- TwoFactorSetup: move to app layout (hosts wire-elements/modal), guard on hasTotp() not hasTwoFactorEnabled(), redirect to settings and flash open_recovery_modal on first TOTP enrollment
- WebauthnKeys.register(): drop hasTwoFactorEnabled() guard (first key may be the sole factor), generate codes + dispatch openModal on first key enrollment
- Settings\Index: add #[Url] on $tab, add $openRecoveryModal flag, mount() reads the flash and lands on the security tab
- settings/index.blade.php: x-init block dispatches openModal when $openRecoveryModal is set
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
When the panel runs on a domain+HTTPS and the user has a registered key, the 2FA
challenge offers "Mit Security-Key anmelden" alongside the TOTP/backup-code field.
A verified assertion completes login exactly like a TOTP success; rate-limit +
session gate reused. TOTP and backup codes remain fully usable.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Codex review follow-ups: extract the notify toaster into a shared partial and
include it in the auth layout too, so sendResetLink + recovery-code regenerate
actually surface their confirmation (the auth layout had no toaster). Record an
AuditEvent for password resets via the email-token path, matching the 2FA path.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Address Codex security review:
- ForgotPassword + clusev:reset-admin now rotate remember_token, so a stolen
remember-me cookie cannot survive a password reset (the email-token path
already did this).
- useRecoveryCode reads/checks/removes under a row lock (DB transaction +
lockForUpdate), so two concurrent requests can't both spend the same one-time
code (replay).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
ForgotPassword gains sendResetLink() + a ResetPassword component at
/reset-password/{token} using Laravel's password broker. The email option is
shown only when mail.default is a real mailer (hidden while MAIL_MAILER=log), so
it activates automatically once SMTP is configured. Tested with Notification::fake.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
"Passwort vergessen?" on login -> a reset view that proves identity with a TOTP
or one-time backup code (no email needed), then sets a new password under the
min(12) mixedCase numbers policy. Rate-limited, generic messages (no account
enumeration), audited.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2FA confirm now generates 8 backup codes and redirects to a show-once recovery
view (download as .txt, regenerate). Reachable again from Settings. Codes are
shown before the onboarding gate so a fresh enrollee can save them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The challenge now falls back to consuming a one-time recovery code when the TOTP
check fails. Relaxed the code input (was numeric, maxlength 6) so a backup code
is typable, and added a hint. Bilingual.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Security pivot — make server hardening, SSH access, firewall, dashboard domain/TLS
and the release channel controllable from the dashboard (no SSH needed), with guards
so a remote change can never lock the operator out.
Foundation
- ssh_credentials gains name + disabled_at + last_used_at; CredentialVault refuses a
disabled credential. New key/value Setting model. FleetService::runPrivileged() /
runPlain() — central sudo-aware exec (base64-wrapped sh -c), live-verified as root.
A · control-plane self-hardening
- SecurityHeaders middleware: env-aware CSP (allows the Vite dev origin in dev, strict
same-origin in prod), X-Frame-Options DENY, nosniff, Referrer/Permissions-Policy,
HSTS when secure. 2FA brute-force throttle (5/60s). install.sh sets
SESSION_SAME_SITE=strict + EXPIRE_ON_CLOSE + SECURE_COOKIE (only behind TLS).
B · SSH credential management
- name/label on the access; a credential card on the server page with Bearbeiten /
Sperren-Entsperren (kill-switch) / Löschen (R5), all audited.
C · server hardening from the dashboard (guards + confirmation)
- HardeningService (PermitRootLogin no, PasswordAuthentication no, fail2ban,
unattended-upgrades) + FirewallService (UFW). HardeningAction modal previews the
exact root commands before applying. GUARDS: refuse to disable password-login when
Clusev itself logs in by password or no key exists; UFW opens the real sshd port +
80/443 before enabling. Live-verified non-destructively (previews, the password
guard refusing, ufw status read).
D+E · System page (/system)
- Dashboard Domain + Let's-Encrypt email (Setting) -> DeploymentService renders the
matching Caddy site block (honest: stages the file + shows the reload command, never
fakes TLS). Release channel (stable|beta|dev) configurable; Versions reads it.
Built largely by 4 parallel agents into disjoint files; shared files integrated + the
security-critical bits hardened by hand (the password-auth lock-out guard + env-aware CSP).
Verified (R12): /system + server detail + all 8 routes 200 / 0 console errors (CSP does
not break Livewire/Alpine/Vite); credential card + 5 hardening "Anwenden" buttons render;
the hardening modal opens with the command preview; System persists domain/channel +
renders valid Caddy config; runPrivileged runs as root + the vault refuses disabled creds.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
boban