From the whole-codebase re-audit (deferred MEDIUM findings, Codex-reviewed):
- poller: CredentialVault enforces a credential's disabled_at lock only at connect(), but
PollMetrics reuses one long-lived SSH connection per server, so a credential disabled
mid-run kept streaming metrics over the already-open session. Add Server::withActiveCredential()
(whereHas credential whereNull disabled_at); the poller selects via it and prunes any cached
client whose server left the active set, so a revocation drops the server on the next tick and
closes its session promptly.
- prod compose: add security_opt no-new-privileges:true to every service + a generous pids_limit
(fork-bomb backstop). cap_drop/read_only are deliberately left out — they need a per-service
prod smoke test (nginx :80 bind, entrypoint chown) before enabling; documented inline.
- Caddyfile + compose: strengthen the TRUSTED_PROXY_CIDR guidance — an over-broad value in
external-TLS mode lets any client forge X-Forwarded-For and defeat the IP-keyed throttles + ban.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The "Clusev host" terminal was a shell inside the sidecar container (node@clusev, no
sudo, not the host). It is now a REAL SSH login into the host machine, like any fleet
server — so it shows the real root@<host> prompt with full rights.
- HostCredential (encrypted singleton) holds the host SSH login; a HostShell modal lets
the operator set host/port/user + password|key. The clear-text secret is never echoed
back; on edit a blank secret keeps the stored one, and switching auth method requires a
fresh secret (no password silently reused as a key).
- open('host') mints a kind=host token only when a login is configured, else opens the
setup modal; the internal resolve endpoint returns a server-shaped SSH spec (decrypted,
internal-net only) for kind=host, or 404 when unconfigured.
- compose: extra_hosts host.docker.internal:host-gateway so the sidecar reaches the host
sshd; Caddy now 404s /_internal/* at the public edge (the sidecar uses app:80 directly).
- rail gains a debounced search box past 5 servers; removed the now-obvious PTY hint line.
Browser-verified (R12): host tile shows "not configured" + gear → modal → SSH login as
root runs commands, zero console errors; search filters; resolve returns the host spec.
15 terminal tests pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A dedicated /terminal page with a target rail: one terminal per fleet server (SSH)
plus one for the Clusev host itself. php-fpm cannot hold an interactive PTY, so a
small Node sidecar (ws + ssh2 + node-pty) bridges xterm.js to the PTY.
Flow: the Livewire page mints a single-use, 60s TerminalSession token and dispatches
it to an Alpine xterm island; the browser opens a same-origin WS (/terminal/ws,
proxied by nginx in dev / Caddy in prod to terminal:3000); the sidecar burns the
token at an internal resolve endpoint (shared-secret header, private network only)
for a connection spec, then opens an SSH PTY (decrypted credential, never sent to the
browser) or a local host PTY. Real shell = native Tab/Shift-Tab completion.
Security:
- token burned ATOMICALLY (single conditional UPDATE) — no double-open race
- resolve endpoint guarded by hash_equals shared secret, exempt from CSRF + PanelScheme
host enforcement (private net only), returns decrypted creds over the internal net
- sidecar enforces same-origin on the WS upgrade (hostname match, port-agnostic)
- single-use 60s tokens, swept daily so the table can't grow unbounded
Verified in-browser (R12): host + server terminals connect, accept keyboard input,
run commands, Tab-complete; cross-origin WS rejected; zero console errors. 9 feature
tests cover minting, the resolve spec, single-use burn, expiry, and locked creds.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- reverbClient() now returns wss://<domain>:443 when the active domain is being
served (the HTTPS front door), instead of deriving wss://host:80 from a request
that looks like plain HTTP:80 behind an external TLS proxy. Bare-IP recovery
stays plain ws.
- Caddy no longer redirects the /app/* /apps/* WS paths to https when the upstream
already terminated TLS (X-Forwarded-Proto: https) — that redirect broke the
WebSocket in external-proxy mode.
- The 'TLS active' status card no longer claims Let's Encrypt issuance in
external-proxy mode; it states TLS is provided by the upstream proxy.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The panel domain is editable on the System page again — safely this time. It is
stored in the DB (Setting `panel_domain`, overriding install-time APP_DOMAIN) and
APPLIED ON RESTART, never mid-session: a snapshot file (storage/framework/active-domain)
is frozen at container start by the entrypoint (`clusev:snapshot-domain`), so saving a
new domain only takes effect after `docker compose ... restart`.
How it works
- DeploymentService: pending (configuredDomain, DB) vs active (domain(), snapshot file);
setDomain() persists; restartPending() drives the UI notice. Snapshot reads the DB
DIRECTLY (cache-independent) and retries until the settings table is readable; if it
never is, it freezes the env fallback so the active domain is always a FIXED value
(never a live one that could shift after startup).
