The server-detail page gains a "Firewall-Regeln" panel — addressing "ich kann nur
aktivieren, sonst nichts": list rules, add, and delete, with hard SSH-lockout guards.
FirewallService:
- status(): one privileged read — installed/active, default policies, and the rule
list. ufw rules come from `ufw show added` (add-syntax, works active OR inactive),
defaults from /etc/default/ufw; a CLUSEV_FWREAD_OK sentinel + a "Status:" check
distinguish a real read from a failed/empty one.
- addRule(): validated action/proto/port/from (proto before `from`, ufw grammar);
refuses deny/reject on the SSH port or portless (would block all inbound).
- deleteRule(): whitelists the spec against rules ufw actually reported (injection-
proof — a forged spec can't match), deletes by spec (race-free, no rule number),
guards SSH-port allow rules incl. ranges and trailing comments, distinguishes
not_found from a real deletion so the audit only records true deletions.
firewalld is READ-ONLY this release: status() reads the runtime state of every active
zone (ports/services/rich rules, zone-attributed), rule mutation is refused with a
German note. on/off + hardening (Phase A) still work.
UI: x-panel with default-policy badges, "+ Regel" (modal modals.firewall-rule), per-
rule delete via R5 ConfirmAction (audit deferred to the real outcome), graceful
read-error / not-installed / inactive / firewalld-read-only states.
Fix: the firewall row's tone variable was renamed $tone -> $ruleTone — the page-level
$tone is a closure used by the gauges/Volumes panel; reusing the name clobbered it and
500'd the page below the firewall block. R12 now confirms the full loaded page.
Default-policy EDITING was intentionally not exposed (highest lockout risk).
Pint clean; Codex review clean; R12 — server-detail HTTP 200, 0 console errors,
firewall panel + rules + volumes all render.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Foundation so Clusev no longer assumes Debian/apt/ufw/systemd. A host's OS is
resolved once (cached) and every package/firewall/service decision asks it.
New app/Support/Os/:
- OsProfile — family + package manager + firewall tool + service manager, plus
supports(feature) returning NULL or a German reason (graceful degradation).
- OsDetector — one unprivileged probe (/etc/os-release + `command -v` with sbin on
PATH + which firewall is RUNNING); family from ID/ID_LIKE cross-checked against
installed binaries; cached 1h (60s when nothing detected). Readability-guards the
`.` source so a host without /etc/os-release still falls back by package manager.
- PackageManager — apt/dnf/zypper command strings (pending count, apply, install,
is-installed); zypper exit 102/103 normalized to success.
- FirewallTool — ufw + firewalld enable/disable. firewalld opens ssh/80/443 in the
PERMANENT config BEFORE the daemon starts filtering (handles running + stopped),
preserving the no-lockout guard for custom SSH ports.
Integration:
- FirewallService enable/disable now OS-aware (ufw or firewalld) with a support gate.
- MaintenanceService: hasApt -> updateSupport(); pendingUpdates() + applyUpgrades()
across managers (dnf check-update exit 100 handled).
- HardeningService: state()/commandFor() per-OS (dpkg vs rpm, ufw vs firewalld, apt
periodic vs dnf-automatic; yum-only hosts gate auto-updates). Each row carries
supported/reason; unsupported features render muted with a German note instead of
a toggle. apply() refuses unsupported features gracefully.
- Server-Details surfaces the detected System / package manager / firewall.
- SystemUpdate modal + view: OS-neutral copy; audit action system.package_upgrade.
Arch (pacman) & Alpine (apk/OpenRC) are detected and gracefully disabled where
unsupported. Debian/ufw/systemd path verified behaviourally identical on the live
fleet. Pint clean; Codex review clean (fixed firewalld lockout + os-release guard +
yum/dual-firewall/zypper edge cases); R12 — 9 routes 200, 0 console errors.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Security pivot — make server hardening, SSH access, firewall, dashboard domain/TLS
and the release channel controllable from the dashboard (no SSH needed), with guards
so a remote change can never lock the operator out.
Foundation
- ssh_credentials gains name + disabled_at + last_used_at; CredentialVault refuses a
disabled credential. New key/value Setting model. FleetService::runPrivileged() /
runPlain() — central sudo-aware exec (base64-wrapped sh -c), live-verified as root.
