Verified live against a real Debian 12: the hardening actions work end-to-end
(root + password self-lockout guards refuse correctly, auto-updates and ufw enable,
disabling password auth persists and blocks password logins). One gap surfaced: on
a minimal image without rsyslog the distro-default fail2ban sshd jail (logpath
/var/log/auth.log) fails to start — "Have not found any log file". Pin the sshd jail
to `backend = systemd` (reads the journal) via a jail.d drop-in on enable:
log-source-agnostic and valid on every supported (systemd) target. fail2ban then
comes up active with the sshd jail reading the journal.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Disabling SSH root login (PermitRootLogin no) severs Clusev's OWN access when it
connects AS root — afterwards neither key nor password reaches root. The
password-auth toggle already guards against self-lockout; the root toggle did not.
Refuse to disable root login while the active credential's username is root, with a
clear message: add a non-root sudo user + key and switch Clusev to it first.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Automatic updates are a choice, not a security gate: the unattended row now
reports secure=true always and carries a `neutral` flag. The checklist renders
it muted (aktiv/inaktiv) instead of the green/orange SICHER/OFFEN verdict, so
"off" is never flagged as insecure. Detection is unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The hardening checklist read "installed" from the package manager alone
(dpkg `^ii` / rpm `-q`), so it disagreed with the live fail2ban/firewall
panels, which use `command -v` + `systemctl is-active`. On a host where the
component is genuinely present but not recorded as an apt `^ii` package —
installed from source, or left in dpkg `rc` (config-only) state — the
checklist showed `nicht installiert` while the panel reported it active with
real bans (the reported contradiction).
The installed probe now ORs three conditions: the package-manager test, the
client binary on PATH, and the service already running. Since a component can
never be active without being installed, this only removes FALSE negatives —
it can never produce a false positive. Detection is now consistent with
Fail2banService::status and FirewallTool. Applies to both fail2ban and the
firewall (ufw/firewalld).
Adds HardeningServiceTest covering the Debian/apt source-install fallback:
the emitted probe gains `command -v fail2ban-client` and `dpkg -l ufw`, and an
active component reads as featureOn.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Foundation so Clusev no longer assumes Debian/apt/ufw/systemd. A host's OS is
resolved once (cached) and every package/firewall/service decision asks it.
New app/Support/Os/:
- OsProfile — family + package manager + firewall tool + service manager, plus
supports(feature) returning NULL or a German reason (graceful degradation).
- OsDetector — one unprivileged probe (/etc/os-release + `command -v` with sbin on
PATH + which firewall is RUNNING); family from ID/ID_LIKE cross-checked against
installed binaries; cached 1h (60s when nothing detected). Readability-guards the
`.` source so a host without /etc/os-release still falls back by package manager.
- PackageManager — apt/dnf/zypper command strings (pending count, apply, install,
is-installed); zypper exit 102/103 normalized to success.
- FirewallTool — ufw + firewalld enable/disable. firewalld opens ssh/80/443 in the
PERMANENT config BEFORE the daemon starts filtering (handles running + stopped),
preserving the no-lockout guard for custom SSH ports.
Integration:
- FirewallService enable/disable now OS-aware (ufw or firewalld) with a support gate.
- MaintenanceService: hasApt -> updateSupport(); pendingUpdates() + applyUpgrades()
across managers (dnf check-update exit 100 handled).
- HardeningService: state()/commandFor() per-OS (dpkg vs rpm, ufw vs firewalld, apt
periodic vs dnf-automatic; yum-only hosts gate auto-updates). Each row carries
supported/reason; unsupported features render muted with a German note instead of
a toggle. apply() refuses unsupported features gracefully.
- Server-Details surfaces the detected System / package manager / firewall.
- SystemUpdate modal + view: OS-neutral copy; audit action system.package_upgrade.
