Backup (recovery) codes must be viewable ONLY at the moment they are
generated — at first-factor enrollment or on regenerate — and NEVER
re-viewable afterward from "Backup-Codes verwalten".
- Modals\RecoveryCodes: add server-gated $revealed. mount() pulls a
one-time session flag (2fa.codes_fresh); regenerate() sets it. render()
emits codes ONLY when revealed, so a client cannot tamper a flag to
re-view stored codes.
- View: revealed state shows codes grid + download + warning + close;
hidden state shows a security notice + Neu erzeugen + close (no codes,
no download).
- TwoFactorSetup::confirm() and WebauthnKeys::register() put
2fa.codes_fresh on first-factor code generation (put, survives the
redirect + later openModal request).
- Add recovery_hidden_notice (DE/EN parity).
- Tests: manage view hides codes; fresh flag reveals once; regenerate
reveals the new set; first-factor paths set the flag.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The "Gesperrte IPs ansehen" modal did its SSH Fail2banService::status read
in mount(), so clicking the trigger blocked for seconds with no spinner
before the modal appeared.
Split mount() into an instant mount() (stores serverId only) plus a
load() method fired by wire:init, mirroring Services\Index. While
! $loaded the view renders a 4-row skeleton inside the max-h-96 scroll
container; once loaded it renders the real jail/IP list (or empty/error).
The unban flow still re-reads via loadJails() and dispatches
fail2banChanged, keeping #[Locked] $serverId and the audit intact.
Adds Fail2banBansModalTest covering the instant mount (status never
called), load() rendering the list, read-error surfacing, and both
unban success (audit + refresh + dispatch) and failure paths.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Re-applies the onboarding gate to /livewire/update component calls, not just the
initial page GET, so a component mounted while onboarded cannot run destructive
actions after the account is reverted to must_change_password mid-session.
Addresses the codebase-wide Codex finding flagged during the SSH-key-provision review.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Guard the TOTP verifyKey call behind hasTotp() so a key-only user's null
two_factor_secret never reaches Google2FA::verifyKey(); they reset via a
backup code. Also adds the reset_no_2fa_note lang key (EN + DE) rendered
on the forgot-password form explaining the no-2FA recovery options.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- TwoFactorSetup: move to app layout (hosts wire-elements/modal), guard on hasTotp() not hasTwoFactorEnabled(), redirect to settings and flash open_recovery_modal on first TOTP enrollment
- WebauthnKeys.register(): drop hasTwoFactorEnabled() guard (first key may be the sole factor), generate codes + dispatch openModal on first key enrollment
- Settings\Index: add #[Url] on $tab, add $openRecoveryModal flag, mount() reads the flash and lands on the security tab
- settings/index.blade.php: x-init block dispatches openModal when $openRecoveryModal is set
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Journal was a one-time snapshot mislabeled "journalctl -f": it loaded the last
N lines once and never refreshed, so it was neither live nor complete.
- FleetService: `journalctl --show-cursor` + new journalSince() reads only entries
after the stored journald cursor (no gaps, no dup appends), capped to a bounded
live tail; parseJournal split into splitJournalCursor + parseJournalLines.
- Services\Index: pollJournal() (wire:poll.5s) appends new entries since the cursor
and caps retained rows at 300 (fetch ceiling == display ceiling).
- Honest labels: drop the misleading "-f"; badge stays "live" (now true).
Command palette (Strg/⌘ K) can now jump to a server: the fleet feeds the Alpine
cmdk x-data; servers surface only while searching, matched on name OR IP, and
selecting one navigates to /servers/<uuid>.
Cursor is validated (^[a-z0-9;=]+$) and single-quoted before the remote shell —
no injection (Codex-reviewed: no P1, no security findings). Removes stock
ExampleTest (asserted 200 on an auth-gated route → always 302).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Revert the hydrate-on-every-request sync — writing the single global active-server
session on every async request (slow load(), polls, parallel tabs) is inherently
last-writer-wins and races. Setting it only at mount (once per deliberate
navigation) is race-free and fixes the visible drift. bfcache restore + multi-tab
remain inherent edges of the single-session model — documented in the handoff.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add a hydrate() hook so Show re-asserts its server as active on the wire:poll tick
and any action — covering a wire:navigate bfcache restore that skips mount(),
without the earlier racy client-side POST. Idempotent + server-side, no race.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The livewire:navigated activate-POST hook introduced unbounded cross-request
ordering races (the on-screen confusion is already fixed race-free by
Show::mount setting the active server + ServerSwitcher::targetFor navigating on
switch). Remove the JS hook + activate endpoint. The remaining bfcache edge is
invisible (the cached page shows the right server) and a transient stale session
resolves on the next deliberate navigation — documented in the handoff.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Abort any in-flight active-server POST on each navigation so a slower stale
request can't overwrite the latest selection. Fix the activate-endpoint test to
use an onboarded user (the route is behind EnsureSecurityOnboarded).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
wire:navigate restores Back/Forward pages from its client cache without re-running
Show::mount(), which could leave active_server_id pointing at a different server
than the details page on screen. Add a servers.activate endpoint + a global
livewire:navigated hook that re-asserts the on-screen server on every navigation
(including cache restores).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two "current server" notions diverged: the sidebar switcher (session active_server_id)
vs the server-details URL. Now viewing a server's details sets it active (sidebar
always matches the page), and switching the sidebar while on a details page navigates
to the chosen server (instead of reloading the old one). One current server, in sync.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- ZeroTolerantCounterChecker only tolerates a 0 counter when the stored counter is
also 0; a 0 after a non-zero counter is a rollback and is rejected.