A · control-plane self-hardening
- SecurityHeaders middleware: env-aware CSP (allows the Vite dev origin in dev, strict
same-origin in prod), X-Frame-Options DENY, nosniff, Referrer/Permissions-Policy,
HSTS when secure. 2FA brute-force throttle (5/60s). install.sh sets
SESSION_SAME_SITE=strict + EXPIRE_ON_CLOSE + SECURE_COOKIE (only behind TLS).
B · SSH credential management
- name/label on the access; a credential card on the server page with Bearbeiten /
Sperren-Entsperren (kill-switch) / Löschen (R5), all audited.
C · server hardening from the dashboard (guards + confirmation)
- HardeningService (PermitRootLogin no, PasswordAuthentication no, fail2ban,
unattended-upgrades) + FirewallService (UFW). HardeningAction modal previews the
exact root commands before applying. GUARDS: refuse to disable password-login when
Clusev itself logs in by password or no key exists; UFW opens the real sshd port +
80/443 before enabling. Live-verified non-destructively (previews, the password
guard refusing, ufw status read).
D+E · System page (/system)
- Dashboard Domain + Let's-Encrypt email (Setting) -> DeploymentService renders the
matching Caddy site block (honest: stages the file + shows the reload command, never
fakes TLS). Release channel (stable|beta|dev) configurable; Versions reads it.
Built largely by 4 parallel agents into disjoint files; shared files integrated + the
security-critical bits hardened by hand (the password-auth lock-out guard + env-aware CSP).
Verified (R12): /system + server detail + all 8 routes 200 / 0 console errors (CSP does
not break Livewire/Alpine/Vite); credential card + 5 hardening "Anwenden" buttons render;
the hardening modal opens with the command preview; System persists domain/channel +
renders valid Caddy config; runPrivileged runs as root + the vault refuses disabled creds.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Full feedback round — all browser-verified (R12: 7 routes 200, zero console errors)
and functionally tested live against the target host.
- Metrics are real AND honest: poller now stores cpu/mem/DISK/LOAD history (all
four sparklines real, not synthetic); KPIs show absolute context (Memory
"1,9 / 7,8 GB", Disk "13 / 80 GB", Load "4 Kerne"); tiles are status-coloured
and Load is rated against core count (so "yellow" actually means load≈0.7-1.0×
cores), not a fixed warning tint.
- File manager is functional: Hochladen (Livewire upload -> SFTP put), Download
(SFTP get -> streamed), and view/edit (new FileEditor modal: SFTP get, binary/
size guards, SFTP put on save + audit). File names + Bearbeiten open the editor.
- Settings redesigned (/frontend-design): account identity header + section nav
(Profil / Sicherheit) instead of flat stacked panels.
- Routes are English (R13): /einstellungen -> /settings; rule added to rules.md +
CLAUDE.md. Dummy data removed: the topbar "Flotte online / Uptime 42d" + dead
bell button are gone, replaced by a real "<online>/<total> online" pill.
New: app/Livewire/Modals/FileEditor + view; FleetService get/read/write/upload +
Sftp putFromFile/size.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Resolve all 12 confirmed findings from the SSH-integration review.
Security:
- TOFU host-key pinning (new VerifiesHostKey trait + servers.ssh_host_key column):
SshClient/Sftp record the server host key on first connect and refuse the
connection on any later mismatch — phpseclib does not pin host keys itself.
- PollMetrics keeps one long-lived SSH connection per server and reuses it across
ticks (a single login, not one per interval) — avoids fail2ban/auth-log churn;
dead connections are dropped and re-established next tick.
- @js() escaping for every server-controlled value interpolated into wire:click
(file names, paths, service names, SSH-key comments/fingerprints) — prevents
JS-string breakage / injection from untrusted remote data.
Correctness:
- parseKeys regex makes the key comment optional (keys without a comment were
silently dropped).
- parseVolumes pops the three trailing single-token df fields and rejoins the
rest, so mount points containing spaces parse correctly.
- Sftp gains a disconnect() method to match SshClient (explicit cleanup).
Rules:
- Services "Start" -> "Starten" (R9, German).
- Files breadcrumb buttons get min-w-11 + padding (R7, >=44px touch target).
Verified live: host key stored + mismatch refused + correct key reconnects;
poller reuse polls ok; all pages still render real data.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
boban