Two hardening features completed in parallel (each with its own spec + tests),
sharing call sites (TwoFactorSetup, WebauthnKeys, routes) so committed together:
- ConfirmAction token hardening: destructive confirm flows now carry a server-issued,
single-use, signed token (App\Support\Confirm\ConfirmToken) instead of trusting a
client-mutable event/params/auditTarget. Every #[On] apply handler consumes + validates
the token (forged/replayed/direct-bypass calls no-op). Server-scoped per action; closes
the codebase-wide confirm-bypass + audit-forgery vector across Security, Sessions, Users,
WebauthnKeys, Servers\Show, Services, System, Files.
- Backup-code airtight reveal: codes are revealed via a transient channel, not a persisted
Livewire property, so a captured/replayed snapshot can't re-render them; the recovery
download is grant-gated.
Full suite green (162).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The panel domain is editable on the System page again — safely this time. It is
stored in the DB (Setting `panel_domain`, overriding install-time APP_DOMAIN) and
APPLIED ON RESTART, never mid-session: a snapshot file (storage/framework/active-domain)
is frozen at container start by the entrypoint (`clusev:snapshot-domain`), so saving a
new domain only takes effect after `docker compose ... restart`.
How it works
- DeploymentService: pending (configuredDomain, DB) vs active (domain(), snapshot file);
setDomain() persists; restartPending() drives the UI notice. Snapshot reads the DB
DIRECTLY (cache-independent) and retries until the settings table is readable; if it
never is, it freezes the env fallback so the active domain is always a FIXED value
(never a live one that could shift after startup).
- AppServiceProvider: derives app.url from the active domain at boot; pins server->Reverb
publishing to the internal reverb:8080 (domain/cert-independent).
- Caddy: on-demand TLS gated by /_caddy/ask (issues a cert only for the configured
domain); HTTP always served for bare-IP recovery; /app,/apps forced to HTTPS for any
hostname (plaintext only on a bare IP).
- Reverb client endpoint is derived from the live request and rides the same front door
(/app tunnel — Caddy in prod, nginx in dev), so realtime follows a domain change with
no JS rebuild and no stale .env value.
- System page: domain form + R5 confirm + "restart required" notice with the exact
command; DE/EN strings (R16).
Anti-lockout / security
- session.secure + the HTTPS redirect follow the real request scheme; bare-IP HTTP is
always a recovery path. trustProxies('*') only in production (dev can't be tricked into
faking HTTPS via X-Forwarded-*). When a domain is active only that domain (HTTPS) and
the literal server IP (HTTP) serve the panel; any other/stale host is refused (404),
and IP-recovery redirects stay on the IP.
Bump 0.3.0 -> 0.4.0; CHANGELOG. Follow-up tracked: make the public `metrics` broadcast
channel private (wire broadcasting auth).
Verified: Pint clean; npm build; Caddyfile validates; R12 all routes 200 + 0 console
errors; Echo connects via the unified /app tunnel; domain set/clear + restart-gating +
/_caddy/ask (200 active / 403 other) + host-enforcement matrix all confirmed in dev;
Codex review iterated to no actionable in-scope findings; 14-agent adversarial
lockout/security review (real trustProxies finding fixed).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Per operator feedback ("das soll automatisch sein, die Caddy-Config muss man nicht
sehen, nur 'SSL steht'"):
- TLS is fully automatic via Caddy (auto-issue + auto-renew + HTTP→HTTPS). The System
page now shows only the STATUS (domain + access URL) — the generated Caddy config and
the manual `caddy reload` command are gone, and the domain/email edit form is removed.
- The panel domain is an INSTALL-TIME value (APP_DOMAIN → config('clusev.domain')), so it
stays consistent with APP_URL, the Reverb (wss) endpoint and cookie security — none of
which can be re-derived at runtime (Caddy's site address + the browser's Reverb host are
fixed at install/build, and .env is never rewritten). DeploymentService is now read-only.
- Removed AppServiceProvider's runtime app.url override (it let a stale DB value shadow the
install-time URL). Migration drops the inert empty dashboard_domain/dashboard_email rows
(a real configured value is preserved as history; re-apply via install.sh — see CHANGELOG).
- Hardening checklist: all toggle buttons share one style (secondary/bordered) instead of
varying with state (R10).
Bump 0.2.0 -> 0.2.1 + CHANGELOG. Pint clean; Codex reviewed (the remaining note is a
deliberate install-time-domain tradeoff — a runtime/DB domain cannot be served by the
templated Caddy without a false "TLS active" status); R12 — system/server-show/dashboard
HTTP 200, 0 console errors, raw config + edit form gone, buttons uniform.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Operator feedback: no way to add servers; irrelevant storage-internals text; fail2ban
only on/off; raw shell commands shown; no apt update/upgrade.
- Add server: CreateServer modal (name, IP/host, SSH port, user, password|key, optional
label) on the Servers index → creates server + encrypted credential ATOMICALLY (DB
transaction). Strict IP/hostname validation (filter_var + hostname; rejects 999.x, ':').
- System updates (Debian/Ubuntu only): MaintenanceService + SystemUpdate modal — shows the
pending-update count (or "unbekannt" when undeterminable) and runs apt update && upgrade
as root; gated to apt hosts.
