Re-applies the onboarding gate to /livewire/update component calls, not just the
initial page GET, so a component mounted while onboarded cannot run destructive
actions after the account is reverted to must_change_password mid-session.
Addresses the codebase-wide Codex finding flagged during the SSH-key-provision review.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Guard the TOTP verifyKey call behind hasTotp() so a key-only user's null
two_factor_secret never reaches Google2FA::verifyKey(); they reset via a
backup code. Also adds the reset_no_2fa_note lang key (EN + DE) rendered
on the forgot-password form explaining the no-2FA recovery options.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- TwoFactorSetup: move to app layout (hosts wire-elements/modal), guard on hasTotp() not hasTwoFactorEnabled(), redirect to settings and flash open_recovery_modal on first TOTP enrollment
- WebauthnKeys.register(): drop hasTwoFactorEnabled() guard (first key may be the sole factor), generate codes + dispatch openModal on first key enrollment
- Settings\Index: add #[Url] on $tab, add $openRecoveryModal flag, mount() reads the flash and lands on the security tab
- settings/index.blade.php: x-init block dispatches openModal when $openRecoveryModal is set
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Journal was a one-time snapshot mislabeled "journalctl -f": it loaded the last
N lines once and never refreshed, so it was neither live nor complete.
- FleetService: `journalctl --show-cursor` + new journalSince() reads only entries
after the stored journald cursor (no gaps, no dup appends), capped to a bounded
live tail; parseJournal split into splitJournalCursor + parseJournalLines.
- Services\Index: pollJournal() (wire:poll.5s) appends new entries since the cursor
and caps retained rows at 300 (fetch ceiling == display ceiling).
- Honest labels: drop the misleading "-f"; badge stays "live" (now true).
Command palette (Strg/⌘ K) can now jump to a server: the fleet feeds the Alpine
cmdk x-data; servers surface only while searching, matched on name OR IP, and
selecting one navigates to /servers/<uuid>.
Cursor is validated (^[a-z0-9;=]+$) and single-quoted before the remote shell —
no injection (Codex-reviewed: no P1, no security findings). Removes stock
ExampleTest (asserted 200 on an auth-gated route → always 302).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Revert the hydrate-on-every-request sync — writing the single global active-server
session on every async request (slow load(), polls, parallel tabs) is inherently
last-writer-wins and races. Setting it only at mount (once per deliberate
navigation) is race-free and fixes the visible drift. bfcache restore + multi-tab
remain inherent edges of the single-session model — documented in the handoff.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add a hydrate() hook so Show re-asserts its server as active on the wire:poll tick
and any action — covering a wire:navigate bfcache restore that skips mount(),
without the earlier racy client-side POST. Idempotent + server-side, no race.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two "current server" notions diverged: the sidebar switcher (session active_server_id)
vs the server-details URL. Now viewing a server's details sets it active (sidebar
always matches the page), and switching the sidebar while on a details page navigates
to the chosen server (instead of reloading the old one). One current server, in sync.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- ZeroTolerantCounterChecker only tolerates a 0 counter when the stored counter is
also 0; a 0 after a non-zero counter is a rollback and is rejected.
- clusev:reset-admin --disable-2fa now also deletes the user's security keys, so a
compromised key can't revive when 2FA is re-enabled.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Swap the strict counter checker for a zero-tolerant one so platform
authenticators / synced passkeys (which always report counter 0) can assert,
while non-zero counters still must strictly increase (clone detection).
- Guard registration (options + register) and the UI on hasTwoFactorEnabled, so a
key is never created against a disabled/reset second factor.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- credential_id can exceed the unique-index key length; store it in TEXT and
enforce uniqueness on an auto-derived sha256 hash column (lookups use the hash).