Arch (pacman) & Alpine (apk/OpenRC) are detected and gracefully disabled where
unsupported. Debian/ufw/systemd path verified behaviourally identical on the live
fleet. Pint clean; Codex review clean (fixed firewalld lockout + os-release guard +
yum/dual-firewall/zypper edge cases); R12 — 9 routes 200, 0 console errors.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Operator feedback: no way to add servers; irrelevant storage-internals text; fail2ban
only on/off; raw shell commands shown; no apt update/upgrade.
- Add server: CreateServer modal (name, IP/host, SSH port, user, password|key, optional
label) on the Servers index → creates server + encrypted credential ATOMICALLY (DB
transaction). Strict IP/hostname validation (filter_var + hostname; rejects 999.x, ':').
- System updates (Debian/Ubuntu only): MaintenanceService + SystemUpdate modal — shows the
pending-update count (or "unbekannt" when undeterminable) and runs apt update && upgrade
as root; gated to apt hosts.
- fail2ban configuration: Fail2banConfig modal — Sperrdauer / Max. Fehlversuche / Zeitfenster,
written to a Clusev-owned jail.d drop-in (zz-clusev.local, last-wins; never touches the
operator's jail.local/jails). Durations kept verbatim in fail2ban's native grammar
(600, 10m, 1h 30m, -1). Reads the EFFECTIVE [DEFAULT] across files; refuses to save when the
current policy couldn't be read (no overwrite with unseen defaults); reloads fail2ban only
when already active (never starts it).
- Modals: removed the raw "Befehle (als root)" preview + raw stdout dumps from the hardening
modal — clean German description + result only.
- System page: dropped the .env/Datenbank storage-internals callout (irrelevant to the user).
R15 — Codex gate: `codex review --uncommitted` run iteratively; fixed every finding across 9
rounds (fail2ban jail clobbering, section/precedence, composite/-1 durations, reload-starting-
inactive, read-failure propagation, glob exit code, apt-count failure, atomic server create,
IP validation) until clean — 0 security issues throughout. Live-verified on 10.10.90.162;
R12: Servers/Detail/System 200 / 0 console errors, modals open, hardening modal shows no commands.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Rework the server-hardening UX per operator feedback ("only activate, can't
deactivate or adjust, UFW won't even activate, is the existing state read?").
- Bidirectional toggles: each item (SSH root-login, SSH password-login, fail2ban,
UFW, unattended-upgrades) is a clean Aktivieren/Deaktivieren toggle driven by the
live feature state, not a one-shot "Anwenden".
- Real state read (HardeningService::state, privileged): SSH from `sshd -T` (the
EFFECTIVE config — honours Include order + Match blocks), UFW from `ufw status`,
unattended from `apt-config dump` (effective periodic value), packages via dpkg —
so nicht-installiert / inaktiv / aktiv are detected; a feature counts as "secure"
only when installed AND active.
- UFW activation installs ufw if missing (fixes "ufw: not found"); opens the detected
sshd port + 80/443 before `ufw --force enable`; adds disable().
- SSH drop-in renamed 00-clusev.conf (sorts + wins first); apt periodic written to a
last-winning 99zz-clusev file. Long timeout for apt installs.
- preview() returns the EXACT command apply() runs (single source — no drift between
the confirmation preview and the executed mutation). Password-disable lock-out guard
intact (refused when Clusev uses password auth or no key exists).
R15 — Codex review gate: `codex review --uncommitted` run iteratively; fixed every
finding across 5 rounds (drop-in precedence, apt periodic config, preview/apply drift,
ufw status detection, privileged-read error handling, stale-config secure state) until
"no actionable regressions". 0 security issues throughout.
Live-verified on 10.10.90.162: state via sshd -T (effective), fail2ban + unattended
toggled on/off both ways, ufw installed + state reflects, lock-out guard refuses
disabling password auth. R12: server detail 200 / 0 console errors, toggles render.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- fix(hardening): fail2ban/unattended apt installs failed because the 12s SSH timeout
aborted the package download. runPrivileged/runPlain take a $timeout; apt actions use
600s. Live-verified: fail2ban installs + is active/enabled on 10.10.90.162.
