Previously a POST to a fake login hit a Laravel 419 (CSRF) or 405, unmasking the framework, and the
phpMyAdmin/generic forms even posted to real paths (/index.php, /login). Now: the decoy paths are
CSRF-exempt (bootstrap/app.php) and drop BlockBannedIp (an already-banned prober stays inside the
deception, always fed a fake — never a revealing 403 — while the ban still blocks them from the REAL
login). Every fake form posts back to its own decoy, so a submit re-serves the fake page (looks like a
failed login) and trap() records the guessed username + password as threat intel (meta.tried_user /
tried_pass). DetectHoneytoken stays on the group, so a submitted canary is still caught.
The deceptive bodies were bare unstyled HTML — obvious to any human/scanner. Give each a
self-contained, offline-safe inline-CSS skin that mirrors the real thing (WordPress login grey
canvas + logo + blue button; phpMyAdmin blue theme + logo + fieldset; a clean generic admin card)
so the decoy is convincing enough to hold a probe. No external assets (CSP/airgap-safe).
boban