- Disabling 2FA now also deletes the user's security keys + backup codes, so
re-enrolling starts clean and old factors never silently revive.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
options() now validates the label before returning creation options, so clicking
Add with a blank/invalid name aborts before navigator.credentials.create() and
never leaves an orphaned credential on the authenticator.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Persist the updated PublicKeyCredentialSource (not just the sign_count column)
so the next assertion validates against the latest counter — keeping the
library's cloned-authenticator / counter-rollback detection effective.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A "Security-Keys" panel in Settings → Security: add (name + navigator.credentials
.create via resources/js/webauthn.js), list (name/added/last-used), remove (R5
confirm modal), all audited. Hidden with a hint when domain+HTTPS is absent.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
When the panel runs on a domain+HTTPS and the user has a registered key, the 2FA
challenge offers "Mit Security-Key anmelden" alongside the TOTP/backup-code field.
A verified assertion completes login exactly like a TOTP success; rate-limit +
session gate reused. TOTP and backup codes remain fully usable.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
WebauthnService builds creation/request options (rpId = active domain, ES256/RS256,
attestation none, exclude/allow lists) via web-auth/webauthn-lib v5, stores the
challenge in the session, and verifies attestation/assertion responses (allowed
origin = https://<rpId>, sign-count tracked). Option building + serialization are
unit-tested; the cryptographic verify path is browser-verified on a domain host.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
WebAuthn is offered only with an active domain (the rpId) over HTTPS; bare-IP/HTTP
returns false so a ceremony never runs with an invalid IP rpId.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add web-auth/webauthn-lib ^5.3, the webauthn_credentials table (per-user unique
credential_id), the WebauthnCredential model and User hasMany relation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Codex review follow-ups: extract the notify toaster into a shared partial and
include it in the auth layout too, so sendResetLink + recovery-code regenerate
actually surface their confirmation (the auth layout had no toaster). Record an
AuditEvent for password resets via the email-token path, matching the 2FA path.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Address Codex security review:
- ForgotPassword + clusev:reset-admin now rotate remember_token, so a stolen
remember-me cookie cannot survive a password reset (the email-token path
already did this).
- useRecoveryCode reads/checks/removes under a row lock (DB transaction +
lockForUpdate), so two concurrent requests can't both spend the same one-time
code (replay).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Shell-only emergency recovery: resets the admin password (prints a random one if
omitted) and, with --disable-2fa, clears the 2FA secret + backup codes so the
operator can re-enroll. Requires server access — the safe last resort.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
ForgotPassword gains sendResetLink() + a ResetPassword component at
/reset-password/{token} using Laravel's password broker. The email option is
shown only when mail.default is a real mailer (hidden while MAIL_MAILER=log), so
it activates automatically once SMTP is configured. Tested with Notification::fake.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
"Passwort vergessen?" on login -> a reset view that proves identity with a TOTP
or one-time backup code (no email needed), then sets a new password under the
min(12) mixedCase numbers policy. Rate-limited, generic messages (no account
enumeration), audited.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2FA confirm now generates 8 backup codes and redirects to a show-once recovery
view (download as .txt, regenerate). Reachable again from Settings. Codes are
shown before the onboarding gate so a fresh enrollee can save them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The challenge now falls back to consuming a one-time recovery code when the TOTP
check fails. Relaxed the code input (was numeric, maxlength 6) so a backup code
is typable, and added a hint. Bilingual.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
CSRF (419), unmatched-route 404 and maintenance (503) errors are thrown before
the web-group SetLocale middleware runs, so the custom error pages rendered in
the default locale for EN users. Extract SetLocale::apply() (session-guarded, so
it is safe pre-session) and call it from a withExceptions render hook that falls
through to the normal renderer — the error views now honour the user's language
where it is known.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Branding assets (public/, served directly):
- favicon.svg (scalable, primary), favicon.ico (16/32/48 PNG-embedded),
apple-touch-icon.png (180), icon-192/512.png, site.webmanifest. The mark is
the in-app brand glyph (orange Lucide "server" on dark). Wired into both
layouts via a shared partials/head-icons (rel=icon svg+ico, apple-touch,
manifest, theme-color #06080A). nginx serves the manifest as
application/manifest+json.
Never show raw error text (custom messages only):
- Custom branded resources/views/errors/{403,404,419,429,500,503}.blade.php on a
self-contained error layout (design tokens, brand mark, bilingual via
lang/errors.php) — replaces Laravel's default Symfony/whoops pages.