- fail2ban configuration: Fail2banConfig modal — Sperrdauer / Max. Fehlversuche / Zeitfenster,
written to a Clusev-owned jail.d drop-in (zz-clusev.local, last-wins; never touches the
operator's jail.local/jails). Durations kept verbatim in fail2ban's native grammar
(600, 10m, 1h 30m, -1). Reads the EFFECTIVE [DEFAULT] across files; refuses to save when the
current policy couldn't be read (no overwrite with unseen defaults); reloads fail2ban only
when already active (never starts it).
- Modals: removed the raw "Befehle (als root)" preview + raw stdout dumps from the hardening
modal — clean German description + result only.
- System page: dropped the .env/Datenbank storage-internals callout (irrelevant to the user).
R15 — Codex gate: `codex review --uncommitted` run iteratively; fixed every finding across 9
rounds (fail2ban jail clobbering, section/precedence, composite/-1 durations, reload-starting-
inactive, read-failure propagation, glob exit code, apt-count failure, atomic server create,
IP validation) until clean — 0 security issues throughout. Live-verified on 10.10.90.162;
R12: Servers/Detail/System 200 / 0 console errors, modals open, hardening modal shows no commands.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- fix(hardening): fail2ban/unattended apt installs failed because the 12s SSH timeout
aborted the package download. runPrivileged/runPlain take a $timeout; apt actions use
600s. Live-verified: fail2ban installs + is active/enabled on 10.10.90.162.
- feat(release): cut the foundation as the first real semantic release v0.1.0 (no more
-dev). CHANGELOG is Keep-a-Changelog BY VERSION; the Versions page parses it by version,
reads the newest git TAG as "latest release", and honestly compares installed vs latest
in the channel. Channels reduced to stable|beta (no user-facing dev); System clamps a
legacy value back to stable. Tagged v0.1.0.
- fix(domain/.env): the panel domain lives in the DATABASE (Settings); the app never
rewrites .env. AppServiceProvider overrides config('app.url') at runtime from the Setting
(guarded against a missing table); /system states this explicitly. Caddy config is a
standalone generated file; a Caddy reload is the only infra step.
- docs(arch): Caddy is the prod-only TLS reverse proxy IN FRONT of the app container's
nginx (Internet -> Caddy:443 -> nginx:80 -> php-fpm); no Caddy in dev.
- R15 (rules.md + CLAUDE.md): Codex must review every change for errors + security before
"done". The Codex CLI is not installed in this runtime (needs `sudo npm i -g @openai/codex`
+ `/codex:setup`); an independent adversarial security review of this diff returned CLEAN
(no vulnerabilities, no bugs) as the interim gate.
Verified (R12): /system + /versions 200 / 0 console errors; channels stable|beta only,
DB-not-.env callout; versions by-version with v0.1.0; app.url override resolves from the
Setting; fail2ban live install ok.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Security pivot — make server hardening, SSH access, firewall, dashboard domain/TLS
and the release channel controllable from the dashboard (no SSH needed), with guards
so a remote change can never lock the operator out.
Foundation
- ssh_credentials gains name + disabled_at + last_used_at; CredentialVault refuses a
disabled credential. New key/value Setting model. FleetService::runPrivileged() /
runPlain() — central sudo-aware exec (base64-wrapped sh -c), live-verified as root.
A · control-plane self-hardening
- SecurityHeaders middleware: env-aware CSP (allows the Vite dev origin in dev, strict
same-origin in prod), X-Frame-Options DENY, nosniff, Referrer/Permissions-Policy,
HSTS when secure. 2FA brute-force throttle (5/60s). install.sh sets
SESSION_SAME_SITE=strict + EXPIRE_ON_CLOSE + SECURE_COOKIE (only behind TLS).
B · SSH credential management
- name/label on the access; a credential card on the server page with Bearbeiten /
Sperren-Entsperren (kill-switch) / Löschen (R5), all audited.
C · server hardening from the dashboard (guards + confirmation)
- HardeningService (PermitRootLogin no, PasswordAuthentication no, fail2ban,
unattended-upgrades) + FirewallService (UFW). HardeningAction modal previews the
exact root commands before applying. GUARDS: refuse to disable password-login when
Clusev itself logs in by password or no key exists; UFW opens the real sshd port +
80/443 before enabling. Live-verified non-destructively (previews, the password
guard refusing, ufw status read).
D+E · System page (/system)
- Dashboard Domain + Let's-Encrypt email (Setting) -> DeploymentService renders the
matching Caddy site block (honest: stages the file + shows the reload command, never
fakes TLS). Release channel (stable|beta|dev) configurable; Versions reads it.
Built largely by 4 parallel agents into disjoint files; shared files integrated + the
security-critical bits hardened by hand (the password-auth lock-out guard + env-aware CSP).
Verified (R12): /system + server detail + all 8 routes 200 / 0 console errors (CSP does
not break Livewire/Alpine/Vite); credential card + 5 hardening "Anwenden" buttons render;
the hardening modal opens with the command preview; System persists domain/channel +
renders valid Caddy config; runPrivileged runs as root + the vault refuses disabled creds.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
boban