- AppServiceProvider: derives app.url from the active domain at boot; pins server->Reverb
publishing to the internal reverb:8080 (domain/cert-independent).
- Caddy: on-demand TLS gated by /_caddy/ask (issues a cert only for the configured
domain); HTTP always served for bare-IP recovery; /app,/apps forced to HTTPS for any
hostname (plaintext only on a bare IP).
- Reverb client endpoint is derived from the live request and rides the same front door
(/app tunnel — Caddy in prod, nginx in dev), so realtime follows a domain change with
no JS rebuild and no stale .env value.
- System page: domain form + R5 confirm + "restart required" notice with the exact
command; DE/EN strings (R16).
Anti-lockout / security
- session.secure + the HTTPS redirect follow the real request scheme; bare-IP HTTP is
always a recovery path. trustProxies('*') only in production (dev can't be tricked into
faking HTTPS via X-Forwarded-*). When a domain is active only that domain (HTTPS) and
the literal server IP (HTTP) serve the panel; any other/stale host is refused (404),
and IP-recovery redirects stay on the IP.
Bump 0.3.0 -> 0.4.0; CHANGELOG. Follow-up tracked: make the public `metrics` broadcast
channel private (wire broadcasting auth).
Verified: Pint clean; npm build; Caddyfile validates; R12 all routes 200 + 0 console
errors; Echo connects via the unified /app tunnel; domain set/clear + restart-gating +
/_caddy/ask (200 active / 403 other) + host-enforcement matrix all confirmed in dev;
Codex review iterated to no actionable in-scope findings; 14-agent adversarial
lockout/security review (real trustProxies finding fixed).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Per operator feedback ("das soll automatisch sein, die Caddy-Config muss man nicht
sehen, nur 'SSL steht'"):
- TLS is fully automatic via Caddy (auto-issue + auto-renew + HTTP→HTTPS). The System
page now shows only the STATUS (domain + access URL) — the generated Caddy config and
the manual `caddy reload` command are gone, and the domain/email edit form is removed.
- The panel domain is an INSTALL-TIME value (APP_DOMAIN → config('clusev.domain')), so it
stays consistent with APP_URL, the Reverb (wss) endpoint and cookie security — none of
which can be re-derived at runtime (Caddy's site address + the browser's Reverb host are
fixed at install/build, and .env is never rewritten). DeploymentService is now read-only.
- Removed AppServiceProvider's runtime app.url override (it let a stale DB value shadow the
install-time URL). Migration drops the inert empty dashboard_domain/dashboard_email rows
(a real configured value is preserved as history; re-apply via install.sh — see CHANGELOG).
- Hardening checklist: all toggle buttons share one style (secondary/bordered) instead of
varying with state (R10).
Bump 0.2.0 -> 0.2.1 + CHANGELOG. Pint clean; Codex reviewed (the remaining note is a
deliberate install-time-domain tradeoff — a runtime/DB domain cannot be served by the
templated Caddy without a false "TLS active" status); R12 — system/server-show/dashboard
HTTP 200, 0 console errors, raw config + edit form gone, buttons uniform.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
One-command, idempotent production install per docs/install-update-design.md
(the "JETZT" phase). Onboarding (forced password change + 2FA) already ships
via EnsureSecurityOnboarded; the in-dashboard self-updater stays deferred to v1.x.
- install.sh: preflight -> idempotent secrets (set_kv never regenerates) ->
derive SITE_ADDRESS/APP_URL/REVERB_* from the single APP_DOMAIN knob -> build ->
up -> wait DB -> migrate + cache -> clusev:install. One-time admin password is
printed only on the terminal, never stored. Bare-IP and private-IP warnings.
- app/Console/Commands/Install.php: idempotent first admin (Str::password(20),
must_change_password); hard no-op once a user exists (INSTALL_LOCK idiom).
- docker/caddy/Caddyfile: one template, both modes; Reverb wss over /app/* and
/apps/* on the same address; admin-API-free, security headers. Validated for
bare-IP (:80) and domain (https) modes.
- docker-compose.prod.yml: Caddy is the only host-published service (80/443 +
HTTP/3); app/reverb/queue/mariadb lose host ports (internal net only);
CLUSEV_IMAGE indirection (locally-built tag, GHCR digest later); Redis requires
a password; caddy-data/caddy-config volumes persist ACME certs.
- .env.example: APP_DOMAIN/APP_SCHEME/ACME_EMAIL/SITE_ADDRESS/CLUSEV_IMAGE/
UPDATE_HMAC_KEY documented.
- README: real Clusev install/deploy guide (replaces Laravel boilerplate).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
boban