Optional host-level WireGuard gate for the Clusev panel: install.sh installs
wireguard-tools (off), a 'clusev wg setup/up/down/status/add-peer/remove-peer'
host CLI sets up wg0 + gates TCP 80/443 to the WG subnet via a dedicated
CLUSEV-WG-GATE iptables chain off DOCKER-USER, with 'clusev wg down' as the
escape hatch and SSH/WG-UDP never gated. Hardened after an adversarial review:
exact ordered firewall rules, persistence skips if wg0 is down (no reboot
brick), down isolates Clusev's chain, setup idempotency, precise install
wiring (CLUSEV_DIR exec + install_host_watchers). SP1 of 2; dashboard
status/traffic is SP2.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
App-level persistent IP ban for Clusev's own login (distinct from the remote-fleet
Fail2banService): BannedIp model, BruteforceGuard service, guests-only BlockBannedIp
middleware, Login/2FA hooks + audit, a new Anmeldeschutz settings tab, clusev:unban CLI.
Hardened after an adversarial multi-lens review: documented IP trust model (Caddy sole
proxy, prod-only trustProxies), guests-only enforcement so an authed operator is never
locked out and can self-unban, current-IP self-whitelist, concrete cache strategy,
inet_pton CIDR matching, R5 confirm modals, errors.php for the 403 strings.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- backup field: autocomplete=off -> one-time-code (backup codes ARE one-time codes;
matches the main challenge field, the rest of the app, and the spec; restores
password-manager OTP autofill that the earlier polish broke)
- both verify() use the trait's memoised $this->pendingUser() instead of a fresh
User::find(), saving a redundant query on the failed-attempt re-render (Pint dropped
the now-unused User import in TwoFactorBackup)
- spec: align trait backing-state visibility note to the implemented 'private'
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Spec 1 of 2 for the 2FA challenge rework. Moves the backup (recovery) code
off the combined challenge screen into a dedicated /two-factor-challenge/backup
route + view, behind a 'Backup-Code verwenden' button; the main screen shows
only the primary factor. A key-only user without secure context (http + bare IP)
is redirected straight to the backup view. Shared rate-limit/login logic is
extracted into a CompletesTwoFactorChallenge trait so both views hit one bucket
set. IP-vs-domain factor routing is already correct (WebauthnService::available)
and unchanged. Spec 2 (auth-failure -> fail2ban hard IP ban) is out of scope here.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Spec for a bilingual /help page (left topic nav like Settings) covering all
settings, a generic reverse-proxy setup guide, and the 2FA access-path note
(security key only over the HTTPS domain; backup code on the bare-IP/HTTP path;
TOTP works everywhere). Also generalize the external-TLS hint copy (no product
name).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
DNS pre-check + internal SNI handshake to caddy to trigger on-demand issuance, with a
persisted status (no page-load ACME side effects), per-user throttle, external-TLS-mode
gating, and the control-plane-never-locked constraint.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Deferred runbook for the final beta-prep step: purge CLAUDE.md, rules.md,
handoff.md, docs/session-handoff.md and docs/superpowers from all history,
strip Co-Authored-By trailers, keep the files locally + gitignored, then a
gated force-push. Execute at beta-cut time only, behind explicit confirmation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The 2fa.codes_fresh reveal flag is now a timestamp (set at enrollment) and
RecoveryCodes::mount() only reveals within [now-600s, now], symmetric to the
download-grant window. A reveal flag whose modal never opened can no longer
re-reveal the codes later in the session. FirstFactorCodesTest asserts the
flag is an int.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two hardening features completed in parallel (each with its own spec + tests),
sharing call sites (TwoFactorSetup, WebauthnKeys, routes) so committed together:
- ConfirmAction token hardening: destructive confirm flows now carry a server-issued,
single-use, signed token (App\Support\Confirm\ConfirmToken) instead of trusting a
client-mutable event/params/auditTarget. Every #[On] apply handler consumes + validates
the token (forged/replayed/direct-bypass calls no-op). Server-scoped per action; closes
the codebase-wide confirm-bypass + audit-forgery vector across Security, Sessions, Users,
WebauthnKeys, Servers\Show, Services, System, Files.
- Backup-code airtight reveal: codes are revealed via a transient channel, not a persisted
Livewire property, so a captured/replayed snapshot can't re-render them; the recovery
download is grant-gated.
Full suite green (162).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2FA becomes optional + pluggable: TOTP, a security key, or both, fully
deactivatable, recommended not forced. hasTwoFactorEnabled = either factor;
onboarding drops the forced-2FA redirect; recovery codes become a modal (drop the
dedicated page/route); challenge adapts to whichever factor(s) exist; last-factor
removal clears codes. WebAuthn E2E stays domain-deferred.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Optional security-key 2nd factor via web-auth/webauthn-lib, gated on domain +
HTTPS (rpId = active domain). TOTP + backup codes stay the required 2FA and the
only recovery. Build now with unit/feature tests (mocked ceremony) + R12 gating;
real YubiKey end-to-end deferred to a domain+HTTPS host.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 1: 2FA recovery codes (encrypted, show-once + downloadable, usable at the
challenge), a forgot-password flow (2FA-code proof primary, email link only when
SMTP is configured), and a clusev:reset-admin CLI lockout fallback. WebAuthn is
deferred to a Phase-2 spec.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Design for seven reported fixes: unified bordered button kit (retire
ghost/ghost-danger, add danger-soft), firewall+fail2ban panels in an
installed-only responsive grid, auto-updates reframed as a neutral operator
preference (never an insecure verdict), create-server SSH verification with
atomic rollback, a new "Initialisierung" (pending) server status, and an
SSH key-only hint on the checklist. Includes file map, TDD + R12 plan.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
boban