Operator decision: password strength is the user's own responsibility. Removed the
mixedCase + numbers requirement from every password rule (Password::min(6) is all that
remains), so a plain 6-char password ("abcdef") is accepted. Dropped the
"upper/lowercase + a digit" clause from the hints (de + en).
Verified: a 6-char simple password validates; a 5-char one still rejects (length); full
suite 467 pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Operator decision — 12 was too long; 6 is acceptable and password strength is the user's
own responsibility. Changed Password::min(12) → min(6) in every place that validates a
password (password change, forgot/reset, settings profile, create-user) and updated the
visible hints (de + en). The upper/lowercase + digit complexity is unchanged — only the
minimum length was flagged.
Verified: a 6-char complex password ("Abc123") now validates; too-short and complexity-less
passwords still reject; the password page shows "min. 6"; full suite 467 pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adversarial audit of the auth surface confirmed several exploitable gaps. Every fix
auto-expires and never permanently locks the control plane (bare-IP recovery host and
the clusev:reset-admin CLI stay open).
Login:
- per-IP (20/min) + per-account (30/15min) buckets on top of the existing email+IP 5/min,
so a distributed multi-IP brute-force of the single admin account is capped instead of
scaling linearly with IPs. ip/acct counters decay on their own (a valid login doesn't
reset a flood's budget).
- constant-time: the unknown-email branch now runs one bcrypt against a fixed DUMMY_HASH
(evaluated before the `! $user ||` short-circuit), closing the account-enumeration
timing oracle.
2FA:
- TOTP replay protection — verifyTotp uses verifyKeyNewer with a persisted last-used step
(two_factor_last_used_step migration), so each 30s code is single-use. Passes 0 (never
null) as the old step, since null makes verifyKeyNewer return bare `true` not the step.
- challenge + 2FA-proof reset gain an IP-independent per-account backstop, capping the
distributed TOTP/backup brute-force surface.
Defense-in-depth / DoS:
- global throttle on /livewire/update (180/min per user-id-or-IP) via setUpdateRoute,
keeping 'web' + the persistent EnsureSecurityOnboarded gate intact.
- reauth throttle (5/min per user) on password change/profile; SMTP test-send capped
(3/10min per user) so the panel can't relay spam.
- SshClient gets a short, separate connect timeout (~5s) so a dead/tarpit host can't hold
a worker across several sequential 15s reads (the observed 8.3s /livewire/update DoS).
- profile password policy raised to 12 chars + mixed case + numbers (was 10).
Tests: BruteForceHardeningTest covers TOTP replay, per-email + per-IP login caps,
identical unknown/known rejection, and reauth throttling. Full suite 187 green; Codex
clean; verified in a real browser (login/polls/Livewire updates unaffected by the throttle).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Follow-up hardening on top of 2171895 (which v0.9.2 shipped). That first pass
introduced a cost-12 bcrypt dummy that was *slower* than the real verify path —
a reverse timing oracle plus CPU-DoS amplification. Replace it with work that
mirrors the real path instead of exceeding it, and close the remaining query /
exception asymmetries:
- resetPassword(): resolve 2FA with a uniform lookup — always exactly one
webauthn-existence query (even for a TOTP user, and for a missing account) so
its presence/absence can't tell accounts apart. Every path now does one users
lookup + one webauthn query + one Google2FA HMAC + one locked recovery-code
transaction (real data when present, throwaway data otherwise).
- Split burnVerificationTime() into dummyTotpVerify() (HMAC) and
dummyRecoveryLookup() (locked SELECT in a transaction); drop the bcrypt
Hash::check entirely. A webauthn-only account spends an equivalent throwaway
HMAC so its crypto cost matches a TOTP account.
- dummyRecoveryLookup() no longer catches DB errors: a DB failure must surface
identically to the real useRecoveryCode(), else an outage is an error-response
oracle (generic for unknown, 500 for a real account).
- sendResetLink(): report() the swallowed Throwable so a broken queue/token
store is detectable instead of silently "succeeding" for every address.
Tests: ForgotPasswordTimingTest now asserts an identical (users,
webauthn_credentials) query fingerprint across TOTP, no-2FA, webauthn-only, and
unknown-email branches, plus queued-mail and rate-limiter parity. Codex re-review
verdict: clean (residual sub-microsecond crypto differences are below the
network/DB noise floor for this self-hosted single-admin threat model).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Queues the reset-link notification so sendResetLink returns in constant time regardless
of account existence; resetPassword does equivalent dummy verify work for unknown/no-2FA
users. Closes the timing side-channels flagged on the forgot-password review.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Guard the TOTP verifyKey call behind hasTotp() so a key-only user's null
two_factor_secret never reaches Google2FA::verifyKey(); they reset via a
backup code. Also adds the reset_no_2fa_note lang key (EN + DE) rendered
on the forgot-password form explaining the no-2FA recovery options.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Address Codex security review:
- ForgotPassword + clusev:reset-admin now rotate remember_token, so a stolen
remember-me cookie cannot survive a password reset (the email-token path
already did this).
- useRecoveryCode reads/checks/removes under a row lock (DB transaction +
lockForUpdate), so two concurrent requests can't both spend the same one-time
code (replay).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
ForgotPassword gains sendResetLink() + a ResetPassword component at
/reset-password/{token} using Laravel's password broker. The email option is
shown only when mail.default is a real mailer (hidden while MAIL_MAILER=log), so
it activates automatically once SMTP is configured. Tested with Notification::fake.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
"Passwort vergessen?" on login -> a reset view that proves identity with a TOTP
or one-time backup code (no email needed), then sets a new password under the
min(12) mixedCase numbers policy. Rate-limited, generic messages (no account
enumeration), audited.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
boban