Two hardening features completed in parallel (each with its own spec + tests),
sharing call sites (TwoFactorSetup, WebauthnKeys, routes) so committed together:
- ConfirmAction token hardening: destructive confirm flows now carry a server-issued,
single-use, signed token (App\Support\Confirm\ConfirmToken) instead of trusting a
client-mutable event/params/auditTarget. Every #[On] apply handler consumes + validates
the token (forged/replayed/direct-bypass calls no-op). Server-scoped per action; closes
the codebase-wide confirm-bypass + audit-forgery vector across Security, Sessions, Users,
WebauthnKeys, Servers\Show, Services, System, Files.
- Backup-code airtight reveal: codes are revealed via a transient channel, not a persisted
Livewire property, so a captured/replayed snapshot can't re-render them; the recovery
download is grant-gated.
Full suite green (162).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Stored recovery codes were re-viewable two ways after their one-time
reveal. Both paths are now closed so codes are only viewable/downloadable
right after a fresh generation (enrollment or regenerate).
HOLE 1 — RecoveryCodes::$revealed was a mutable public Livewire prop, so
a crafted /livewire/update could flip it to true and make render() emit
stored codes. Annotated with #[Locked]; Livewire now rejects any
client-side write (set still happens server-side in mount()/regenerate()).
HOLE 2 — two-factor.recovery.download was auth-gated only, so any authed
user could GET it anytime to re-download stored codes. Added a one-time
session grant (2fa.download_grant) put alongside the existing
2fa.codes_fresh wherever codes are freshly generated (TwoFactorSetup,
WebauthnKeys, RecoveryCodes::regenerate); the route now
abort_unless(pull(grant), 403) before streaming — one download per fresh
generation, later direct hits 403.
Tests: lock rejection + download-grant lifecycle (forbidden → granted ok
→ consumed forbidden). Full suite 137 passed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Backup (recovery) codes must be viewable ONLY at the moment they are
generated — at first-factor enrollment or on regenerate — and NEVER
re-viewable afterward from "Backup-Codes verwalten".
- Modals\RecoveryCodes: add server-gated $revealed. mount() pulls a
one-time session flag (2fa.codes_fresh); regenerate() sets it. render()
emits codes ONLY when revealed, so a client cannot tamper a flag to
re-view stored codes.
- View: revealed state shows codes grid + download + warning + close;
hidden state shows a security notice + Neu erzeugen + close (no codes,
no download).
- TwoFactorSetup::confirm() and WebauthnKeys::register() put
2fa.codes_fresh on first-factor code generation (put, survives the
redirect + later openModal request).
- Add recovery_hidden_notice (DE/EN parity).
- Tests: manage view hides codes; fresh flag reveals once; regenerate
reveals the new set; first-factor paths set the flag.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
boban