Adversarial audit of the auth surface confirmed several exploitable gaps. Every fix
auto-expires and never permanently locks the control plane (bare-IP recovery host and
the clusev:reset-admin CLI stay open).
Login:
- per-IP (20/min) + per-account (30/15min) buckets on top of the existing email+IP 5/min,
so a distributed multi-IP brute-force of the single admin account is capped instead of
scaling linearly with IPs. ip/acct counters decay on their own (a valid login doesn't
reset a flood's budget).
- constant-time: the unknown-email branch now runs one bcrypt against a fixed DUMMY_HASH
(evaluated before the `! $user ||` short-circuit), closing the account-enumeration
timing oracle.
2FA:
- TOTP replay protection — verifyTotp uses verifyKeyNewer with a persisted last-used step
(two_factor_last_used_step migration), so each 30s code is single-use. Passes 0 (never
null) as the old step, since null makes verifyKeyNewer return bare `true` not the step.
- challenge + 2FA-proof reset gain an IP-independent per-account backstop, capping the
distributed TOTP/backup brute-force surface.
Defense-in-depth / DoS:
- global throttle on /livewire/update (180/min per user-id-or-IP) via setUpdateRoute,
keeping 'web' + the persistent EnsureSecurityOnboarded gate intact.
- reauth throttle (5/min per user) on password change/profile; SMTP test-send capped
(3/10min per user) so the panel can't relay spam.
- SshClient gets a short, separate connect timeout (~5s) so a dead/tarpit host can't hold
a worker across several sequential 15s reads (the observed 8.3s /livewire/update DoS).
- profile password policy raised to 12 chars + mixed case + numbers (was 10).
Tests: BruteForceHardeningTest covers TOTP replay, per-email + per-IP login caps,
identical unknown/known rejection, and reauth throttling. Full suite 187 green; Codex
clean; verified in a real browser (login/polls/Livewire updates unaffected by the throttle).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Queues the reset-link notification so sendResetLink returns in constant time regardless
of account existence; resetPassword does equivalent dummy verify work for unknown/no-2FA
users. Closes the timing side-channels flagged on the forgot-password review.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add web-auth/webauthn-lib ^5.3, the webauthn_credentials table (per-user unique
credential_id), the WebauthnCredential model and User hasMany relation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Address Codex security review:
- ForgotPassword + clusev:reset-admin now rotate remember_token, so a stolen
remember-me cookie cannot survive a password reset (the email-token path
already did this).
- useRecoveryCode reads/checks/removes under a row lock (DB transaction +
lockForUpdate), so two concurrent requests can't both spend the same one-time
code (replay).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two fixes/hardenings on top of v0.4.0:
1) Blade raw-block bug (R17). The topbar's @php block had a COMMENT containing the literal
tokens @php/@endphp; Blade's non-greedy raw-block matcher took the @endphp in the comment
as the block end and dumped the remainder ("$title ??= …") as plain text into <header> on
every authenticated page (and left the page title empty). R12 missed it: the page still
returned 200 with no console error and the <title> comes from the Livewire component. Fixed
the comment; added rule R17 (no directive tokens in Blade comments; block over inline @php;
R12 must inspect the rendered DOM, not just status/console) to rules.md + CLAUDE.md.
2) Broadcast channels are now PRIVATE (security hardening — closes the follow-up flagged in
v0.4.0). MetricsTicked rides a PrivateChannel authorized via /broadcasting/auth
(withBroadcasting + routes/channels.php), so fleet metrics can no longer be subscribed to by
anyone holding the bundled app key — including over a stale Caddy host after a domain change.
The channel callback requires User::securityOnboarded() (rotated password + 2FA), mirroring
the panel's EnsureSecurityOnboarded gate — authentication alone is not enough. Echo sends the
CSRF token for the auth handshake. Convention documented (CLAUDE.md §3 / channels.php): every
channel is private.
Bump 0.4.0 -> 0.4.1; CHANGELOG.
Verified: Pint clean; npm build; R12 all routes 200 + 0 console errors (both locales); topbar
<header> rendered text clean (no @/{{ }}/$var/key leaks); private broadcast publishes to
reverb:8080 and /broadcasting/auth + the onboarding-gated callback authorize correctly; Codex
review clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
boban