- feat(release): cut the foundation as the first real semantic release v0.1.0 (no more
-dev). CHANGELOG is Keep-a-Changelog BY VERSION; the Versions page parses it by version,
reads the newest git TAG as "latest release", and honestly compares installed vs latest
in the channel. Channels reduced to stable|beta (no user-facing dev); System clamps a
legacy value back to stable. Tagged v0.1.0.
- fix(domain/.env): the panel domain lives in the DATABASE (Settings); the app never
rewrites .env. AppServiceProvider overrides config('app.url') at runtime from the Setting
(guarded against a missing table); /system states this explicitly. Caddy config is a
standalone generated file; a Caddy reload is the only infra step.
- docs(arch): Caddy is the prod-only TLS reverse proxy IN FRONT of the app container's
nginx (Internet -> Caddy:443 -> nginx:80 -> php-fpm); no Caddy in dev.
- R15 (rules.md + CLAUDE.md): Codex must review every change for errors + security before
"done". The Codex CLI is not installed in this runtime (needs `sudo npm i -g @openai/codex`
+ `/codex:setup`); an independent adversarial security review of this diff returned CLEAN
(no vulnerabilities, no bugs) as the interim gate.
Verified (R12): /system + /versions 200 / 0 console errors; channels stable|beta only,
DB-not-.env callout; versions by-version with v0.1.0; app.url override resolves from the
Setting; fail2ban live install ok.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Security pivot — make server hardening, SSH access, firewall, dashboard domain/TLS
and the release channel controllable from the dashboard (no SSH needed), with guards
so a remote change can never lock the operator out.
Foundation
- ssh_credentials gains name + disabled_at + last_used_at; CredentialVault refuses a
disabled credential. New key/value Setting model. FleetService::runPrivileged() /
runPlain() — central sudo-aware exec (base64-wrapped sh -c), live-verified as root.
A · control-plane self-hardening
- SecurityHeaders middleware: env-aware CSP (allows the Vite dev origin in dev, strict
same-origin in prod), X-Frame-Options DENY, nosniff, Referrer/Permissions-Policy,
HSTS when secure. 2FA brute-force throttle (5/60s). install.sh sets
SESSION_SAME_SITE=strict + EXPIRE_ON_CLOSE + SECURE_COOKIE (only behind TLS).
B · SSH credential management
- name/label on the access; a credential card on the server page with Bearbeiten /
Sperren-Entsperren (kill-switch) / Löschen (R5), all audited.
C · server hardening from the dashboard (guards + confirmation)
- HardeningService (PermitRootLogin no, PasswordAuthentication no, fail2ban,
unattended-upgrades) + FirewallService (UFW). HardeningAction modal previews the
exact root commands before applying. GUARDS: refuse to disable password-login when
Clusev itself logs in by password or no key exists; UFW opens the real sshd port +
80/443 before enabling. Live-verified non-destructively (previews, the password
guard refusing, ufw status read).
D+E · System page (/system)
- Dashboard Domain + Let's-Encrypt email (Setting) -> DeploymentService renders the
matching Caddy site block (honest: stages the file + shows the reload command, never
fakes TLS). Release channel (stable|beta|dev) configurable; Versions reads it.
Built largely by 4 parallel agents into disjoint files; shared files integrated + the
security-critical bits hardened by hand (the password-auth lock-out guard + env-aware CSP).
Verified (R12): /system + server detail + all 8 routes 200 / 0 console errors (CSP does
not break Livewire/Alpine/Vite); credential card + 5 hardening "Anwenden" buttons render;
the hardening modal opens with the command preview; System persists domain/channel +
renders valid Caddy config; runPrivileged runs as root + the vault refuses disabled creds.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
boban