Security re-audit + adversarial red-team of the honeypot deception and
brute-force ban layer. Fixes (all with regression tests):
HoneypotController::trap
- BAN EVASION: keyed ban off getRealMethod() not isMethod('post') — the
latter honors _method / X-HTTP-Method-Override, so a POST spoofed as PUT
dodged the ban entirely. Now any non-safe verb to a decoy bans.
- REFLECTED-BAN vs EVASION: removed the Origin-based skip; the Origin header
is attacker-controlled, so it was a trivial universal ban-evasion (send a
foreign Origin) worse than the narrow griefing it prevented.
- UNMASK/500: mb_scrub all attacker-controlled meta (ua/query/path/creds) so
invalid UTF-8 can't throw JsonEncodingException on the array-cast column.
- Ban now runs FIRST and independently of the audit (separate guarded
try/catch) so a failing audit can never skip the ban; deceive() always 200.
- AUDIT DoS: per-IP hourly cap via atomic Cache::add(0)+increment.
DetectHoneytoken::trip
- Same guarded ban-first / audit-second structure + per-IP audit cap
(bounds an exempt or rotating source) + mb_scrub on the path.
BruteforceGuard::banNow
- Dedup the auth.ip_banned audit per IP+reason on a 60s window (was
full bantime): collapses the scanner flood without masking a legitimate
re-ban after an operator unban, and still audits distinct reasons.
Supply-chain / release / dashboard
- Pin prod base images (caddy/mariadb/redis) by @sha256 digest.
- Atomic branch+tag push in clusev-release.sh (no orphan untagged commit).
- Route github.ref_name through a validated $TAG env in ci-staging.yml.
- Strip inline credentials from the origin URL in set-repository-url.sh
(greedy match handles an @ inside the password).
- WireGuard peer name via Js::from in wire:click; settings badge shows the
real role; Threats pill/top_ip account for honeypot_login attempts.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Review found the build fallback could inherit a stale digest pin (compose build aborts), a slash-shaped/non-ghcr lock ref caused a doomed pull, env mode never persisted the pin (host restart used a nonexistent default tag), and the resolver test was unlinted/unrun in CI. Resolver now always leaves a coherent pin, validates ghcr.io/<owner>/<name>@sha256 refs only, exports the mode flag (drops the file-level shellcheck disable), and CI lints + runs the script unit tests.
Backbone sub-project #1, CI half (verified with actionlint; the runtime proof is
the first rc/stable tag push — these jobs cannot run locally).
- ci-staging.yml:
- new `images` job (needs: test): buildx builds clusev-app (Dockerfile) +
clusev-terminal (docker/terminal/Dockerfile) → private GHCR, tagged by
version; then a framework smoke-boot (`php artisan route:list`) so a class
stripped by export-ignore that is still reachable on boot fails before promote.
- `deploy-staging` widened to any tag; pulls the CI-built private image
(CLUSEV_IMAGE/CLUSEV_TERMINAL_IMAGE + CLUSEV_PULL=1) instead of building.
- new gated `promote` job (needs: [test, images], if success + stable vX.Y.Z,
no -rc): copy the exact image digests to the public GHCR, run promote.sh
(leak-guard + export-ignore tree), write release-images.lock, push code+tag.
- promote-public.yml: repurposed as a guarded manual fallback mirroring the auto
promote (image copy + lock + guard). Dropped the "beta channel" naming.
- promote-stable.yml: removed (no beta→stable step in a single-channel model).
Deploy inputs are GitHub vars/secrets (GHCR_OWNER, PUBLIC_GHCR_OWNER,
PUBLIC_REPO_SLUG, STAGING_*, GHCR_TOKEN, PUBLIC_REPO_TOKEN, PROMOTE_FORBIDDEN) —
never hardcoded.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
GitHub deprecated the Node 20 action runtime, so checkout@v4 and setup-node@v4 were
force-run on Node 24 with a warning. v5 of both targets Node 24 natively; their inputs
are unchanged (ref/repository/token/fetch-depth/path; the build's node-version stays
'20', that's the project runtime not the action runtime). setup-php@v2 is the current
major and unaffected. ci-staging runs only on tag pushes, so the warning clears on the
next tagged release.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- PromotionService::publicTags() is called on every Release render incl. the 5s
page poll; the anonymous GitHub tag API is rate-limited (60/h per IP). Cache it
120s so the panel never gets rate-limited to empty. (Test flushes cache in setUp.)
- yank.yml: replace the loose shell-glob tag guard with an anchored grep regex so
a garbage/space/metachar tag dispatched straight from the GitHub UI is rejected
before reaching git push --delete (the panel already validates tag ∈ publicTags).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Full-page tests render @vite layouts; without public/build/manifest.json (gitignored,
absent on a fresh CI checkout) they 500. Move npm ci + npm run build ahead of the
test step so the manifest exists. Fixes the red CI on every v* tag.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- promote.sh: fail fast before mutating the public tree if the tag was already
promoted (avoids a half-commit left on the runner on re-dispatch).
- ci-staging.yml: pass STAGING_PROJECT_DIR via env + :? guard instead of a
${{ }} expression in run: (clears the template-injection lint, fails loudly
on misconfig).
- README: PUBLIC_REPO_URL was never read by any workflow — keep only the slug.
- set-repository-url.test.sh: chmod +x for mode parity with promote.test.sh.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Promotion workflows for the release pipeline. promote-public publishes a tag to
the public repo's beta channel; promote-stable re-tags a finalised beta as a
stable vX.Y.Z. Both bound to the 'production' environment (required reviewer),
reading PUBLIC_REPO_SLUG/PUBLIC_REPO_TOKEN. Tree copy via scripts/promote.sh
excludes .git/.github so private CI never reaches the public repo.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
boban