Add update.sh (sudo ./update.sh): git pull --ff-only (never discards local
changes), self-update via re-exec if the script itself changed, then hand off
to the idempotent install.sh non-interactively. Sets safe.directory so a
root-run pull works on the clusev-owned tree.
Fix install.sh so a non-interactive re-run (an update) no longer wipes a
configured domain / ACME e-mail: both now default to the existing .env value
when not supplied. First install (empty = bare IP) is unchanged.
README documents 'sudo ./update.sh'; the MOTD shows the update command.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Default the first-admin login e-mail to a predictable admin@clusev.local
when no --email / CLUSEV_ADMIN_EMAIL is given, instead of a host-derived
admin@<host> address the operator would have to guess. Combined with the
default password 'clusev' (forced change on first login), a fresh install
now has a fully predictable initial login. Override at install time or
change it later under Settings -> Profile.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Initial admin now uses the standard default password "clusev" (operator decision) with
must_change_password forcing a new password on first login; banner/MOTD/README tell the
operator to change it immediately. Idempotent no-op when an admin already exists.
- Richer host MOTD (CLUSEV wordmark, version, live stack status, login + management hints).
- README: install block now installs git (minimal Debian/Ubuntu lack it) and lists it as a
prerequisite — found by a full fresh-VM install test (install + idempotent re-run verified).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Validated install.sh end-to-end on a fresh Debian 13 VM (Docker apt install, clusev
user, image build, stack up, migrate, admin, MOTD) and a fully idempotent re-run.
Two follow-ups from that test:
- MOTD: replace the bare two-liner with an orange CLUSEV wordmark, the version, a LIVE
stack status ("X/Y Dienste aktiv", green/red via `docker compose ps` at each login),
the dashboard URL, a login hint (where the one-time credentials come from — no secret),
and management commands. install.sh substitutes __CLUSEV_URL__, __CLUSEV_VERSION__ and
__CLUSEV_COMPOSE__; the status lookup degrades to "unbekannt" and never fails a login.
- README: minimal Debian/Ubuntu images ship without `git`, so the documented `git clone`
failed before reaching the installer. The install block now installs git first and the
requirements note it. (curl is missing too but the installer self-installs it.)
Admin password strategy confirmed correct as-is: clusev:install generates a random
20-char password with must_change_password=true (forced rotation on first login) — kept
over a guessable default like "clusev", which would be a default-credential vuln and
would nullify the brute-force hardening.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Security pivot — make server hardening, SSH access, firewall, dashboard domain/TLS
and the release channel controllable from the dashboard (no SSH needed), with guards
so a remote change can never lock the operator out.
Foundation
- ssh_credentials gains name + disabled_at + last_used_at; CredentialVault refuses a
disabled credential. New key/value Setting model. FleetService::runPrivileged() /
runPlain() — central sudo-aware exec (base64-wrapped sh -c), live-verified as root.
A · control-plane self-hardening
- SecurityHeaders middleware: env-aware CSP (allows the Vite dev origin in dev, strict
same-origin in prod), X-Frame-Options DENY, nosniff, Referrer/Permissions-Policy,
HSTS when secure. 2FA brute-force throttle (5/60s). install.sh sets
SESSION_SAME_SITE=strict + EXPIRE_ON_CLOSE + SECURE_COOKIE (only behind TLS).
B · SSH credential management
- name/label on the access; a credential card on the server page with Bearbeiten /
Sperren-Entsperren (kill-switch) / Löschen (R5), all audited.
C · server hardening from the dashboard (guards + confirmation)
- HardeningService (PermitRootLogin no, PasswordAuthentication no, fail2ban,
unattended-upgrades) + FirewallService (UFW). HardeningAction modal previews the
exact root commands before applying. GUARDS: refuse to disable password-login when
Clusev itself logs in by password or no key exists; UFW opens the real sshd port +
80/443 before enabling. Live-verified non-destructively (previews, the password
guard refusing, ufw status read).
D+E · System page (/system)
- Dashboard Domain + Let's-Encrypt email (Setting) -> DeploymentService renders the
matching Caddy site block (honest: stages the file + shows the reload command, never
fakes TLS). Release channel (stable|beta|dev) configurable; Versions reads it.
Built largely by 4 parallel agents into disjoint files; shared files integrated + the
security-critical bits hardened by hand (the password-auth lock-out guard + env-aware CSP).
Verified (R12): /system + server detail + all 8 routes 200 / 0 console errors (CSP does
not break Livewire/Alpine/Vite); credential card + 5 hardening "Anwenden" buttons render;
the hardening modal opens with the command preview; System persists domain/channel +
renders valid Caddy config; runPrivileged runs as root + the vault refuses disabled creds.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
One-command, idempotent production install per docs/install-update-design.md
(the "JETZT" phase). Onboarding (forced password change + 2FA) already ships
via EnsureSecurityOnboarded; the in-dashboard self-updater stays deferred to v1.x.
- install.sh: preflight -> idempotent secrets (set_kv never regenerates) ->
derive SITE_ADDRESS/APP_URL/REVERB_* from the single APP_DOMAIN knob -> build ->
up -> wait DB -> migrate + cache -> clusev:install. One-time admin password is
printed only on the terminal, never stored. Bare-IP and private-IP warnings.
- app/Console/Commands/Install.php: idempotent first admin (Str::password(20),
must_change_password); hard no-op once a user exists (INSTALL_LOCK idiom).
- docker/caddy/Caddyfile: one template, both modes; Reverb wss over /app/* and
/apps/* on the same address; admin-API-free, security headers. Validated for
bare-IP (:80) and domain (https) modes.
- docker-compose.prod.yml: Caddy is the only host-published service (80/443 +
HTTP/3); app/reverb/queue/mariadb lose host ports (internal net only);
CLUSEV_IMAGE indirection (locally-built tag, GHCR digest later); Redis requires
a password; caddy-data/caddy-config volumes persist ACME certs.
- .env.example: APP_DOMAIN/APP_SCHEME/ACME_EMAIL/SITE_ADDRESS/CLUSEV_IMAGE/
UPDATE_HMAC_KEY documented.
- README: real Clusev install/deploy guide (replaces Laravel boilerplate).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
boban