0×
cores), not a fixed warning tint.
- File manager is functional: Hochladen (Livewire upload -> SFTP put), Download
(SFTP get -> streamed), and view/edit (new FileEditor modal: SFTP get, binary/
size guards, SFTP put on save + audit). File names + Bearbeiten open the editor.
- Settings redesigned (/frontend-design): account identity header + section nav
(Profil / Sicherheit) instead of flat stacked panels.
- Routes are English (R13): /einstellungen -> /settings; rule added to rules.md +
CLAUDE.md. Dummy data removed: the topbar "Flotte online / Uptime 42d" + dead
bell button are gone, replaced by a real "<online>/<total> online" pill.
New: app/Livewire/Modals/FileEditor + view; FleetService get/read/write/upload +
Sftp putFromFile/size.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Service start/stop/restart now run over SSH (root direct, else `sudo -n`) and
report the real result instead of an optimistic state flip; the Services list is
reloaded afterwards to reflect the actual unit state. journalctl in systemd() is
likewise run via sudo/root so the full system journal is available once a
privileged credential exists. Unit names are validated before interpolation.
Without a privileged credential the action fails honestly ("sudo: a password is
required") rather than pretending to succeed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Make the panel actually operate the server, not just display it — for everything
that works in the SSH user's own space (no sudo required).
- FleetService: addAuthorizedKey (append, dedup, perms-safe via base64 transport),
removeAuthorizedKey (by SHA256 fingerprint, preserves every other key — never
rewrites blindly, no lockout), sshKeys (reload), deleteFile (SFTP unlink).
- AddSshKey form modal: paste a public key -> appended over SSH + AuditEvent +
list reload. Wired to the "Schlüssel hinzufügen" button on Server-Details.
- Server-Details: key removal now performs the real SSH removal then reloads;
new "Dateien" button opens the file manager scoped to this server.
- Files: delete performs the real SFTP unlink then reloads the directory.
Verified live: add+remove of a throwaway key leaves the existing key intact;
real file delete confirmed gone. systemctl start/stop/restart still need a
privileged credential (the demo account has no passwordless sudo).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Addresses "chart/gauges don't update" and "design": the visible live layer no
longer depends on the Reverb WS path (which was unreliable through the dev NAT).
- Poller is now the single SSH metrics source: FleetService::applyMetrics writes
the latest reading + a rolling cpu/mem history into the cache (and the DB).
- Dashboard reads latest + history from cache (no SSH on web render); the big
chart and KPI sparklines render real history; wire:poll.10s refreshes them.
- Server-Details gauges read the poller-updated row via wire:poll.10s; the donut
rings get a size="lg" variant (h-24) so they read clearly + animate.
- FleetSeeder no longer seeds a fake fleet (those servers had no credentials and
showed no data). It seeds one real server from CLUSEV_DEMO_SSH_* env vars, or
an empty fleet otherwise. Existing fake servers removed from the demo DB.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Resolve all 12 confirmed findings from the SSH-integration review.
Security:
- TOFU host-key pinning (new VerifiesHostKey trait + servers.ssh_host_key column):
SshClient/Sftp record the server host key on first connect and refuse the
connection on any later mismatch — phpseclib does not pin host keys itself.
- PollMetrics keeps one long-lived SSH connection per server and reuses it across
ticks (a single login, not one per interval) — avoids fail2ban/auth-log churn;
dead connections are dropped and re-established next tick.
- @js() escaping for every server-controlled value interpolated into wire:click
(file names, paths, service names, SSH-key comments/fingerprints) — prevents
JS-string breakage / injection from untrusted remote data.
Correctness:
- parseKeys regex makes the key comment optional (keys without a comment were
silently dropped).
- parseVolumes pops the three trailing single-token df fields and rejoins the
rest, so mount points containing spaces parse correctly.
- Sftp gains a disconnect() method to match SshClient (explicit cleanup).
Rules:
- Services "Start" -> "Starten" (R9, German).
- Files breadcrumb buttons get min-w-11 + padding (R7, >=44px touch target).
Verified live: host key stored + mismatch refused + correct key reconnects;
poller reuse polls ok; all pages still render real data.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replace the page mock data with real reads from the target host via the
phpseclib SSH layer. New FleetService parses raw command output into the exact
shapes the Livewire pages already consume; all parsing forces LC_ALL=C and reads
/proc to stay locale-independent.
- app/Services/FleetService.php: metrics (cpu via two /proc/stat samples, mem via
/proc/meminfo, disk via df), full snapshot (identity/specs incl. virt+disk_gb,
volumes, interfaces from ip+/proc/net/dev, sshd/fail2ban/ufw hardening, authorized
keys), systemd units + journal, and an ls-based directory listing. One compound
command per read; connect/parse failures bubble up.
- clusev:poll-metrics command replaces the mock emitter in the dev supervisor:
polls every credentialed server, persists cpu/mem/disk/status, broadcasts
MetricsTicked(server) — unreachable boxes flagged offline, loop never dies.
- Pages wired with graceful failure (offline state, never a 500):
Dashboard (live cached metrics + notable units), Services (real units+journal),
Files (real listing + dir navigation via open/go/up), Server-Details (live
snapshot persisted onto the row + offline banner).
- WithFleetContext prefers a credentialed, non-offline server as the default.
- dualChart filters ticks by server name so the chart tracks the active host.
Verified live against a real Debian 13 box: metrics/services(91)/journal(25)/
files(navigable)/snapshot(5 ifaces, real hardening, real key) all parse correctly.
Credentials are stored encrypted in the vault — never in source.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
boban