- clusev:reset-admin --disable-2fa now also deletes the user's security keys, so a
compromised key can't revive when 2FA is re-enabled.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Swap the strict counter checker for a zero-tolerant one so platform
authenticators / synced passkeys (which always report counter 0) can assert,
while non-zero counters still must strictly increase (clone detection).
- Guard registration (options + register) and the UI on hasTwoFactorEnabled, so a
key is never created against a disabled/reset second factor.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
options() now validates the label before returning creation options, so clicking
Add with a blank/invalid name aborts before navigator.credentials.create() and
never leaves an orphaned credential on the authenticator.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A "Security-Keys" panel in Settings → Security: add (name + navigator.credentials
.create via resources/js/webauthn.js), list (name/added/last-used), remove (R5
confirm modal), all audited. Hidden with a hint when domain+HTTPS is absent.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
When the panel runs on a domain+HTTPS and the user has a registered key, the 2FA
challenge offers "Mit Security-Key anmelden" alongside the TOTP/backup-code field.
A verified assertion completes login exactly like a TOTP success; rate-limit +
session gate reused. TOTP and backup codes remain fully usable.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
WebauthnService builds creation/request options (rpId = active domain, ES256/RS256,
attestation none, exclude/allow lists) via web-auth/webauthn-lib v5, stores the
challenge in the session, and verifies attestation/assertion responses (allowed
origin = https://<rpId>, sign-count tracked). Option building + serialization are
unit-tested; the cryptographic verify path is browser-verified on a domain host.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
WebAuthn is offered only with an active domain (the rpId) over HTTPS; bare-IP/HTTP
returns false so a ceremony never runs with an invalid IP rpId.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add web-auth/webauthn-lib ^5.3, the webauthn_credentials table (per-user unique
credential_id), the WebauthnCredential model and User hasMany relation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Address Codex security review:
- ForgotPassword + clusev:reset-admin now rotate remember_token, so a stolen
remember-me cookie cannot survive a password reset (the email-token path
already did this).
- useRecoveryCode reads/checks/removes under a row lock (DB transaction +
lockForUpdate), so two concurrent requests can't both spend the same one-time
code (replay).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Shell-only emergency recovery: resets the admin password (prints a random one if
omitted) and, with --disable-2fa, clears the 2FA secret + backup codes so the
operator can re-enroll. Requires server access — the safe last resort.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
ForgotPassword gains sendResetLink() + a ResetPassword component at
/reset-password/{token} using Laravel's password broker. The email option is
shown only when mail.default is a real mailer (hidden while MAIL_MAILER=log), so
it activates automatically once SMTP is configured. Tested with Notification::fake.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
"Passwort vergessen?" on login -> a reset view that proves identity with a TOTP
or one-time backup code (no email needed), then sets a new password under the
min(12) mixedCase numbers policy. Rate-limited, generic messages (no account
enumeration), audited.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2FA confirm now generates 8 backup codes and redirects to a show-once recovery
view (download as .txt, regenerate). Reachable again from Settings. Codes are
shown before the onboarding gate so a fresh enrollee can save them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The challenge now falls back to consuming a one-time recovery code when the TOTP
check fails. Relaxed the code input (was numeric, maxlength 6) so a backup code
is typable, and added a hint. Bilingual.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
There was no lang/{de,en}/validation.php, so Laravel fell back to its built-in
English messages for every input-field validation error regardless of locale.
Add the full validation language file in German (source of truth) and English,
plus a localized `attributes` map so :attribute reads naturally (e.g. "SSH-Port",
"E-Mail-Adresse"). Per-form validationAttributes() still override these.
Verified: Validator resolves DE/EN messages + attribute labels; submitting the
empty login form renders "E-Mail-Adresse muss ausgefüllt werden." in German.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
boban