- docker-compose.prod.yml pins APP_DEBUG=false so a prod error can never render a
stack trace (the custom pages show instead).
- Files download error dispatched a bare $e->getMessage(); wrap it in the
localized files.download_failed (consistent with upload/delete).
Verified in-browser: icon links present + all assets 200; custom 404 renders the
branded German message (no raw "Not Found"/trace), responsive at 375, 0 console.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Auth success alone does not prove the server can run commands (a server that
authenticates but rejects exec channels would be accepted, yet every fleet
operation runs commands). The probe now echoes a unique marker and requires it
in the output — proving exec works, while still tolerating servers that omit
the optional exit-status packet.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
testConnection gated success on `exit code === 0`, but phpseclib returns false
from getExitStatus() when a server omits the optional exit-status message, which
would reject a valid login with an empty error. A successful connect() already
proves the credential (it throws on auth failure), so the probe now succeeds on
any exception-free connect + exec.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
CreateServer now probes the entered SSH login inside the create transaction; a
failed probe throws and rolls back (no half-registered server), surfacing the
SSH reason on the form. Successful creation starts the server as `pending`
("Initialisierung") instead of red/offline until first contact promotes it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Connect + trivial exec against a server's stored credential; never throws,
returns {ok,error}. Used by the create-server guard to verify the SSH login
before persisting.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Automatic updates are a choice, not a security gate: the unattended row now
reports secure=true always and carries a `neutral` flag. The checklist renders
it muted (aktiv/inaktiv) instead of the green/orange SICHER/OFFEN verdict, so
"off" is never flagged as insecure. Detection is unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The hardening checklist read "installed" from the package manager alone
(dpkg `^ii` / rpm `-q`), so it disagreed with the live fail2ban/firewall
panels, which use `command -v` + `systemctl is-active`. On a host where the
component is genuinely present but not recorded as an apt `^ii` package —
installed from source, or left in dpkg `rc` (config-only) state — the
checklist showed `nicht installiert` while the panel reported it active with
real bans (the reported contradiction).
The installed probe now ORs three conditions: the package-manager test, the
client binary on PATH, and the service already running. Since a component can
never be active without being installed, this only removes FALSE negatives —
it can never produce a false positive. Detection is now consistent with
Fail2banService::status and FirewallTool. Applies to both fail2ban and the
firewall (ufw/firewalld).
Adds HardeningServiceTest covering the Debian/apt source-install fallback:
the emitted probe gains `command -v fail2ban-client` and `dpkg -l ufw`, and an
active component reads as featureOn.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two fixes/hardenings on top of v0.4.0:
1) Blade raw-block bug (R17). The topbar's @php block had a COMMENT containing the literal
tokens @php/@endphp; Blade's non-greedy raw-block matcher took the @endphp in the comment
as the block end and dumped the remainder ("$title ??= …") as plain text into <header> on
every authenticated page (and left the page title empty). R12 missed it: the page still
returned 200 with no console error and the <title> comes from the Livewire component. Fixed
the comment; added rule R17 (no directive tokens in Blade comments; block over inline @php;
R12 must inspect the rendered DOM, not just status/console) to rules.md + CLAUDE.md.
2) Broadcast channels are now PRIVATE (security hardening — closes the follow-up flagged in
v0.4.0). MetricsTicked rides a PrivateChannel authorized via /broadcasting/auth
(withBroadcasting + routes/channels.php), so fleet metrics can no longer be subscribed to by
anyone holding the bundled app key — including over a stale Caddy host after a domain change.
The channel callback requires User::securityOnboarded() (rotated password + 2FA), mirroring
the panel's EnsureSecurityOnboarded gate — authentication alone is not enough. Echo sends the
CSRF token for the auth handshake. Convention documented (CLAUDE.md §3 / channels.php): every
channel is private.
Bump 0.4.0 -> 0.4.1; CHANGELOG.
Verified: Pint clean; npm build; R12 all routes 200 + 0 console errors (both locales); topbar
<header> rendered text clean (no @/{{ }}/$var/key leaks); private broadcast publishes to
reverb:8080 and /broadcasting/auth + the onboarding-gated callback authorize correctly; Codex
review clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
boban